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Good question - while I assume manpower should come from the parent country and equipment the same, I really don't know. Perhaps someone who knows more about the game might be able to answer?
This is probably the French being opportunistic and a further consequence of Soviet over-stretch. Landing just a couple of divisions though is just asking for trouble!
It's something they've tried regularly in recent months but had rarely worked or, if they did get ashore, were rounded up and destroyed. Then again, this time ...
The extra factories will help in time no doubt, but in the short term you could consider pausing some fronts and concentrating your efforts (e.g. on the Moscow advance) if the stockpile situation continues to deteriorate.
Pausing!? "Nie, nigdy!" and “L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace.” Though we do already remain dormant on a few of the sectors, more to preserve the focus and momentum rather than skimp on men and equipment. As long as we are killing and destroying more of theirs than ours and making ground, there will only be rest when victory is impaled on the tips of our lances. This will be made clearer in the next chapter, so actually the advice is being substantially heeded.
Nice. It occurred to me that if you took a look at your occupation policy for the Soviet Union you might be able to optimise things so you get more of what you need most - which at right now might be military factories.
Yes, I think that was something that really needed doing.
You might want to take it a little further and at least build that railroad up to level 2? What still concerns me though is the absence of any supply hub further north in Kerman province. I think getting supply to that front without one is going to be very problematic.
Very apt. At least it kept some of the Russians and Mongolians occupied for a long time. They are likely to be released for the Eastern Front soon - part of the reason we have been pushing in such haste in recent weeks. I suspect the Allies should now be able to contain them in those narrow Himalayan passes now easily enough. Unless they prove unusually incompetent or the enemy (MAB) manage to spring some sort of major surprise.
Indeed, I was very thankful when this transpired. As for the US lodgement: operational security precludes me from commenting for now. You will have to read the next despatch to see what transpires.
Yep, Brisbane is more important - but I think the bigger probem is that SE Australia is almost completely exposed to an adversary with naval superiority. Not good at all.
Agreed on both counts. Can hope (but not expect) the rest of the Allies don't continue to leave the Aussies in the lurch here. More important to hold that than PNG or Borneo, you'd think, but ... and it's not just the Japanese we're worried about here (which would be bad enough) but the otherwise not very stretched US. I have a nasty feeling about the long-term prospects there.
To All: next chapter published soon! Thanks for your readership and especially comments, whose value is as gold to me!
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Chapter One Hundred and Six: Grzmot (Thunder) (5-16 July 1947)
Chapter One Hundred and Six: Grzmot (Thunder) (5-16 July 1947)
Battle-weary but determined Polish troops prepare to cross the Oka River on 6 July 1947. [Leonardo AI, Phoenix 1.0, prompts only]
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Polish Theatre: The Moscow Front
The northern sector of Estonia, Finland and Archangelsk remained largely static from the evening of 5 July through to the middle of the month. But in the westernmost part of the Moscow Front around Belarus, progress was being made by both Poland around the key regional city of Smolensk and the Allies more widely. The battle was won on the night of the 6th and the Polish advance guard took the city the following afternoon.
The PAF had reasserted air supremacy over the CRAZ on the evening of the 5th – mainly because the Allies and Soviets were heavily contesting the Belarus air zone again (noting that the loss figures below only relate to any Polish engagement, including AA).
While the breakout from Tula had been checked at the Oka River the day before, 4 DP had forced its way over the river to the north-west of Tula by the night of 6 July as a new attack to the north-east went from balanced to the Pole’s favour. The attack was eventually won on the afternoon of the 7th and the crossing secured against a Soviet counter-attack early on 9 July.
While that was happening, Roslavl (near Belarus) fell to 12 DP at 1300hr on the 7th. By that night the Poles were ready to continue to punch forward after Smolensk had been secured and the Germans begun an attack of their own on some of the Soviet units now in danger of being cut off in yet another pocket battle.
The attack north from Roslavl took three days of hard fighting to win, but it was by the evening of 10 July. During that time, Polish forces were catching up to the Oka River line, resupplying and rebuilding for the next phase of the drive to Moscow.
Further to the east of the front a new tactical pocket was formed and liquidated north of Tambov, with another Soviet division forced to surrender on the evening of the 8th.
The following morning a new offensive was launched to hook around towards Ryazan in a bid to take the city and outflank the Soviet defensive line that had formed to its east.
Over in the east, the trap had been closed on the Soviets at 0700hr on 11 July with around 90,000 Soviet troops encircled in a large Roslavl Pocket on 11 July. Over the next few days the trapped Soviet divisions were compressed into an ever-smaller area, with the final surrenders taking place on 12-13 July after brief skirmishes.
As the Roslavl Pocket was being destroyed to the east, the operation to breach the Oka and drive onto Moscow went into its next phase: a two-pronged offensive that exploited the bridgeheads secured earlier, with some support from German divisions. Further east a subsidiary attack pressed in on Ryazan, which was now flanked on four sides after another retreating Soviet division was over-run and surrendered east of Ryazan.
The first quick attack was broken off at midday after running into heavy resistance, but the rest met with success by 2200hr that night as the north-eastern attack across the final obstacle of the Moskva River was won.
Both spearheads pushed forward on 12 July as the western prong drove north to the Moskva and the eastern advance got across it at the junction with the Oka. Although the Soviets put in another defence of the Moskva crossing that evening which stalled the advance, reinforcements and a flanking attack from the west saw a Polish victory achieved by the night of the 13th.
This attack was being conducted solely by the light tank divisions of 1st Army, which had naturally been outrunning the main body of the advance during breakout phases such as this one. Their equipment shortages had not yet prevented them from doing so but it also meant they continued to bear the brunt of the fighting. The were undeterred as these latter-day Winged Hussars thundered across the Russian plains towards Moscow.
Desperate as the Poles were to get across the Moskva River in strength before the Soviets could establish a new line, the enemy proved able to rush reinforcements from other fronts to save the great city. The third attempt to widen the Moskva bridgehead west of the Oka confluence stalled again and had to be halted early on 15 July.
