Changing The War

[unmerged(598)]

Originally posted by grumbler
They could have had many more landing craft, eg (which used exactly the same materials and technology) and thus had had more success in Africa, the Med, and the Pacific.

Both the US and UK adopted Europe as the priority theatre. There's no need for more landing craft in Africa in 1942 as Britain was about to begin an assualt which would end in a march all the way to Tunisia.

Actually, this was not true until 1944, when there WAS an actual Western Front to deal with. Whether the Luftwaffe was destroyed over Germany (expensive) or over France (cheap) was just a matter of Allied priorities. Gerany committed significant resources to the Strategic Bombing Campaign only after the war was lost anyway.

It is true;

AA batteries in Germany:
1940 791
1941 967
1942 1148
1943 2132

An average of 16,000 shells was expended per aircraft destroyed. So, transferring around 10,000 AA weapons and the 500,000 men deployed to use them might have made a significant impact in Russia or Italy.

That's just one asset, and does not include the vehicles to transport, service or maintain the weapons, and doesn't even consider the Luftwaffe forces retained in Germany and Rumania.

Germany commited extravagant resources to revenge the bombing of Germany, the V1 and V2 programs of 1943 consumed enough resources to create 24,000 fighters. It has been estimated that the resources spent on these weapons, a direct result of allied bombing was around 1/3 the expense of the Manhattan Project.

This is a common rationale for the SBC, but the fact was that the British had to lie to thier people about the losses involved in order to "keep morale up." I don't think that the British were more buoyed by the SBC than they were depressed by the loss of Singapore and Burma, for instance. Had the British deployed the resources they deployed in the SBC into tactical aircraft for Burma and Malaya, morale may have actually been higher.

Singapore required more than just resources to save, it required a naval victory which would have ensured constant resupply. Britain can't simply build more carriers and battleships as their shipyards are already filled during this period.

The British were definately buoyed from the city bombing reports. Having suffered at the hands of the Luftwaffe, the fact that Britain was striking back was extremely important, especially in 1942 when the rest of the war had been nothing short of disaster.

 

[PDH]

Originally posted by sean9898

Singapore required more than just resources to save, it required a naval victory which would have ensured constant resupply. Britain can't simply build more carriers and battleships as their shipyards are already filled during this period.

I sure Singapore can't be saved under the "more competant CO" theories, but the Island and the southern end of Malaya should be able to hold out as a besieged bastion for a period of time. Such a stand might allow changes in the ABDA defenses - at least diverting troops and throwing the actual conquest times out.

The real changes, as has been mentioned by others, would be a competant defense of Burma. Maybe we find a good defensive general for Singapore as well as Burma.

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by grumbler
They could have had many more landing craft, eg (which used exactly the same materials and technology) and thus had had more success in Africa, the Med, and the Pacific.

There are some examples where the Allies felt they had trouble scraping together enough landing craft. But inquiries/investigations after the fact actually showed that they had plenty, they were just being stockpiled etc. elsewhere, as the various commands were enormously jealous of the resources allocated them.

PDH
Saving Singapore would have required the commitment of just about all available Allied naval forces-my "battle" of the Andaman Sea" scenario that I mentioned above. American carriers, British carriers and battleships etc. I think it could have been done, or, at least, might have been attempted-and it's a fascinating fight to contemplate.

 

[unmerged(592)]

actually a lot of the people who fired flak in Germany weren't really front ready soldiers but woman and BDM/ hilter youth boys and girls.

 

[grumbler]

Originally posted by sean9898
Both the US and UK adopted Europe as the priority theatre. There's no need for more landing craft in Africa in 1942 as Britain was about to begin an assualt which would end in a march all the way to Tunisia.

However, additional landing craft in the Med and the Pacific in 1942 would have allowed many more options to the commanders than they in fact had. While Agelastsu noted that "... inquiries/investigations after the fact actually showed that they had plenty [of landing craft], they were just being stockpiled etc. elsewhere, as the various commands were enormously jealous of the resources allocated them," this is true of every type of resource. Landing craft appear more often in the history reports as being the critical shortage in operational plans, so regardless of whether or not more optimal deployment would have solved the problem, an actual increase in production would also have helped. Moreso, IMO, than the SBC did.

