Differences in WW1 aftermath due to the Red victory?

[Abdul Goatherd]

I agree about loyalty.
But at that point there was no loyalty to Emperor in trenches. Army started to rot even before he got deposed.
New (white) governments consisted of same old officers, bureaucrats and nobles. They were no different from old regime and failed to gain loyalty as they failed to address social issues.
All the reasons why Emperor got deposed were still there under Kerensky. How would he gain the loyalty from Army and regain discipline if the mobilized folk, peasants and workers mainly, killed officers or blatantly ignored them? Without solving land issue (and other ones) it would be impossible.
In short, in 1917 there was no loyalty available, not even Bolsheviks had an army to resist German offensive. And one of key reasons why Bolsheviks won was because of them being able to gain loyalty by radical solution of social issues, including land reform.

True. Loyalty needs to go both ways.

But the land issue is precisely one of the major reasons there were mass desertions from the frontline. Once talk of land reform was in the air, serf-soldiers are going to hurry home to claim their plots lest they miss out.

 

[Rubidium]

A "Russia doesn't collapse in 1917" scenario is almost certainly easier to pull off than a "Whites win the Civil War" scenario. The Whites were outnumbered, outgunned, and internally divided; it would take a miracle for them to seize control (and even that would probably just lead to another round of civil war between the various White factions).

On the other hand, if Russia can just stave off collapse, Germany is going to collapse fairly soon itself. The British blockade is literally starving them to death; every day the war continues is a day closer to total collapse.There's a reason that Germany, by 1917, was willing to take all sorts of crazy gambles: actively inciting a Communist revolution in a neighboring country, restarting unrestricted submarine warfare and risking US entry, and the all-out Spring Offensive; they knew that if they didn't get lucky soon, they were doomed. The remaining Central Powers were already on the brink of collapse: Austria-Hungary had been more or less crippled since the Brusilov Offensive, the Ottomans spent 1917 being driven out of the Sinai and Palestine, the Allied forces in Greece were threatening Bulgaria.

Assuming the Russians manage to beat back the October Revolution, they will certainly prioritize restoring control over their pre-war territory. Without the need for a cordon sanitaire to keep the Soviets away, the rest of the Entente have no interest in supporting independence for Poland/Finland/the Baltics/etc.

While the full Sevres terms probably won't go through, more of it will. In particular, you almost certainly do see an Armenian state carved out of what is now Eastern Turkey (either as a Russian "mandate" if we get something like the League of Nations mandate system, or merely a more traditional nominally-independent Russian puppet state if we don't). We might see a Kurdistan too. The internationalization of Istanbul almost certainly doesn't stick, but I expect that you do see significant modification of the terms of the Straits Convention to allow Russia greater access to the Mediterranean.

You still get a partition of Austria-Hungary, but Galicia probably goes to Russia as well (either directly or as another puppet state), to give a more defensible border along the Carpathians. Not sure how Germany shakes out.

 

[Taylor]

An interesting question. Russia's war aims during WW1 seem to not have been as ambitious as those of its allies. It seems they wanted, most of all, control over the Dardanelles strait and a southward shift of Russia's borders. They probably wanted more of Poland as well.

Since Russia did well against the Ottomans, and the allies were very keen to dismantle the OE, the Dardanelles objective would probably have been achieved, along with a nice and big Armenian client state. The UK had a while earlier decided that it didn't really mind if Russia had access to the Med, since in any naval battle between Russia and the UK in the Med, the UK would have a massive upper hand because of its naval bases. Better to fight them on 'home ground' then in a Russian lake!

In the proposed scenario, there was no Kerensky offensive and Russia managed to hold on on its Polish front by the skin of its teeth till the end of the war. By no means a very strong performance then. In fact, by the end of the war most of Poland, if not all, would probably still be occupied by the Central Powers, and the Russian military situation would be very weak. So any gains there would be purely because of Allied generosity.

One thing that is of interest is that the UK was both an ally and a rival of Russia - it was very happy that Russia had found an enemy to concentrate on to its West (Germany/Austria) because it removed some pressure off Central Asia. In fact some in the UK hoped that Germany would defeat Russia before being defeated by France and the UK. So if Russia survived the war, the UK would do its best to keep Russia's attention on its Western border and away from Central Asia. I think we might see the UK and USA arguing for an independent Poland carved out of Germany, Austria and Russia; it would be smaller than OTL interwar Poland because only Congress Poland would be taken from Russia. To keep Russia from feeling betrayed the Allies would then probably have to offer her more of Turkey and/or a larger influence in the Balkans. So I would guess a more extreme treaty of Sevres but perhaps a little more leniency towards Germany. The treaty of Sevres would probably be unenforceable, like it was in OTL.