Ryazan had been secured and a bridgehead over the Oka there secured by 14 July, however the enemy was counter-attacking there too as battles ebbed to and fro with attacks and counter-attacks. Kaluga had also been occupied in the east and the momentum was maintained there. While Polish troops now overlooked Moscow north across the Moskva in one place, Polish supply was becoming difficult and the leading units exhausted, while the Soviets poured in forces to establish a new line.
In the air, the VVS had returned to the fray in the CRAZ, though the PAF still maintained clear air superiority as the Moscow Offensive continued below them.
Near Vitebsk, the Allies thought they had spotted another weak point in the enemy line in a location that had resisted stoutly for months now. Interestingly, there was an increasing number of other 4thInt divisions being spotted. Perhaps a sign of both Soviet decline but also of the Sinkiang front having been liquidated and handed over to the MAB to handle.
But despite initial success by 17 July the battle would turn against the Poles (where two of the three divisions were militia) and the attack was halted, though it had inflicted heavy casualties on the defenders up to that point.
By the morning of 16 July, the Poles had secured some more of the south bank of the Moskva east of Moscow and held but had not been able to extend the bridgehead north of the Moskva-Oka junction. They were trying to firm up their control of the Moscow approaches but now needed more divisions to catch up to the front line and to improve supply at the cutting edge, which was now very poor after recent quick advances.
Meanwhile, the Soviet scramble to build an emergency defensive line along the Moskva River seemed to be coming together and may require a larger hammer to crack the nut.
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Polish Theatre: The Volgograd-Caucasus Front
The Black Sea was dominated by Allied naval and troop presence by the evening of 5 July 1947, with supplies being run into Rostov, Kerch and Novorossiysk to supplement the rail network from the west. Batumi was the only 4thInt port left and it now had the French landing threatening it from the north and the Allies in Turkey from the south.
Mikhaylovka (west of Volgograd) was taken at midday on 6 July, threatening the Soviet salient extending to its west.
On 8 July, the grateful Australian government was able to offer a pile of surplus infantry equipment even as the Poles provided the main Allied effort in trying to stem the American invasion there. A week later the Germans would offer an even larger shipment of lend-lease infantry weapons. If these deliveries could be realised, it would really assist that burgeoning infantry equipment deficit from recent intense operations.
A briefing on Allied plans for the Eastern Front was provided on 10 July. While it was of course no guarantee these various offensives would be carried out it was interesting to gauge their ambitions – especially on the Northern and Moscow Fronts.
The decision of the Poles to assume a defensive posture north of Mikhaylovka up to Penza was confirmed when their troops were subjected to a check in the Saratov sector on the evening of 10 July, where a quick attack was heavily defeated (1,290 Polish, 249 Soviet casualties). There were only so many places the Poles could maintain strong offensive operations on the Eastern Front. For now, these were on the broad Moscow Front, the Mikhaylovka Salient and the Caucasus.
At home, the long-awaited completion of a new civilian factory that evening was replaced with the start of construction of a military factory in Łodz. Other queued projects were railway upgrades for the Cherkasy, Sistan-Iranshah and Dnipropetrovsk networks.
On 11 July the first of the next wave of Romanian 8th Army EF divisions began to arrive in Rostov and to the east. They were directed on to the front east of Volgograd and south of the Mikhaylovka Salient.
The rapid advance along the Black Sea coast had seen a number of Soviet divisions overrun in the last few days (as described in the previous chapter) and by the early hours of 12 July had linked up with the French beachhead north of Batumi, which was now all that stood between the Caucasus and Turkish fronts.
That evening, three more occupied military factories came on line (to a total of 47), one each being assigned to infantry equipment (13 factories; deficit up to 7,120 including 2,745 from garrison shortfalls), light tanks (8 factories, 782 deficit) and light SP artillery (3 factories, 195 deficit). Support equipment had a small surplus of 22 units.
At midday on 13 July both sides (other Allies as well as Poland and the 4thInt) had offensives in progress along different parts of the main Eastern Front, with the USR now assessed to be over 40% towards capitulation. Good progress but still much more work to be done.
In Turkey, the Allies were still holding back most their forces behind the front lines. This meant no progress was being made and seemed to be (quite understandably) largely driven by supply issues. Though the Allied commanders may have been well advised to remove some of those excess divisions to improve the overall supply situation further forward.
The good news was that, if a breakthrough could be made on this front, and tidal wave of troops from many nations was poised to pour over the thinning 4thInt line still holding Turkey’s eastern border region.
A brief attempt to fully motorise supply in 8th Army (like all the other Polish armies) with another 680 trucks had to be halted on 15 July when a surge in demand for trucks saw the stockpile evaporate to an overall 85% logistic fulfilment. This would have to wait a while for the demand to stabilise.
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The Middle East, Iran and Central Asia
Iranshah’s supply depot had recently been connected to the supply grid on the evening of 5 July. This seemed to have a positive effect on supply distribution but it was soon overstretched. At that time, the Iranian front was still quiet as the Poles tried to consolidate and resupply.
Elsewhere on the Eastern Front, as we have seen above, both sides were active and in Central Asia, the remaining Allied divisions in Sinkiang were fighting their rearguard actions.
It was soon determined that the single line out of Iranshah needed a further upgrade: this was place din the queue but it would take some time yet to be commenced as other priority projects were completed, as we saw in the previous section.
By 9 July supply in the rear areas had improved a little but remained poor at the front. The Poles held in place, forced to fight off Soviet attacks – which were defeated with heavy casualties over the next day.
Allied plans in the region were also provided on 10 July, with the plans of the Pole’s colleagues still largely not being backed up by action.
Another and even more determined round of Soviet attacks across the Iranian front were in progress by the night of 14 July. Some looked at first as though they may succeed but all were eventually defeated by 16-17 July, largely at heavy cost to the enemy. Part of this was a spoiling attack by the Poles on the much-contested Birjand late that night which met with good initial progress.
By 15 July, the isolated pocket of Allied troops in Sinkiang had been liquidated by the Soviets and PRC, who were then pushing to take the last little Sinkiang salient west of occupied Kashgar.
