Chapter XXX: Operation Templar Part II.
The one unmentioned, but undoubtedly critical, part of Operation Templar were the deception and misdirection efforts undertaken in parallel. Originally proposed as harassment and raiding missions to keep 'doing something' while the preparation for Templar was ongoing efforts were re-directed to overcome the biggest concern of both Gort and the IGS in London; the amphibious landings. Despite the success at Tobruk and the skill and courage of the BEF it was accepted that it was IV Corps' arrival that tipped the balance in favour of the landings. The greater distance of the Benghazi landings, and the total isolation of Tripoli, was therefore a cause for concern as the supporting land columns would be far further away leaving the landing forces on there own. To assure success Gort would need to know where the Italians where and then make them move somewhere else. This need for deception by the Army matched a similar one by the Navy; the Italians were outnumbered 2:1 in Battleships which, despite their superiority in cruisers and destroyers, was very bad odds. Unless the Supermarina believed those odds had changed there was a good chance the Prima Squadra would flatly refuse to leave port, regardless of the orders from above. Thus a joint services deception plan was formulated and put into action.
The plan began in Alexandria where the local Italian agents were allowed to sea the entrance of HMS
Warspite and HMS
Valiant, both under tow and belching smoke. This was more true than the Admiralty was comfortable with,
Valiant was capable of independent steaming but had lost most of her secondary armament and firing control while
Warspite was the complete opposite, fully able to fight and fire but her steering, always suspect since damaged at Jutland, had failed completely and so her towing was necessary. The Italian agents also saw several light vessels flying the Tricolour and several officers in French uniforms being formally greeted at the quayside. On the other side of the theatre, around Tripoli, the Seals and Sea Gladiators from HMS
Argus and
Hermes were regular sights in the skies. These flights, supported by the longer legged Ansons of Coastal Command, concentrated on the area between Tripoli and the border with Frence North Africa, the Ansons being ordered not to fly straight back to Valletta but first head east towards the border before heading home. The final element was to conduct no overt recon around the western targets Msus, Benghazi or El Aghella but instead use only army co-operation aircraft, such as the Hawker Audax's of No.6 Squadron, to attack the retreating troops and 'hide' the reconnaissance as part of those missions.
The Avro Ansons of No.48 Squadron would be a regular sight along the North African coast during Operation Templar.
In Italy the Servizio Informazioni Militari (SIM), the 'Brokerage House' for all intelligence gathered, started to put together a picture as the information came in. Their first, and most obvious, observation was that the Royal Navy outside Taranto was two battleships down, from this they concluded the navy's gunnery at the battle must have been more effective than believed. The next observation was the seeming lack of reconnaissance around Benghazi but the prevalence around Tripoli, indicating a concentration of effort on the western front, which was puzzling as the bulk of the British Army was believed to be in the east and there was nowhere for them to attack from anyway. The final piece of the puzzle, the sightings of French flags and the mystery aircraft flying out of French North Africa, caused consternation when it was put with the other conclusions. Clearly, the SIM believed, the French were intending to join the war, the flights in the west were reconnaissance for an invasion and the French officers at Alexandria were liaising in preparation for a grand 'Allied Fleet' to crush the Regia Marina. Once this conclusion had been reached the SIM excelled themselves at finding supporting evidence, the border guards in the North reported increased activity, harmless radio transmissions were poured over, turning up 'coded messages' in abundance, harmless tourists were 'unmasked' as French spies. The suspicious paranoia inherent in the SIM and so encouraged by Mussolini's regime was showing it's main drawback; while you may never miss a scheme or plot against you, you will see several that don't exist. This problem was compounded by human nature, every ambitious officer tried to attach his personal theories and observations onto the 'discovered scheme' reasoning that if they were right their career would advance and if they were wrong they would be wrong with their bosses and so appear loyal.
