Poles Apart – an HOI4 Ahistory

[Bullfilter]

Gotta start next week

That’s the plan

 

[jak7139]

In Crimea, the entire peninsula had been secured by midday on 19 May as the majority of the units involved began redeploying north to assist with the Azov-Donetsk offensive. Kerch would be secured but there were no plans to attempt pushing across the strait as the Soviets quickly built their defences on the other side of the significant obstacle.

I think "b" is the shortcut key for moving via rail. It's really good to use in offensives like this. And division org recovers relatively quickly.

advances were being made but no more dramatic breakthroughs or encirclements were in immediate prospect.

I would go for Rostov next, then Stalingrad, then Astrakhan. It cuts off the entire Soviet Middle East/Caucasus front. They'll have no supply, so you can then swing everything north while still pushing towards Moscow with what you can spare.

In the northern sector, the brief Allied thrust to link up with northern Belarus had been thrown back and Narva remained in Soviet hands. The Allies still held Pskov but once more – to resigned Polish frustration – the bulk of their forces had pulled back to lurk in depth, perhaps transferring out again.

If you have any extra divisions, maybe sending some here for more breakthroughs could help.

The High Command would soon need to decide whether the next phase would see an attempt at a general advance or a more targeted series of encirclements.

Encircling is always better, especially if you want to minimize casualties and equipment losses.

How did you end up making this equipment picture? Very nicely done!

 

[SSmith]

The Allies still held Pskov but once more – to resigned Polish frustration – the bulk of their forces had pulled back to lurk in depth, perhaps transferring out again.

Very disappointing since a little earlier the Allies appeared to have moved a lot of those divisions in Estonia forward to the front line.

Drawing back even further, ground gained since the start of the month made it clear the largely Allied-held Belarus sector had remained static with the big Polish advances being made towards Sumy-Kharkov and in the Crimea.

I am curious about the enclave SE of Mozyr that's in a different shade of pink - is that controlled by the British?

Having noticed the Allies had apparently pushed their main aircraft strength forward, the ‘spare’ Polish fighters in Warsaw were tasked with preventing raids by a squadron of Soviet strategic bombers over Eastern Germany early on 18 May.

This seems fair since the Germans are putting over 3,000 fighters up over Poland!

However, the Polish TF4 participated in another major battle in the Black Sea from 2200hr on 20 May through to the 22nd. It was a disaster for the Soviet fleet, with only two of the 12 vessels engaged escaping. None of the enemy ships was sunk by a Polish sub, though perhaps they contributed to some of the damage caused.

TF4 in the Black Sea had its first confirmed kill when a single Soviet freight convoy was sunk near Istanbul on 31 May.

Well that's something, I suppose. Events have moved so fast there's probably not going to be much for the submarines to do in the Black Sea now. Maybe they could do some useful work elsewhere in the world - supporting the defence of Australia perhaps?

Allied logisticians were doing their best to support the advance, but the rapid gains naturally put pressure on stock holdings as demand outstripped supply at the front.

One thing that caught me out recently was that my supply started to struggle even though I was building up railways (and the odd supply hub) as I advanced. I finally figured out the bottleneck was much closer to home, i.e. with the railway lines near my own capital...

In the crucial category of infantry equipment, the heavy toll of recent operations had created a deficit of over 4,300 units by early on 29 May.

I find I burn through a lot of infantry equipment and support equipment, and especially if the enemy is dictating the tempo of operations. I figured that if I had exhausted my stockpiles then all of the old equipment had been handed out to the front line units... and I think this was a big factor explaining why I found myself losing battles I expected to win.

Of interest, the Soviets had finally enacted service by requirement to try to stem their severe manpower shortages. As at 31 May, their pool of free manpower had increased but remained very low, while the increased conscription would impact industrial output, construction speed and training times, which would hopefully create problems of their own.

In that case I think you can expect to see their manpower pool increase massively over the coming weeks and months. Unfortunate, but not entirely unexpected.

Moscow was now confirmed as the ultimate objective for the 1947 campaigning year, with the aim being to take it – and its crucial rail nexus – before winter set in once more.

The High Command would soon need to decide whether the next phase would see an attempt at a general advance or a more targeted series of encirclements.

Given the way things have been going recently (Kharkiv, Sevastopol, Donetsk and more) I think Moscow is definitely on the cards, although I am a little concerned that Soviet resistance seems to be stronger in the northern section of the front facing towards Moscow. Continuing to go after encirclements seems like a good plan, at least for now. Let's see how the situation develops.

 

[BenKerryAltis]

When is the next post?

 

[Bullfilter]

That's a nice encirclement!

And encirclement closed!

Yes, one of the larger ones so far and not too costly to complete. Especially with a bit of Allied help in some of the attacks.

Soviets have poured more troops into the northern front, it will be a pain to dislodge them. Logistics wise a "narrow front" is hampered by the fact that one supply hub in particular will have to be overtasked

With the hammer and anvil approach and also some broad front advances, we're hoping to keep more than one supply line open. But yes, that is of course something to be kept in mind. All the more reason to overwhelm them generally in as many places as possible and keep them pinned where they are stronger. That way we hope poor supply at the front won't be too bad by comparison to enemy weakness.

Well very nice advances in the south, and starting to work your way up. Surely Moscow by Christmas?

Indeed. Vodka shots in the Kremlin by or before! Though in this run under Trotsky, Petrograd is the capital. Moscow is still a huge prestige and logistical prize.

I like to think there is a stodgy old WW1 general back in Warsaw who is haw-hawing about how it is time for a Big Push.

Love Blackadder (or in this case, I think we'd refer to the enemy as Slackbladder!). We'll see if we can move our drinks cabinet more than two feet closer to Moscow this time!

"Permission to say 'Huzzah!' in a loud and annoying voice?"

"Permission granted."

"HUZZAH!"

I think "b" is the shortcut key for moving via rail. It's really good to use in offensives like this. And division org recovers relatively quickly.

Oh yes, have used rail movement a fair bit, but for the shorter distances had wanted the troops to arrive in fighting order. I only ever do it by gut feel though, so may be a bit cautious about it on occasion.

I would go for Rostov next, then Stalingrad, then Astrakhan. It cuts off the entire Soviet Middle East/Caucasus front. They'll have no supply, so you can then swing everything north while still pushing towards Moscow with what you can spare.

Yes, Rostov is definitely a short term objective, though it's currently heavily defended and we need to muster the troops a bit first. As for the Stalin(Volgo)grad onwards path as the primary push, that will be discussed further at the start of the next chapter.

If you have any extra divisions, maybe sending some here for more breakthroughs could help.

We've been steadily stripping them away from there, while leaving a few in place in case opportunities develop later. The Estonian effort has been so lacklustre for so long and the enemy stronger there that I feel we can't afford to spare or good attacking units to do much there. The other Allies will either pick up the slack or at least just hold the line and keep the enemy occupied, we expect.

Encircling is always better, especially if you want to minimize casualties and equipment losses.

Indeed. We do it when we can. Sometimes in big deliberate sweeps, or in smaller tactical ops if the pace of the advance is fast enough and we can open up gaps in the line to slip around and cut off laggards.

How did you end up making this equipment picture? Very nicely done!

I can't claim credit for that one. Just a random image swept off the net. If I do something myself or via AI I'll note it, anything else you can assume is generic web stuff.

Very disappointing since a little earlier the Allies appeared to have moved a lot of those divisions in Estonia forward to the front line.

I've stopped expecting anything much from them. Like in a number of other places, lots of small national contingents seem to hover around and then do bugger all.

I am curious about the enclave SE of Mozyr that's in a different shade of pink - is that controlled by the British?

Yes, for some reason the game have given a slab of territory to the Brits. It seems to ebb and flow in HOI4 a bit randomly. <shrugs>

This seems fair since the Germans are putting over 3,000 fighters up over Poland!

Indeed - least we could do with some spare second-line fighters.

Well that's something, I suppose. Events have moved so fast there's probably not going to be much for the submarines to do in the Black Sea now. Maybe they could do some useful work elsewhere in the world - supporting the defence of Australia perhaps?

