I didn't initially plan to write such a long post. But I realized there was so much I wanted to say. This is going to be an extremely long and massive post. Let's get started.
I didn't expect that I would need to write so many parts, so I've decided to create a table of contents.
Part I: Why China is Called "China," the Boundaries of China's Territorial Expansion, and the Reasons Behind Millennia of Conflict Between Agriculture and Pastoralism
Let’s first address the first question: Why is it called “China”?
As seen on a topographic map of East Asia, China occupies a relatively isolated geographical environment. To its west lies the world’s highest plateau—the Tibetan Plateau—and the second-largest shifting desert; to the north stretches the vast and barren Mongolian steppe. To the east, it faces the world’s largest ocean, while to the south are the world’s third-largest peninsula and its largest archipelago.
For ancient Chinese, their homeland was the best place in the world—an unquestionable and self-evident Celestial Empire. In contrast, the smaller civilizations surrounding them paled in comparison.
.png "china(1).png")
I’ve roughly outlined the core regions conducive to early civilization development in different colors. It’s evident that China’s core area was significantly larger than those of other regions. Only the Indian subcontinent, located on the far side of the Tibetan Plateau, could rival China’s core in scale.
Although the Central Asian civilization zone marked in blue isn’t small in size, it consists mostly of mountains and deserts, making it incapable of forming a civilization strong enough to rival early Chinese dynasties.
Thus, once ancient China achieved unification, it would immediately exert immense pressure on its surroundings and embark on outward expansion. The surrounding small states and early civilizations were utterly incapable of resisting this Leviathan and could only be devoured and annihilated by it.
This leads us to the second question: Where are the boundaries, or the limits, of China's expansion? What is meant by the term "imperial barrier"?
When we overlay the territories of all Chinese dynasties, we can roughly identify this region — representing the maximum extent of military expansion that Chinese dynasties could potentially achieve under extremely ideal conditions. We observe that these frontiers were invariably blocked by massive mountain ranges and water bodies, or by tropical rainforests.
.png "asian(1).png")
In times of imperial zenith, an empire could expand its borders far beyond its core, creating unstable frontier zones beyond the natural barriers—mountains, rivers, deserts, and rainforests—as shown on the map. These areas served as buffer zones between vassal states and regions under stable military control.
However, during periods of imperial decline, these buffer zones would rapidly shrink or be lost, retracting to a more stable territorial core. Should the empire weaken further, it would contract back to its heartland.
.png "asian(2).png")
Here’s my rough sketch of the relatively stable territories versus the contracted core regions. We can observe that these boundaries are also delineated by mountain ranges. The relatively stable territories resemble the territorial extent of the Qing Dynasty, which reached its maximum expansion during the modern era. By then, global dynamics had shifted, preventing the Qing from projecting power beyond those formidable natural barriers.
The shape of the core region mirrors what we see in Europa Universalis IV for the Ming Dynasty (some dynasties fell in 1644, but others had already lost peripheral territories by 1444). This represents a dynasty in full defensive posture, where the border lies mere tens of kilometers from the core, shielded by mountains and deserts. Such contraction could result either from a deliberate choice to conserve strength or from catastrophic losses that severed control over distant regions.
Beyond the above, we can also observe that the contraction of Chinese dynastic territories in the south was relatively minor, whereas the northwest experienced disproportionately large losses. This disparity stems from the South’s proximity to China’s core regions. After the Yangtze River basin was developed, the Nanling Mountains—which separate Guangdong and Guangxi from the north—proved less formidable than other natural barriers. Moreover, Guangdong and Guangxi lacked expansive central plains to rival the economic and military might of the Yangtze region. In contrast, Vietnam possessed a larger core plain, enabling it to break free from Chinese control when opportunities arose.
