When theyd conquered all of the major civilisations of the americas with such tiny forces, hard to blame them for their overconfidence. The portugese weren't able to conquer the mamlukes via the red sea, but they were able to help weaken them to the point the ottomans easily overran them
Extend from what we saw here, I can think of a more realistic scenario. Which a joint force of colonial Catholic states of Europe during 30 yrs war aided the remnants of Ming after 1644.5.18, when Emperor Chongzhen hang himself and the Northern china was lost to Shun and Qing.
The flaw of this alt-history scenario would be:
- Remnants of Ming had a really divided opinion on what they should be doing to survive;
- Power struggle among courts and provincial warlords were highly severe, which historically led to quick collapse of the "Southern Ming";
- Combining 1. and 2. southern Ming was a fragile alliance between a. officials fled from north, b. deflected rebel warlords (such as Li Dingguo and his Xiying Clique, but actual participants are much more divert in background), c. former pirates (Zheng's Clique) and d. local gentlemen led by retired scholar-officials and e. provincial governors.
- The 30 yrs war itself.
- The scale of war between Ming-Qing-Shun was a bloodshed in level similar (maybe exceeding) the 30 yrs war, involving extensive use of cannon, musketeers and gunships. The Qing dynasty, when they rose to power, had an extensive firearm production line and massive deployment among their Banners. Some evidence:
- The Ministry of Works established the Zhuoling Arsenal, commissioning officials to produce gunpowder under the oversight of a specially appointed high minister; the plant operated 200 stone-milling pans, each holding 30 jin (≈ 15 kg) of ingredients, with every pan counting as one batch, and powder milled for three days was reserved for active military supply while powder milled for one day served firearms and artillery drills and built up advance stores; a standing quota of 300,000 jin (about 150 tonnes) had to be maintained, with stocks replenished as they were drawn down. (“工部，设濯灵厂。委官制备火药，特命大臣督理。厂设石碾，二百盘。每盘置药三十斤，为一台。每台，碾三日者，以备军需。碾一日者，以演枪炮，豫贮军需火药。以三十万斤，为率随用随备”)
- ...more than a thousand blacksmiths were hired to cast several hundred Miepang cannon weighing over 200 jin each, more than 3,000 medium Miepang cannon of 70 – 100 jin, 1,000 “Hundred-shot” cannon, over 7,000 triple-barrel guns and matchlock muskets, as well as upwards of 45,000 suits of armour. ⁵⁵ A large consignment of additional weapons and equipment was also shipped from Beijing and reached Liaodong in the second lunar month of the 48th year of Wanli (1620)... ("...遂雇用铁匠千余人，打造两百斤以上的灭庞炮数百位，七八十斤至百斤重的灭庞炮三千多位，百子炮千门，三眼铳和鸟铳七千多杆，以及盔甲四万五千余副等，⁵⁵而自北京运补的大量武器装备也于万历四十八年二月送抵辽东...") (红夷大炮与明清战争, Huang Yinong)
So, bascially speaking, the Spanish-European expedition would need to be at least be around 20~30k elite fighting force (otherwise worthless), with extensive European elite standard firearm, prepared to engage with enemie familiar with extensive modern (in 17th century contenxt) warfare experience and strong willings to fight. Moreover, to intervine and eventually stop the in-fighting of southern Ming courts, they shall be commanded by a sound leadership group with good political, diplomatic and strategic senses.
Overall, I believe, if navigating themselves carefully, western expedition force could successful in their objective. If the objective was not to "conquer China", but to sustain a surviving Ming Empire friendly to western trades. If their leadership is capable enough, they could even convert Chinese emperors to Catholic Christianity (and it they can just ignore the conservative Pope order on Chinese conversion that killed the mission later in OTL). However, the casauties would no doubt be much much higher than average colonial campaigns performed by those early imperialism powers of Europe.
Appendix: Comparing the useage of firearm between late Ming china and 30yrs war Europe:
During the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) most Western-European field armies made the
transition from pike-shot parity to clear firearm dominance: by 1625 Catholic-League infantry were already
58 % musket/arquebus, 36 % pike; by 1627 their ratio had climbed to
≈ 65 % firearms, and standard Imperial companies in 1641 stood at
66 % muskets to 33 % pikes (
Wikipedia). Swedish brigades pushed still further—each 500-man squadron was organised for roughly
1 pike : 1.3 muskets (≈ 57 % firearms) and, after 1631, frequently detached surplus shot to reach two muskets per pike in battle (
elenderilsblog.blogspot.com).
Late-Ming reformers never went that far. Qi Jiguang’s
Jixiao Xinshu (1571, still the template in the 1610s) prescribed an infantry brigade of 2 699 men with
1 080 matchlocks and 216 bows—only
40 % firearms on paper, with no pikes at all (
Wikipedia). Contemporary manuals such as
Shenqipu (1598) kept the same proportion, and surviving Ming campaign records show bows and cold-steel weapons continuing to outweigh guns in the field. In short, European infantry were already majority-firearm forces, whereas Ming-Qing armies treated matchlocks as a powerful minority arm.
Tactical usage also diverged. Europeans drilled continuous salvos from shallow six-rank formations and relied on pikes chiefly for cavalry defence; Gustavus Adolphus added one
3-pounder regimental gun (crewed by three men or one horse) to almost every 500-man unit, giving infantry organic, mobile fire support. Ming forces did experiment with ten- or twelve-man volley teams, yet their musketeers fought behind carts, wagons or earthworks and seldom manoeuvred in open order; cavalry and wagon-mounted swivel-guns remained essential to protect flanks rather than dedicated pikes.
Artillery scale and production show a different picture. Europe fielded more pieces per battlefield but not necessarily higher output per state: Swedish and Imperial armies together rarely mustered more than 200 serviceable cannon in one engagement. China, by contrast, poured resources into periodic burst programmes—Xu Guangqi’s northern foundries
cast over 400 “Hong-yi” culverins (1622-1630) (
xinwen.bjd.com.cn), and under the Kangxi emperor Beijing yards produced
905 bronze-and-iron guns between 1675-1721, half of them heavy pieces over 250 kg, under Verbiest’s supervision (
故宫博物院 documentation). Yet Chinese artillery seldom accompanied infantry on the march; most pieces were emplaced at forts or city walls, limiting tactical flexibility that Europeans had begun to exploit with light regimental ordnance.