[/B][/QUOTE]... transferring around 10,000 AA weapons and the 500,000 men deployed to use them might have made a significant impact in Russia or Italy.[/B][/QUOTE]

I don't think that these weapons and personnel were really of much use on the Eastern Front.
As SS points out, many of them were not combat-capable troops. Perhaps the resources used could have produced other, more valuable weapons (certainly more ATGs would have been useful), but my point is that the Allies tied up more resources in the SBC than was justified by either the production destroyed or the German resources diverted. Those same Allied resources could have been devoted to winning the battle of the ATlantic earlier and holding more territory in the Pacific, as well as accelerating the Allied conquests in North Africa and the Med.

Germany commited extravagant resources to revenge the bombing of Germany, the V1 and V2 programs of 1943 consumed enough resources to create 24,000 fighters. It has been estimated that the resources spent on these weapons, a direct result of allied bombing was around 1/3 the expense of the Manhattan Project.

And how does this compare to the Allied expenditures on the SBC?

Singapore required more than just resources to save, it required a naval victory which would have ensured constant resupply. Britain can't simply build more carriers and battleships as their shipyards are already filled during this period.

If Singapore held out, as it was expected to, until June of 1941 the entire strategic situation would have been reversed. Britain didn't need a naval victory in early 1942 to hold Singapore, she needed Singapore to act a a fortress to tie down Japanese forces. With adequate ground and air forces in place (plus, of course, competant command) Singapore may have held out for many mionths, until the resources to break the siege were in place. Even if the siege is never broken, the Japanese forces (especially aircraft) required to maintain it would have been unavailable elsewhere and this counld only redound to the Allies' benefit.

The shipyards were full of escort production because, lacking the resources to build the LRP aircraft needed to win the Battle of the Atlantic, the British suspended work on new capital ships in order to build the maximum possible number of escorts. Again, this tells against the SBC, IMO, and not in its favor.

The British were definately buoyed from the city bombing reports. Having suffered at the hands of the Luftwaffe, the fact that Britain was striking back was extremely important, especially in 1942 when the rest of the war had been nothing short of disaster.

Hmm, this is somewhat circular logic: the SBC was required because, IMO, the resources diverted to the SBC made other losses occur, and so the war was going so badly that an SBC was needed to divert attention. British moral never cracked in WWI when the Germans bombed British cities and the British were unable to retaliate in kind.

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by grumbler
British moral never cracked in WWI when the Germans bombed British cities and the British were unable to retaliate in kind.

The government certainly felt that it came close to cracking though. Whatever we may feel after the fact, or historians may decide now, at the time the British Government was desperately worried about civilian morale, most especially at the height of the Blitz. Hence, partially, the strategic bombing campaign.

Personally, certainly from 1940-42, I think that a lot of the effort that went into Strategic Bombing would have been better used for naval or naval aircraft construction-a half built carrier still occupies a valuable slip even if you're delaying construction. But, after that, with the Americans building up their European presence, I feel the campaign becomes far more valuable.

As for the neccessity of a naval victory to save/relieve Singapore, I suppose that partially depends on what else the Japanese have captured. For example, if the approaches via the East Indies have to be cleared by the allies, one can certainly expect the IJN to sortie, as it would if an attempt was made to force through a supply convoy. This is the navy whose war doctrine seems to be mostly based around the concept of the decisive battle, after all.

 

[unmerged(598)]

Originally posted by grumbler
I don't think that these weapons and personnel were really of much use on the Eastern Front.

The 88mm AA Gun was the primary German, and one of the most effective anti-tank weapons of the war.

And how does this compare to the Allied expenditures on the SBC?

It does not matter, the allies could invest in heavy bombers without sacrificing required fighter or tank production, the Germans could not. Having Germany redirect it's production effort to revenge weapons considerably shortened the war.

Hmm, this is somewhat circular logic: the SBC was required because, IMO, the resources diverted to the SBC made other losses occur, and so the war was going so badly that an SBC was needed to divert attention. British moral never cracked in WWI when the Germans bombed British cities and the British were unable to retaliate in kind.

When Britain began the SBC in 1941 there was no other method of attacking Germany. The escalation from 1942 onwards was an attempt to cripple German production, moral and tie up forces in defending the Reich. The success of each goal is questionable, but the transfer of those resources to other weapons does not necesarily have an impact on the war.