They'll lurk there while there are still Soviet ports in operation. Otherwise, maybe somewhere in the nearer Atlantic if the Americans get adventurous, but otherwise likely to be kept in port to minimise fuel use.

One thing that caught me out recently was that my supply started to struggle even though I was building up railways (and the odd supply hub) as I advanced. I finally figured out the bottleneck was much closer to home, i.e. with the railway lines near my own capital...

Yes, I've been careful (especially after the good testing experience earlier in Western China) to ensure upgrades always emanate from a main line all the way back to the capital. Seems to be holding up OK so far, but we'll be well tested if we manage to get that breakthrough into the Russian hinterland we're after, especially with a lot of co-located Allied divisions also absorbing logistic effort.

I find I burn through a lot of infantry equipment and support equipment, and especially if the enemy is dictating the tempo of operations. I figured that if I had exhausted my stockpiles then all of the old equipment had been handed out to the front line units... and I think this was a big factor explaining why I found myself losing battles I expected to win.

Have been building it as much as possible and getting a fair bit through L-L, but yes, it's a daily struggle. At least old stuff (Polish or imported) is better than none and from the casualties panel I can see the Soviets are losing vast amounts of gear and (especially now they've had to jack up their conscription level) and I suspect that will be as big or more of a problem for them in keeping their current div strengths up and presumably making it well-nigh impossible to properly equip new formations, even if they build up their manpower reserves.

In that case I think you can expect to see their manpower pool increase massively over the coming weeks and months. Unfortunate, but not entirely unexpected.

Per above, doubtless, but it comes at a cost for them - especially as I continue to eat up their industrial base as we push deeper into the heartlands.

Given the way things have been going recently (Kharkiv, Sevastopol, Donetsk and more) I think Moscow is definitely on the cards, although I am a little concerned that Soviet resistance seems to be stronger in the northern section of the front facing towards Moscow. Continuing to go after encirclements seems like a good plan, at least for now. Let's see how the situation develops.

Yes, we're pushing for it. You will soon see what the High Command's plans are for the summer and get an initial read on what and how feasible the strategic objectives are .

When is the next post?

Soon! Next month fully played through, images edited, first instalment written up.

All: After this I'll be away for a few days, so plenty of time for comments and discussion.

 

[Bullfilter]

Chapter One Hundred and Two: North and South
(Eastern Front: 1-15 June 1947)

A Polish 14TP – still the staple medium tank of the mechanised divisions in 1947 – advances in the Kursk sector, early June 1947. [Leonardo AI, Phoenix 1.0, using a reference image]

=======​

The Southern Sector: the Kuban Offensive

At the end of May 1947, some advocates within the Polish High Command were advocating for a drive towards Volgograd and the Caspian Sea to cut off the 4thInt in the Caucasus and Middle East. While an attractive proposition in theory, it would require a significant effort, including a good number of the mobile divisions of the 1st Army.

​

Arguing against this, the ‘Moscow First’ proponents pointed out it was a considerable distance to traverse, with extended supply lines, while the Soviets could maintain an alternate (though more circuitous) supply route to the east of the Caspian Sea via northern Iran. For now, the idea of such a major push in the south was shelved. If circumstances presented themselves (or could be shaped) to conduct such a grand round-up later, it might be revived.

However, though it would be considered a secondary effort to the main drive on Moscow in June 1947, this did not mean the southern sector would be neglected. It would be a primarily ‘leg infantry’ campaign for the Poles, with initial moves in June being directed to secure the eastern end of the Donetsk Salient up to the Donets and Don Rivers, including the important port of Rostov. This would provide the secure springboard for planned breakouts to the north from around Voroshilovgrad and to the south, through Rostov and across the lower Don River.

​

By the afternoon of the 1 June the push was on. Despite a limited Soviet counter-attack from Rostov, their defences in the east of the salient were look very weak and disorganised after previous retreats.

​

An attack on Rostov was ready to launch in the pre-dawn hours of 3 June, simultaneously with a wave of attacks to force the Donets River east and west of Voroshilovgrad, just as gaps were beginning to open in the weakening Soviet defence in the sector and previously redeployed 1st Army mobile divisions had arrived from the north to boost the Moscow Drive.

​

Rostov fell a day later and Polish forces prepared to fan out across the Don, trying to catch the Soviets before they could reform their lines. At that point, to the north the Poles were already across the Donets at two points west of Voroshilovgrad and were on track to widen the bridgehead soon against patchy resistance.

At that time, supply was holding up quite well in the Don Salient but the future use of this as a major supply corridor was aided by the commencement of more rail building upgrades stretching all the way back to Lwów, the way-point for the main rail line from Warsaw.

​

From the north to central sectors of the line, the pressure on forward supply depots could be seen, resulting in some shortages in those areas. But in the south, the Donetsk and Rostov hubs were holding up well so far, delivering surprisingly good logistic support to the front-line soldiers there.

The Soviets managed to insert another division to conduct a quick defence south of Rostov later on the morning of 4 June as the Poles and other Allies kept up the pressure to the north. Part of the plan was for both offensives – the Moscow Drive and the Kuban Offensive – to split Soviet attention and make it harder for them to consolidate their defence all across the south.

​

So far, this seemed to be working with large gaps appearing from Rostov all the way around to the west of Voroshilovgrad. This should make otherwise fraught and time-consuming river crossing operations much easier.

A day later and the Donets bridgehead had rapidly expanded and deepened as the Poles sought to get their heavier mobile units across the Donets and punching through gaps in the line. Meanwhile, Soviet screening forces west of Millerovo on the eastern edge of the Moscow Drive axis of advance were being cleared out.

​

To the south, the Poles were almost over the Don but with fewer divisions and no significant Allied support as yet the progress was a little slower.

By the morning of 6 June, the picture in the south and across the whole of the Polish Theatre of the Eastern Front showed multiple attacks making good progress as the Donets bridgehead now rapidly approached the upper Don River line. The full story of the drive north from here will be told in the third part of this chapter.

[Image from Leonardo AI, Phoenix 1
​

By late that night, the lower Don had been crossed without opposition south-west of Rostov, while a few more Allied divisions (British and German) had begun to appear as another Soviet division appeared to contest the crossing of the Don further east.

​

The next major development for the southern campaign came on 9 June, when the Romanian government – which had close political ties with their Polish colleagues – offered almost a whole army as an expeditionary force. The first seven divisions were transferred to Polish command straight away.

​

A new 8th Army was established as part of the 2nd Army Group, with General Roman Abraham – ‘Roman of the Romanians’ – made a welcome return to active duty. The Romanian units were all stationed in the middle east, where there were plenty of other Allied divisions present. All were entrained and sent up to Donetsk, where they would later be used to strengthen the Kuban Offensive.

One of the key components of the battle plan for the Kuban was to draw more Allied divisions into the area to bolster the line and perhaps eventually see the Poles’ colleagues begin to mount their own attacks. More Allied formations were appearing, it seemed a good number through the port of Rostov: ideally situated to support the southern offensive.

​

Meanwhile, the last few days had seen the lower Don bridgehead expanded to a four-province width. The ambitions for the offensive, given the known arrival of the Romanian EF divisions and increasing Allied presence in the salient, now grew to include striking south-west past Krasnodar to link up with the Allied forces gathered in Kerch. Perhaps an attack from behind would be able to force the Kerch Strait and turbo-charge the general offensive.

On the 11th, the French were already attempting a Kerch crossing as more divisions appeared in the Azov Sea – hopefully heading towards Rostov, as other Allied divisions made their way by rail via Donetsk. Krasnodar was now definitely an intermediate objective as the bridgehead slowly expanded south.

​

By 14 June more steady progress had been made. As Allied (mainly British at this stage) support seeped into the front lines, a dash along the Azov coast was attempted to outflank the Soviet line trying to form to the east towards Salsk.

​

Usefully, the British were also launching two coordinated attacks to try to force a crossing of the Donets just above its junction with the Don.

On the morning of 15 June, the first Romanian 8th Army division de-trained in Donetsk and began reorganising as it marched south Rostov and integration into the Kuban Offensive.