 

[Yakman]

Well... let's say there's no 'Kerensky Offensive' and Lenin like, banana slips off the Finland Station.

I don't see Germany losing earlier, and w/o the defeat of the offensive, the Russian military is in a reasonable form (i.e. not dissolved) throughout 1917.

My question then is 1918. Does Kerensky go on the attack then? Does Germany collapse in 1918 after presumably NOT launching the Ludendorff offensives?

 

[Eusebio]

True. Loyalty needs to go both ways.

But the land issue is precisely one of the major reasons there were mass desertions from the frontline. Once talk of land reform was in the air, serf-soldiers are going to hurry home to claim their plots lest they miss out.

It didn't help that the very first act of the Petrograd Soviet post-February Revolution was to institute the election of soldier committees with control of weapons and the power to discipline officers.

 

[ramius3443]

I'm still inclined to say the war ends on schedule, if not a bit earlier, if Kerensky or some othet White holds on (no civil war): Germany is still dying for much the same reasons as historical, and while there is no Spring Offensive to drain them of their best and brightest, there is also a lot less troops on the Western front for the Allied '18 offenses. Germany's allies would almost certainly still collapse on schedule (its not like Austria's prospects would be improved by having th Eastern front still open), and with a faltering Western Front, a stagnated Eastern front, a riotous homefront, and every single ally falling in November/December, I fail to see how Germany makes it out of 1918.

Keeping the above assumption in mind, I'd postulate the following: Poland either gets autonomy or attempts a rebellion and is crushed underneath by the Russians. Poland not rising up and instead becomes a protectorate is my likely guess. All the other parts of the Empire remain in. Russia dominates affairs in Romania, I have no idea about Bulgaria. Greece doesn't lose to Turkey in 1922 thanks to Russian support, in exchange for defacto Russian control of the strait and Greece falling into Russia's orbit. I'd assume that the former Austro-Hungarian Empire turns out much the same as it did in history, albeit with some slight border differences between Czechoslovakia and Poland due to their probably not being a border war.

Not sure about this one, but I'll also make an interwar guess. Instead of a French-interwar alliance web in Central Europe, Franco-Russian alliance would dominate. Terms of Versailles probably harsher to Germany (especially in enforcement), but not territorially.

 

[olm]

My guess for "Kerensky holds out until Central-Powers collapse":

Russia gets all Polish and Ukrainian majority areas of Austria-Hungary, and also some Polish majority border areas from Germany but less than independent Poland received historically, no Polish corridor. If Poles are lucky they may get some Finland style autonomy arrangement, if not then they simply will be suppressed under Russian boot.

Czechoslovakia would be still created but slightly smaller, no Carpathian Ruthenia and possibly also somewhat less Hungarian areas at south as British would want to limit a country that inevitably is going to end up in Russian sphere of influence. Roughly same story with Romania, mostly historical but obviously no Bessarabia, and possibly slightly less from Hungary. Quite unsure about Italy-Yugoslavia in this scenario, so going to assume roughly historical outcome.

Russia definitely would want presence in Dardanelles but not sure how it would actually look in practice. Maybe Russia annexes Dardanelles directly so they can establish Port Arthur on Mediterranean, while most of the European Ottoman areas including Constantinople become officially Greek but in Russian sphere similar like Manchuria before 1905.

Armenian areas would be separated from Ottoman Empire but dunno the exact arrangement, maybe formally independent Armenian state under Russian influence, or maybe some Finland style autonomy within Russia.

 

[Herbert West]

And the UK and France (and the US) agree to this total Russian domination of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe why?

 

[olm]

And the UK and France (and the US) agree to this total Russian domination of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe why?

Well, the question is how could that be prevented? Brits could be willing to show more leniency towards Germany, but that would still be very much limited by French and Russians trying to weaken it as much as possible. Austria-Hungary seems beyond salvage. What else, prop up Italian presence in Balkans to counterbalance Russia?

 

[Wagonlitz]

possibly also somewhat less Hungarian areas at south as British would want to limit a country that inevitably is going to end up in Russian sphere of influence

Preßburg to Austria perhaps? It is close to Wien after all and wasn't it still majority German at this time?

 

[Herbert West]

Well, the question is how could that be prevented? Brits could be willing to show more leniency towards Germany, but that would still be very much limited by French and Russians trying to weaken it as much as possible. Austria-Hungary seems beyond salvage.

In late 1918, maybe. But even in mid-1918, the dissolution was not a given.

 

[Wagonlitz]

In late 1918, maybe. But even in mid-1918, the dissolution was not a given.