 

[unmerged(2539)]

The 88mm AA Gun was the primary German, and one of the most effective anti-tank weapons of the war.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Some things to consider.
88s given to inf early in the war to counter AFVs.
In 43 the regular inf divs lose their 88 guns( 24 per div), these are withdrawn to the Riech to create the flak defenses against the increasing SBC, also a facter was its high profile and long set up time which made its employment problematical, which resulted in heavy losses as they were used in an agressive role that was not there intended use. This ment that from then on till wars end 90% of flak was air force controlled.

Some other stats for the 88
41 flak outside germany is 81%
44------------------------39%

42-43 7 flak divs in the east. Between 10-50 88s per div.
44---11

Hannibal

 

[unmerged(5222)]

Responding on the defence of Singapore and Malaya topic. I think you are not giving the Japanese enough credit here. The Japanese simply prepared themselves so well that any army would have been hard pressed to stop them.

1 - They had agents posing as Chinese traders selling bicycles etc. These agents were responsible not only in informing on enemy dispositions, but also on terrain, available jungle paths, and recruiting locals or preparing locals by a sort of subtle psi-war. By the time of the attack, the local Malay and Indian population (i.e. ~66% were well divided between supporting the Japanese or not, as they were supposed to be 'our Asian cousins'. The Chinese in Malaya and Singapore of course cannot give in to Japan due to China!

2 - The Japanese had superior tactics and logistics and took advantage of the simplest means for their own version of 'blitzkreig'. The British themselves could not prepare for defence simply due to the speed of Japanese advance - something they didn't expect. They only realised after more than 1/2 Malaya had been lost that the Japanese were advancing on bicycles! The Japanese were even outflanking positions that guard normal roads by cycling swiftly through village and jungle paths not on established maps! The bicycles had been collected and cached at strategic locations by the Japanese agents in Malaya.

3 - Superior air and seapower - this of course is due to much of Japan's resources focussing on the area at the time vs. British. Japan being closer also helps.

4 - Poor British defence. The whole defensive philosophy of the British was flawed. First, they expected a seaborne assault on Singapore(???) when it would have been easy to see that the key to Singapore was Malaya. Also, Singapore was not really important as a resource - the Japanese were interested in resources which they could have shipped through neutral Thailand, even if the ports in Malaya were non-operational. The taking of Singapore would have been at leasure.

Truly, what the British should have done was just abandon Singapore and Malaya - their defence seemed so much to do with pride! The loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse was tragic - they should have been in the Atlantic. The British were already stretched too thin. If their resources were pulled back to India and the Burmese border, they could saved resouces when SEA eventually fell and retake it once other arenas were concluded.

 

[grumbler]

Originally posted by sean9898
The 88mm AA Gun was the primary German, and one of the most effective anti-tank weapons of the war.

The 88 FLAK was a good AT gun early in the war, before tanks were armed with more than 37-47mm guns. After that, it became much less survivable and therefor less useful. The 88PAK (a different weapon based on the 88 FLAK but in fact a different gun on a different carriage) was useful up until the war's end (and even beyond). I granted that some of the weapons resources could be diverted into more useful weapons, but a straight translation of FLAK into PAK is simply not possible.

It does not matter, the allies could invest in heavy bombers without sacrificing required fighter or tank production, the Germans could not. Having Germany redirect it's production effort to revenge weapons considerably shortened the war.

If you really believe that the Allies simply had unlimited production capabilities and could build anything at whim, then of course this is correct. I don't think your belief is backed by the facts, however. The Allies could not produce as much as they wanted of everything, IMO, and so I conclude the SBC was a drain on resources. Feel free to prove me wrong.

When Britain began the SBC in 1941 there was no other method of attacking Germany. The escalation from 1942 onwards was an attempt to cripple German production, moral and tie up forces in defending the Reich. The success of each goal is questionable, but the transfer of those resources to other weapons does not necesarily have an impact on the war.