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South East Asia
With little change in Borneo and Java up to mid-July, the main action was in the key port fortress of Singapore. By 10 July the Allies still held the patch of land to its north-west but only had two divisions entrenched in the city itself – perhaps not sufficient for the long term.
Despite a good start, the Malayan defence north-west of Singapore was dislodged back to the city by 13 July.
The attack on Singapore itself came early on 15 July but for now, the Allied defence held strong despite being outnumbered 2-1. Whether this could be maintained in coming days remained to be seen.
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Australia and PNG
No territory changed hands in West Papua during the period. In Queensland, the GAK mounted a counter-attack against the isolated and unsupplied American division north of Townsville at 0800hr on 10 July. The starved US troops surrendered without any resistance two hours later.
This forced an attack they had been making in concert with US troops south of Townsville to be abandoned an hour later. The other GAK division originally directed to Brisbane had been diverted and moved to bottle up the remaining US (larger) beachhead from the south. To the west, the Australians were fighting a delaying defence in the Gulf of Carpentaria.
As soon as the northern attack was complete, the victorious GAK division began attacking to the south and their comrades held Townsville firmly and also swung around to the coast to block any escape in that direction.
This initial quick attack would be won quickly, leaving the climax of this counter-offensive to play out from 16 July onwards.
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The Americas
As had become usual in recent months, little of note happened in the Americas. Neither side had succeeded in dislodging the other as the TRA contained the Allies, who hunkered down in their Yucatan ports.
Meanwhile, the Soviet scramble to build an emergency defensive line along the Moskva River seemed to be coming together and may require a larger hammer to crack the nut.
Good question - while I assume manpower should come from the parent country and equipment the same, I really don't know. Perhaps someone who knows more about the game might be able to answer?
Further to the east of the front a new tactical pocket was formed and liquidated north of Tambov, with another Soviet division forced to surrender on the evening of the 8th.
They were trying to firm up their control of the Moscow approaches but now needed more divisions to catch up to the front line and to improve supply at the cutting edge, which was now very poor after recent quick advances.
Moscow is a key rail/supply hub, so should help if you can take it. Poland needs to move men up quickly for an attack before the Soviets bring enough to fully entrench.
We must continue to believe so. Yes, this month is proving to be a real pivot point for the Eastern Front, I feel. Perhaps the wider war (though that is more diffuse).
They've been very useful during this part of the campaign. Of interest, we're now seeing more German, British and French offensives on the Eastern Front, whereas before it all seemed to be the C-Y combination.
I'd be more worried if the rest of the Allies weren't largely filling that gap. It means Poland has continued to concentrate on what it considers the key points, rather as the shock troops of the general offensive. And even there, on attack and defence, we're getting satisfactory Allied support most of the time. And in total they have so many divisions, when you throw in the EU-breadth secondary and minor Allied powers.
Moscow is a key rail/supply hub, so should help if you can take it. Poland needs to move men up quickly for an attack before the Soviets bring enough to fully entrench.
Yes, if. I appreciate the Soviet AI rallying as best it can to create a proper defence of Moscow as we run into the familiar problems of tired troops and supply trying to catch up. The fine line of momentum vs overextension is being dance over daily.
Chapter One Hundred and Seven: Sztorm (Storm) (16-26 July 1947)
Moscow under fire, viewed from Polish positions on the south bank of the Moskva River, 16 July 1947 [Leonardo AI, Phoenix 1.0, prompts only]
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The Northern Theatre
While this period saw little movement in the lines in Estonia, Finland or Archangelsk, Poland did note that the hitherto strong Red Army garrison of the Soviet capital, Petrograd, had been thinned down to just a single division by 18 July 1947.
There was only a light Finnish presence opposite them at this time, to be sure, but this did seem to be both a bit imprudent and also indicative of the Soviets being further stretched on the multiple fronts they were obliged to man.
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Polish Theatre: The Moscow Front
As it had been in recent weeks, the principal focus of the Polish campaign of summer 1947 remained on the drive to Moscow, where Polish forces had fought their way across the Oka River to its southern outskirts in recent days.
By the end of 17 July, Polish a one or two other Allied divisions had occupied the southern bank of the Moskva River all the way from its junction with the Oka (where they held a small bridgehead) to the west of Moscow, where Polish forces were closing up to the headwaters of the Moskva.
The supply situation behind the front was quite good as a wide range of supply depots and rail lines serviced the advancing troops. But naturally, it was taking some time for logistics at the front of the storm front to catch up. That, plus the need for slower moving infantry troops to close up and for tired troops to reorganise after days of advancing and fighting had temporarily stalled the advance.
Given the need to build up sufficient strength and supplies to fight across a defended river obstacle, the Poles decided to prepare more fully before the final assault on their main summer objective.
The air war in the CRAZ had also heated up again, disrupting more Polish bomber missions than previously and leading to more air casualties, though AA fire and accidents were contributing more to those casualties so far than Soviet fighter interceptions.
On the Soviet side, Polish fighters and AA were causing similar amounts of losses to their TAC and CAS, whose losses were mounting. Air parity obtained as 18 July began, with only minor Allied support provided at that time.
On the western side of the front, Smolensk was now well behind the front lines as the Poles continued to press with new attacks towards both Velikiye Luki in the north-west and eastward from Smolensk, where a major victory was won by the evening of the 19th.
20 July saw the Poles, with some Allied support, attempting to punch through a weakened Soviet line south of Rzhev, from where they planned to flank the western end of the Moskva River line protecting Moscow, as the divisions in front of the great city built up, reorganised and resupplied, while fighting off regular Soviet counter-attacks.
The supply situation was improving noticeably by early on 21 July, though the units directly in front of Moscow still suffered significant supply shortages which would inhibit any attack.
In the air war, the Poles had finally exhausted all their reserve stocks of old piston-engine fighters (no longer being built) by 21 July. As losses continued, the number of piston-engine wings would be reduced as jets took over.
As the build-up along the Moskva River continued into 22 July, the Rzhev offensive was approaching the western end of the river.
In the air war, yet another Polish ace was promoted, to take over the 1 DM fighter wing.
At last, early on 23 July, the final offensive to break the Moskva River line began with a major attack to the eats of Moscow to expand the narrow bridgehead already held there. The short and sharp battle was won that afternoon.
