The Butterfly Effect: A British AAR

[El Pip]

Appendix B3: An Imbalance in the Industrial Nation.​

Government industrial policy, to the extent that it even existed, had two main strands; supporting strategic industries and what could uncharitably be described as "backing losers". The former was straight forward in principal if tricky in practice, the basic premise was that certain industries were vital in wartime but unprofitable in peace and so needed support so they would still be operational when requried. An uncontroversial example would be the armour plate industry, with the ship building 'holidays' enforced by the Naval Treaties the specialist suppliers experienced a dramatic fall in orders leading to idle factories and an workforce facing unemployment. To stop the highly specialised forges and kilns from being closed and the skills being lost when the workforce retrained or moved on, the manufacturers had received a modest subsidy of around £300,000, spread over all the main firms and spaced out to fill the gap until the Treaties allowed shipbuilding to restart. The main complaint about the scheme was that it had been too modest, the Admiralty's estimates on required armour (or their estimate of what the Treasury would allow them to buy) had been too low and too little capacity had been preserved, a problem made worse when the Army started looking for armour plate for it's tank production. The subtler complaint was that the direct subsidy was misleading and hid the indirect subsidies that had been given, for instance the large contracts for 'Research and Development' of new types of armour plate and manufacturing techniques. While these contracts had produced valuable results, for instance the new high-manganese cemented armour plate used on the King George V and Swiftsure classes, it was argued that traditionally the firms themselves had paid for such research themselves, or it had been done in the Admiralty's own research institutions, and thus the contracts were just a disguised additional subsidy. To an extent this was probably true, though given the voracious complaints made at the time it perhaps wasn't a very well hidden disguised subsidy.

Not all 'strategic' subsidies were as defensible, there was the unfortunate case of the War Office continuing to spend £5,000 a year on supporting the stables that breed their light horses. When set along side the £200 that was spent by the same department on subsidy for "Mechanical Transport" (i.e. lorries), at a time when a single new lorry cost somewhere around £250, the scheme does look at best farcical. In the defence of the War Office the actual spending on mechanical transport was far higher and in the hundreds of thousands of pounds, but that money was spent was procuring vehicles for the lorried infantry and development work for the Motor Rifle battalions, none of which counted as subsidy. It should also be noted that the automotive industry was in no way in need of subsidy, it was in fact enjoying something of a boom time from as civilian sales soared along with the growing economy. As we saw in Chapter CXXV Imperial Airways was the recipient of considerable subsidy to fund the Empire Air Mail Scheme and this was again justified on strategic grounds due to the perceived value of better links across the Empire. Finally the merchant fleet received over £6million in subsidy from a scrappage scheme, which subsidised new construction for owners who scrapped obsolete vessels. This was naturally subject to the work being done in British yards with 'modern' methods, while the start of the scheme was heavily impacted by the boilermakers strike by the start of 1938 demand was such that yards were looking at expansion. How much was due to the scheme and how much was just pent up demand from the Depression years and a reaction to rising world trade is, as always, unclear and the conclusion probably depends upon your views on the desirability of industrial subsidy as much as the evidence.

The sugar beet refinery in Spalding, Lincolnshire. Formerly owned by Anglo-Scottish Sugar it had passed to the British Sugar Company when the industry had been nationalised early in 1936. The realm of agricultural subsidy is a matter for a later chapter but it should be noted they were far larger in scale than anything in industry; sugar beet alone received more funds than all the industrial schemes combined and over the decade from 1926 to 1936 agriculture received 85% of total direct government subsidy. Despite the claims of the industry, and those who believed nationalisation and sate control would make any industry more efficient, sugar cane continued to be substantially cheaper than sugar beet. Tate & Lyle, who along with the other sugar cane firms had escaped nationalisation, would continue to dominate and supplied over 50% of the UK market from their three vast refineries in London, Liverpool and Greenock.​

If the subsidy schemes aimed to support existing industries, the other arm of government industrial policy was officially aimed at encouraging new industries to start. A prime example was the Team Valley Trading Estate, a vast industrial estate in the North East of England near Gateshead. The estate was planned and built on a vast scale, the central access road was over 2 miles long, and when work started in 1936 it was one of the largest developments in Europe. The estate was entirely government funded in the hopes of supporting an area that had been hit hard by the Depression, similar schemes were being developed for the other Special Areas that were also suffering, for example in a link back to our previous look at Jute, Dundee council were agitating for a similar project to help diversify the city and end their dependence on Jute. Hence the less than generous accusation that the scheme was about supporting losers, in this case those regions that had 'lost out' as traditional industries declined and the Depression ravaged the economy. On it's own terms the Team Valley project was a success, eventually several hundred firms, directly employing almost 20,000 workers, would be based there and would continue to operate long after official support was withdrawn. However, this achievement had taken a great deal of money and effort from almost the entire government. Leaving aside the cost of building the estate, which was just over £3 million when it was finished in 1938, the rents were below market rate, over half of the firms were also eligible for concessions on rates and taxes, and every government spending department was pressurised into making orders with firms based there. The Special Commissioner for the region was also concerned at how many of the jobs were with firms who had moved premises to get those concessions and how many were actually new jobs for the region.