Actually, Britain committed itself to the SBC long before the war began, not in 1941. The RAF subscribed to the theories of the Italian, Duhonet (spelling?) long before the war (as did the USAAC), and devoted considerable resources to creating a LRB force. This was purely a political process - without belief that air power can win a war on its own, there is no justification for an independent air force. The failure of strategic aircraft early in the war did not deter the "true believers" and so the effort was continued regardless of military costs and the lost opportunities: by 1941, the investment made in strategic bombing was simply too great to abandone, no matter how unsuccessful it was, IMO.

The Allied decision to engage in strategic bombing was NOT made in 1941, nor was it, imo, a response to what was happening in the war. The resources used in the SBC, just by the British, made their 1941 failures in N Africa and the Far East more likely. That is my entire point.

Perhaps by 1944, there would have been enough Allied production surplus to other efforts to make the SBC possible at no great cost to the Allies. However, this would have been too late to affect the war, which was all but ended in that year by Operation Bagration on the Eastern Front.

 

[grumbler]

Originally posted by attamaco
Responding on the defence of Singapore and Malaya topic. I think you are not giving the Japanese enough credit here. The Japanese simply prepared themselves so well that any army would have been hard pressed to stop them.

I think the Japanese deserve all the credit one can give to a force that was so outnumbered and operated on such a shoestring. However, even the Japanese were surprised by how successful they were, and diverted forces planned for arrival in the Malaya Theatre elsewhere, as being superfulous to needs.

1 - They had agents posing as Chinese traders selling bicycles etc. These agents were responsible not only in informing on enemy dispositions, but also on terrain, available jungle paths, and recruiting locals or preparing locals by a sort of subtle psi-war. By the time of the attack, the local Malay and Indian population (i.e. ~66% were well divided between supporting the Japanese or not, as they were supposed to be 'our Asian cousins'. The Chinese in Malaya and Singapore of course cannot give in to Japan due to China!

The Japanese did do an excellent recon job, but I think that you overstate the case here. There was no Malay or Indian native operations against the British, and while some may have provided the Japanese with local intelligence, Japanese records reported to date don't attribute any successes to this.

2 - The Japanese had superior tactics and logistics and took advantage of the simplest means for their own version of 'blitzkreig'. The British themselves could not prepare for defence simply due to the speed of Japanese advance - something they didn't expect. They only realised after more than 1/2 Malaya had been lost that the Japanese were advancing on bicycles! The Japanese were even outflanking positions that guard normal roads by cycling swiftly through village and jungle paths not on established maps! The bicycles had been collected and cached at strategic locations by the Japanese agents in Malaya.

Actually, Japanese logistics proved their achilles heel. Their superior tactics allowed them to seize British supplies and maintain their advance, but ammo shortages were always plaguing them. In fact, the assault on Singapore was only made possible when it occurred do to a Japanese merchant skipper disobeying orders and delivering his cargo to a frontline port instead of sailing to a rear-area port.

The British were absolutely taken aback by the speed of the Japanese advance. The Japanese were willing, as you note, to use terrain the British considered impassible (the Americans on Bataan were defeated using similar tactics). However, the Japanese had run out of manuevering room at Johore, and a british stand there was entirely possible.

3 - Superior air and seapower - this of course is due to much of Japan's resources focussing on the area at the time vs. British. Japan being closer also helps.

True, bur Japan enjoyed the same advantages, only in spades, at bataan. Bataan held out until April, and Corregidor until May. With far more trained troops, some fully-equipped airbased, and a much better supply situation in Malaya, a similar (but more long-lasting) British effort could have been expected, given reolute leadership.

4 - Poor British defence. The whole defensive philosophy of the British was flawed. First, they expected a seaborne assault on Singapore(???) when it would have been easy to see that the key to Singapore was Malaya. Also, Singapore was not really important as a resource - the Japanese were interested in resources which they could have shipped through neutral Thailand, even if the ports in Malaya were non-operational. The taking of Singapore would have been at leasure.

Are you sure the above is giving the Japanese enough credit?

I don't argue with any of this, though. All I am saying is that Singapore itself could have been held longer with the proper support in place pre-war (which would have been more likely had no resources been diverted to the SBC), and that the loss of Singapore, not Malaya, was what caused british morale to sag so low that an almost futile continuation of the SBC was deemed an appropriate response.

Truly, what the British should have done was just abandon Singapore and Malaya - their defence seemed so much to do with pride! The loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse was tragic - they should have been in the Atlantic. The British were already stretched too thin. If their resources were pulled back to India and the Burmese border, they could saved resouces when SEA eventually fell and retake it once other arenas were concluded.