Yunnan’s relative stability under Chinese rule, however, was due to the local tusi (tribal chieftains). The most secure pivot of Chinese influence in the southwest was Sichuan, particularly the Chengdu Plain. Beyond Sichuan, expansion southward was hindered by rugged terrain and complex geography. Compared to Guangdong and Guangxi, Yunnan enjoyed greater autonomy—but its fragmented landscape also prevented the emergence of a strong, unified regime capable of challenging the Central Plains dynasties. The only exceptions were the Nanzhao and Dali kingdoms (circa Tang to Yuan dynasties), which remained politically decentralized. Once these smaller power centers were dismantled, the southwest devolved into a patchwork of tusi polities too fractured to resist central authority. They could only remain semi-dependent on the empire.
China’s influence here resembled the mandala systems of Burma or Siam, albeit on a vastly larger scale. This expansive mandala extended Chinese reach deep into the Zomia highlands.
In the northwest, particularly in Xinjiang, the primary geographical barrier was the desolate, uninhabited deserts. Thus, Central Plains dynasties only needed to seize a few key strongholds to gain access to the Hexi Corridor and reach the Tarim Basin. The Tarim Basin has always been sparsely populated, making it impossible to resist the Central Plains. Moreover, since the Silk Road passed through this region, Central Plains dynasties often exerted pressure here to secure necessary trade revenues. Consequently, the northwest’s borders fluctuated dramatically over time.
Regarding the Tibetan Plateau, it became part of the empire’s sphere of influence after the Yuan Dynasty. Like Xinjiang, the plateau was sparsely populated, with vast uninhabited areas (such as Qiangtang), and its main population centers concentrated in the southern river valleys. Although difficult to march through and lacking supply lines, the Tang-Tibet Ancient Road allowed for rapid military campaigns to seize these population hubs.
The northern grasslands, however, were another region of extreme fluctuation. The vast steppes were hard to control, as there were few cities to serve as administrative centers. Thus, the grasslands were often the first to be lost by Chinese dynasties. This ties into the third issue: the millennia-long conflict between agriculture and pastoralism, which we will discuss later.
Because nomads lacked fixed settlements, Central Plains dynasties struggled to maintain long-term control over the steppe regions. Control depended heavily on the personal decisions of local rulers. The exception was the Qing Dynasty, which stabilized the grasslands by becoming the Khan of Mongolia and securing legitimacy through marriage alliances with the Golden Lineage (descendants of Genghis Khan). By transforming nomads into semi-sedentary herders, the Qing successfully anchored the steppe peoples, ensuring firm control over the northern grasslands.
Finally, cold Northeast Asia was difficult to control before the Tang Dynasty, as the Liaoxi Corridor had not yet risen from the sea. During the Tang, Chinese dynasties began extending their influence into the region. Before this, expansion northward was slow, relying on the Liao River waterways. After the Liao Marshes disappeared, land-based expansion became possible, and during the Liao and Jin Dynasties, Northeast Asia was developed and incorporated as core territory. However, the Yuan Dynasty later destroyed many settled cities, leading to a collapse. Although the Ming Dynasty made some efforts, the Little Ice Age and the Qing Dynasty’s forced relocations ultimately rendered these efforts futile.
For Northeast Asia, it has always been a relatively forgotten land. The primary threats to Chinese dynasties never came from the northeast. Thus, the Qing chose to relocate populations inward... and then Russia arrived in the Far East.
In conclusion, control over Northeast Asia depended on whether the Central Plains dynasties sought to develop it. If they did, it could become core territory within a few centuries. If not, like other regions, it would gradually be lost as national power waned.
Based on the above analysis, we can conclude that the boundaries of China's expansion and the so-called "imperial barriers" largely coincide with the territorial extent of the Qing Dynasty, with only minor adjustments.
