Differences in WW1 aftermath due to the Red victory?

[diegosimeone]

Leaving Russia aside for a second, assuming the Reds fail or never start a huge revolution there, is there another place that could possibly be the main ''Soviet" homeland?

Would that be a defeated Germany?
I don't see Austria as an alternative as it'd collapse. I was wondering if the Ottomans had a ''Red' movement worthy of mention. My guess is not, but Ataturk having to face the Greeks, the Armenians, the Russians, the Kurds(lots of them sided with him in our timeline actually) and an Ottoman/Turkish Red army he'd be completely crashed. As far as I know he crushed the Communists rather early and he also attempted to create a decoy Communist Party of some sort, so it is possible that there was let's say a demand. But I'm not entirely sure if they appeared due to ideology entirely or because they saw that the Reds in Russia won. Nor how big they could get.

My guess would be Germany and we'd probably end up with a civil war. Not sure to what extent (country torn apart, split into regions, split into East/West or North/South etc or a clear victory of one side), but it probably would leave the country in a mess no matter what.

Maybe Spain would actually be a serious candidate here as a consequence of everything else.

 

[Kovax]

I also have an impression that Hungarians were never super enthusiastic about whole AH project, although admittedly my knowledge on the issue is fairly limited.

Well, there were a few minor revolts in the late 1700s, then one major revolt in 1848 which briefly freed more than half of Hungary from Austrian control, and actually managed to make a trivial incursion into Austria before the Emperor called in his cousin, the Czar of Russia, to squash the uprising (and then plunder it, but getting them to leave afterward was apparently another problem). The Austrians offered amnesty in exchange for surrender, and then rounded up several of the leaders and generals and hanged them, despite the amnesty. The imminent threat of another such revolt less than a decade later led to the A-H compromise, with Hungary gaining a fair degree of internal autonomy, but still firmly tied to Austria and with only a limited say in foreign policy. "Unenthusiastic" is probably a mild way to put it; they wanted "out", but realistically were (mostly) willing to suffer with the revised situation for lack of sufficient strength to go it alone. When they finally got that autonomy at the end of WWI, it was minus over 60% of their land, and nearly half their people, with the rest going to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania.

Don't be fooled by such silliness as the Hungarian decision tree in HOI4, where Hungary can VOLUNTARILY put a Hapsburg on the throne and re-form A-H. That would probably be about as desirable as allowing Israel to VOLUNTARILY re-establish the Third Reich.

Hungary did end up with a bloody communist revolution (backed by the Soviets), which was eventually crushed by Romanian troops (who then took another small piece of land in the process) and former Hungarian military officers and other volunteers, since Hungary wasn't even allowed a formal army to defend itself against the uprising.

 

[Eusebio]

The Provisional Government had already proclaimed an independent Poland in March of 1917, tied to Russia in a "free military union". In fact even the Russian foreign minister in 1916, Sazonov, had proposed an autonomous Poland in order to get Britain and France off his back. And again in 1916 Germany and Austria had already proclaimed an independent Kingdom of Poland. But anyway. What you guys are missing is that by 1917 the Petrograd Soviet, basically, was running the show, and the socialist parties there had negative zero interest in Tsarist imperialist map-painting fantasies of crushing the Poles, taking the Dardanelles or annexing bits of Galicia, let alone fighting another war or two to do so. Add in Wilson's Fourteen Points and the threat of the Western Entente calling in Russia's war debts and destroying its economy if it goes rogue and the likelihood of a victorious Russia being able to do any of this stuff is well, not high. They will be lucky to hold onto everything they had pre-1914.

 

[olm]

This is a very bold statement which assumes that Russia would retain a military that was willing to fight in foreign wars while being on the brink of civil war.

There was a financial crisis, lack of rifles, ammunition, artillery, shells, provision, most of those were imported yet still lacking, close to the level of Central powers rather rest of Entente. No loyalty, angered people, no thousands volunteers like for the Bolsheviks, army loses and crumbles.

What kind of miracle would it require for Russia to do that? I don't even mention Haller's Army as a part of Entente's efforts to arm Poland which was already stronger than Red Army, which was effectively most what Russia could muster at that time. Unless Entente would want to give Russia and Italy proper victory rewards and maybe support Ottomans while at it and hang Atatürk on Byzantine revival day.