It is interesting to nore Churchill's own wafflings on this subject. In fact, as history would show, he did the worst possible thing. He decided to abandone Singapore because needs on other fronts made its defense too difficult, and then there too few forces to defend it but sent enough that its loss was a disaster!

An excellent book on all of this (and more), BTW, is HP Wilmott's Empires in the Balance. He treats all of these issues with considerable scholorly research.

 

[unmerged(598)]

Originally posted by grumbler
The 88 FLAK was a good AT gun early in the war, before tanks were armed with more than 37-47mm guns. After that, it became much less survivable and therefor less useful. The 88PAK (a different weapon based on the 88 FLAK but in fact a different gun on a different carriage) was useful up until the war's end (and even beyond). I granted that some of the weapons resources could be diverted into more useful weapons, but a straight translation of FLAK into PAK is simply not possible.

The problem is that they had to produce all those 88mm AA to protect Germany. Even in 1944 88mm AA weapons were useful to defend against tanks, especially from defended positions. British crew were particularly fearful of the weapon having seen it decimate them in the desert.

If you really believe that the Allies simply had unlimited production capabilities and could build anything at whim, then of course this is correct. I don't think your belief is backed by the facts, however. The Allies could not produce as much as they wanted of everything, IMO, and so I conclude the SBC was a drain on resources. Feel free to prove me wrong.

You are quite correct. However, what exactly do the allies do with more tanks? They stalled the offensive in 1944 not because of a lack of equipment, but of supplies. What exactly would more armor divisions have gained?

Actually, Britain committed itself to the SBC long before the war began, not in 1941.

Britain's original plan was for daylight precision bombing. That changed during 1941 in order to keep the bomber force intact. While plans were in place to carry out strategic bombing, they did not really begin the campaign until 1942. Harris himself claims that one of the motivating factors behind the bombing was to attack Germany in Germany, somewhere their people could see results.

The Allied decision to engage in strategic bombing was NOT made in 1941, nor was it, imo, a response to what was happening in the war. The resources used in the SBC, just by the British, made their 1941 failures in N Africa and the Far East more likely. That is my entire point.

No strategic bombing took place before the fall of France, the first raid was launched as a direct response to the accidental bombing of London. While Britain may have planned to someday launch their own attacks, there was no action taken for almost a year of the war.

British failure in N Africa was little to do with resource shortage. Withdrawl of forces at the wrong time, combined with a cavalry type tank attack (fire on the run) ensured that Rommel's hull down tanks and 88mm would decimate their formations. The men of Gazela were not short staffed, just in an awful defensive position.

The losses in the far east cannot be blamed on strategic bombing, unless you suppose that Britain would double the size of her army and be able to magic them around the world at will.

Perhaps by 1944, there would have been enough Allied production surplus to other efforts to make the SBC possible at no great cost to the Allies. However, this would have been too late to affect the war, which was all but ended in that year by Operation Bagration on the Eastern Front.

If this was really the case, then shouldn't Britain and America simply have waited for the Russians to win the war all by themselves?

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by attamaco
2 - The Japanese had superior tactics and logistics and took advantage of the simplest means for their own version of 'blitzkreig'. The British themselves could not prepare for defence simply due to the speed of Japanese advance - something they didn't expect. They only realised after more than 1/2 Malaya had been lost that the Japanese were advancing on bicycles! The Japanese were even outflanking positions that guard normal roads by cycling swiftly through village and jungle paths not on established maps!

Yes, the Japanese were extremely well trained at jungle warfare, the same tactics turning the outer defence line at Bataan. But the success of the few (I've actually heard of only one.....aaargh) British units that bothered to try and train for jungle warfare proves that they could have been stopped.

3 - Superior air and seapower - this of course is due to much of Japan's resources focussing on the area at the time vs. British. Japan being closer also helps.

Yes, the British were greatly distracted, nost of the available aircraft in Malaya being types by now obsolescent in Europe, something that was certainly not true of Japanese types. The siting of Malaya's airfields under the RAF's aegis, without any consultation over how they would be defended by the army (!) cetainly didn't help. But we are discussing hypotheticals here, whereby the British have been able to deploy more and better aircraft to the zone-that's how this "alternate" discussion started!

