What do you think, what would've happened if the Bismarck (the ship, duh) survives the British fleet and continues to operate?
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Well, probably much like the other rogue German fleets in the first world war, it would be annoying for awhile and be forced to surrender or be destroyed down the line
There were a lot of things going on when Bismarck sailed.
First, the German fleet was not being built for raiding, but to be a classic battle fleet. So the ships available had to be used in ways for which they were not really suited.
Second, Raeder had spent a lot of time developing methods to support ships overseas, so it was possible to provide fuel and food for raiders. It was not possible, however, to supply ammunition especially for capital ships.
Third, the German surface fleet had been operating with relative impunity and with success - the cruises of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau offsetting the loss of Graf Spee. German surface raiders were able to threaten convoys, forcing Britain to detach old battleships to cover them, and the raiders could slip in and out of port fairly easily. Bismarck represented a different level of threat, as she might be able to sink or cripple a convoy's battleship escort while remaining relatively undamaged herself. Therefore the Royal Navy expended a lot of resources on tracking her and knew when she had left port.
Fourth, the Royal Navy had a lot more assets deployed - especially search aircraft - than had been available for previous operations, and information was better collected, interpreted and disseminated than had been the case.
All that said, the Royal Navy didn't have a lot of capital ships that could match Bismarck for speed or power. King George V, Hood... Nelson and Rodney were much slower, and the Queen Elizabeths were both slower and weaker. Renown and Repulse were so very much weaker that no thought was given to putting them in the gun line. This lack of fast, powerful capital ships explains why the incomplete Prince of Wales was pressed into service before she was operational. Plus, British ships of that time were very short-legged - they didn't carry much fuel, so it was critical to get warships in position ahead of Bismarck since they could not pursue her for very long.
After Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were intercepted, Hood destroyed and Prince of Wales crippled, the strategic position was bad for both sides. Unlike earlier breakouts, radar-equipped British cruisers were sending out regular position updates on the German ships (the Germans believed the cruisers were more effective than they sometimes were). So the Germans felt pinned, which certainly meant every Royal Navy warship would vector on them, and - critically - Bismarck's seemingly minor damage from the battle included one hit that cut off a large portion of her fuel. From the British side, the loss of Hood was stunning and the lack of fast capital ships was now much worse. Add in the lack of fuel oil and little ability to refuel at sea, and it was obvious that Bismarck would reach port, or turn and drive off the pursuing cruisers, before British capital ships could catch her.
This is when air assets played their critical role. If Bismarck's 'one-shot' of Hood was a golden BB, so was the last-chance torpedo hit that wrecked Bismarck's rudders and left her virtually uncontrollable.
So. Conditions had changed dramatically without either side realizing how much. Radar, radio tracking, centralized intelligence collection and surveillance aircraft were more available and better used. The vast areas of the Atlantic the Germans intended to hide in had shrunk, and a German ship once found could be tracked until assets could be assembled to destroy it. On the German side, success with previous cruises made them think they could keep doing it - the gambler's fallacy of 'riding a run' instead of appraising what they stood to lose. They believed they could strike at will and vanish... and they were wrong... or, at best, no longer right.
On balance, each side had their share of lucky and unlucky breaks. If Bismarck had not been lost on that cruise, her close-call would have given the German naval command a reason to cancel any further raiding cruises. The destruction of Hood made sinking Bismarck the number one priority for the Royal Navy; had she made it to a port in France she would have been bombed around the clock while capital ships watched for her exit. Like Gneisenau, I think she would never have been repaired or sailed again.
First, the German fleet was not being built for raiding, but to be a classic battle fleet. So the ships available had to be used in ways for which they were not really suited.
Second, Raeder had spent a lot of time developing methods to support ships overseas, so it was possible to provide fuel and food for raiders. It was not possible, however, to supply ammunition especially for capital ships.
Third, the German surface fleet had been operating with relative impunity and with success - the cruises of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau offsetting the loss of Graf Spee. German surface raiders were able to threaten convoys, forcing Britain to detach old battleships to cover them, and the raiders could slip in and out of port fairly easily. Bismarck represented a different level of threat, as she might be able to sink or cripple a convoy's battleship escort while remaining relatively undamaged herself. Therefore the Royal Navy expended a lot of resources on tracking her and knew when she had left port.
Fourth, the Royal Navy had a lot more assets deployed - especially search aircraft - than had been available for previous operations, and information was better collected, interpreted and disseminated than had been the case.
