Chapter XXIV: Part One - The Leader and The Technocrat.
The Battle of the Coast of Tobruk was a meeting between the rising stars of both sides, Admiral Bergamini for the Regia Marina and Admiral Tovey of the Royal Navy. Admiral Carlo Bergamini was probably the finest technical officer in the Italian navy, an expert in naval artillery the ships he commanded were always well drilled in gunnery. Before commanding the Seconda Squadra he had headed the efforts to upgrade and replace the Italian navy's fire control systems with great success. The new systems he had developed were amongst the fastest and most accurate in the world and, more importantly, were the first effective anti-air fire control to enter service with the Regia Marina. Serving with the Seconda Squadra since late 1934 he had insisted on the entire force being re-fitted with the new systems before training the squadron into the finest in the fleet.
Admiral Tovey's background was less technical and more practical. A sailor since 14 Tovey's career had been wide and varied from commanding destroyers at Jutland to restoring morale and discipline as Captain of HMS
Rodney after the Invergordon mutiny. It was his actions at Jutland that had provided the impetus to his career, commanding the 18th destroyer flotilla he had sunk the German cruiser
Wiesbaden and earnt himself a DSO as well as the attention of the Admiralty Board. He would later claim his promotion was due to Navy tradition not talent; 'The frigate captains of one war are the admirals of the next' had been an axiom since before Nelson. For all his modesty Tovey was an excellent motivator and leader of men, a fine seaman and contentious planner who tried to consider all contingencies.
Admiral Carlo Bergamini, rising star of the Regia Marina and former mathematics prodigy. One of the leading naval artillery experts in Italy, he had been intimately involved in the design of the latest generation of fire control for the fleet and was an expert in it's use and theoretical potential.
While the commanders of both forces were at least comparable, the same could not be said of the vessels they commanded. The Italian force was based around three
Zara heavy cruiser with four
Condottieri light cruisers and three modern destroyer flotillas as escort. None of the ships was more than five years old and all the ships had been designed for speed and fire-power, indeed such was the obsession with speed that several of the
Condettieris had the same power plant as the
Zaras, giving them a top speed in excess of 36 knots. All this speed came at a cost and that price was armoured protection, range and, in the case of the
Zaras torpedo tubes.
The Royal Navy forces in comparison were in the main over 15 years old and designed to operate anywhere, not just in the Mediterranean. The requirements of range and long term crew habitation were space, and tonnage, intensive and more importantly problems Italian designers didn't have to deal with. The only modern vessels in the two Royal Navy forces were the
Leander class light cruisers, all built since 1930 but unfortunately designed for commerce protection duties not as escorts for naval battles. Tovey also faced a far more challenging mission not only did he have to keep the Italian force away from the vulnerable transports bringing in new troops and supplies, he also had to provide fire and air support to the hard pressed troops already landed. Against all this gloom there were significant positives, his capital ships although old were formidable; the battlecruisers HMS
Hood, HMS
Renown and HMS
Repulse and the carriers HMS
Eagle,
Glorious and
Courageous. Tovey could also count on land based air support from Malta and the superior morale and experience of a Royal Navy sailor versus his Italian counterpart.
In the hours before the battle began as the two forces approached, both commanders thought their side possessed the vital edge needed to overcome the enemy; Bergamini believed the technology of his ships would be decisive while Tovey placed his faith in his men. Both men would be correct, but not in the way either of them expected.