Interesting. What changed in those months? Were there huge setbacks or something?
I thought that the Italian front finally was moving in Austrian favour towards the end of the war.

 

[Taylor]

Well, the question is how could that be prevented? Brits could be willing to show more leniency towards Germany, but that would still be very much limited by French and Russians trying to weaken it as much as possible. Austria-Hungary seems beyond salvage. What else, prop up Italian presence in Balkans to counterbalance Russia?

But if we assume Russia only managed to not collapse until the end of WW1, then Poland would actually not be under their control at the time of the armistice, and Russia would still be on the brink of revolution. A popular revolt by Poles could seriously challenge Russia at that point.

 

[fr-rein]

Well, the question is how could that be prevented? Brits could be willing to show more leniency towards Germany, but that would still be very much limited by French and Russians trying to weaken it as much as possible. Austria-Hungary seems beyond salvage. What else, prop up Italian presence in Balkans to counterbalance Russia?

How would Russia take back Poland then? Start a war against it? Or hold Straits and Armenia against Ataturk?
Russia, even if not collapsing, would be even more pathetic than Italy (and effectively without an army and on a brink of civil war), which was in a far better shape and didn't stop effectively fighting in war in 1917.
I don't even mention that (before Germans came) Ukraine already made a separate government and demanded to be autonomous country like Poland or Finland used to be, which happened after October Revolution and the end of Russian Constituent Assembly.

In short, Russia was in no shape to take back it's own territory, much less to take other spoils of war, being in a situation similar to Italy, but much worse. Even if Entente for some reason would have pro-russian diplomatic stance, they would need to send in armies to help Russia to restore control, become a huger empire and give it priceless geopolitical prize like Straits.

 

[Herbert West]

Interesting. What changed in those months? Were there huge setbacks or something?
I thought that the Italian front finally was moving in Austrian favour towards the end of the war.

You mean apart from the total collapse of the Macedonian Front, the very strong upsurge in nationalist feeling in the south (and east) of the empire as a consequence, and the failure of the italian front?

Nothing much.

 

[Wagonlitz]

You mean apart from the total collapse of the Macedonian Front, the very strong upsurge in nationalist feeling in the south (and east) of the empire as a consequence, and the failure of the italian front?

Nothing much.

Forgot about Macedonia.

Though, didn't the Italian front go well?

 

[Taylor]

Forgot about Macedonia.

Though, didn't the Italian front go well?

In the beginning of the year yes, but after that it was again a very costly stalemate. Near the end the Italians really surged ahead but by that point Austria-Hungary was already falling apart anyway.

 

[olm]

How would Russia take back Poland then? Start a war against it?

Pretty much. Russians don't really need some exceptional military performance in this case, they simply need to mount an offensive before Poles manage to build up their armed forces which is a fairly low bar. While Poles would definitely put up some resistance, I honestly can't see them prevailing, simply not enough time to build up defences.

Or hold Straits and Armenia against Ataturk?

They don't need to 1v1 Ataturk, they simply need to contribute enough so that in Turks vs Greeks the balance shifts in favour of latter.

I don't even mention that (before Germans came) Ukraine already made a separate government and demanded to be autonomous country like Poland or Finland used to be, which happened after October Revolution and the end of Russian Constituent Assembly.

And that Ukrainian project failed to take off despite Russia suffering the worst disaster imaginable, because Ukrainians didn't manage to build up sufficient armed forces before their enemies came knocking at door. Governments are cheap and easy to form, it is armies that are hard to build requiring time and resources.

 

[olm]

In late 1918, maybe. But even in mid-1918, the dissolution was not a given.

So what would you see potential borders and government structure of this surviving entity be? Western-Allies can't really deny giving at least some AH clay to all their allies bordering it. I also have an impression that Hungarians were never super enthusiastic about whole AH project, although admittedly my knowledge on the issue is fairly limited.

 

[fr-rein]

Pretty much. Russians don't really need some exceptional military performance in this case, they simply need to mount an offensive before Poles manage to build up their armed forces which is a fairly low bar.

This is a very bold statement which assumes that Russia would retain a military that was willing to fight in foreign wars while being on the brink of civil war.

There was a financial crisis, lack of rifles, ammunition, artillery, shells, provision, most of those were imported yet still lacking, close to the level of Central powers rather rest of Entente. No loyalty, angered people, no thousands volunteers like for the Bolsheviks, army loses and crumbles.

What kind of miracle would it require for Russia to do that? I don't even mention Haller's Army as a part of Entente's efforts to arm Poland which was already stronger than Red Army, which was effectively most what Russia could muster at that time. Unless Entente would want to give Russia and Italy proper victory rewards and maybe support Ottomans while at it and hang Atatürk on Byzantine revival day.