The imperial barriers were primarily determined by two factors: the limits of military control and the limits of information transmission. Imagine you're an emperor of China—if your orders take over a month to reach the frontier regions, effective governance becomes unstable. Beyond the limits of information transmission lies the limit of military control, which typically extends slightly farther. Armies stationed here can suppress unrest and maintain order in unstable areas. However, troop movements require food and supplies, and without passing through relatively prosperous regions, the logistical burden of feeding a large army becomes staggering. According to ancient Chinese records, a supply wagon carrying 100 jin (approximately 50 kg) of grain would have only about 5 jin left after a month's journey—this marks the outer limit of military control.
Thus, apart from the relatively weak Song Dynasty, all Chinese dynasties eventually reached their expansion limits and encountered these unbreachable imperial barriers.
Now, let's move on to Part III: The Millennia-Long Struggle Between Agriculture and Pastoralism.
First, let’s examine the following set of maps, which illustrate:
.png "1 (1).png")
.png "1 (2).png")
.png "1 (3).png")
.png "1 (4).png")
.png "1 (5).png")
We can observe a striking similarity among these maps, revealing that climate profoundly shaped China's history and the trajectory of its civilization. Climate dictated where nomadic lifestyles thrived and where sedentary agriculture took root.
The millennia-long struggle between agriculture and pastoralism essentially revolved around this faint yet decisive climatic boundary. This line marked not only the outer limit of arable farming but also the optimal grasslands essential for nomadic herding. Neither side could concede this territory—there was no room for peaceful coexistence. It was a fight for survival, a zero-sum contest.
The intensity of this conflict depended on the harshness of the climate and temperature fluctuations. Over thousands of years, the territorial reach of nomadic empires and Central Plains dynasties expanded and contracted in tandem with rainfall patterns and temperature shifts.
We must recognize a crucial fact: nomadic peoples could not naturally form large-scale nomadic empires. Due to the inherent challenges of centralized management among nomads, the world's first fully developed, large-scale nomadic empire was none other than the Xiongnu. (The Scythians, while significant, do not qualify as a fully mature, large-scale nomadic empire.)
The rise of the Xiongnu Empire occurred shortly after the formation of the Qin Dynasty. Prior to this, nomadic tribes in northern China lacked the incentive to form centralized empires. The very catalyst for the creation of nomadic empires was, paradoxically, the unification of China. The energy unleashed by a unified agrarian civilization drove nomads from their beloved grasslands and disrupted the raiding patterns of smaller tribal groups. To survive, nomads were forced to abandon their traditional ways and form massive empires to counterbalance the agrarian states—a concept known as the "Mirror Empire Theory."
The stronger the agrarian empire, the more powerful the nomadic empire it would spawn. Thus, at the far eastern edge of Asia, the agrarian leviathan and the nomadic behemoth engaged in two millennia of bloody conflict—until Europeans reshaped the world.
Throughout this struggle, the agrarian empires often emerged victorious. Their superior economies, larger armies, and greater populations gave them the upper hand. Yet, their victories were always temporary. Agrarian empires could never penetrate, control, or settle the steppes, nor could they establish cities there. Thus, while they consistently defeated nomadic empires, they could never eradicate nomadism itself. Once an agrarian empire weakened, the nomads would inevitably resurge, sparking new cycles of conflict.
This also meant that nomadic empires depended on the existence of agrarian empires. When an agrarian empire collapsed, nomadic empires would soon lose their cohesion and disintegrate as well.
For instance, when the Ming Dynasty fell, the Mongols, who had opposed the Ming for two centuries, were completely crushed and absorbed by the Qing Dynasty. Similarly, the rise of the Qing coincided with the emergence of the Zunghar Khanate, the last and most powerful nomadic empire in Asia.
There are only two ways to end this endless cycle:
I've now completed a rough overview of the first part. Next, I'll update the second part, which will cover:
I didn't expect that I would need to write so many parts, so I've decided to create a table of contents.
- Part II: The Reasons for the Emergence of the Southern and Northern Dynasties in China.
- The first question: The geographical factors behind the Southern and Northern Dynasties.
- The second question: Why were the southern dynasties generally on the defensive and why did their northern expeditions often end in failure?