The battle opened not with the roar of heavy guns or the near silent bubbles of torpedoes but with the mechanical chatter of light anti-air weapons. The Italian force had spotted, and was trying to drive off, a Coastal Command Avro Anson. The Anson, and indeed the rest of No.48 Squadron, had been rushed into service and hurriedly transferred to Valetta airbase via Gibralta. Such had been the rush that the Ansons had arrived with only their 0.303 Vickers machine guns installed, the mounts and aims for their 360lb bombs having been left with 17 Group. Brought into theatre only for their reconnaissance role the crews had to content themselves with shadowing the Italian squadron before lack of fuel forced their return to base. This opening spar was a double blow for the Italians, the obvious blow was they had been spotted and could no longer count on the element of surprise. More seriously, and entirely unintentionally, it exploited flaws in Admiral Bergamini's personality; an arrogant optimism about technology. Bergamini had expected his new anti-aircraft fire control systems to be effective in combat and drive off any aircraft that tried to attack. The lack of attack by the Anson was taken as proof of this so, following the logic, it was believed the sheer volume and accuracy of fire would deter the British carrier aircraft or destroy them if they dared approached. Confident in his ability to fend off any air attack until he closed in to kill the carriers Bergamini drove his force onwards. In this confidence in anti-aircraft fire Bergamini was far from alone, Admirals across the world's navies were far from convinced of the merits of aircraft carriers in anything other than scouting. One of these unconvinced commanders was none other than Bergamini's opponent Admiral Tovey.
On receiving news of the approaching Italian force Tovey had to balance his two objectives, fire support and protecting the landings. If he moved to intercept the approaching forces the landings, deprived of support, could be repulsed. If he waited the Italians could get too close, or slip past him, and go on to wreak havoc on the unarmed transports supplying the landing. Tovey made his choice; try to stall for time and hope the beachhead made enough progress to survive un-supported for a few hours. Tovey, after consulting with his Air Operations Officers, ordered
Glorious and
Courageous to launch No.808 and No.813 Squadrons to attack the incoming Italian ships. Although far from convinced about the merit of the attack, and fearful of heavy losses among the pilots carrying it out, it is a mark of Tovey's character that he trusted his AirOp officers despite personal misgivings. Tovey had no experience of air operations beyond reconnaissance float planes and had never served on a carrier before the war, it was only the superior communication and control equipment on HMS
Eagle that convinced him to raise his flag there. Where many commanders would have vacillated or allowed personal prejudice to guide their decisions Tovey held true to his principles, he hated 'back seat drivers' and would allow himself to interfere with experts doing their job.
A Fairey Seal with HMS Glorious in the background. Only introduced into service in 1933 the Seal had already been slated for replacement by 1935, with the first squadrons converting to Blackburn Shark, a design that was itself superseded by the Swordfish the following year. With the replacement programme delayed by the outbreak of war, the Admiralty wanted it's squadrons ready to fight not re-training on new aircraft, the Seal would be the workhorse of the Fleet Air Arm during the Abyssinian War.
The strike was, however, far smaller than the Fleet Air Arm officers had wanted. At only two squadrons, one of which would be Gloster Sea Gladiators to guard against enemy fighters, there would be less than twenty actual strike aircraft. Worse the single squadron in Force B equipped with the new Swordfishes, No.825, had only just returned from a ground-support mission over Tobruk so could not be used. Attempts to argue for more aircraft or more time however met with flat refusal, while Tovey was prepared to let the Air Operation Officers do their jobs without interference he would not let them do his; the landing needed support and the Italian squadron needed delaying. Two squadrons was all that could be spared from from army co-operation so those two squadrons would have to suffice.
The pessimism of the FAA officers appeared born out by the bombing run, several of the attacking Fairey Seals were damaged before they could drop their bombs with most who made it through hitting nothing but sea. Of the three hits that were scored the 500lb bombs only managed to damage the superstructure of their targets without penetrating the deck armour or causing any serious damage. What the pilots or their commanders could not see was the impact the attack had on Admiral Bergamini. His much vaunted systems and training had failed to down a single aircraft, the light damage to the cruisers
Alberto di Giussano and
Armando Diaz was a massive blow to the Admiral's confidence because it had been so unexpected. Convincing himself it had been a failure of his captains to position their ships according to plan and not his technology Bergamini slowed his squadron to a virtual crawl as he personally re-positioned every ship into it's 'correct' location. Over an hour later, with the Seconda Squadra re-organised to it's commanders liking, the Italian force set sail on a course parallel to the direction the Fleet Air Arm planes had come from. Bergamini officially searching for the BEF's supply transports, but actually hoping to find the British carriers and extract revenge for the humiliation of the strike.
Up Next; Part Two of course.