4 - Poor British defence. The whole defensive philosophy of the British was flawed. First, they expected a seaborne assault on Singapore(???) when it would have been easy to see that the key to Singapore was Malaya. Also, Singapore was not really important as a resource - the Japanese were interested in resources which they could have shipped through neutral Thailand, even if the ports in Malaya were non-operational. The taking of Singapore would have been at leasure.

Percival must take a lot of the blame here, with even the limited time he had to prepare, considering the availability of local labour, Singapore could have been defended at least as long as Bataan-considering the supply situation, even longer. Which is why we've detached Montgomery (although I still don't think he'd have been sent east.) As for the "myth of the guns" (only pointing seaward)-they could range on the landward side, but were still useless as they had the wrong type of shell! Brilliant planning-not! As for the importance of Singapore, we might want to consider a possible Malta parallel if it holds out.

Truly, what the British should have done was just abandon Singapore and Malaya - their defence seemed so much to do with pride! The loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse was tragic - they should have been in the Atlantic. The British were already stretched too thin. If their resources were pulled back to India and the Burmese border, they could saved resouces when SEA eventually fell and retake it once other arenas were concluded.

Perhaps, perhaps. On the other hand, if you're a wargamer (Sean9898-WiF) you are forcibly reminded of Singapore's strategic location. When looking at such a map there are three "keys" to the Pacific-Singapore, Truk, and Hawaii. Probably not the best source to quote for a historical argument here, but that's what they are. Holding Singapore for longer delays Japanese expansion, since many of the troops doing the assault were shipped to reinforce the Dutch East Indies Campaign. Holding it indefinitely unhinges the entire Japanese position in SE Asia, and quite possibly could lead to an earlier end to the Pacific war.

 

[grumbler]

Originally posted by sean9898
The problem is that they had to produce all those 88mm AA to protect Germany. Even in 1944 88mm AA weapons were useful to defend against tanks, especially from defended positions. British crew were particularly fearful of the weapon having seen it decimate them in the desert.

The 88FLAK could still do a great deal of damage in 1944, but it was a large and cumbersome weapon. The 88PAK did far more damage by that time in the war, I think.

You are quite correct. However, what exactly do the allies do with more tanks? They stalled the offensive in 1944 not because of a lack of equipment, but of supplies. What exactly would more armor divisions have gained?

So, what if they had used the SBC's resources for an additional "Mulberry" and enough trucks to keep the supplies moving? My entire point is that the resources of the SBC could have been more useful in many areas. By your comments, you seem almost to agree!

Britain's original plan was for daylight precision bombing. That changed during 1941 in order to keep the bomber force intact. While plans were in place to carry out strategic bombing, they did not really begin the campaign until 1942. Harris himself claims that one of the motivating factors behind the bombing was to attack Germany in Germany, somewhere their people could see results.

The British believed, prewar, that "the bomber will always get through." This was proven false, as were all the other justifications for the SBC. "Bomber" Harris would, of course, do anything to rationalize the use of the heavy bomber. Admitting that the SBC was a mistake was impossible for him. The SBC never made the German civilian morale crack. As the British themselves showed, being directly attacked improved civilian morale and dedication to the cause.

No strategic bombing took place before the fall of France, the first raid was launched as a direct response to the accidental bombing of London. While Britain may have planned to someday launch their own attacks, there was no action taken for almost a year of the war.

The reason for the lack of British SBC activity was fear that their attacks on German cities would draw retaliation on British cities. Everyone was so bound up in the myth of the bomber devastating cities that the british reach a nuclear-deterrance-like conclusion regarding the heavy bomber - that it was too effective to actually use (see Churchill's History of the Second World War for more on this)! This myth, like many, was resistant to the facts, and so the SBC was carried out regardless of actual costs and benefits.

British failure in N Africa was little to do with resource shortage. Withdrawl of forces at the wrong time, combined with a cavalry type tank attack (fire on the run) ensured that Rommel's hull down tanks and 88mm would decimate their formations. The men of Gazela were not short staffed, just in an awful defensive position.

If the defeat of the British came as a rsult of the withdrawal of forces, does that not argue that better results would have been obtained had there been sufficient forces left in the desert to finish off Triploi even after the withdrawal of forces for Greece? You make my point for me.