Well, I think it is safe to assume that Central-Powers capitulation will increase morale quite significantly, and it wouldn't be all that hard to sell a short campaign to prevent Poles from "stealing Russian victory". Pacification of Poland also requires a whole lot smaller army then Russia fielded in WW I, so supply problems will be strongly alleviated. Historically Russian army completely dissolved, lots of officer corps was lynched or joined whites, army had to be completely rebuilt from scratch, had to fight devastating conflict against internal and external enemies on literally all sides, and in the end still came fairly close to conquering Poland that had few years to build up its forces with Western backing. In our scenario at least some part of Russian army persists and can be used as basis to strengthen and consolidate forces for Polish campaign in short order, while Poles have practically no time to build up their forces, and Western support to them is probably non-existent, because anything else would be seen as betrayal pushing Russia to throw its lot with Germany before Paris peace conference even ends.

edit: I do think Poles could diplomatically get some Finnish style autonomy in such situation if they play their cards right, but attempting full independence seems doomed to failure.

 

[fr-rein]

Well, I think it is safe to assume that Central-Powers capitulation will increase morale quite significantly

So you assume that during 1.5 years Russia would be able to both sustain Army, stop it from rotting and prevent civil war? Well, yes, if they could somehow pull it off it would be real. But it is less realistic than German 1918 offensive resulting in their victory/tie and mostly favourable end of war.
How to stop army from rotting?
How to stop socialists from seizing power in Russian Constitutient Assembly and agreeing for peace with Germany in 1918?
How to supply Army for over a year from October-November 1917 till November 1918?
How to avoid socialists/Bolsheviks triggering civil war?

Your best bet for this would be Kerensky, but he had too little and not too loyal troops to seize power. Would he have enough to deal with rotting army, revolters and such? Would they be loyal and why?
And if you go by a promise of land reform you can expect White Army all again, but against you - since officers and nobility were largely against that.

And to a historical example - a result of 1905 war shows that loss of Poland and victory concessions would be most likely guaranteed. I mean, if I was Kerensy, I would give up Poland and Finland in exchange for support inside the country and prevent government disintegration.

 

[olm]

So you assume that ...

Yes, there were several assumptions laid out in OP, and used them as basis for my posts here. How realistic those assumptions really are? I don't really know! How would Russia sustain itself? Well, I don't know either! I could make some guesses, like any Russian offensives after Brusilov's are automatically out except maybe something very limited against Ottomans just to raise morale, Lenin never makes it to Russia and remaining bolsheviks manage to somehow mess things up, Kerensky maybe decides to cooperate with generals to neutralize socialists/Bolsheviks, maybe some promises to peasants about something, maybe some investments into repressive apparatus, who knows really...

But that's not really question in OP. If Russia is still in war then Central-Powers capitulate it is fair to assume that it will still have at least some troops manning the line, no matter how badly. And I really struggle to think how at this point, after all those sacrifices for victory, ANY Russian government, no matter what colour it was at that point, would be willing to give up territories considered rightly Russian. This seems like the absolutely fastest way to get couped.

 

[yerm]

I cannot envision a what-if where Russia manages to stay intact through to the conclusion of the war but is worse off than its historical civil-war-torn + humiliating b-l treaty plagued situation. Anything that communist Russia managed to keep hold onto should absolutely be assumed to also be held or reconsituted by a less wrecked hypothetical Russia that makes it to the war's finish line.

My position on the impact towards Germany is the opposite of most: having another victorious party sitting at the table, who is a clear rival of the other great powers, is liable to improve the German postwar outcome. Britain especially will not be keen on letting them run away with a colossal land grab and France will not tolerate being sidelined. Italy and the USA now have an extra major voice at versailles to try to talk to (manipulate) for their agenda. Comparing WWI to prior major conflicts (eg the 7 years war, which was IMO just as much of a "world war") what stands out is that the rivalries and attempts at balance curtailed the worst abuses of the defeated, while this war's victors had a far more free hand to dictate as they pleased. Russia's presence pushes it back in the direction of balance of power.