Just before midnight that day, the Poles had reached the approaches to Krasnodar, which for now seemed undefended. The Allies were keeping up their attack across the Kerch Strait, which was still having a difficult time but seemed to have been reinforced. The British were still trying to get across the Donets north-east of Rostov.

=======​

Research and Naval Warfare

After a staff discussion at the Internal Security Department in Warsaw at the end of May 1947, calls for the introduction of military police to garrison units for the occupation of conquered lands – mainly in the Soviet Union – were heeded. But first, five months of doctrine and training work would be required before the capability could be raised. It was planned to begin that research when the next team became available.

​

On 1 June, another merchant convoy was sunk by ORP Krakowiak in the Black Sea, near Istanbul. There would be no other Polish naval action for the rest of the month.

And it only took another four days for the researchers to embark on raising the MP capability, after rubber processing was improved on 5 June.

=======​

The Northern Sector: the Moscow Drive and a CRAZy Air War

We heard earlier that in preparation for the planned Moscow Drive across the Donets River, as May 1947 ended the bulk of the mobile 1st Army divisions still held in the Sumy sector (eight in all, not all shown below) we railed south towards Voroshilovgrad to be ready to exploit the anticipated breakthrough.

​

Kursk fell to the Poles after a fierce battle (1,620 Polish and 1,480 Soviet casualties) on the morning of 1 June, three provinces south of Orel, one of the intermediate objectives for the complementary ‘western wing’ of the Moscow Drive.

On 3 June, as noted previously the eight 1st Army division arrived on the southern bank of the Donets River west of Voroshilovgrad and began reorganising for their crossing of the river to support the bridgehead which four attacks that were launched in the pre-dawn darkness, even as the rest of the Don Salient was being cleared out.

​

To the north-west, in the Shostka-Sumy sector, a weak spot in the Soviet line was probed as other divisions in the area replenished after recent operation, ready to create or exploit more breakthroughs. Though smaller and not as well equipped as their regular comrades, the Polish militia divisions had been improved during the war and still performed adequately, even in the attack.

​

Soon after, east of Kharkov a large Polish attack across the Donets and flanking forces from the north and south had no problems breaking the defences of a single armoured division on the other side of the river to unify the bridgehead in that area. The pressure on the Soviets was being increased all along the line that morning to give them no respite from Polish vengeance.

​

Two days later, the rapid tactical movement and flanking marches through gaps in the line saw the first surrender of a Soviet division that month, trapped on the northern bank of the Donets south-east of Kharkov. It would not be the last.

​

In Estonia, the line had shortened and stabilised again by the night of the 5th as the Allies seemed happy enough to let the status quo continue there for now.

​

However, in the Kursk region they were a bit more active. A single British (Chinese EF) division’s attack on three entrenched and organised (though somewhat under-strength) Soviet formations was making no progress until it was reinforced by no fewer than seven Polish divisions.

​

A hard-fought battle would end in Allied victory on the morning of 8 June. Though quite a heavy Allied toll, many of these casualties (it was impossible to differentiate in individual circumstances) were not Polish.

As the day ended on 6 June, the main Donets bridgehead was wide and deep after just under four days of fighting in the Moscow Drive. Millerovo had been taken to anchor the right flank of the advance. The Poles kept pushing into gaps as quickly as they could to outflank enemy strong points, to keep the momentum going, keep the enemy unbalanced and presenting opportunities for local encirclements.

​

Supply was still holding up well enough at the front in some places but was starting to get more difficult at the ‘tip of the spear’. However, it was not enough to prevent the advance from continuing at pace as more of the 1st Army divisions began to close up to the front. The upper Don River was now in their sights. They wanted to get across it in force before the Soviets could consolidate a line behind it.

The next day, another Soviet division was surrounded and destroyed in the northern Voroshilovgrad sector. The Soviets were trying hard to establish a fall-back line but the Poles kept striving to find the weak points and push hard.

​

After a rest and reorganisation over recent days (which had also allowed fuel stocks to recover somewhat), the Polish Air Force (only operating on a small scale over Belarus and Eastern Germany at that time) identified a new opportunity to assist the offensive late on 7 June. The Central Russia Air Zone (CRAZ) now contained the forward battle area of the eastern Moscow Drive advance and neither sides’ air forces were engaged there – yet.

​

The order was given and by midnight, 1,150 PAF aircraft had begun operating in the CRAZ. It would take the wings some time to improve tactical visibility and mission efficiency, with extra ground crews brought in to support the effort.

​

An hour later, three wings not yet sent in were pushed forward to bases closer to the front line, including the elite jet-equipped 14. DM. The remaining long-range fighters were sent to interdict enemy bombers over the Kuban region, where the enemy had established local air superiority.

​

As 8 June drew to a close, supply at the tip of the Moscow Drive was becoming critically low but still the Poles pushed forward as best they could. The first units reached the upper Don River at midnight. Organisation remained high, even if supplies were running out at the forward edge. Behind the front line the depot at Kursk was temporarily massively overloaded, but the lines from Donetsk and Rostov flowed freely.

​

After two days operating over the CRAZ, the PAF remained unchallenged in the skies, with only a few aircraft lost to AA fire as they pounded enemy ground defenders. The Allies now had air superiority over the active Polish theatre battle lines.

​

The following afternoon, this had spread even further, with the Soviets only controlling the air over the Caucasus.

​

One of the first battles not won by the Poles during the first nine days of the advance came south-east of Voronezh on the evening of 12 June, with a probe called off quickly after an exhausted mechanised division tried to push across the Don. In the north-western part of the line from Voronezh to Sumy, this resistance would gradually increase in coming days.

But through to 15 June, the Poles were happy with the rapid gains and disruption their offensive had caused in its first 12 days. The upper Don had been reached and breached in one place, while steadier but fair progress had been made on the western side of the front closer to the Allied-controlled Belarus sector, where the line had remained static for the first half of the month.

​

The month-to-date casualties were averaging a little higher than for the month before but that was to be expected due to the increasing operational tempo.

Equipment holdings in critical lines continued to be a greater problem than personnel, where the manpower reserve had only decreased slightly despite the heavy casualties in June. Light tank and SP Arty holdings continued to be badly in deficit given the heavy use being made of these formations in the offensives. Another look at holdings and distribution may need to be made in the future, though for now the formations still seemed to be doing their job, where speed rather than hitting power was the key.

​

Infantry and anti-tank equipment shortages were the other areas of difficulty, where lend lease and increased production could still not keep up with combat and attrition losses. In good news for the air force, jet fighter holdings were close to the point where a second wing could be raised – these aircraft seemed to be taking minimal losses in the air, as far as it could be determined. And train holdings were healthy enough for now, though the production line was still ticking along (one factory) to allow for expansion if needed.

The tougher fighting to the west was typified by battles in the Orel-Voronezh sector over 14-15 June. In Orel, a first hasty attack to close another pocket on two stranded Soviet divisions was repelled by four tired but doughty Soviet infantry divisions at 2100hr on the 14th. But two fresher armoured divisions had followed up with a new attack, which had been won by 1400hr on the 15th. Another encirclement was being anticipated but had yet to be locked down by that night.

​

However, an initial push to take Voronezh in a difficult cross-river attack had met increasing Soviet resistance that inflicted very heavy casualties on the Polish attackers who were forced to abandon the effort at midnight on the 14th. They lost men at more than a 10-1 ratio, unprecedented for operations so far that month. The key rail and supply hub would have to be taken another way, as the Poles sought to support an existing German attack to expand the Don bridgehead to its south seemed to be making better progress.

 

[StrategyGameEnthusiast]

However, an initial push to take Voronezh in a difficult cross-river attack had met increasing Soviet resistance that inflicted very heavy casualties on the Polish attackers who were forced to abandon the effort at midnight on the 14th. They lost men at more than a 10-1 ratio, unprecedented for operations so far that month.

Oof... That really isn't good for Poland, especially if the Soviets can keep that ratio up.

 

[BenKerryAltis]

Oof... That really isn't good for Poland, especially if the Soviets can keep that ratio up.