- The third question: Why is it essential to defend the Huai River in order to defend the Yangtze River?
Part I: Why China is Called "China," the Boundaries of China's Territorial Expansion, and the Reasons Behind Millennia of Conflict Between Agriculture and Pastoralism
Let’s first address the first question: Why is it called “China”?
As seen on a topographic map of East Asia, China occupies a relatively isolated geographical environment. To its west lies the world’s highest plateau—the Tibetan Plateau—and the second-largest shifting desert; to the north stretches the vast and barren Mongolian steppe. To the east, it faces the world’s largest ocean, while to the south are the world’s third-largest peninsula and its largest archipelago.
For ancient Chinese, their homeland was the best place in the world—an unquestionable and self-evident Celestial Empire. In contrast, the smaller civilizations surrounding them paled in comparison.
I’ve roughly outlined the core regions conducive to early civilization development in different colors. It’s evident that China’s core area was significantly larger than those of other regions. Only the Indian subcontinent, located on the far side of the Tibetan Plateau, could rival China’s core in scale.
Although the Central Asian civilization zone marked in blue isn’t small in size, it consists mostly of mountains and deserts, making it incapable of forming a civilization strong enough to rival early Chinese dynasties.
Thus, once ancient China achieved unification, it would immediately exert immense pressure on its surroundings and embark on outward expansion. The surrounding small states and early civilizations were utterly incapable of resisting this Leviathan and could only be devoured and annihilated by it.
This leads us to the second question: Where are the boundaries, or the limits, of China's expansion? What is meant by the term "imperial barrier"?
When we overlay the territories of all Chinese dynasties, we can roughly identify this region — representing the maximum extent of military expansion that Chinese dynasties could potentially achieve under extremely ideal conditions. We observe that these frontiers were invariably blocked by massive mountain ranges and water bodies, or by tropical rainforests.
In times of imperial zenith, an empire could expand its borders far beyond its core, creating unstable frontier zones beyond the natural barriers—mountains, rivers, deserts, and rainforests—as shown on the map. These areas served as buffer zones between vassal states and regions under stable military control.
However, during periods of imperial decline, these buffer zones would rapidly shrink or be lost, retracting to a more stable territorial core. Should the empire weaken further, it would contract back to its heartland.
Here’s my rough sketch of the relatively stable territories versus the contracted core regions. We can observe that these boundaries are also delineated by mountain ranges. The relatively stable territories resemble the territorial extent of the Qing Dynasty, which reached its maximum expansion during the modern era. By then, global dynamics had shifted, preventing the Qing from projecting power beyond those formidable natural barriers.
The shape of the core region mirrors what we see in Europa Universalis IV for the Ming Dynasty (some dynasties fell in 1644, but others had already lost peripheral territories by 1444). This represents a dynasty in full defensive posture, where the border lies mere tens of kilometers from the core, shielded by mountains and deserts. Such contraction could result either from a deliberate choice to conserve strength or from catastrophic losses that severed control over distant regions.
Beyond the above, we can also observe that the contraction of Chinese dynastic territories in the south was relatively minor, whereas the northwest experienced disproportionately large losses. This disparity stems from the South’s proximity to China’s core regions. After the Yangtze River basin was developed, the Nanling Mountains—which separate Guangdong and Guangxi from the north—proved less formidable than other natural barriers. Moreover, Guangdong and Guangxi lacked expansive central plains to rival the economic and military might of the Yangtze region. In contrast, Vietnam possessed a larger core plain, enabling it to break free from Chinese control when opportunities arose.