With all that in mind, my first instinct is that Britain will be trying to dampen Russian expansion. I do think Russia gets the straits - they are unlikely to be able to be denied here. Holding them long term is another story, but I assume they get at minimum their biggest desire. I do not thinl they would get to eat Poland, as this is the clay France and Britain will want Germany to keep in this altered setting to keep them lurched against Russia's Empire, while Russia here is probably deep down wishing it could LOSE its rebellious Polish land somehow without the corresponding loss of imperial prestige. I assume their land grabs are to the south. As for everything else, Germany probably still sucks up the losses of A+L and its colonies etc. and a large (maybe not quite as large but still big) war indemnity still sticks.

Japan will get even more considerations in Asia for their support than even historically, as they are the logical counter/rival to Russia in the east (or at least viewed as such since 1905). I expect Italy, with a better bargaining position + Russians getting Mediterranean access, would not be as ignored here. Putting them in as the new rival for the southern Balkans and naturally will maintain a counter to Russian emergence there is going to feel good for France and Britain. Serbs are who I expect to get the "Italy Treatment" in this setting.

Without a visible civil war and destructive communist takeover, I expect non-Russian nations to be less staunchly anti-communist, at least at first. This would be similar if less than how many places were only marginally anti-fascist until Hitler and WWII ruined fascism for everyone - in this hypothetical, socialism true or otherwise has not been tried. I would imagine a far bigger and more influential socialist presence throughout the west. France in particular. I think spanish civil war style mayhem is possible in most non english speaking places, especially France or Germany.

Russian victory without a turnover in government and likely adding even more problems thanks to new territories and added naval ambitions I think is a poison pill. I cannot envision its government capable of either resisting a Barbarossa-type attack from a repeat of nazi Germany or anything similar if it scores early wins, nor of establishing a superpower status military apparatus. Germany, meanwhile, is probably facing a combination of less loss in the peace and weaker neighbors. The big hurdle to a repeat of pre-WWII for them in this scenario is that Russia DOES share a border here and can for example guarantee Czechoslovakia without needing open borders to enforce it. The problem will be I expect them to be insular and faltering, so they may just not care if Germany blobs and even encourage it to stick it to the West.

 

[Taylor]

I cannot envision a what-if where Russia manages to stay intact through to the conclusion of the war but is worse off than its historical civil-war-torn + humiliating b-l treaty plagued situation. Anything that communist Russia managed to keep hold onto should absolutely be assumed to also be held or reconsituted by a less wrecked hypothetical Russia that makes it to the war's finish line.

My position on the impact towards Germany is the opposite of most: having another victorious party sitting at the table, who is a clear rival of the other great powers, is liable to improve the German postwar outcome. Britain especially will not be keen on letting them run away with a colossal land grab and France will not tolerate being sidelined. Italy and the USA now have an extra major voice at versailles to try to talk to (manipulate) for their agenda. Comparing WWI to prior major conflicts (eg the 7 years war, which was IMO just as much of a "world war") what stands out is that the rivalries and attempts at balance curtailed the worst abuses of the defeated, while this war's victors had a far more free hand to dictate as they pleased. Russia's presence pushes it back in the direction of balance of power.

With all that in mind, my first instinct is that Britain will be trying to dampen Russian expansion. I do think Russia gets the straits - they are unlikely to be able to be denied here. Holding them long term is another story, but I assume they get at minimum their biggest desire. I do not thinl they would get to eat Poland, as this is the clay France and Britain will want Germany to keep in this altered setting to keep them lurched against Russia's Empire, while Russia here is probably deep down wishing it could LOSE its rebellious Polish land somehow without the corresponding loss of imperial prestige. I assume their land grabs are to the south. As for everything else, Germany probably still sucks up the losses of A+L and its colonies etc. and a large (maybe not quite as large but still big) war indemnity still sticks.

Japan will get even more considerations in Asia for their support than even historically, as they are the logical counter/rival to Russia in the east (or at least viewed as such since 1905). I expect Italy, with a better bargaining position + Russians getting Mediterranean access, would not be as ignored here. Putting them in as the new rival for the southern Balkans and naturally will maintain a counter to Russian emergence there is going to feel good for France and Britain. Serbs are who I expect to get the "Italy Treatment" in this setting.