At the same time, a German-led attack to its south was also won.
Then to the east of Moscow a wave of attacks was unleashed – part of the ‘summer storm’ that sought to overwhelm and break the whole Soviet defence along the entire Moscow Front. A recent advance south of Tver was being defended against a heavy Soviet counter-attack while a major river crossing of the Moskva south of Tver was also fought and won by the following morning.
Once the eastern Moskva bridgehead had been secured, on the morning of the 25 July an attack by two full Polish corps was launched to secure the eastern approach to Moscow, with a hard-fought victory achieved by midday on the 26th. To its west, the river had been forced in two locations as Polish troops advanced to take up those north bank positions and the western approach to Moscow.
In the skies of the CRAZ above all these critical battles, air superiority had swung firmly back to the Allies, as a mass influx of Allied aircraft bolstered the PAF’s effort as recent total Soviet losses to Polish sources now outweighed Polish losses to them and fewer Polish bombing sorties were being disrupted. Interestingly, the biggest Allied contributors this time were Yugoslavia, New Zealand and India.
Supply by this time was again stretched at the front through advances, heavy concentration of troops and increased operational tempo, but it was proving sufficient for the task. The Moskva River line was being shattered. Meanwhile, Polish engineers rushed to repair damaged rail lines in more recently gained areas.
The western Moscow approach was secured at 1100hr on 26 July and the eastern crossing early the next morning. Once secured from counter-attack and reinforced, these would offer a more cost-effective way to attack Moscow itself than a difficult river crossing into an urban area.
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Polish Theatre: The Volgograd Front
The main story on the Volgograd Front during July was the Battle of the Mikhaylovka Pocket. By 17 July it was still a salient, but a drive towards the Don River just west of Volgograd further isolated the Red Army divisions left within the elongated salient. Just one province now kept it open to the rest of the USR and at 0100hr on the 17th artillery opened up from both the north and south as a pincer attack was launched from both directions. Both sides suffered from poor supply, though it was more of a hindrance in the attack than the defence.
The defence was well-established and the fighting proved both bitter and prolonged. It soon became clear more divisions would be needed and these were brought don from the north, where the line was left to other Allies to defend, and the south with recently arrived and reorganised 8th (Romanian) Army formations fed forward.
Meanwhile, the Germans were compressing the salient further from the south.
The battle to close off the salient ground on into 19 July and then beyond, with over five days of fighting required to finally win it. Casualties had been heavy on both sides.
And even when the ‘bottle was corked’ on the afternoon of the 22nd, the ensuing Soviet counter-attack was strong enough to require further reinforcements to repel. The tide turned back in Poland’s favour by 1700hr, though the Soviet attack would persist even as the Poles began to compress the newly formed pocket just to the west of the main battle a little later that evening.
An attempt to snatch a bridgehead across the Don in front of Volgograd was also made, the river crossing meeting with some initial success.
Just before midnight, the main battle first swung towards the Soviets and then back to the Poles as the Soviets sought to reinforce. The gain was secured by the evening of 23 July, the attack defeated with fairly heavy casualties.
While the Poles were concentrating on the Mikhaylovka Pocket and the approaches to Volgograd plus the secondary thrust into the Caucasus, their allies had plans to push all the way to the Caspian Sea. They now had a lot of men amassing in the rear areas but not yet pushing hard at the front.
Polish researchers completed their latest strategic bomber design on 25 July, switching their focus next onto cheaper war austerity trains, in case the demand on the expanding Eastern Front became too great for ordinary train production to keep pace. Because even if the Soviets capitulated, thoughts would turn next to what would be the ongoing fight with the MAB further to the east.
For now, with nuclear research still in its comparatively early stages and other production lines stretched, none of these new bomber designs were being built yet.
In the Mikhaylovka Pocket, the Poles assisted the German efforts to liquidate the trapped Soviet divisions as the survivors were shepherded further east over 24-27 July.
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Polish Theatre: The Caucasus
The push to link up with the Allies in Turkey via Georgia continued on 17 July, but a four-division attack by 8th Army to seal off Batumi in southern Georgia ultimately stalled on the morning of the 19th with heavy casualties on both sides.
After some reorganisation and reinforcement and though supply was still a problem, attacks recommenced on 22 July: one south towards Batumi, the other east into a less well defended part of the mountainous Georgian hinterland.
The battle for Batumi was won on 23 July, the eastern attack by the 24th, then successfully held against a counter-attack on the 25th.
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Middle East, Iran and Central Asia
The Poles were ready to renew their offensives in Iran by 17 July. Supply was not strong, but they were keen to probe for any new weak spots in the Soviet line and to keep up pressure on all fronts. The attacks into Fars, Isfahan and Birjand all met with success over 17-18 July without unduly heavy casualties.
On the other hand, the last Allied presence in Sinkiang had been ejected by 19 July, with the MAB (principally the PRC) taking over full responsibility for the sector.
Once the new gains in Iran were occupied by the afternoon of 20 July, they were all heavily counter-attacked by the Red Army, once each in Fars and Isfahan and twice in Birjand. All of these were eventually heavily defeated, especially in Birjand between 20-27 July (only major battles shown below). This was exactly what the Poles had hoped for: not only distracting the enemy but causing them to lose disproportionate losses in trying to retake heavily defended positions as reinforcements followed up the initial advances.
As usual, the engineers followed up the advances, repairing damaged rail lines and trying to get more supplies to the front – a seemingly unattainable objective in southern Iran.
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Australia and PNG
While there was little new to report in South East Asia or North America, the GAK in Australia – specifically Queensland – had plenty to do. After their isolated division north of Townsville was destroyed, the remaining US divisions cut off to its south tried to hold on until their comrades might rescue them from the west, where the Australian front line defence had collapsed by the afternoon of 16 July.
Unfortunately for them, the Poles were aware that their supplies were almost completely exhausted. Leaving the defence of Townsville itself in place, it was assessed the other two GAK divisions should be enough to begin liquidating the enclave.
The first attack went in on 19 July and it took three days of tough fighting before victory was achieved, driving the two US divisions inland to join their comrades to the west. Potential rescue was still a good distance away.