Yunnan’s relative stability under Chinese rule, however, was due to the local tusi (tribal chieftains). The most secure pivot of Chinese influence in the southwest was Sichuan, particularly the Chengdu Plain. Beyond Sichuan, expansion southward was hindered by rugged terrain and complex geography. Compared to Guangdong and Guangxi, Yunnan enjoyed greater autonomy—but its fragmented landscape also prevented the emergence of a strong, unified regime capable of challenging the Central Plains dynasties. The only exceptions were the Nanzhao and Dali kingdoms (circa Tang to Yuan dynasties), which remained politically decentralized. Once these smaller power centers were dismantled, the southwest devolved into a patchwork of tusi polities too fractured to resist central authority. They could only remain semi-dependent on the empire.
China’s influence here resembled the mandala systems of Burma or Siam, albeit on a vastly larger scale. This expansive mandala extended Chinese reach deep into the Zomia highlands.
In the northwest, particularly in Xinjiang, the primary geographical barrier was the desolate, uninhabited deserts. Thus, Central Plains dynasties only needed to seize a few key strongholds to gain access to the Hexi Corridor and reach the Tarim Basin. The Tarim Basin has always been sparsely populated, making it impossible to resist the Central Plains. Moreover, since the Silk Road passed through this region, Central Plains dynasties often exerted pressure here to secure necessary trade revenues. Consequently, the northwest’s borders fluctuated dramatically over time.
Regarding the Tibetan Plateau, it became part of the empire’s sphere of influence after the Yuan Dynasty. Like Xinjiang, the plateau was sparsely populated, with vast uninhabited areas (such as Qiangtang), and its main population centers concentrated in the southern river valleys. Although difficult to march through and lacking supply lines, the Tang-Tibet Ancient Road allowed for rapid military campaigns to seize these population hubs.
The northern grasslands, however, were another region of extreme fluctuation. The vast steppes were hard to control, as there were few cities to serve as administrative centers. Thus, the grasslands were often the first to be lost by Chinese dynasties. This ties into the third issue: the millennia-long conflict between agriculture and pastoralism, which we will discuss later.
Because nomads lacked fixed settlements, Central Plains dynasties struggled to maintain long-term control over the steppe regions. Control depended heavily on the personal decisions of local rulers. The exception was the Qing Dynasty, which stabilized the grasslands by becoming the Khan of Mongolia and securing legitimacy through marriage alliances with the Golden Lineage (descendants of Genghis Khan). By transforming nomads into semi-sedentary herders, the Qing successfully anchored the steppe peoples, ensuring firm control over the northern grasslands.
Finally, cold Northeast Asia was difficult to control before the Tang Dynasty, as the Liaoxi Corridor had not yet risen from the sea. During the Tang, Chinese dynasties began extending their influence into the region. Before this, expansion northward was slow, relying on the Liao River waterways. After the Liao Marshes disappeared, land-based expansion became possible, and during the Liao and Jin Dynasties, Northeast Asia was developed and incorporated as core territory. However, the Yuan Dynasty later destroyed many settled cities, leading to a collapse. Although the Ming Dynasty made some efforts, the Little Ice Age and the Qing Dynasty’s forced relocations ultimately rendered these efforts futile.
For Northeast Asia, it has always been a relatively forgotten land. The primary threats to Chinese dynasties never came from the northeast. Thus, the Qing chose to relocate populations inward... and then Russia arrived in the Far East.
In conclusion, control over Northeast Asia depended on whether the Central Plains dynasties sought to develop it. If they did, it could become core territory within a few centuries. If not, like other regions, it would gradually be lost as national power waned.
Based on the above analysis, we can conclude that the boundaries of China's expansion and the so-called "imperial barriers" largely coincide with the territorial extent of the Qing Dynasty, with only minor adjustments.
The imperial barriers were primarily determined by two factors: the limits of military control and the limits of information transmission. Imagine you're an emperor of China—if your orders take over a month to reach the frontier regions, effective governance becomes unstable. Beyond the limits of information transmission lies the limit of military control, which typically extends slightly farther. Armies stationed here can suppress unrest and maintain order in unstable areas. However, troop movements require food and supplies, and without passing through relatively prosperous regions, the logistical burden of feeding a large army becomes staggering. According to ancient Chinese records, a supply wagon carrying 100 jin (approximately 50 kg) of grain would have only about 5 jin left after a month's journey—this marks the outer limit of military control.