All that said, the Royal Navy didn't have a lot of capital ships that could match Bismarck for speed or power. King George V, Hood... Nelson and Rodney were much slower, and the Queen Elizabeths were both slower and weaker. Renown and Repulse were so very much weaker that no thought was given to putting them in the gun line. This lack of fast, powerful capital ships explains why the incomplete Prince of Wales was pressed into service before she was operational. Plus, British ships of that time were very short-legged - they didn't carry much fuel, so it was critical to get warships in position ahead of Bismarck since they could not pursue her for very long.
After Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were intercepted, Hood destroyed and Prince of Wales crippled, the strategic position was bad for both sides. Unlike earlier breakouts, radar-equipped British cruisers were sending out regular position updates on the German ships (the Germans believed the cruisers were more effective than they sometimes were). So the Germans felt pinned, which certainly meant every Royal Navy warship would vector on them, and - critically - Bismarck's seemingly minor damage from the battle included one hit that cut off a large portion of her fuel. From the British side, the loss of Hood was stunning and the lack of fast capital ships was now much worse. Add in the lack of fuel oil and little ability to refuel at sea, and it was obvious that Bismarck would reach port, or turn and drive off the pursuing cruisers, before British capital ships could catch her.
This is when air assets played their critical role. If Bismarck's 'one-shot' of Hood was a golden BB, so was the last-chance torpedo hit that wrecked Bismarck's rudders and left her virtually uncontrollable.
So. Conditions had changed dramatically without either side realizing how much. Radar, radio tracking, centralized intelligence collection and surveillance aircraft were more available and better used. The vast areas of the Atlantic the Germans intended to hide in had shrunk, and a German ship once found could be tracked until assets could be assembled to destroy it. On the German side, success with previous cruises made them think they could keep doing it - the gambler's fallacy of 'riding a run' instead of appraising what they stood to lose. They believed they could strike at will and vanish... and they were wrong... or, at best, no longer right.
On balance, each side had their share of lucky and unlucky breaks. If Bismarck had not been lost on that cruise, her close-call would have given the German naval command a reason to cancel any further raiding cruises. The destruction of Hood made sinking Bismarck the number one priority for the Royal Navy; had she made it to a port in France she would have been bombed around the clock while capital ships watched for her exit. Like Gneisenau, I think she would never have been repaired or sailed again.
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Just to add - the British radar and aircraft could track a ship the size of the Bismarck and the British could re-route the convoys away from it. This does come with a significant opportunity cost, but the Bismarck alone could not significantly disrupt the British war effort. Aside from significant wear and tear on the British admiralty the only change that would have happened is the Bismarck survives to be sunk later.
And ties up more assests, both in terms of RN ships via fleet-in-being, and as RAF assests being mowed down over its mooring.
In real life those assets where already tied up for most of the war by the Tirpitz.
Now what would it imply if the RN/RAF had to cover one more fast battleship, ideally stationed at another harbour?
If that other harbour was on the Atlantic coast in south western France maybe. If it was in Northern waters or Germany I doubt extra assets would be needed.
Don't forget that the Royal Navy had smashed the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean by this point in the war. It is likely that the Royal Navy would have refocused some of its strength. To think that a single battleship would vastly alter the war when the battleships were already vastly outnumbered is a bit of a stretch. It might even be that the Prince of Wales and Repulse are assigned to that particular duty instead!
You mean HMS King George V alone outnumbered the 30knot+ German capital ships*?
After the US entry into the war (roughly when the Rheinübung took place give or take some month) it was the case.
Do we really want to descend into details? Do we really want to list all of the Battleships and Battlecruisers, Carriers and Heavy Cruisers of the Royal Navy that could have been assigned to stand off against the Bismarck? Do we really have to go into the detail of the idea that though Bismarck was capable of a speed of 30+ knots, that it's invariably not realistic for a ship to cruise at its top speed and that even if it does, manoeuvring against an enemy force that has enough destroyers and cruisers to box/Canalize the ship will greatly reduce that speed.
No the Bismarck would have been confined to port and bombed into insignificance. The only reason it ever held any importance was because of that single shot against the hood, and that it was destroyed at sea.
It is well known that 20+ years old ships built for 22 knots are equally good at cruising with 15 knots as brand new ones built for 30 knots. They have the hull form and powerplant optimized for the same cruising speed. Thus top speed is irrellevant. That's why the RN did such a great job during Operation Berlin.