The thinking, as presented to Mussolini and his inner circle, went along the lines of; The French government had not joined the war until they saw which way it was going, afraid to risk a protracted and possibly losing conflict with a divided populace. When it appeared the British were going to win the French had decided to join the war on the British side to try and grab some of the spoils. With no British presence in western Libya the French planned to invade there to put puts on the ground, enhancing any post-war claims. As the Royal Navy had been badly damaged they were going to offer their navy in return for a larger say in negotiations about areas they had not fought in. The theory met with approval because it was exactly what Italy would have done, stayed out until the outcome was clear and then join the wining side to try and gain as much as they could. Seemingly faced with a nightmare scenario the Comando Supremo was forced into a radical rethink abandoning their previous plan for a withdrawal to the bottleneck of El Aghella, trading land for time until the 5th Army arrived to hold the line. Clearly the 5th Army could no longer be moved east, in the event of an attack by France the small Tripoli garrison would soon fall and Italy, having traded away Benghazi for time, would be left without a major port in North Africa. The priorities were decided, Tripoli was the easiest to hold, the prepared defence on the French border were formidable and the garrison had been working on fortifying the town since the war had started. Thus half the 5th Army, two divisions and most of the artillery heavy weapons, were sent to dig in on the border while the lightened and faster other half made for El Aghella to hold the choke point. In the west the 10th Army was also ordered to El Aghella while SETT Command was instructed to head for Benghazi, if possible, and dig in until the 5th or the 10th Army could relief them. This tacit admission that the whole of eastern Libya was being abandoned did little to help morale in units that were already dubious about the merits of the war.
For the British, unaware of the success of their misdirection, timing was key; attack too early and the Italians would not have moved, too late and they might rumble the deception. In the end the 4th of April, a scant two weeks after planning had started, was the start date. While this seems rapid planning for the original Templar had been proceeding before the strategy was set so much of the preparation and reconnaissance work transferred straight across. For the rest the planner relied, as the British Army always had, on the general in the field and the soldier on the ground to overcome any deficiencies in planning. While far from ideal it was the British way and, not for the first or last time, it was an outstanding success. As at Tobruk advanced parties of Marines and engineers secured the docks before the main troops came ashore to exploit the landing and push outwards from the beachhead. Unlike at Tobruk however the naval support, HMS
Hood and the rest of Force H for the Tripoli landings and the Force B carriers further back around Benghazi, was not needed. The small garrisons quickly folding in the face of overwhelming odds, the odd pockets of resistance by the para-military fascist militias were quick to realise the futility of fighting on for a cause many were far from convinced about. As the second day after the landing ended progress had been broadly in-line with plans, Alexander's III Corps making the most rapid progress along the coastal roads while the beachhead at Tripoli was the most cautious, Auchinleck concerned the Italian 5th Army was far closer to his landing site than hoped.
Operation Templar two days after the landings. Alexander's III Corps captured Derna without a shot being fired while Alanbrooke has been held up by the worse than expected interior roads, slowing his advance and giving the 10th Army more time to prepare. At Benghazi the BEF rapidly secured the city before pushing out to take up the old Italian defensive positions in preparation for the expected counter-attack. VI Corps at Tripoli had advanced the least due to unexpectedly fierce resistance from the garrison and para-military forces delaying the mopping up phase.
For the Italian high command their most feared scenario, loss of all North African ports and supply depots, had happened in one fell swoop. Learning from their experience at Tobruk the Comando Supremo knew the landings would have to be dislodged quickly and their supply lines cut. If they were allowed time to resupply and consolidate their positions the Italian forces might not be able to dislodge them, particularly if the still feared French support materialised. As predicted Il Duce was as enraged by the humiliation as the loss of territory and demanded the Regia Marina match 'The price in blood paid by the heroic army', the losses at First Taranto seemingly not enough. The Supermarina, knowing anyone resisting the order would be replaced by someone more pliant, made the best job they could. All the crews of the Prima Squadra were shown the pictures from Alexandria, to raise morale and show the Royal Navy could be hurt. The commanders studiously studied the records of the engagement, trying to learn the lessons and avoid the mistakes of last time. Finally, ready as they would ever be and with Il Duce's words ringing in their ears the cream of the Regia Marina made up steam, set course for North Africa and left Taranto harbour to meet their fate.
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Up Next, an update of some sort. Quite possibly a naval battle, but I make no promises.