Thus, apart from the relatively weak Song Dynasty, all Chinese dynasties eventually reached their expansion limits and encountered these unbreachable imperial barriers.
Now, let's move on to Part III: The Millennia-Long Struggle Between Agriculture and Pastoralism.
First, let’s examine the following set of maps, which illustrate:
- The boundary between China's agricultural and pastoral regions
- The arid-humid divide
- Rainfall distribution boundaries
- The division between monsoon and non-monsoon regions
- The separation of endorheic (internal drainage) and exorheic (external drainage) basins
- Temperature zone demarcations
We can observe a striking similarity among these maps, revealing that climate profoundly shaped China's history and the trajectory of its civilization. Climate dictated where nomadic lifestyles thrived and where sedentary agriculture took root.
The millennia-long struggle between agriculture and pastoralism essentially revolved around this faint yet decisive climatic boundary. This line marked not only the outer limit of arable farming but also the optimal grasslands essential for nomadic herding. Neither side could concede this territory—there was no room for peaceful coexistence. It was a fight for survival, a zero-sum contest.
The intensity of this conflict depended on the harshness of the climate and temperature fluctuations. Over thousands of years, the territorial reach of nomadic empires and Central Plains dynasties expanded and contracted in tandem with rainfall patterns and temperature shifts.
We must recognize a crucial fact: nomadic peoples could not naturally form large-scale nomadic empires. Due to the inherent challenges of centralized management among nomads, the world's first fully developed, large-scale nomadic empire was none other than the Xiongnu. (The Scythians, while significant, do not qualify as a fully mature, large-scale nomadic empire.)
The rise of the Xiongnu Empire occurred shortly after the formation of the Qin Dynasty. Prior to this, nomadic tribes in northern China lacked the incentive to form centralized empires. The very catalyst for the creation of nomadic empires was, paradoxically, the unification of China. The energy unleashed by a unified agrarian civilization drove nomads from their beloved grasslands and disrupted the raiding patterns of smaller tribal groups. To survive, nomads were forced to abandon their traditional ways and form massive empires to counterbalance the agrarian states—a concept known as the "Mirror Empire Theory."
The stronger the agrarian empire, the more powerful the nomadic empire it would spawn. Thus, at the far eastern edge of Asia, the agrarian leviathan and the nomadic behemoth engaged in two millennia of bloody conflict—until Europeans reshaped the world.
Throughout this struggle, the agrarian empires often emerged victorious. Their superior economies, larger armies, and greater populations gave them the upper hand. Yet, their victories were always temporary. Agrarian empires could never penetrate, control, or settle the steppes, nor could they establish cities there. Thus, while they consistently defeated nomadic empires, they could never eradicate nomadism itself. Once an agrarian empire weakened, the nomads would inevitably resurge, sparking new cycles of conflict.
This also meant that nomadic empires depended on the existence of agrarian empires. When an agrarian empire collapsed, nomadic empires would soon lose their cohesion and disintegrate as well.
For instance, when the Ming Dynasty fell, the Mongols, who had opposed the Ming for two centuries, were completely crushed and absorbed by the Qing Dynasty. Similarly, the rise of the Qing coincided with the emergence of the Zunghar Khanate, the last and most powerful nomadic empire in Asia.
There are only two ways to end this endless cycle:
- Summon Einstein from the world of *Command & Conquer: Red Alert* and invent a weather control device.
- Let technological progress render all else obsolete, as industrialization supersedes everything.
I've now completed a rough overview of the first part. Next, I'll update the second part, which will cover:
- Why some regional factions in China's provinces succeeded while others failed
- How to unify China amidst fragmentation
- Where rebellions first broke out
- The rationale behind the policies of the Song, Ming, and Qing Dynasties
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