The British troubles in N Africa were partly due to poor tactics, for sure (more the lack of combined arms than the style of tank attack, IMO, but that is debatable). However, had there been more tanks there, more would have survived the German long-range fire and succeeded inclosing with, and destroying, German positions.

The losses in the far east cannot be blamed on strategic bombing, unless you suppose that Britain would double the size of her army and be able to magic them around the world at will.

The critical weaknes of the British in the Far East was aircraft, not troops. Additional well-trained troops in Malaya would have helped, for sure. More could have been available had the british, like the Germans, Japanese, and Soviets, recognized that air power is the vital adjunct to land and sea power, but almost useless on its own. This would have had Britain spending far more on tactical aircraft and troops equipment prewar, so that the "guaranteed" garrison in Singapore would actually have been in place in December, 1941 - no "magicking" of forces needed. There was simply a finite amount of production the British could engage in. The SBC was a luxury that, I think, history showed the British could not afford.

If this was really the case, then shouldn't Britain and America simply have waited for the Russians to win the war all by themselves?

The British and Americans probably COULD have waited for the Soviets to defeat Germany, but for political reasons they did not. I'm not sure what your point has to do with our debate.

 

[unmerged(4386)]

Western Allies can't take a chance on letting Stalin think he's being left to fight Hitler on his own. Stalin might sign an armistice with Germany that would leave Hitler with forces to turn westward.

British didn't think that Japan would grab French Indochina, and therefore have all those modern aircraft within range of Malaya and Singapore,... big mistake!

 

[unmerged(592)]

Didn't the US exactly do that? Let the soviet forces wear down the German ones to a short of defeat situation with just some economic aid and some distractions like Africa and Italy and finally grab their share of the prize?

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by SoleSurvivor
Didn't the US exactly do that? Let the soviet forces wear down the German ones to a short of defeat situation with just some economic aid and some distractions like Africa and Italy and finally grab their share of the prize?

Ah, the "Roosevelt the Arch-manipulator" theory. I enjoyed reading about it in the "Roon" bits of Wouk's fictional opus "Winds of War" and sequel. It gives him to much credit.....or too little, depending on your point of view.

 

[grumbler]

Originally posted by SoleSurvivor
Didn't the US exactly do that? Let the soviet forces wear down the German ones to a short of defeat situation with just some economic aid and some distractions like Africa and Italy and finally grab their share of the prize?

In a word, no.

A longer explanation would require a book. Luckily for you, many people have risen to that challenge!

 

[unmerged(598)]

Originally posted by grumbler
The 88FLAK could still do a great deal of damage in 1944, but it was a large and cumbersome weapon. The 88PAK did far more damage by that time in the war, I think.

Yes, but thanks to bombing the Germans were still producing AA weapons. The Flak version of the 88mm was effective, but a big target in the face of enemy tanks and artillery.

So, what if they had used the SBC's resources for an additional "Mulberry" and enough trucks to keep the supplies moving? My entire point is that the resources of the SBC could have been more useful in many areas. By your comments, you seem almost to agree!

I don't see how my comments would allow you to conclude that I agree. The French campaign in 1944 would not have been improved by another Mulberry, or more trucks. The allies simply advanced too far too quickly. IMHO, the capture of intact ports, which was pretty much impossible is the only solution to the supply problem.

The British believed, prewar, that "the bomber will always get through." This was proven false, as were all the other justifications for the SBC.

I do not believe that any justifications for Strategic bombing have been proved false. Neither has the bomber will get through theory. The bombers, be they German, American or British did always get through. While daylight bombing would extract a toll too high for the results, nighttime bombing was undefendable.

"Bomber" Harris would, of course, do anything to rationalize the use of the heavy bomber. Admitting that the SBC was a mistake was impossible for him. The SBC never made the German civilian morale crack. As the British themselves showed, being directly attacked improved civilian morale and dedication to the cause.

Bombing did not improve British morale. It made life difficult to survive in the areas targetted, slowed industrial production and split families during the evacuation. My father has never mentioned how buoyed he was in the subway stations or how the experience was anything other than terrifying. Industrial output in Coventry came to a standstill for months after the firebombing, not only as communication and industrial areas were hit, but because so many workers were displaced they could not get to work. It was this raid which led to the formulation of the dehousing theory.