That’s one big fumble I think. A really big fumble. Historically Voronezh has been a big pain. But you have to take it for the supply hub

 

[jak7139]

Oh yes, have used rail movement a fair bit, but for the shorter distances had wanted the troops to arrive in fighting order. I only ever do it by gut feel though, so may be a bit cautious about it on occasion.

I usually use it a lot. I move my divs right up to the battle line if possible. The few hours/days it saves can be the difference between closing an encirclement or not, preventing an enemy attack or not, closing a frontline gap or leaving it open.

Part of the plan was for both offensives – the Moscow Drive and the Kuban Offensive – to split Soviet attention and make it harder for them to consolidate their defence all across the south.

A good plan. And this chapter shows it working out well!

I still think a Caucasus drive should be entertained, so you can free up Allied divisions in Turkey and potentially take Armenia, Georgia, Baku out of the war. The Allies need less fronts to handle and closing this one off seems like a good bet.

The next day, another Soviet division was surrounded and destroyed in the northern Voroshilovgrad sector. The Soviets were trying hard to establish a fall-back line but the Poles kept striving to find the weak points and push hard.

Pressure, pressure, even more pressure. Don't let them recover!

Light tank and SP Arty holdings continued to be badly in deficit given the heavy use being made of these formations in the offensives. Another look at holdings and distribution may need to be made in the future, though for now the formations still seemed to be doing their job, where speed rather than hitting power was the key.

​

Infantry and anti-tank equipment shortages were the other areas of difficulty, where lend lease and increased production could still not keep up with combat and attrition losses.

How many factories on inf, SPA, and AT? More might be needed.

The key rail and supply hub would have to be taken another way, as the Poles sought to support an existing German attack to expand the Don bridgehead to its south seemed to be making better progress.

You're already across the river in the south, so crossing down there and moving north to Voronezh seems like the plan.

 

[stnylan]

Ooof that's a bit of a sharp check, but overall some pretty nice gains. Now hopefully those will only prove setbacks of a temporary nature, because manpower is too precious to waste.

 

[Bullfilter]

Before we move onto the rest of the world, a review of recent comments (time yet for more if people wish to - next bit not yet written up).

Oof... That really isn't good for Poland, especially if the Soviets can keep that ratio up.

That’s one big fumble I think. A really big fumble. Historically Voronezh has been a big pain. But you have to take it for the supply hub

Ooof that's a bit of a sharp check, but overall some pretty nice gains. Now hopefully those will only prove setbacks of a temporary nature, because manpower is too precious to waste.

Yes, it was an expensive check though might seem a bigger setback when highlighted like this at the end of the chapter than I felt it was at the time. Basically, it had started well and if I could have gotten Voronezh quickly, even if at some expense, then getting the hub and rail connection then would have been nice.

It mainly meant it would take longer and I’d have to look for another approach. While a small pain and I definitely can’t afford to do that too often, it’s not yet at the point where I need to even consider increasing conscription: production is more of an issue. So yes, need to be a bit more careful than that unless the prize is too big to ignore.

I usually use it a lot. I move my divs right up to the battle line if possible. The few hours/days it saves can be the difference between closing an encirclement or not, preventing an enemy attack or not, closing a frontline gap or leaving it open.

Right, I do use it a fair bit, but had the feeling the disorganisation can last a while if I want to employ them quickly after movement. So I’ve tended to use it more for longer moves, where I’m sure it will save time on balance. Though perhaps I can do it a bit more, as you say.

A good plan. And this chapter shows it working out well!

I still think a Caucasus drive should be entertained, so you can free up Allied divisions in Turkey and potentially take Armenia, Georgia, Baku out of the war. The Allies need less fronts to handle and closing this one off seems like a good bet.

I do think it’s working as envisaged for now. Just need to see how sustainable it is. Re the Caucasus, I do have it in mind but don’t want to spoil what might happen next and whether we look to push there or not. My main concern is stripping too many troops from the main knockout blow and slowing that down.

If we can force the USR to surrender by taking Moscow and the industrial and population heartland, then the ME-Iran front collapses anyway. And one never knows what surprises - good or bad - lurk just around the corner. This AAR has a few left yet!

Pressure, pressure, even more pressure. Don't let them recover!

Always.

How many factories on inf, SPA, and AT? More might be needed.

Will check out and maybe give another readout soon, but I’ve been shuffling priorities around without reporting them all. The main deficit areas have been getting ramped up effort but part of the problem is waiting for the efficiency lag to catch up. Too quick and the effect is severely diminished anyway.

You're already across the river in the south, so crossing down there and moving north to Voronezh seems like the plan.

All I can say there is a bit of wait and sea. The quick “up the guts and over the river” approach didn’t work, for sure, but yes there are other, more deliberate, options.

 

[BenKerryAltis]

I do think it’s working as envisaged for now. Just need to see how sustainable it is. Re the Caucasus, I do have it in mind but don’t want to spoil what might happen next and whether we look to push there or not. My main concern is stripping too many troops from the main knockout blow and slowing that down.

If we can force the USR to surrender by taking Moscow and the industrial and population heartland, then the ME-Iran front collapses anyway. And one never knows what surprises - good or bad - lurk just around the corner. This AAR has a few left yet!

Exactly, Caucasus will have to do with economy of force. The focus goes to the north.
On Voronezh consider attack again

 

[SSmith]

At the end of May 1947, some advocates within the Polish High Command were advocating for a drive towards Volgograd and the Caspian Sea to cut off the 4thInt in the Caucasus and Middle East.

I can't say I recall whether those states in the Caucasus are aligned with the Soviets or the Allies? If they're part of the 4INT, you're not going to cut anyone off by breaking through to the Caspian.

The next major development for the southern campaign came on 9 June, when the Romanian government – which had close political ties with their Polish colleagues – offered almost a whole army as an expeditionary force. The first seven divisions were transferred to Polish command straight away.

A new 8th Army was established as part of the 2nd Army Group, with General Roman Abraham – ‘Roman of the Romanians’ – made a welcome return to active duty.

Very nice! Even if they're not up to Polish standards, they'll still be useful to help guard the longer front lines you will likely need as the advance continues.

More Allied formations were appearing, it seemed a good number through the port of Rostov: ideally situated to support the southern offensive.

Hopefully they help. Otherwise they'll just eat up your supplies...

Krasnodar was now definitely an intermediate objective as the bridgehead slowly expanded south.

Any chance of striking south and cutting off the Soviet forces between Kerch and Krasnodar?

The order was given and by midnight, 1,150 PAF aircraft had begun operating in the CRAZ. It would take the wings some time to improve tactical visibility and mission efficiency, with extra ground crews brought in to support the effort.

After two days operating over the CRAZ, the PAF remained unchallenged in the skies, with only a few aircraft lost to AA fire as they pounded enemy ground defenders. The Allies now had air superiority over the active Polish theatre battle lines.

The absence of Soviet air activity in these key air zones is very encouraging. Do you have any intelligence on the Soviet air force? My guess is they've been swept away by all that Allied air power!

As 8 June drew to a close, supply at the tip of the Moscow Drive was becoming critically low but still the Poles pushed forward as best they could. The first units reached the upper Don River at midnight. Organisation remained high, even if supplies were running out at the forward edge.

However, an initial push to take Voronezh in a difficult cross-river attack had met increasing Soviet resistance that inflicted very heavy casualties on the Polish attackers who were forced to abandon the effort at midnight on the 14th. They lost men at more than a 10-1 ratio, unprecedented for operations so far that month. The key rail and supply hub would have to be taken another way.

I concur that it's important to take that supply hub. If you have enough supply, maybe taking a little time to reorganise and prepare a fresh assault would be more successful? That Kharkov hub looked to be very overloaded, but having to build a new supply hub would delay you for several months.

Equipment holdings in critical lines continued to be a greater problem than personnel, where the manpower reserve had only decreased slightly despite the heavy casualties in June. Light tank and SP Arty holdings continued to be badly in deficit given the heavy use being made of these formations in the offensives.

