Chapter III: The Alsace Offensive
'The opposing French and German trenches, their parapets hard frozen, were so close that they were actually within hearing of each other. Towards dawn a rapid thaw set in. The parapets melted and subsided, and two long lines of men stood up naked, as it were, before each other, face to face with only two possibilities - wholesale murder on the one side or the other, or a temporary unofficial peace for the making of fresh parapet protections.
The situation was astounding and unique in the history of trench warfare. The French and German officers, without conferring and unwilling to negotiate, turned their backs so that they might not see officially so unwarlike a scene, and the men on each side rebuilt their parapets without the firing of a single shot.'
Lord Northcliffe commenting on an incident shortly before the Alsace offensive.
March 1915
Trench warfare had been a fact of life of the Western Front for some 8 months, and had heralded some of the most atrocious conditions man has been forced to endure; epidemics of 'trench foot' and 'shell-shock' spread through the ranks of both sides, vermin thrived and daily rain came in the form of artillery bombardments unrivalled in scale, all in the bitter cold of winter. It had also witnessed two of the stranger incidents in the history of warfare, the incident described above and the famous 'Christmas truce'; brief glimpses of humanity and mutual respect in an otherwise brutal and inhuman environment. By mid-spring, shortly before the post-winter thaw and notorious April rains, trench warfare on the Western Front was about to add another horror to its legacy. The meat-grinder, prolonged and sustained offensive.
At 07:00 hours on the 14th of March, 1915, 39 French Divisions began the first major French offensive in the Great War, preceded by a half-hour long artillery barrage. At the simultaneous blowing of over a hundred whistles literally thousands of French Infantrymen began to climb their parapets and begin their assaults on German trench lines. The terrain was often difficult, broken by shell holes as it was, and the Germans held much of the advantageous high ground along the front. None-the-less the French Army initially went about their duty with enthusiasm, eager for the chance to show the Hun their quality, break the drudgery and deadlock of trench warfare and therefore escape the discomforts that go with it.
The Alsace Offensive begins
It was not to be however, despite the great advantages in numbers held. The German positions were well prepared, complex and well-designed trench lines were supplemented by numerous pre-war fortifications and artillery was accurately 'zeroed' in on certain strategic and 'choke' points. German re-enforcements also came quickly and in plentiful numbers, somewhat negating the numerical advantages the French had counted on. In the face of these obstacles French casualties were inevitably immense; over a 15-day period much of the 2nd Army battered itself to pieces and suffered an estimated 40,000 casualties, and yet for all this sacrifice success was extremely limited. The result of the long-standing and popular political pressure applied to the General Staff was an absolute disaster. However, rather than curbing French popular enthusiasm for offensives, people blamed poor planning and preparation rather than the formidable defences and technologies of the time. This idea was in fact re-enforced further when the second devastating blow to fall on the Army's morale struck less than a week later. As such the disaster of the Alsace offensive can be considered two or even three-fold- not only was it a massive waste of human life which gave no gains whatsoever, but it paved the way for the German counter-attack in the Argonne region of Belgium and subsequently to re-enforce the 'offensive mentality'.
'Our modern battles afford no spectacle; they are cruel and mysterious. There are big empty spaces clotted with shell holes and cut with long furrows which mark the soil as the veins make marble patterns on the hands. There are columns of smoke from bursting shells, a line of shadows that creeps close to the earth and disappears. Those who are in the battle never know anything more of it than one episode.'
Account of an anonymous French staff officer.
British soldiers cover the withdrawl of French troops.
'I have read a good many stories of battle, and some of their embroideries appear to me rather exaggerated; the truth is quite good enough by itself. Although they were bombarded beforehand, my men went very firmly into action. The cannonade worked on the ears and the nerves, getting louder with every step nearer the front, till the very earth shook, and our hearts jumped in our breasts.
Where we were there were hardly any trenches or communication trenches left. Every half-hour the appearance of the earth was changed by the unflagging shellfire. It was a perfect cataract of fire. We went forward by fits and starts, taking cover in shell-holes, and sometimes we saw a shell drop in the very hole we had chosen for our next leap forwards.
A hundred men of the battalion were half buried, and we had scarcely the time to stop and help them to get themselves out. Suddenly we arrived at what remained of our first-line trenches, just as the Boches arrived at our barbed wire entanglements - or, rather, at the caterpillar-like remains of our barbed wire.
At this moment the German curtain fire lengthened, and most of our men buried in shell-holes were able to get out and rejoin us. The Germans attacked in massed formation, by big columns of five or six hundred men, preceded by two waves of sharpshooters. We had only our rifles and our machine guns, because the 75's could not get to work.'
An anonymous French soldier sent north to re-enforce the Argonne positions.
N.B. The 75's (75mm Howitzers) 'could not get to work' because they were stuck in the clogged and muddy roads in transit to the front.
April 1915
The German reply to the Alsace Offensive came in the form of the Argonne Counter-Offensive, and began on the 5th of April, less than a week after France's humiliating withdrawal. The German General Sixt von Amin lead 21 divisions of the Kaiserliche Armee (professional soldiers) in an attack against a total of only 16 Entente divisions. The Entente forces were mainly comprised of hastily trained and less lavishly equipped French reservists (the French People's Voluntary Army), French cavalry units and Belgian regulars. Also present at the battle were elements of the Japanese and British Expeditionary Forces. Despite heavy rains and resulting muddy ground conditions the battle was successfully concluded in favour of the German Army by the 16th of April, forcing the Entente to establish new positions on the borders of the Maas river. This constituted a second humiliating blow to the Entente, marking an all-time low in the French Army's morale. In the eyes of the public the loss of the Argonne forest region, the city of Arlon, and the unprecedented success of the German offensive served only to show the incompetence of their leaders, further undermining their arguments for a defensive policy. After the Argonne counter-offensive many feared that the now committed and aggressive German Army would prove every bit as successful as the Prussian Army had in the 1870's.
Regular French soldiers retreat during the Argonne counter-offensive.
Note- Quotes are originally from 'Source Records of the Great War', Vol. IV, ed. Charles F. Horne (1923)