To believe that the British sat in shelters merrily singing "We'll hang our washing on the Siegfried Line," is to believe wartime propaganda. A concerted effort by German heavy bombers on the scale of the British campaign would have severely hampered the war effort, and the will to continue. Speer himself is quoted as saying "6 more Hamburgs would have knocked us out of the war."

The reassesment of Strategic bombing is typical of the kindler, more gentle and politically correct age we live in. The immorality of killing German women and children allows for reassesment of a campaign which had a very large impact on Germany's ability to attack Russia and later the allies.

The reason for the lack of British SBC activity was fear that their attacks on German cities would draw retaliation on British cities.
Everyone was so bound up in the myth of the bomber devastating cities that the british reach a nuclear-deterrance-like conclusion regarding the heavy bomber - that it was too effective to actually use (see Churchill's History of the Second World War for more on this)! This myth, like many, was resistant to the facts, and so the SBC was carried out regardless of actual costs and benefits.

It was not a myth, take a look at the devastation in London and Germany. The affects of strategic bombing are still evident today, many of the towns in Essex have areas where housing was built to relocate the homeless people of London.

If the defeat of the British came as a rsult of the withdrawal of forces, does that not argue that better results would have been obtained had there been sufficient forces left in the desert to finish off Triploi even after the withdrawal of forces for Greece? You make my point for me.

In 1941 the British army was not big enough to carry out actions in Greece and the desert. The relatively light burden building strategic aircraft in February 1941 imposed would not have changed that. Again, don't presume I make your point, obviously I made it poorly but in no way supporting your arguement. Poor strategic decisions do not necesarily disappear with greater resources.

The defeat at Gazela and the retreat to Cairo was not a resource problem, but a similar problem the Italians suffered in 1941, fortified areas which could be isolated and flanked. The mismanagement was so great that not even Tobruk could be saved. Putting the Red army in the desert would not atone for mistakes that grave.

The critical weaknes of the British in the Far East was aircraft, not troops. Additional well-trained troops in Malaya would have helped, for sure. More could have been available had the british, like the Germans, Japanese, and Soviets, recognized that air power is the vital adjunct to land and sea power, but almost useless on its own. This would have had Britain spending far more on tactical aircraft and troops equipment prewar, so that the "guaranteed" garrison in Singapore would actually have been in place in December, 1941 - no "magicking" of forces needed. There was simply a finite amount of production the British could engage in. The SBC was a luxury that, I think, history showed the British could not afford.

Never reinforce a defeat. Doubling, or tripling the forces available to not make up for incompetance. Adding more aircraft to Singapore requires a resultant increase in logistics. You can't simply transfer men and material and assume that everything is going to be OK.

The British and Americans probably COULD have waited for the Soviets to defeat Germany, but for political reasons they did not. I'm not sure what your point has to do with our debate.

My point is that Bagration did not end the war, and would not without the Germans fighting on the Western Front. To assume that the allies simply sat back until 1944 allowing the Russians to win the war is a false one, and an insult to the many airmen who gave their lives over Germany.

Originally posted by SoleSurvivor
Didn't the US exactly do that? Let the soviet forces wear down the German ones to a short of defeat situation with just some economic aid and some distractions like Africa and Italy and finally grab their share of the prize?

No, rather than the German or Russian tactic of simply throwing men and material into the front, the allies actually planned for an invasion and conquest of France then Germany. Rather than rushing into action they waited until they were strong enough, until they had the supplies necesary and had acheived overwhelming air superiority before assaulting France.

At the same time, allied soldiers were dying for political reasons in Italy, a result of political meddling to convince the Russians that they were doing their part in the war.

 

[unmerged(592)]

I don't think you can bblame the Russians for being attacked in 1941 and having heavy losses.

No, rather than the German or Russian tactic of simply throwing men and material into the front, the allies actually planned for an invasion and conquest of France then Germany. Rather than rushing into action they waited until they were strong enough, until they had the supplies necesary and had acheived overwhelming air superiority before assaulting France.


Russian strategy actually was to avoid war until the foe was weakened. This of course failed but the Allies didn't really hurry to support Russia with 100%.