The leadi8ng US-TRA troops in the Gulf country were only one province closer as the next attack went in on 24 July, joined now by the mountaineers who had been temporarily sent in to ensure a quick end to the pocketed invaders. Two divisions were destroyed the following day: the other two were still retreating and would be eliminated, but no battle report was available showing the numbers lost.
[Image from Leonardo AI, Phoenix 1.0, prompts only.]
With job done by midday on the 26th, attention was turned to holding back the enemy advancing from the west. One GAK division would reinforce the Australian division that now held Townsville, the mountaineers would occupy the mountains to its west and the third division take up a blocking position to their south.
It was uncertain whether this would be enough to stop the enemy’s advance, but it was hoped that poor enemy supply would hinder their further progress, while the Allies retained the key port and railhead of Townsville. Of course, renewed US amphibious landings on the Australian east coast could upset this plan at any time.
After many weeks of stasis in PNG, the Japanese had managed to advance into two of the mountainous interior provinces of West Papua and attack the Allies sole port on the north coast, which held on as at midday on 26 July. Should it be lost, the whole Allied force would be doomed.
While this period saw little movement in the lines in Estonia, Finland or Archangelsk, Poland did note that the hitherto strong Red Army garrison of the Soviet capital, Petrograd, had been thinned down to just a single division by 18 July 1947.
20 July saw the Poles, with some Allied support, attempting to punch through a weakened Soviet line south of Rzhev, from where they planned to flank the western end of the Moskva River line protecting Moscow, as the divisions in front of the great city built up, reorganised and resupplied, while fighting off regular Soviet counter-attacks.
On the other hand, the last Allied presence in Sinkiang had been ejected by 19 July, with the MAB (principally the PRC) taking over full responsibility for the sector.
One GAK division would reinforce the Australia division that now held Townsville, the mountaineers would occupy the mountains to its west and the third division take up a blocking position to their south.
Calvary and motorized units will be of decisive importance in the east, and expand mountaineer units. An offensive from Canada is unlikely to be of any use.
The envisioned battle will be of mainline motorized columns (the poor infrastructure will still ruin the speed) aided by every bit of logistical support companies (actually battalions) and motorized artillery to break through the Chinese infantry formations at all cost. (if possible also invent some sort of "super reliable" heavy tank for breakthrough along rail lines (armored trains anyone?). Calvary divisions provide screen and flank security and conduct tactical envelopments. Air force would be of critical importance in the east.
Paratroopers anyone? Airport seizure is essential for the airpower fight.
Strategic nuclear bombings against American industrial heartland might be an attritional strategy, but are you really willing to do that? What sort of monster has this war turned us into?
For Next month the offensive should be concentrated on the North, continue to push north until reaching Leningrad-Archangelsk pocket. This will also isolate the Soviet force in Karelia. On the South the offensive need to reach Astrakhan, at that point the Soviets will probably surrender.
Post war policy:
Unfortunately we will have to give Belarus everything in their natural territory. There's no need to deal with even more insurgency
Ukraine should be kept under direct occupation, at least as long as the war is still going (interwar Polish-Ukrainian relationship was godawful in our timeline). Still better do it softly. A "Greater Ukraine" would also be put under Polish control for the factories. The northern industries from Donbass to Kharkov and even Tula would be better in Polish hands. In fact almost of Russian Industry should be kept under allied, and especially Polish hands as long as it does not destabilize the new authorities in Russia. Crimea should be allowed autonomy, the coast of the Black Sea is not of great use to Poland in any foreseeable future.
The most important criteria of the New Russian government would be it's ability to sustain the allied fronts in Central Asia. A Morgenthau Plan like dissolution is not feasible in that regard. All major logistical nodes in Europe all the way to the fronts must remain in the hands of one effective authority. But the rest of the regions should be granted autonomy. There's just too much fat for the Russian bear.
Karelia should be granted independence (the Finns didn't do much in the war).
The Caucasus would have to be merged into another authority, which unfortunately means we will lose access to the oil of Baku. Some parts would be handed to Turkey.
Things seem to have slowed a bit on the forums on the reading and response side, so I'm going to wait a while longer before writing up the final chapter of the July 47 session for a couple of days, to give people a chance to catch up (if that's what they need). I'm thinking in the northern summer there may be other wholesome distractions etc
Thanks though to those who have commented recently:
For now, no, but (as is often the case) it's right at the front, where the unit concentration is higher and battle damage worse and units' supply lines are extended after advances. Hopefully not too critical a problem though: just don't want to waste strength when supply penalties are that high and the opposition is forming up behind rivers. Still time to get all this done before winter sets in again ...
This is the plan: push on a wide front while resistance is weak, search for weak spots and pincers if they start to establish defence lines, but one way or another always keeping them off balance tactically and strategically.
They have so far: the Allies seem to have shipped in plenty of divisions and the fronts are now narrow, with good defensive terrain and probably poor supply for the MAB. I think the main strategic fear for now is some Japanese amphibious flanking move on the sub-continent (or invading through Afghanistan or Thailand and Burma).
Will see if it can be formed in time, what they're able to throw at it and whether they try any more Anzio-style flanking amphibious landings. We don't have any reserves to help plug gaps now.
Calvary and motorized units will be of decisive importance in the east, and expand mountaineer units. An offensive from Canada is unlikely to be of any use.
The envisioned battle will be of mainline motorized columns (the poor infrastructure will still ruin the speed) aided by every bit of logistical support companies (actually battalions) and motorized artillery to break through the Chinese infantry formations at all cost. (if possible also invent some sort of "super reliable" heavy tank for breakthrough along rail lines (armored trains anyone?). Calvary divisions provide screen and flank security and conduct tactical envelopments. Air force would be of critical importance in the east.
Paratroopers anyone? Airport seizure is essential for the airpower fight.
Strategic nuclear bombings against American industrial heartland might be an attritional strategy, but are you really willing to do that? What sort of monster has this war turned us into?