Aside from trucks, trains and convoys, I don't see much good news here. I would be trying to shift production now to cover the basics as best I could (starting with infantry equipment) because it's looking like Polish industry just isn't producing enough of everything to sustain this offensive. It is going to take time to turn this around, but it might be a good idea as well to start building more military factories? I hope the picture is better than I think it is. If you're getting a lot of LL, it just might be.

 

[Bullfilter]

I can't say I recall whether those states in the Caucasus are aligned with the Soviets or the Allies? If they're part of the 4INT, you're not going to cut anyone off by breaking through to the Caspian.

They're all 4thInt. If restricted to the three small SSRs, would the supply they provide at least be insufficient for the numbers of troops in a potential pocket? Or does it not scale that way in HOI4? There may still be some utility in cutting that many troops off from the main Russian heartland I suppose, but from what you say the prize may be somewhat limited.

Very nice! Even if they're not up to Polish standards, they'll still be useful to help guard the longer front lines you will likely need as the advance continues.

I did check them out and they seem quite large infantry divisions. Perhaps bigger and better than ours ... here's a rough comparison between the respective line divisions:

Hopefully they help. Otherwise they'll just eat up your supplies...

True! Let's hope they do some good ... still, this Caucasus thrust is really secondary for us and I'm actually trying to 'entice' them in to any open spaces we create and see if they do some pushing themselves.

Any chance of striking south and cutting off the Soviet forces between Kerch and Krasnodar?

A bit harder for us without the mobile units which have all been diverted to the main northern thrust, but we're certainly aiming in that direction and you'll see how far we get in the chapter following this next one (won't spoil as I've played ahead to the end of the month).

The absence of Soviet air activity in these key air zones is very encouraging. Do you have any intelligence on the Soviet air force? My guess is they've been swept away by all that Allied air power!

I have done a few comparisons using the broad intel stats and they appear to have well over 6,000 aircraft left all told. They just haven't (yet) deployed any into this AZ. I actually do a bit of a survey of the wider air situation in the next Eastern Front chapter so you'll see a bit more there - and whether they send any our way in this newly contested AZ.

I concur that it's important to take that supply hub. If you have enough supply, maybe taking a little time to reorganise and prepare a fresh assault would be more successful? That Kharkov hub looked to be very overloaded, but having to build a new supply hub would delay you for several months.

Yes, I was keen to grab it quickly. With so many battles to monitor simultaneously I think that one just kept going longer than I would have let it by preference. Again, you'll see what transpires re Voronezh in the next EF chapter.

Aside from trucks, trains and convoys, I don't see much good news here. I would be trying to shift production now to cover the basics as best I could (starting with infantry equipment) because it's looking like Polish industry just isn't producing enough of everything to sustain this offensive. It is going to take time to turn this around, but it might be a good idea as well to start building more military factories? I hope the picture is better than I think it is. If you're getting a lot of LL, it just might be.

I've been doing this pretty regularly as we go along, just not reporting it that much in the narrative. Same with the lend-lease we're getting, which can sometimes be pretty large and helps a lot (even if it may be older gear). I've not been building many new mil factories all game. In part because I'm still an HOI4 newb and wasn't sure how many I'd need, and partly because I had no idea the war was going to go on for so long!

There's a civ factory currently under construction and perhaps I'll build a mil one next, though I'm also using construction a lot for beefing up the rail networks. Also, in good news, I'm getting some extra factories (of both types) from occupation: increasing my output as the Soviets lose it.

Bearing in mind this is from a 15 Jun 47 save (and I've played through to 30 June) so as not to jump beyond the narrative, here are some production figures for what we were doing at that point. As you can see, the main deficit areas have been getting factories switched regularly (hence the 50-60% efficiency rates at that point) and adding too many more at that rate does not seem to do much good. Waiting for those rates to improve, with a lot of slack to get to 100%.

And there's lend lease as well, with below what the current programs are and what has been delivered. Denmark was a brand new one accepted on 15 June. I'll have to review the donors at the end of the month and see if I can scrape any more inf equipment (etc) from any of them. iirc, they were pretty reluctant/unable to give things like tanks and SPA but I can always try again.

 

[Bullfilter]

Chapter One Hundred and Three: It's Warming Up
(Rest of the World: June 1947)

Polish troops advance in the mountains of Kerman in Iran, June 1947. After a period of virtual dormancy, this theatre saw a sharp increase in activity during the late spring of 1947. [MS Bing AI]

=======​

The South West Pacific Area (SWPA)

The SWPA (embracing Australia and PNG and the nearby Pacific islands) remained largely unchanged during June 1947. There was some action in Australia and the Allies won an attacking battle in the south of the PNG front during the month.

By the start of the month, the last two GAK divisions had arrived by sea in Perth one was sent by rail north to join their comrades blocking the American advance along the west coast. The other was diverted back to Sydney, due to concerns about possible US landings and their build-up in the Gulf of Carpentaria, which the Allies had not properly reinforced. One GAK division had recently left Townsville to head west to reinforce the Gulf defence.

​

By mid-June, the reinforced defence in the wets was in place and the US only seemed to have a light screening force in place for now. Their main effort seemed to be in the Gulf country to the east of the lodgement. The GAK division had arrived and located itself in a reserve position where it could reinforce either of the Allied positions facing the significant build-up of US forces opposite. The mountain division remained defending Townsville, the immediate supply source and escape port should things go bad.

​

In PNG, the UK was on the attack in the south and was winning in tough conditions where both sides were becoming exhausted.

​

In the Gulf, by the evening of 19 June General Sosabowski did not like the strength of the US build-up and the weakness of the two-province-wide Allied defensive line facing them. He ordered the GAK to fall back one province to a natural choke point that would be easier to defend should the Allies not provide the Australians enough support to hold and the enemy broke through.

​

Simultaneously 198. Inf Div, which had arrived in Sydney from Perth earlier, was once more put on troop trains and sent north, to join their comrades in the Gulf. Other Allied troops would have to guard the eastern seaboard from US invasion in Brisbane or Sydney or not, as they wished: with the limited GAK troops in Australia, the Poles would only vouch for keeping Townsville open.

As June ended, 198. Inf Div had almost joined their comrades in the Gulf country, who were already digging in on the fall-back line. As feared, the other Allies had pulled back support for the beleaguered Australians at the front and the northerly of the two positions was is imminent danger of falling to the Americans, who had 11 divisions arrayed at the front (though many in poor supply – as were the Allies there).

=======​

South East Asia

In Malaya, by 10 June the Allies were still holding on to their two enclaves. Kuala Lumpur (four formations) and seemingly just one in Singapore. The Japanese had not yet mustered enough strength to overwhelm either, it seemed.

​

In the up-and-down campaign in northern Borneo, the Allies were on the attack again though the latest advance with British and Swiss troops looked to be dangerously over-extended. It remained a side-show for both sides with neither committing many divisions.

​

But by mid-month there was some rare good news for the Allies: in Java the Dutch East Indies and Britain had earlier managed to cut off four US divisions south of Soerabaja and were attacking in an attempt to reduce the cut-off enclave.

​

By 19 June three of those US divisions had been forced to surrender and the last would soon follow.

​

Five days later the enclave had been eliminated and the Allies were resisting a belated US counter-attack along their newly established front line.

​

In Borneo, the Allies were once again on the back foot, with their earlier advance defeated and the MAB pressing the attack on the south-western approach to Bandar Seri Begawan (Brunei).

​

In Malaya, the Japanese had built up their forces surrounding Kuala Lumpur but had not yet been able to break through. The Allies had reinforced Singapore and actually managed to advance but that small salient was thinly held and the Japanese had also increased their force size on the perimeter.

​

As June ended, the Allies had been pushed further back in Borneo but had also reinforced Brunei somewhat. Apparently, this front may go on as it had been indefinitely with neither side able to deliver the decisive blow.

​

In Malaya, the news was bleaker. The Japanese had finally made a big push on Kuala Lumpur with only an exhausted Romanian division left to fight a doomed resistance. The key port would no doubt soon fall into enemy hands. The small salient near Singapore had been vacated by the Allies again (doubtless due to a recent MAB attack). Its fate looked dubious once Kuala Lumpur fell, if the MAB concentrated their forces sufficiently to crack the defences there.