Without a visible civil war and destructive communist takeover, I expect non-Russian nations to be less staunchly anti-communist, at least at first. This would be similar if less than how many places were only marginally anti-fascist until Hitler and WWII ruined fascism for everyone - in this hypothetical, socialism true or otherwise has not been tried. I would imagine a far bigger and more influential socialist presence throughout the west. France in particular. I think spanish civil war style mayhem is possible in most non english speaking places, especially France or Germany.

Russian victory without a turnover in government and likely adding even more problems thanks to new territories and added naval ambitions I think is a poison pill. I cannot envision its government capable of either resisting a Barbarossa-type attack from a repeat of nazi Germany or anything similar if it scores early wins, nor of establishing a superpower status military apparatus. Germany, meanwhile, is probably facing a combination of less loss in the peace and weaker neighbors. The big hurdle to a repeat of pre-WWII for them in this scenario is that Russia DOES share a border here and can for example guarantee Czechoslovakia without needing open borders to enforce it. The problem will be I expect them to be insular and faltering, so they may just not care if Germany blobs and even encourage it to stick it to the West.

I agree with most of what you say. I think the peace talks would be more akin to the Congress of Vienna, were rivalry between the victors prevented an all too lobsided result. One thing though, I don't think the USA would stand for Germany keeping Poland, instead being strongly in favour of an independent Polish nation. I also don't see France and the UK objecting to that, not strongly at least.

 

[Wagonlitz]

I think spanish civil war style mayhem is possible in most non english speaking places, especially France or Germany.

Why not in Britain?

Also, I expect there still being a plebiscite in Slesvig. It's cheap to do, is a fringe area, plus it semi threatens the Kieler Canal depending on how far south the yes goes.

 

[Henry IX]

I suspect that some nation in East or South East Europe is going to get a lot of love from Britain as they frantically try to build up a buffer state to maintain the balance of power. I would guess the most likely possibilities are: Italy, which gets the whole coast of the Adriatic either directly or as protectorates, Hungry, who get recognised as an 'oppressed people' in the A-H empire and get most of their claims recognised, leading to a regional power, Poland, if it manages to shake of Russian domination (depending on the condition of the Russian state in 1918), or possibly Turkey, if the British are really strapped for effective counterbalances.

I also agree that including the Russians also gives the Germans more wriggle room to play their opponents off against each other, probably reducing territorial losses in Europe.

 

[yerm]

I agree with most of what you say. I think the peace talks would be more akin to the Congress of Vienna, were rivalry between the victors prevented an all too lobsided result. One thing though, I don't think the USA would stand for Germany keeping Poland, instead being strongly in favour of an independent Polish nation. I also don't see France and the UK objecting to that, not strongly at least.

How do you create an independent Polish nation without taking territory that is recognised as part of the Russian Empire for over a century? How does Russia allow Poland to go without having it be an invitation for their other enserfed minority regions to want the same? In addition, what would the allies truly be willing to let the Empire obtain as compensation for the loss of this ceded Polish territory? World war I can be blamed on Germany pulling the trigger on war, but it needs to be remembered that the trigger they pulled was forcing Russia's hand because their government did not think it could survive a blow to its legitimacy!

Wilson/USA would be even more of an outsider at Versailles than historically in this setting. Russia is at the table and Germany did not take the massive Brest-Litovsk land grab, so this idea of America coming in to save the day is going to be less prominent on top of less share of great power winner voice.

 

[Eusebio]

How do you create an independent Polish nation without taking territory that is recognised as part of the Russian Empire for over a century? How does Russia allow Poland to go without having it be an invitation for their other enserfed minority regions to want the same?

By 1917 Russia was disintegrating, political power was in the hands of socialists who were opposed to imperialism, and the previous Tsarist government as well as the new Provisional Government had already conceded to Polish independence in principle, the territory of which they hadn't controlled for several years. If the Tsar, Kerensky or whoever, decided to continue the war solely for the purpose of imperialist landgrabs in Poland or Turkey, in the face of opposition from the western allies, a mutinous army and a war weary populace, they would be overthrown very very quickly. The idea that a victorious Russia would be dictating terms to Wilson is a fantasy. The country was dependent on massive lines of British and French credit to stave off economic collapse.