For Next month the offensive should be concentrated on the North, continue to push north until reaching Leningrad-Archangelsk pocket. This will also isolate the Soviet force in Karelia. On the South the offensive need to reach Astrakhan, at that point the Soviets will probably surrender.
Post war policy:
Unfortunately we will have to give Belarus everything in their natural territory. There's no need to deal with even more insurgency
Ukraine should be kept under direct occupation, at least as long as the war is still going (interwar Polish-Ukrainian relationship was godawful in our timeline). Still better do it softly. A "Greater Ukraine" would also be put under Polish control for the factories. The northern industries from Donbass to Kharkov and even Tula would be better in Polish hands. In fact almost of Russian Industry should be kept under allied, and especially Polish hands as long as it does not destabilize the new authorities in Russia. Crimea should be allowed autonomy, the coast of the Black Sea is not of great use to Poland in any foreseeable future.
The most important criteria of the New Russian government would be it's ability to sustain the allied fronts in Central Asia. A Morgenthau Plan like dissolution is not feasible in that regard. All major logistical nodes in Europe all the way to the fronts must remain in the hands of one effective authority. But the rest of the regions should be granted autonomy. There's just too much fat for the Russian bear.
Karelia should be granted independence (the Finns didn't do much in the war).
The Caucasus would have to be merged into another authority, which unfortunately means we will lose access to the oil of Baku. Some parts would be handed to Turkey.
Thanks for that detailed appraisal of what lies ahead. Given the scale, we'll need to rely even more on some useful and robust Allied support: it will be interesting to see how that goes. Our current mobile forces are of course quite limited in grand terms and for now our ability to expand them is also very limited (equipment shortages, mainly). Same goes for other specialists (mountain troops, paratroops etc). More would be nice but 'art of the possible' applies, as the latter would also require a substantial transport aircraft arm too, I assume, and we currently have none.
I think in RP terms, Poland wants a modest nuke capability for deterrence/response and would not have plans for nuking the US. Though maybe the MAB ...
Belarus has already been given everything we can for now, so no issue there. Ukraine etc: will take some more advice on that when the time comes, as I have no experience to speak of in these peace treaty negotiations or occupation/liberation policies and costs/benefits.
And yes, assuming the 4thInt is wrapped up in due course, the MAB for us is the next big thing. Am planning to leave the US to the European Allies to handle if possible. Question to all: is there any chance they can conclude a WP with the Allies at some point? Or is it a fight to the death (if it is, I may need to call quits at some point down the track and impose an artificial peace to end this thing before it catches up with OTL!!!
Things seem to have slowed a bit on the forums on the reading and response side, so I'm going to wait a while longer before writing up the final chapter of the July 47 session for a couple of days, to give people a chance to catch up (if that's what they need). I'm thinking in the northern summer there may be other wholesome distractions etc
Thanks though to those who have commented recently:
For now, no, but (as is often the case) it's right at the front, where the unit concentration is higher and battle damage worse and units' supply lines are extended after advances. Hopefully not too critical a problem though: just don't want to waste strength when supply penalties are that high and the opposition is forming up behind rivers. Still time to get all this done before winter sets in again ...
One can but hope, if not expect ...
This is the plan: push on a wide front while resistance is weak, search for weak spots and pincers if they start to establish defence lines, but one way or another always keeping them off balance tactically and strategically.
They have so far: the Allies seem to have shipped in plenty of divisions and the fronts are now narrow, with good defensive terrain and probably poor supply for the MAB. I think the main strategic fear for now is some Japanese amphibious flanking move on the sub-continent (or invading through Afghanistan or Thailand and Burma).
Will see if it can be formed in time, what they're able to throw at it and whether they try any more Anzio-style flanking amphibious landings. We don't have any reserves to help plug gaps now.
Surely it must! And yes, after the 4thInt comes the MAB. Could get quite interesting out on the vast steppe!
Thanks for that detailed appraisal of what lies ahead. Given the scale, we'll need to rely even more on some useful and robust Allied support: it will be interesting to see how that goes. Our current mobile forces are of course quite limited in grand terms and for now our ability to expand them is also very limited (equipment shortages, mainly). Same goes for other specialists (mountain troops, paratroops etc). More would be nice but 'art of the possible' applies, as the latter would also require a substantial transport aircraft arm too, I assume, and we currently have none.
I think in RP terms, Poland wants a modest nuke capability for deterrence/response and would not have plans for nuking the US. Though maybe the MAB ...
Belarus has already been given everything we can for now, so no issue there. Ukraine etc: will take some more advice on that when the time comes, as I have no experience to speak of in these peace treaty negotiations or occupation/liberation policies and costs/benefits.
And yes, assuming the 4thInt is wrapped up in due course, the MAB for us is the next big thing. Am planning to leave the US to the European Allies to handle if possible. Question to all: is there any chance they can conclude a WP with the Allies at some point? Or is it a fight to the death (if it is, I may need to call quits at some point down the track and impose an artificial peace to end this thing before it catches up with OTL!!!
Just be quick, can’t wait to see the victory. The celebration will be epic.
I’m actually Chinese by ethnicity so please just don’t nuke us.
And the idea is to “motorize” some existing units, just slap a motorized OB on certain veteran units (training level will decrease but could still work). And I said make some calvary units too. They work better in Siberia
Also the rush to far east would be inherently disadvantageous due to distance, win the mobile fight or lose
Just be quick, can’t wait to see the victory. The celebration will be epic.
I’m actually Chinese by ethnicity so please just don’t nuke us.
And the idea is to “motorize” some existing units, just slap a motorized OB on certain veteran units (training level will decrease but could still work). And I said make some calvary units too. They work better in Siberia
Also the rush to far east would be inherently disadvantageous due to distance, win the mobile fight or lose
Chapter One Hundred and Eight: Powódź (Flood) (26-31 July 1947)
Barricades were erected in the streets of Moscow as the USR waited for the hammer to fall, 26 July 1947.
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Polish Theatre: Moscow Front
East of Moscow, Polish armour had taken an advance position north of the Oka-Moskva River junction by 27 July as a major attack sought to close off the neck of another pocket where up to five 4thInt divisions were pinned to the Oka. Two battles would be need, the second ending on the afternoon of 29 July.