​

Overall, the situation in the region had deteriorated a little on balance during the month, though it was not all one-sided. In four of the five theatres, the enemy were on the attack and winning their battles.

=======​

The Americas

For another month, the situation in North and Central America basically remained unchanged.

​

The US seemed content to man a consolidated front line without trying to dislodge the large Allied presence in eastern Canada and Newfoundland-Labrador. As usual, the Allies held many divisions back at port but maintained relatively few at the front. It remained a sink hole for manpower without corresponding useful effort.

​

In the Yucatan enclave, neither side had moved, with the TRA containment maintained against strong Allied defences of the two ports.

=======​

Central Asia and the Middle East

As the Poles pressed the attack in Russia and then the Caucasus in early June 1947, General Haller was directed to probe what appeared to be some thinned Soviet defences in Iran. The first attack came at Kerman, with a see-sawing battle ensuing from midday on 1 June through to midnight on the 4th.

​

For the intensity and duration of the fighting, the combat casualties on either side were relatively low for three and a half days of battle, due to low supply and difficult terrain. In the end, both sides had similar casualties but superior Polish numbers and the use of two specialised mountain divisions prevailed.

In Central Asia, Ayaguz (the last pocket in the far north of Sinkiang) had fallen to the Soviets by 5 June.

The first Polish divisions into Kerman were counter-attacked strongly by the Soviets on 6 June. The position was initially shaky on paper, but as more divisions went from reserve to front line positions and others arrived in the next day, the position stabilised. The newly regained city was held by the end of 7 June.

​

On the Sinkiang front, the latest pocket of Allied troops north of Kashgar contained 20 divisions in three provinces on 10 June. It was holding strongly enough for now though supplies were running out. If only the Allies would attack the single Soviet division in the single province separating them from the rest of Sinkiang supply could be re-established or an escape route opened. But Kashgar itself was now only connected to the Raj by a narrow neck of land squeezed between the Soviets and the PRC.

​

All through mid-June there was a heavy traffic of Allied units being shipped through the Persian Gulf. It was a little difficult to work out where they were all going (if anywhere) but many could be heading to India. For example, on 11 June there were around 40 divisions possibly in transit to or just having arrived in the Raj.

On 15 June, the ‘neck’ province connecting Kashgar to the Raj had no Allied garrison left – and alarming state of affairs. The rest of the Kashgar salient and the pockets to the north were under attack but still holding firmly.

In Iran, the Poles decided to keep pressing. An initially promising attack north-east of Kerman on 15 June was abandoned the next morning after the odds changed and casualties mounted. The Soviets weren’t collapsing quite yet.

​

More widely, as we saw in Russia and the Caucasus in the previous chapter, the Allies were pressing the attack in the north. This new limited offensive in Iran was designed to probe for weaknesses, inflict further casualties and make it more difficult for the Soviets to adequately man all fronts simultaneously. But on 15 June, the USR unleashed a broad front offensive all along the line from northern Turkey to the Persian Gulf.

​

Undaunted, Haller pressed on in Iran. A new attack north of Kerman initiated at midday on the 16th ran into very tough resistance and once more, casualties of over 4,000 men were suffered by the Poles in a battle that dragged on until early on 21 June but ended in Polish victory.

​

Another attack would be needed on 23 June, but that was won far more easily. And to the north-east, the Poles had regrouped and attacked again, this time more successfully.

The next day, it was noted with some relief that the Allies had considerably reinforced the neck of the Kashgar salient. It seemed some of the troops spotted flowing to and through India earlier in the month were beginning to make it to the narrow front. But would anyone take the initiative to try to relieve those trapped to the crowded pock to their north?

​

Looking at the wider perspective, the pipeline of Allied troops moving from the Persian Gulf towards India still seemed to be strong, while 4th Army slowly made headway in its Iranian limited offensive.

​

General Haller at that time pulled out the last two mountain divisions from Bandar e’Abbas: it remained strongly held by the Allies now and in no danger of being lost. Those specialist divisions would be of great use in the continuing campaign to the north.

A attack probe to retake Birjand started well on 24 June but the arrival of a reinforcing enemy division turned the tables and the attack was abandoned with climbing casualties at midnight on the 26th.

​

Attacks had succeeded in advances to the north of Kerman in the last few days, with one holding back a Soviet counter-attack and another briefly lost when the mountain troops of the advance guard outran their supports and were routed shortly after arrival. But the situation would be rectified when the follow-on forces expelled the Soviets soon afterwards.

In the Middle East, the latest Soviet offensive had been weathered by the Allies and they were pushing back in Iraq. A bridgehead over the Tigris River east of Baghdad had recently been expanded and by 27 June an Anglo-Turkish attack had almost succeeded in widening it further, with the Soviet line on this front noticeably thinner than it had been previously.

​

The Soviets still barely hung on the next day, even as the huge throughput of Allied divisions through the Persian Gulf continued. Many seemed to have filtered into southern Iran, others continuing further east.

​

As the month ended, it was the Allies conducting a general offensive in the Middle East, though none of the remaining attacks seemed to be making headway. In Iran, the Poles had fought hard to establish a wide ‘bulge’ aimed at pushing towards the south of the Caspian Sea. Perhaps in time coordination between it and the gathering Caucasus offensive may be possible, though such prospects remained distant at that time.

​

The Allies remained cut off north of Kashgar while the Soviets and MAB pressed in on either side.

​

In the Kerman Bulge, the Poles were currently consolidating and gathering strength for whatever the next phase of the limited offensive might bring as the Allies continued to seemingly bring new forces into the south. And some of them were starting to appear in the north to assist the Poles. If more came, as in the Caucasus the Poles hoped they may offer some useful support and even start launching some attacks of their own. In any case, it should keep the Soviets occupied and keep up the pressure on this secondary front.

​

With the Tigris bridgehead now widened, the Allies were attempting (though without too much initial impact) to expand their foothold and even attack across the waterway from Basrah.

​

The Asia-Pacific remained a difficult theatre for the Allies facing the 4thInt, MAB and US/TRA. Some signs of resurgence in the Middle East and Central Asia did relieve the general gloom in the region, however.

 

[StrategyGameEnthusiast]

The Allies remained cut off north of Kashgar while the Soviets and MAB pressed in on either side.

That's going to hurt... (the Allies if the encirclements get closed)

 

[jak7139]

There's a civ factory currently under construction and perhaps I'll build a mil one next, though I'm also using construction a lot for beefing up the rail networks. Also, in good news, I'm getting some extra factories (of both types) from occupation: increasing my output as the Soviets lose it.

Ideally you would have multiple full lines (15 civs) of factories for construction at this point, but your focus has been elsewhere with the rail networks. More mils would not be amiss. For a medium power like Poland, usually around 1947/48 you should be running out of slots to build factories in.

The mountain division remained defending Townsville, the immediate supply source and escape port should things go bad.

At least the US seems to have bad supply. Their advance will be slow and painful.

But by mid-month there was some rare good news for the Allies: in Java the Dutch East Indies and Britain had earlier managed to cut off four US divisions south of Soerabaja and were attacking in an attempt to reduce the cut-off enclave.

Every little bit helps.

The newly regained city was held by the end of 7 June.

Hooray! Was this a supply hub?

with the Soviet line on this front noticeably thinner than it had been previously.

That's a very good sign.

That's going to hurt... (the Allies if the encirclements get closed)

While the encirclement is bad, functionally those units are already dead. They've been surrounded for a while and the Allied position has remained stable. So it is a loss, just not a devastating one.

And let's be honest, if those divisions were saved, they would just spend 90% of their time at sea anyway.

 

[stnylan]

I mean yes the situation in Malaya Borneo et al is poor, but really that seems a secondary war. The Soviets are the lethal threat (well, unless you are Australian I guess )

 

[Bullfilter]

That's going to hurt... (the Allies if the encirclements get closed)

No doubt - unless I was to send some troops to intervene, which is just a little tempting, I suspect they're doomed.

