Chapter Twenty-Eight: To Fish or Cut Bait?
(January-February 1943)
The remote town of Altay, final objective of the Allied offensive in Sinkiang. Will the Poles continue their bold breakout operation into early 1943, or cut their losses and leave the theatre to their Allies?.
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January 1943: A Bold Dash
8 DP had been forced to retreat south on 28 December by a Fascist attack and was then engaged as the year drew to a close by a Japanese attack from the east. The exhausted Poles were on a hiding to nothing here and were at risk of being cut off. They were ordered to withdraw on the first morning of the new year. It would take them a couple of days before they could break contact.
In the north, the Poles had decided they would continue to exploit the gap they had forced in the enemy’s lines. 2 DP advanced into it late on 7 January. This opened up an even wider gap – on the approaches to Altay. 2 DP secured the breakthrough while more forces followed on slowly behind in the slow and difficult winter conditions.
After receiving expert advice from Allied consultants, Poland undertook to extend the rail line that brought supplies from the Raj to Sinkiang from Peshawar to Northern Kashmir, though it’s commencement would need to wait until a couple of domestic projects were completed.
In the east, by mid-month the Allies had taken over and considerably strengthened the screen that extended from Xibei San Ma north to Communist-occupied Sinkiang. This included one French and two German mountain divisions. The Allies were in the process of trying to destroy a cut-off Sinkiang division. 8 DP was still on its way back.
At 0200hr on 19 January, the Polish mountain troops of 22 DP Górskiej (DPG) finally arrived at the front and were sent in to reinforce the ongoing German attack on the south of the Western Pocket. They reinforced quickly and by that afternoon were adding their expertise to the unsuited German panzer division that had been leading the assault.
This coincided with the Germans making an attack north from Urumqi with two well organised infantry divisions against a single weaker Sinkiang formation
[73% progress]. Poland would continue to fish with their colleagues in western China, for now anyway.
On 22 January the Poles had extended the Altay breakthrough without encountering any opposition. Around the pocket, the enemy tried to break out again but were beaten back with very heavy casualties by the 24th. The southern pocket attack continued and would not be won until early the following month after another gruelling battle.
Late in the month, the new fuel silo was completed in Gdynia and another commenced, allowing excess production to now be stored for future demands, the first of the railway expansions in the east having been finished.
The next round of R&R began the same day, as the first of the disorganised and under-strength Polish divisions were withdraw to the supply base in Kashmir.
Excitement mounted when 28 DP arrived just south of Altay to find it unoccupied. They began a river crossing operation but it would take an estimated eight and a half days to take the last Sinkiang stronghold.
As January ended, the PRC still held the strategic initiative in Asia, the Fascists held on grimly and the Allies were still trying to knock Sinkiang out of the war.
Indochina remained in stalemate, as did Sulawesi where the previous Allied advance had been rolled back to the narrow northern peninsula.
February 1943: Never Say Die
The beginning of February saw Polish infantry equipment upgraded to 1943 standards, with the replacement process begun with some residual production efficiency on the production line.
Two more divisions (8 and 32 DP) were added to the R&R program on 3 February. By then, the battle for the south of the Pocket had been won the day before and the German and Polish troops had occupied the province.
The enemy tried to attack the base of the Polish breakout on the 4th, two divisions attacking a very weak German panzer division. Still, the Poles pushed on to Altay as best they could.
And their persistence over all those months was finally rewarded when Altay fell late on the 7th, with just the one Kwantung EF left fighting for the fascists in the west of Sinkiang.
Sinkiang duly capitulated, tendering their surrender to British representatives at the beginning of 8 January 1943. Some previously secure territory remained in nominal Chinese hands, the rest fell under British occupation.
Officials of the exiled Nationalist Chinese government convene a meeting of local administrators in Urumqi after the fascist surrender on 8 February 1943.
With the decision made to continue operations in Sinkiang, a new extension on the Peshawar rail line was put into the construction queue, while work would start next from Urumqi on a linking branch line, once the next fuel silo in Gdynia was completed.
17 DP – in a very weakened state – was the next division sent to the rear from the eastern sector for R&R that afternoon.
The next day, the reorientation of Polish forces in Sinkiang continued with the two mountain divisions redirected for duty in the mountains on the northern border with Xibei San Ma.
The national focus on AT guns was completed on 16 February, with artillery getting the next focus of Polish attention.
By 20 February, work had begun on the next Peshawar line extension.
A few days later, the supply situation in occupied Sinkiang showed signs of gradual improvement in the rear areas, though none yet in the south-eastern sector.
As the month drew to a close, rested Polish divisions began to their return to the front, though this time they would march slowly in order to maintain organisation, as the timetable was not urgent: perhaps supply may have improved a little more by the time they got there.
Summaries
The PRC was currently concentrating on fighting The Asian League in XSM and the south-east corner where the Guangxi Clique was being pressed back relentlessly. The new Imperial Kwantung capital had been established in Taipei and their remaining forces still fought on in western Sinkiang, south-eastern China and Indochina.
The Chamdo Pocket had not only held out strongly for the last two months, but the small rump Nationalist administration had actually managed to deploy two new divisions to assist the four trapped Allied formations in the meantime.
On the front to the north of XSM, a strong Allied build up was under way, while the Communists had shown no intent yet to push west against the Allies: they seemed more concerned with eliminating the Ma Fascists.
In Sinkiang, the last Kwantung EF still held out in the west under Allied pressure as other forces – Polish and British – headed east to re-establish a forwards screen in the newly claimed Sinkiang territory claimed by the UK on their capitulation.
Both sides seemed bogged down in defensive lines at the narrowest point of French Indochina.
As was also the case in northern Sulawesi, where both sides appeared in poor condition.
The Polish equipment stockpile remained in surplus over most important categories, though a few had long upgrade queues to fill.
The next rail extensions for Urumqi – heading south-east to the new main front – and the Peshawar line were put onto the drawing boards.
The war essentially remained confined to four theatres in Asia: western and south-eastern China, Indochina and Sulawesi. The Asian League seemed to be close to strategic defeat, but may still have some stubborn resistance left in it. The war on Communism was now evenly poised in terms of progress, with Mao’s PRC and Japan still in the ascendant.
Reports on the two great powers who remained neutral were provided by the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw. There was still no firm indication from either the USR or US that they may be considering an imminent entry into the war. As expected, estimate saw the Soviets with the larger land strength and the US in naval power, while both had comparably sized air forces.
Estimates of US industrial capacity, which were more accurate, showed they had greater overall capacity, though a smaller proportion than the Soviets invested in military production. Naturally, they retained a healthy lead in naval production capacity, while the USR had by far the larger manpower reserves.
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