As that fight progressed, the attack on Moscow itself began on 27 July with a single French mountain division attacking across the Moskva. Next, the Poles fended off a Soviet spoiling attack at 1600hr, allowing them to reinforce the wavering French assault late that night with 11 additional Polish divisions, most attacking from the left and right flanks.
Interestingly, Moscow was being defended by two Georgian divisions and a Soviet formation. Both sides had air support. The Polish 2nd Lt Tk Div reinforced the French at 0200hr on the 28th and the battle tipped in favour of the Allies.
To the west, the last pocket of occupied Belarussian territory just north of Vitebsk was attacked by the French this time who were opposed by minor 4thInt divisions only but not making headway. The Poles reinforced with another four divisions on the morning of 28 July and a heavy victory was eventually won on the night of the 29th.
Just before midnight on 29 July the Poles closed off the Oka River pocket and held off a counter-attack while their comrades liquidated the surrounded enemy troops: two Soviet divisions (one infantry, one tank) had been surrounded, the rest having escaped over the last couple of days. Still, over 25,000 enemy were killed or captured.
Moscow was still resisting early on 30 July but the Poles (the French having dropped out of the attack by then) were on the cusp of a victory they would secure that afternoon after a sharp battle. The enemy were retreating to the north as Polish troops entered the city on the night of 30 July 1947.
[Image: Leonardo AI, Phoenix 1.0]
By the following morning, tired but happy Polish troops were getting pictures taken in front of the Kremlin, which had largely been spared from any major damage. Under Trotsky, it had become a museum rather than the centre of the Soviet Government, which he had moved to Petrograd after Stalin’s loss in the 2nd Soviet Civil War.
As Polish-led Allied forces now surged over the Moskva and Oka Rivers on a wide front, a triumphant victory parade was held in Warsaw on 31 July. “Trotsky’s Folly” had come full circle with the greatest Russian city now in the hands of its would-be victims.
[Image: Leonardo AI, Phoenix 1.0]
Further west, Velikiye Luki had fallen by the end of the month as the Allies pushed beyond Vitebsk and towards Rzhev.
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Northern Front
Late on 28 July a general Allied offensive was in progress across the whole length of the Eastern Theatre, including in Finland, with a few Soviet counter-attacks thrown in here and there. Of interest, the Finns were in the process of attacking Petrograd – and seemed to be on top!
Indeed, by the end of 30 July the Soviet capital had been occupied by Finnish troops, who hoisted their flag in front of the Winter Palace. They were already attacking south to try to expand the breakthrough.
[Image: Bing AI, DALL-E3]
This meant both Petrograd and Moscow had fallen within hours of each other. A black day for the Soviets and a glorious one for the Poles and Finns in particular, who Trotsky had gone out of his way to attack with unjustified aggression.
As the month ended, Finnish troops patrolled the streets of Petrograd to maintain order and cement control, now boosted by Yugoslavian and Czech forces. The Estonian front remained stalemated again, though the Allies held and had heavily fortified Narva.
[Image: Leonardo AI, Phoenix 1.0]
The Archangelsk Front remained much as it had for many months now, still pinning down many Soviet divisions (in generally poor supply) that would have been better used elsewhere.
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Polish Theatre: Volgograd Front
On the evening of 26 July, the Polish Armament Ministry approved two new designs: one for an improved version of the 9TP light tank and a significantly improved Orzeł jet fighter. Both were already in heavy production, so it was theorised that this should mean better equipment coming out without disrupting production lines too much. [Though I may have got that wrong, of course.]
On the battlefield, France and Britain were demonstrating a bit of initiative with some attacks of their own while the Poles were heavily concentrated in the south of the sector, liquidating the Mikhaylovka Pocket and preparing for the next phase: a drive on Volgograd.
The last resistance in the Mikhaylovka Pocket was mopped up between 28-30 July as the Poles aided a French attack on three Soviet divisions who mainly surrendered after some initial resistance.
Meanwhile, a large Allied force had amassed on the northern bank of the Don River, just south-east of Mikhaylovka, by the night of 28 July. However, they were short on supplies and a number of the formations needed to reorganise.
On the afternoon of 30 July, Polish logistics chiefs assessed they now had enough surplus trucks available to fully motorise supply for the 8th (Romanian EF) Army, which were immediately released. It was expected this should start to improve supply throughput in preparation for the Volgograd offensive. And due to production and (mainly) the arrival of lend-lease shipments, the infantry equipment deficit had been reduced, but still sat at 4,650 units.
A large Soviet attack on five Polish/Romanian EF divisions in the bend of the Don River west of Volgograd was defeated with heavy casualties on the afternoon of 29 July. By 200hr on the 30th, Petrograd had fallen and Trotsky’s government had relocated to Volgograd: the last of the ‘big three’ Soviet centres and itself now close to the front lines.
Just to the north of that the awaited Allied attack by Polish, French and British divisions on the Mikhaylovka-Volgograd axis had begun and was making good progress. Further south, 8th Army and other Allied units were closing up to the Don and preparing to cross it.
The Polish Air Force continued to maintain air superiority in the CRAZ for the last few days of July with Allied help and without taking excessive losses. The diagram below shows total aircraft numbers by type, air base location and wing allocation, with indications of which wings were commanded by aces.
It also shows how of the piston-engine fighters being slowly run down, almost all the oldest pre-war PZL.11s had now been expended. Tactical bombers, still in production, were now dominated by the latest PZL.63. Not shown in either column are the other lend-lease models still in service from earlier equipment deliveries by Allied partners.
As July ended, the majority of fighting in progress was on the Volgograd Front, with the Northern and Moscow Front going through a relatively quiet period as far as combat was concerned.
The Allies had won the battle north-west of Volgograd and a French advance guard had just secured the gain – one step closer to the provisional Soviet capital. The west bank of the Don had now been fully secured and to the south a new Polish offensive using a full corps of 8th Army divisions had kicked off, following up recent Allied advances there as well.