Ideally you would have multiple full lines (15 civs) of factories for construction at this point, but your focus has been elsewhere with the rail networks. More mils would not be amiss. For a medium power like Poland, usually around 1947/48 you should be running out of slots to build factories in.

For now, with the recently occupied territory and some modest construction, I have two lines of 15 civ factories for now. One building another civ factory (nearly done), the rest working on rail upgrades. I see the mils are cheaper, might switch to one of those next.

At least the US seems to have bad supply. Their advance will be slow and painful.

Let's hope so - but they do have the numbers.

Every little bit helps.

A small shaft of gold, when all around is dark. (to quote Monty Python)

Hooray! Was this a supply hub?

No. no too many in central Iran. Just a rail line.

That's a very good sign.

Yes, I thought so too. They must have been diverting them north. I'll keep digging at them unless it gets too expensive.

While the encirclement is bad, functionally those units are already dead. They've been surrounded for a while and the Allied position has remained stable. So it is a loss, just not a devastating one.

And let's be honest, if those divisions were saved, they would just spend 90% of their time at sea anyway.

Haha, absolutely right. They're now shipping more new ones in anyway and can defend on a much narrower front.

I mean yes the situation in Malaya Borneo et al is poor, but really that seems a secondary war. The Soviets are the lethal threat (well, unless you are Australian I guess )

Very secondary and at least we're doing a little to help Australia. But Moscow first for us back in the one big theatre of the war.

To All: thanks once more. New chapter written and out soon. Happy and Holy Easter to those who celebrate it: hope for some peace and grace in this turbulent world of ours. And similar best wishes to those who may not.

 

[Bullfilter]

Chapter One Hundred and Four: No Pity, No Remorse
(Eastern Front: 16-30 June 1947)

A careworn General Lucjan Żeligowski, now aged 81 in ATL (due to die soon on 9 July 1947 in OTL) had a new portrait taken as the Commander of 1st Army in Kursk, June 1947. [Leonardo AI, Phoenix 1.0, using a reference image previously used in Chapter 41]

=======​

The Northern Sector, 16-24 June: Bryansk, Orel and Voronezh

As the Polish Front had expanded, by 16 June 1947 some of the earlier extreme supply bottlenecks had begun to be mitigated. In the south, recent rail works and additional Allied supply shipments into Rostov and a slower rate of advance meant the supply situation was extremely good.

​

In the critical northern sector, supply naturally remained stretched at the leading edge of the Moscow Drive, but it had not yet caused the offensive to halt. The supply and rail hub of Voronezh had not yet been taken and remained a key Allied target to help power the advance in the centre of the sector.

In the air war, the Soviets had reacted to the PAF’s foray into the Central Russian Air Zone (CRAZ) by deploying almost 2,600 fighters, with a prompt effect on the PAF’s losses. In response to that, the PAF decided to deploy a second wing of Orzel jet fighters. They would start working up in Kharkov and the PAF hoped the Allies would also assist in due course. Until then, though outnumbered they would stick to their guns.

​

On the ground, another tactical encirclement was completed on the night of the 16th just east of Kursk, even as four Soviet divisions launched a strong (but ultimately unsuccessful) attack to rescue their surrounded comrades.

​

By 1300hr the following day two Soviet divisions had been bagged after the Poles reinforced an existing British attack on the surrounded enemy, which included a tank division. At the same time, a tough battle for the town of Orel was won as the push towards Moscow was maintained.

By the end of 16 June, the Soviets had added a few more fighter wings into the CRAZ melee, where PAF casualties – especially among the TAC bombers – mounted. However, the first elements of support for the PAF had appeared and the Allies maintained a very narrow margin of air superiority.

Note: as the casualty screen is only from the Polish perspective, we don’t have direct visibility on what the full Soviet casualties may be from the Allied air forces.​

Two days later, as the ground offensive pushed on, the balance in the CRAZ would change. By that morning, PAF losses continued to mount while further Soviet fighter losses were minimal.

​

But by that afternoon, another four Allied fighter wings had joined the fray and the air balance was perceptibly improved, though it remained in the balance.

Meanwhile, an expensive German-Polish attack to force the Don south of Voronezh had succeeded, with the advance guard (a light Czech EF division) arriving first to secure the crossing. The Soviets were counter-attacking further to the north, with mixed success so far.

​

A new operation had been developed to create the potential for two new encirclements in the Bryansk sector and on the evening of 21 June the breakthrough had been made south-west of Bryansk after a river crossing operation met with success. As that bridgehead continued to push north-west, new attacks east of Bryansk aimed to both take the city and exploit a gap in the enemy lines to the north.

​

Two attacks were required to advance to the next objective in the larger western Bryansk pocket, which would not be occupied until the early morning of 26 June. On the western side of the Soviet salient, three Polish divisions which had remained in Belarus began to concentrate to allow a matching pincer attack when the time came to close off the potential pocket.

The aerial combat in the CRAZ had changed in balance again by 22 June. The Soviets had withdrawn many of their fighter wings but introduced TAC and CAS wings to aid their troops on the ground. Meanwhile, more Allied wings had joined in to reassert clear Allied air superiority. The Germans were concentrating on CAS and TAC operations, while Belgium and the Netherlands led in fighter support, fielding eight wings between them.

​

PAF losses continued to climb but not yet unsustainably, while Soviet CAS in particular began to take heavy losses and had inflicted only minor troop losses so far. Though the Kharkov air base had now become overcrowded, the new jet fighters of 13. DM were sent into the skies to boost the effort at this point.

22 June saw yet another tactical pocket closed off, this time in the Orel sector. The surrender of these troops was hastened when two Polish divisions were added at 1700hr to the attack the British had already initiated. The Soviet division surrendered just under a day later.

​

At 2200hr on the 23rd, the Polish divisions in Belarus had joined up and launched an attack on the main Bryansk salient from the west as their comrades still pushed from the east to close it off. Though the attack started well, it turned sour and had to be abandoned just as their colleagues were advancing in a renewed corps-sized anttack opposite them.

​

By the following morning, the Poles had advanced to the eastern outskirts of Bryansk itself and the Germans were providing some useful assistance in a complementary attack to its south and also further east. It was good to see the additional Allied divisions in the area were up for some offensive operations of their own as the Moscow Drive continued.

At midday on the 24th, the Germans had also distinguished themselves by holding Voronezh on their own initiative, after helping earlier to force the crossing of the Don River to its south. As the Germans resisted the inevitable Soviet counter-attack, the Poles initiated a new offensive towards Lipetsk, seeking to eject the Soviets from the western bank of the Don and keep pushing to seize the vital rail line that ran north from Voronezh.

=======​

The Northern Sector, 25-30 June: The Bryansk and Voronezh Pockets

As fighting continued through 25 June into the 26th, not all Polish attacks were successful. A ‘brick wall in Kaluga’ was struck when one attack north-east of Bryansk failed on the evening of the 25th, then the next morning an advanced guard was expelled from their recent gain east of that in a punishing Soviet counter-attack. Further consolidation and preparation would be required before the advance could be resumed here.

​

By the afternoon of the 26th, the Germans had reinforced and held Voronezh. To its east, the Polish advance continued on a fairly broad front as the bridgehead over the Don was rapidly expanded. Though the Soviets attempted to counter-attack its north-eastern edge, the Poles would eventually firm up their defence and inflict an expensive defeat on the attackers. That part of the line would form the eastern edge of the advance for some time, as the main effort was directed north-west towards Moscow.

​

As at 26 June the overall Polish-Allied advance had spread over all of Ukraine, south towards Krasnodar and through central Russia towards Moscow.

​

The air war in CRAZ had swung firmly in the Allies’ favour by time as Soviet losses now mounted and after they had withdrawn all their fighters. Some Polish troops were being bombed but the losses were relatively light as yet: Soviet casualties to ground attacks remained far higher.

​

The last battle to close off the main Bryansk pocket still raged at the end of 27 June. A first battle had been won earlier that day, then a second had been required and would not be won until the early hours of the 28th. The main effort had come from the east this time, with the one well-organised Polish division in Belarus adding its weight from the west.