The way German raiders have operated (or non-operated) have nothing to do at all with the US entry into the war. It was the UK alone who did that. It is just a strange coincidence that after the US entry the Germans concentrated what they have to the Artic.
They felt they needed two modern fast BBs on station just to block Tirpitz. If Bismarck is around that will increase. Even if PoW isn't sent to be sunk off Malaya the KGV class alone will be hard pressed (particularly in the mid '41-'42 period) since they will have to allow one being in yard at any given time. In practise there will probably be more extensive deployment of US BBs in Europe which may have effects on the Guadalcanal Campaign.
I take you are being sarcastic, but to add:
- There was a difference in standard cruising speed between WW1 and WW2. WW2 tended closer to 20 knots. Submarine surface speeds were the trend setter: you wanted to be faster.
- The old British BBs with unmodernized engines (which was most of them) suffered from significant wear and tear such as constant steam pipe leaks. Under normal conditions they should have been in scrapper's yard. Even the more modern Nelsons had hard time making even 20 knots by the war's end. Furthermore, they tended to have antique direct drive turbines which were inefficient at any speed.
- The new German construction seems to have been particularly fuel efficient at high speed steaming, even for their vintage.
One of the reasons for the German concentration in the Arctic was the realization that Atlantic cruising was untenable after Bismarck's cruise, another the increasing attention being paid to Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen in Brest. Had Bismarck survived, she would also have been under repair in Brest for some time, placing four prime targets in reach of RAF bombers and possibly French saboteurs.
I cannot say whether the Germans would have attempted to sail the four ships out of Brest as a squadron but I can say the Royal Navy would have put together at least four modern capital ships to intercept them, as Renown and Repulse would be fairly reasonable matches for Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.
The Channel Dash was successful because two layers of British search aircraft had simultaneous equipment failures leaving a window of several hours for the Germans to sail undetected. The British Admiralty had predicted they would sail up the Channel, implying to me that the British were reading Ultra traffic or had blocked the Atlantic escape route solidly enough not to fear a sortie... both seem likely.
So it isn't likely that the Germans could get four major warships out to sea without being noticed; somewhat likely that they could run a version of the Channel Dash and, given Bismarck's experience, quite unlikely they would try for an Atlantic sortie. If the results from the historic Channel Dash are a guide, all of the German warships might or might not get through but would almost certainly be heavily damaged and thus out of service for an extended period. We must bear in mind that a raider must not only get to sea but must do so undamaged, and can remain operational only so long as it remains undamaged. Even light damage can end a cruise, as the Battle of the Denmark Strait shows.
And in the meanwhile the Med can be guarded by older battleships as the Italians are short of fuel, and Duke of York, Anson and Howe can be pushed to completion. Sooner or later the Germans will be tempted to sortie, which will serve mostly to give the Royal Navy a solid chance to 'reduce the threat'.
My father used to say, "You can't outrun radio," meaning that a criminal could flee the scene but find the alert spread out around them faster than they could drive. In the same way, German surface warships simply could not, post-Rheinubung, operate against the combination of Allied aircraft, radar and radio except in remote Arctic waters. There, the combination of friendly airpower, frequent low visibility and long nights seemed to offer some operational room - falsely, as the Battles of the Barents Sea and North Sea would show. It was the dilemma of the lesser naval power and the Germans did not solve it.
I cannot say whether the Germans would have attempted to sail the four ships out of Brest as a squadron but I can say the Royal Navy would have put together at least four modern capital ships to intercept them, as Renown and Repulse would be fairly reasonable matches for Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.
The Channel Dash was successful because two layers of British search aircraft had simultaneous equipment failures leaving a window of several hours for the Germans to sail undetected. The British Admiralty had predicted they would sail up the Channel, implying to me that the British were reading Ultra traffic or had blocked the Atlantic escape route solidly enough not to fear a sortie... both seem likely.
So it isn't likely that the Germans could get four major warships out to sea without being noticed; somewhat likely that they could run a version of the Channel Dash and, given Bismarck's experience, quite unlikely they would try for an Atlantic sortie. If the results from the historic Channel Dash are a guide, all of the German warships might or might not get through but would almost certainly be heavily damaged and thus out of service for an extended period. We must bear in mind that a raider must not only get to sea but must do so undamaged, and can remain operational only so long as it remains undamaged. Even light damage can end a cruise, as the Battle of the Denmark Strait shows.