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The Caucasus and Turkey
The Allies had taken the lead in pushing forward in the northern sector of the Caucasus, with the French particularly active on 27 July, with mixed progress and some Soviet counter-attacks. More Allied forces had shipped and railed in and sat in reserve, with only a couple of Polish 8th Army divisions still scattered around after recent fighting. In this sector, the rest of their comrades were operating in Georgia.
In north-east Turkey, the Allies had reinforced the front line and were starting to push back to slowly start reclaiming Turkish territory lost earlier to 4thInt incursions. However, by late on 28 July, no active combat was in progress.
To their north, the Poles had taken Batumi and were now trying to push inland, having achieved the objective of linking the two fronts together at last.
By the end of July, more progress had been made in the difficult terrain on offer. The British had done the same just to the south, over the Turkish border. It would likely prove a grinding campaign, though one finally swinging in the Allies favour. Tbilisi – and a Georgian surrender – was the next objective.
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Middle East, Iran and Central Asia
As all-round pressure increased on the many fronts the Soviets were fighting on, by 28 July the Allies were also now making some gradual progress in Kurdistan after a long time on the defensive, this time led by a Turkish attack on Sulaymaniyah in support of their Kurdish allies (!! ).
Another long-time sore point was being remedied on the Iraq-Iran border at the top of the Persian Gulf, with a strong Allied attack out of Basrah looking like it would force a crossing after many previous failed attempts.
The Allies seemed to have a strong and well-supplied defence organised in the north of India to hold off the MAB.
The Poles had stayed largely on the defensive in Iran for the last few days, consolidating recent gains and trying to improve supply distribution. They had launched an attack just north of Bandar e’Abbas early on 31 July which was going well by the end of the day, while elsewhere Soviet counter-attacks were being held off.
Supply distribution had improved marginally but would likely always be a problem in this sector.
Following the loss of Sinkiang, the general picture in this theatre had shown some early signs of improvement as the Soviets and their 4thInt allies weakened. Of course, the MAB remained unbowed but with limited avenues to advance.
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South-West Pacific
The situation in Singapore, Java, Borneo and West Papua changed little in the last few days of July 1947.
Down in Australia, the Western Australian front was also static, with the Allied defence well established. It was in North Queensland the US was making its major push. By the end of the month, their lead elements had reached but not yet attacked the defensive line the GAK and a few Allied divisions had formed in front of the key transport hub of Townsville.
[Image: Bing AI, DALL-E3]
US supply was naturally very poor, while the Allied divisions were well stocked. That, the terrain and some more time to dig in may help delay or even stop the American advance, though they possessed superior numbers: if they could deploy and supply them effectively.
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Summary
In the Americas, the ‘Enclave Stand-off’ in eastern Canada and the ports on the Yucatan Peninsula continued as it had for months.
In Eurasia, the three factional blocs each still covered much ground, though the Russian heartland of the USR (and thus the 4thInt) was now suffering significant occupation in a great bulge.
The casualty toll continued to grow for both sides of the war, but once more the Soviets had suffered the most. The USR was now assessed as 58% towards surrender, Georgia 51%. The USR alone appeared to have taken around 660,000 in military casualties during July. The Poles had eliminated an estimated 23 more Soviet divisions. The combined factions opposing the Allies had lost almost a million men over this period, the Allies about 660,000 (presumably many of those captured during the fall of Sinkiang).
Combat actions the Poles had been involved in saw around 69,000 casualties during the month, but only about 48,000 of those were Polish troops. The other 21,000 were attributed to other Allied participants in those battles. Net reserve manpower had actually increased by 4,000 since the end of June, with replacements more than making up for the increased losses (likely due to extra recruits being found among non-core occupied territories). The Polish contribution to the war effort had now jumped into third place after Britain and Germany.
Also of interest was an appreciable change in the assessment of the warscore, from 11% in favour of the Allies on 30 June to 17% by 31 July: the occupation of Moscow, Petrograd and other Russian cities had doubtless led to this shift. Second, total Allied productive power (at 2,700 factories) was now almost double that of the estimated combined enemy factions of around 1,400. July 1947 could indeed be viewed by historians as the true turning point of the war. Though that history of course remains to be written …
In terms of production priorities and key equipment holdings, the Poles were now trying to moderate changes to production lines as much as possible, including not completely eliminating some where there may be a current surplus but more gear could be needed in the future for raising new units (such as with medium armoured vehicles for mechanised divisions).
[Image: Bing AI, DALL-E3]
Recent lend lease deliveries had drastically reduced the infantry equipment deficit to just 2,000 units as production of the latest weapons now occupied almost a third of all Polish military production. Light tanks, an area where lend-lease was not so forthcoming, was the next largest deficit (and production effort), followed by AT guns and light SP artillery, all to help reduce shortages. Support equipment production had also just started to be increased after a long period of surpluses had seen it minimised. Aircraft production now focused solely on tactical bombers and jet fighters (noting the recent upgrade to the Orzeł Mk2 had only slightly affected efficiency).
I took a quick tag-peek at the USR’s equipment stockpile to confirm what seemed obvious after their recent conscription rate increase started to refloat their manpower reserve. Basically, as figured, they had deficits in every major category of weapons. Especially (like Poland) in light tanks where they were 4,400 short. AT, AA, medium tanks, support and infantry equipment and trucks also had big deficits of over 1,000 up to 3,000 for field artillery. And now rapidly decreasing capacity to produce more.
Late on 28 July a general Allied offensive was in progress across the whole length of the Eastern Theatre, including in Finland, with a few Soviet counter-attacks thrown in here and there. Of interest, the Finns were in the process of attacking Petrograd – and seemed to be on top!
so it was theorised that this should mean better equipment coming out without disrupting production lines too much. [Though I may have got that wrong, of course.]
Am planning to leave the US to the European Allies to handle if possible. Question to all: is there any chance they can conclude a WP with the Allies at some point? Or is it a fight to the death (if it is, I may need to call quits at some point down the track and impose an artificial peace to end this thing before it catches up with OTL!!!
The fall of the both the Old Capital and the New Capital is surely a sign that this morally bankrupt regime of Trotsky is sure to fall. Alas for the many thousands that will have fallen, and will yet fall, for Trotsky's folly.
One could hope for faster movement, but Russia is just so annoying big.
