I am not sure that I buy the argument that "it's all academic if you win" since the cost of victory is high and the issue is more "could the war have been won with less lost lives" rather than "would the war's outcome have been different." I agree that there will probably never be a definitive answer to this debate.
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There most certainly is a definative answer, ask any national leader who lost a major war, if you had spent more on the wars presecution and you will win instaed of losing, and you will only get one answer. That is of course dependandt on if their still alive to answer the question, as history shows all to often the cost of losing a war, especialy in the case of losing to an extremist. If i recall you qouted Churchil about the blitz, what price will he pay to win this war? i believe he made his views clear as to what a lost war here would mean to the western world. A strong part of SBC rational was to save the lives of our own mens lives, as it offerd an alternative to the bloodbaths of ww1.
Remember that, in order to create the effective SBC of 1944-1945, an enormous expenditure on the part of the Allies was required, from 1919 onwards.
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You have put my point exactly. My point is that the Allied effort cost them more in terms of foregone opportunities than it cost the Germans. This is, of course, debatable, but I acknowledge that Dupuy's work gives a better insight than mere numbers.
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The militry expenditure post ww1 untill 39 is laughable, £107 mil,*(ARMY 192,000, AIR 445, NAVY 284) for the year 31/2, in general due to the pacifism, recision and reluctance for a large standing army(im only concerning myself with the UK) their is no financial ability or political desire to rearm along conventional lines on a scale that would make any significant difference in 40 or 41. Only in 39 does investment quadruple,*(£397mil ARMY 237,000,AIR 7940,NAVY 290) it takes time for munitions to arrive in sufficent levels, 18-24 months show significant returns in volume, secondry to that is the time to turn conscripts into usful soldiers, rifle div 9 months, specialists(F/O, Radio ops etc +3 months, so i dont see that the amount spent pre war can in any way have resulted in a larger force, the £numbers are just to small, in 36 the RAF forms Fighter Command and they take the lions share of the air budget, that is why we have the spitfires and hurricanes and Bomber command stay with twin engined death traps like the Blenhiem that suffer 80-100% losses when the sortie, i will go so far and say that BC was under funded just prior to war and indeed up til 39/40.
Further to this, if their was more conventionl forces available in France 40, given the german operational and tactical advantages their will just be a bigger disaster for the UK rather than any opurtunity to end the war early. The numbers game,( german field strength against available UK/US in europe) and german op and tac advantages are still stongly against any 41/42 oportunitys to end the war. So i dont see what opurtunity you refer to, untill we get to 43, then instead of the med a cross channel op was feasable.But why the rush? Planning for DDay starts in March 43, these things take time, grand strategy for the allies rellies on utilising the numerical and resource advantages they hold.
* Peace time army strength, inc TA.Navy to inc BB,CA,CV,DD and subs, but not those under construction.
However, by then operations Overlord and Bagration were creating other, equally great difficulties for Germany. By the time the SBC really started to bite, the war was moving faster on other fronts. Suppose, by eliminating the SBC, those other fronts could have been accelerated? Would that have been worth the loss of the SBC?
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Without SBC Overlord would not have been so viable, without the Hvy bombers to tow the gliders theirs a drastic reduction in the para comitment, without the bombers their no loss to the atlantic walls equipment(destroyed in the factory, in transit, or produced but stuck in a siding as the bridges and rail lines are gone), without the heavy bombers the 3000 tons droped by US 8TH to clear the minefields by detonation,that hepled the inital waves ashore against a leveled german defence, a total of 11,912 tons were droped in a few hours,more than in a year on the most bombed german city of 43, Hamburg. That there are hvy bombers is a result of the wants of a SBC, you want get them by following what thearmy says what it need to do the job, they want more and heavier art, more mobile art, they dont even want close air support till the wars half over.
Hannibal
Re Carrel
I would not call him discredited, when he wrote he had no access to Waffen Archives (sealled till 78), Whermact archives were taken to the US, and access was restricted, also at the time objectivity was almost impossible and was not even an aim of many who attempted historys of the ww2, Carrel for example goes to great lengths to avoid politics in his main 3 works, his bias is no more less than say any of the Sov accounts done at the same time. Every generation of hitorians will have their own bias, the first historys written by the interegaters of surviving nazis are not discredited by the fact that to get along some of the germans emphasised what they thought the interegaters wanted to hear, or that their bias was shapped by their times and experiences, they(the interegaters) just done the best job they were able to do.
As for Chandler, since he was Head of War Studies at RMA Sandhurst, author of many authorative works on a wide range of works, inc the napoleonic period, and has a high international regard in both litery and academic circles as to the value of his works, i see no reason that his views are not worth quoting, nor Carrells, as ive used some here, as they tally with other acounts their is no reason to ascribe a bias, he just did the best job he knew how to.
) Captured vehicles have only a small fraction of the lifespan of indigenous or lend-lease vehicles, however, as the spare parts and repair skills needed to keep them in operation are seldom available.