And in the meanwhile the Med can be guarded by older battleships as the Italians are short of fuel, and Duke of York, Anson and Howe can be pushed to completion. Sooner or later the Germans will be tempted to sortie, which will serve mostly to give the Royal Navy a solid chance to 'reduce the threat'.
My father used to say, "You can't outrun radio," meaning that a criminal could flee the scene but find the alert spread out around them faster than they could drive. In the same way, German surface warships simply could not, post-Rheinubung, operate against the combination of Allied aircraft, radar and radio except in remote Arctic waters. There, the combination of friendly airpower, frequent low visibility and long nights seemed to offer some operational room - falsely, as the Battles of the Barents Sea and North Sea would show. It was the dilemma of the lesser naval power and the Germans did not solve it.
Nothing ever exists in isolation. In the first instance, the British had battleships available at this point in the war - the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean had been all but destroyed and the reconquest of North Africa provided air cover to most of the Mediterranean. Singapore had been lost and Colombo was not suited to support large fleets, and the USA had the larger force in the Pacific area. Further, due to the natural channelling of the North Sea Fleets made a fast battleship far more dangerous than one in the Atlantic.
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I take you are being sarcastic, but to add:
- There was a difference in standard cruising speed between WW1 and WW2. WW2 tended closer to 20 knots. Submarine surface speeds were the trend setter: you wanted to be faster
- The new German construction seems to have been particularly fuel efficient at high speed steaming, even for their vintage.
The key point here (and you even make it) is the smaller ships. German commerce raiders tended to operate without destroyer and light cruiser escorts. This puts her at danger of either being snuck up upon by surface ships (e.g. battle of Cape Matapan), or being intercepted by enemy U-boats. Standard procedures in this case are to continue sailing using complex non-linear manoeuvres which greatly decrease your linear speed.
On the second case, during an engagement, it allows the enemy to box and channelise your movement - the threat of destroyer launched torpedos etc. This of course affects an engagement more than an extra couple of knots of speed.
Finally, while they were relatively efficient fuel wise, it's important to note that operations over a single month by Tirpitz used so much fuel that it took three months for the Germans to replenish it.
I again reiterate my point that a Bismarck which escapes is simply boxed in port and pounded into insignificance.
The entire operation was just misguided and ridiculous.
What they should have done is dismantle the ship into parts, load them onto uboats, then individually shipping them over to Japan. There the ship would have been reassembled, help delay any US advances in the Pacific, thus decreasing their influence in the European theater.
What they should have done is dismantle the ship into parts, load them onto uboats, then individually shipping them over to Japan. There the ship would have been reassembled, help delay any US advances in the Pacific, thus decreasing their influence in the European theater.
It's going to be hard, and unreliable, to try and intercept Bismarck with a slow battleship. Once they left Norway Eugen and Bismarck cruised at 24-27 knots. The only way a slow battleship is going to intercept is by being vectored to approach ahead of the target in which case it will get a limited window to do so provided the enemy can't or won't evade. It can't even pull back and remain as scary shadower like Prince of Wales did. Destroyers are also limited. Not only do they have relatively poor endurance, but their top speed is more dependant on weather and may fall below that of a fast battleship.
I do not think Matapan like scenario is likely at all, the Germans had radar and were competent with hydrophones. Even in the 30km visibility conditions of Denmark Stait Hood and PoW were heard before they were seen.
I'm not imagining any greater role for Bismarck after the operation than being fleet-in-being in Norway.
This is all very well ... But a 1vs1 battleship engagement is highly unlikely. The hunt for Bismarck is probably the only example I can think of which comes close. And yes, in a 1v1 engagement, Bismarck can probably out run most other ships.
But naval battles rarely existed in isolation and 'being able to run away really good' is not a useful trait in a battleship (hence the name battleship, not surrendership). And as the Battle of Denmark straights and the subsequent hunt for the Bismarck showed, ships aren't actually very good at running away. The attached destroyers and cruisers boxed and pursued the German boats, the fleet carriers crippled her and the slower battleship closed her down and pounded her to an armoured hull.
So yes, speed is great if you wish to avoid a fight. But it's not that consequential if your adversary has destroyers, and submarines and cruisers and carriers and radar and ...
With all due respect, what exactly do you think a single mid tier battleship was going to do, win the war on its own? The Royal Navy Alone had 15+ battleships, some of them, like HMS Rodney and Nelson, arguably superior to Bismarck in armor and firepower.