​

During 28-29 June, the western Bryansk pocket was closed off after a hard-fought campaign, including a renewed attack from the Belarus divisions from the west linking up with troops attacking from the east. Some Soviet divisions had managed to slip out in the interim though it was estimated around nine had been trapped.

​

Another two were encircled south of Bryansk, which had also been captured in the last few days. The Soviets lost almost 22,000 more men killed or captured there as the Germans and Poles liquidated yet another pocket.

The Allies held full air supremacy in the CRAZ by the late morning of 28 June after the Soviets withdrew the last of their aircraft. During June the Poles had lost 92 planes to all causes and the Soviets 56 to Polish fighters and AA. Soviet troops were again being pounded by the Polish bombers.

​

Tula fell to a fast-moving Polish armoured column without a fight on the afternoon of 29 June as the path to Moscow opened up, though they were soon being counter-attacked. The Lipetsk offensive had proved a great success, the advance so quick that one Soviet division was overrun and surrendered when their retreat was outrun by Polish armour that night. Early on the 30th the west bank of the Don there had been secured.

​

The rapid advance north-east of Voronezh led to yet another pocket of Soviet troops being isolated by midnight on the 30th. Three exhausted Soviet divisions were trapped when a Polish mechanised division cut them off south-west of Tambov. An attack to destroy them would no doubt soon be launched.

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Over in the remaining Bryansk Pocket, three separate Allied attacks were under way to claim the surrounded Soviets – almost two full corps worth of troops. Two of the attacks were being led by Germany with Polish help, the other in the east by Poland alone against some Soviet stragglers near breaking point. Estimate were that the pocket would soon be erased.

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And the question of where the Allies were currently concentrating their main air effort and where the Soviets had sent the bulk of their aircraft was answered: the Allies were looking after the Belarus AZ, where a small PAF effort had been operating in support. During June Soviet losses to the Poles alone had been considerable, the bulk of the TAC through the ground troops’ AA defences.

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Intercepted Soviet reports [was curious so briefly tagged over to see what the Soviet’s total losses in both the Central Russia and Belarus AZs for June had been] showed the additional impact of the total Allied air war against them in the two principal AZs for Polish interests.

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As June 1947 ended, a gap two provinces wide had opened up north of Tula – leading straight towards Moscow. While it may be too much to hope this would remain open for long, there were a number of mobile 1st Army divisions that could be sent to see whether some useful exploitation could be made.

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Another gap had been opened up to the east, between Lipetsk and Tambov, where the other pocket had been formed. A quick victory there may also permit a rapid advance in early July: another opportunity to hopefully be exploited soon.

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The Southern Sector, 16-30 June: Kerch, Krasnodar and the Kuban River

In a bonus for the limited Polish offensive in the south the Allies, led by Yugoslavian infantry and German armour, had forced the Kerch Strait and begun attacking inland by the early hours of 18 June. The Poles had by then paused to regroup north of Krasnodar, where a fresh Soviet infantry division had arrived to defend it.

By the end of 20 June, three more 8th Army Romanian EF divisions had made it by train to Donetsk from the Middle East and began reorganising on the move as they headed to the front via Rostov.

It took until just before midday on 21 June for the Poles to be satisfied with their build-up for the next phase of the offensive to close up to the Kuban River and dislodge the Soviet line between Krasnodar and Salsk, where the Soviets had left a gap. Three separate attacks were launched as Allied numbers also grew steadily at the front in both the Don bridgehead and in their Kerch lodgement, with more divisions shipping into the port of Rostov and arriving by rail.

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Despite the Soviets having brought in and additional division to Krasnodar, it would fall to the Poles at midnight on the 22nd, at the same time the last of the seven new Romanian EF divisions disembarked from their trains in Donetsk.

Salsk was in Polish hands and the first use of the new 8th Army EFs had commenced just to its west on the morning of 25 June as the other four divisions made their way to the front. The Romanian formations proved to be formidable and larger than the average Polish equivalent.

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Over to the west of Krasnodar, a major Allied attack to break out of the Kerch crossing and link up with the Allies in the Don bridgehead was reinforced by the Poles. The link-up would be completed on the early afternoon of 26 June.

By the morning of 30 June, the Allies had secured the north bank of the Kuban two more provinces to the east of Krasnodar. Seven divisions – five of them Romanian EFs – launched a major attack to cross the Kuban at 1000hr that morning against four somewhat disorganised and under-strength Soviet defenders. After ten hours the defence was smashed and the crossing commenced.

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They had not yet secured the Kuban bridgehead by midnight though the Allies had got across the mouth of the river to the west and had closed up to the outskirts of Novorossysk. The Poles were relying on their Allies to secure the eastern flank of the enlarged Don bridgehead as they concentrated on the southern push. One goal of this was to effect an eventual link-up with the Allied forces fighting in north-east Turkey.

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Research, Production and Monthly Summaries

The efficiency of Polish equipment conversion was improved on 25 June, with research switched next to developing the first jet-powered Polish tactical bomber, the PZL.70 Borsuk (Badger).

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On 29 June, there was a brief period where for unclear reasons, a sudden train shortage was felt in the Polish logistic system. Rail fulfilment had been sitting at 100% at 1100hr on 28 June but a day later this had fallen to 95%, then just 79% by 1500hr on the 29th. It had picked up again to 86% by 1700hr and was sitting back at 95% by 0300hr on the 30th. At this point, with a 20-train deficit, production priorities were rearranged to up train production from one to three factories. In any case, before this increased production could be felt, 100% capacity had returned by the end of the month. [Question: are ‘war trains’ (which I see are cheaper) any worse than civilian trains? Should I be looking to put the additional production into them instead?]

As the month ended, the Estonian front had contracted again and another stalemate seemed to have developed. A sole unsupported Czech division was exhausting itself with a hopeless attack on Petrograd as (per usual) most of the Allied divisions in Finland sat back in ports, doing nothing.

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The Allied lodgement in Archangelsk had stabilised and even expanded a bit to the north during the month. It was still diverting a considerable number of Soviet troops to guard it (many of them suffering from poor supply and attrition – an added bonus).

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June had brought further widespread advances by the Polish-led Allies offensive into central and southern Russia. Broad assessments indicated that on the front lines, combined Allied division numbers were now significantly greater than the Soviets in most sectors.

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Rather than wide encirclements and narrow thrusts, the Poles had found it useful to conduct smaller operations to surround small-medium sized pockets of Soviet troops to reduce their numbers as part of advances on a wider front that exploited gaps in the enemy lines wherever possible. Some troops would stay to contain and eliminate the pockets while others pushed forward.

Losses of equipment in combat were highest as a proportion in infantry gear, trucks, mechanised vehicles plus all light, medium and heavy tanks and SP artillery. Attrition was taking a heavier toll on artillery, support equipment, AA and AT guns. AT guns, infantry equipment, light tanks and light SP artillery were the only lines of deficit.

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Some production re-prioritisation had been occurring in past weeks to try to remedy these and lend-lease was helping, but it was a slow process while combat intensity increased even higher than it had been. At the end of the month, train numbers were back in surplus, as noted earlier, but steps had been taken to increase the stockpile to cater for further surges in demand. Truck and convoy numbers remained ample.

Overall Allied casualties across all theatres had increased by around 400,000 during June, for the combined enemy factions it was around 570,000 – many in the USR, of course. Total estimated combat casualties (alone) for the duration of this war (excluding that against the Fascists previously) stood at over 36 million – a human catastrophe by any measure. While Soviet manpower reserves had increased from their upgraded conscription laws, they had lost an estimated 20 divisions during the month in the various Polish-Allied encirclements. And it was assessed that chronic equipment shortages were likely preventing many (if any) new divisions from being deployed.

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Though the estimated monthly casualties for Polish battles had increased to about 68,000 many of those had been from participating Allied divisions. Polish losses were estimated at 55,000 during June. The vast majority of these were from ground combat rather than air attack (which included that from combat in Iran). Overall manpower reserves had fallen by about 20,000 after new recruitment – some of which was coming from ‘non-core population’.

With summer about to start, Moscow seemed much closer to falling into Allied hands than it had just a month ago. Could the momentum be maintained? The Polish High Command was betting it could.