The struggles at Team Valley were put into sharp relief by the experiences outside the Special Areas. At the same time as Teams Valley was under construction a dozen large estates had been built by the private sector in the Midlands, the eastern Thames Valley and above all around Greater London, none of the schemes were individually as large as Teams Valley but in the aggregate they provided vastly more facilities and employment. Moreover these schemes did not benefit from any tax advantages yet were still often fully rented ever before final completion, proving the voracious demand for new premises and factories that existed. This did not come as a revelation to the Board of Trade and those in government concerned with industrial policy, even in the 1920s the uneven distribution of employment was a known problem and it had been noticed that the Depression had made thins substantially worse as the heavy industries were hit hardest. Despite the tailwind of re-armament those industries were still growing slower than the booming light industries, the majority of which were based in the Midlands and South East. With the market failing (or at least failing to do what the politicians wanted it to do) and the existing approaches apparently failing to work, pressure was building for a Royal Commission to investigate the problem.

The Guinness Brewery with a small part of the wider Park Royal industrial estate in the background. Built by Guinness in response to the Anglo-Irish Trade War and fears of British tariffs on Irish beer imports, it was the first brewery the company opened outside Ireland and despite it's vast size was only capable of supplying half the UK market when it opened in 1936. The wider Park Royal industrial estate was developed at the same time and, at peak, the developers (Allnatt London) were opening a new factory site every fortnight. While the government could match that speed of construction, they could not hope to match the rate at which new tenants for the factories were acquired.​

As with most Royal Commissions those proposing it already knew what the answer 'should' be, knew it wouldn't be popular and so wanted the Commission to help them build support and, to a large extent, take the blame for the unpopular decision. In this instance it was the soft left of the Conservative Party around Neville Chamberlain, at this time Minister for Pensions and Welfare, who wanted to significantly increase government intervention to force industry to locate where it was perceived to be needed. The theory, if that is not too grand a name, was that making the Special Areas more attractive to industry was hard, but making London far less attractive was comparatively easy. The proposal was therefore to cripple Greater London and, to an extent, the Midlands, this was was to be achieved by a moratorium on new factories, higher rates and anything else they could think of to stop new firms starting in the 'wrong' location and encourage existing ones to move. This was, naturally, an anathema to the traditional wing of the party, MPs with seats near the to-be-restricted areas and those around Oliver Stanley that had close links to or a background in industry and so could see the obvious flaws. With the ongoing boilermakers strike, and trouble clearly brewing in the coal mining industry, Prime Minister Eden decided he did not want another industrial problem and vetoed the idea of the Royal Commission. Instead he placed his faith in the reforms being made by the Board of Trade and Chancellor's Amery's confident assertions that between the re-armament boom and Empire Free Trade all would be well. The problems would come if those assurances were not borne out by reality and the regional disparities continued to grow.

---
Notes:
Firstly, of course those subsidy numbers are real. No-one would dare invent a world where the War Office was spending £5k a year on breeding horses as late as 1939. The £200 figure on lorries is a bit unfair, I believe it was just the winding down of an old scheme (they had been paying more in 29-31 when things were really bad). But I couldn't resist pointing it out. Ship scrappage scheme is OTL but was only £4million ish, in Butterfly more money is being spent to encourage people to weld and cover the extra costs of getting started on it. OTL the aim was just "scrap old ships, build new ones", here it is "scrap old ones, build new ships with modern methods".

Regional industrial policy, I've done my best to make it interesting but it is just a bit of a grim area as no-one (not just UK but anywhere) seems to be able to make it work on a sustained basis. OTL Chamberlain and the Special Commissioners got their Royal Commission, which duly suggested throttling London and forcing people elsewhere. War intervened and then the Labour Party went for it (Bevin had been on the commission so was keen) producing the f*cking awful "Industrial Development Certificate" scheme to stop anyone building a factory where central government didn't want it. As one would expect, this was a relentless disaster. Here I've killed it as Neville is not in power and Eden has enough problems, but the basic issue remains so will doubtless re-appear.

British policy for sugar was, is and probably always will be barking and full of contradictions. It's not EU farming policy mad (which includes such features as setting a high tariff on sugar cane imports, then refunding slightly more than that fee back to the sugar refiners who have to use the sugar cane) but it gets close. In any event I tip my hat to Tate & Lyle, they've dodged at least two attempts to be nationalised and are still going strong.

Finally the Guinness brewery dates are all OTL and is perhaps proof that in the UK at least the trade war never got that heated as people kept drinking Guinness. The Park Royal factory supplied the South of England, while Scotland, Wales and the North got it from Dublin. I believe Guinness were a bit less precious about the "magic" of the St James' gate brewery at that point, so no-one noticed.

 

[TheButterflyComposer]

The theory, if that is not too grand a name, was that making the Special Areas more attractive to industry was hard, but making London far less attractive was comparatively easy. The proposal was therefore to cripple Greater London and, to an extent, the Midlands, this was was to be achieved by a moratorium on new factories, higher rates and anything else they could think of to stop new firms starting in the 'wrong' location and encourage existing ones to move.

Well...that sounds like a terrible idea.

No, it sounds like something you'd see in a paradox game. It is, in fact, how economics work in most strategy games. Clearly someone at some point got confused.

But, since you've decided to cover it, you now have to attempt to fix it, or come up with something else for them to try.

Prime Minister Eden

Compelty forgot he was prime minister and Austen was dead. Mind you, that's much better than his OTL fate of a fairly bad premiership AND having that premiership be totally forgotten.

In any event I tip my hat to Tate & Lyle, they've dodged at least two attempts to be nationalised and are still going strong.

Some machevellian minds going down their way, or smart enough at least to flummox post war labour governments. Which...was not that difficult, admittedly. Any particular reason why the government kept trying to nationalise it?

Finally the Guinness brewery dates are all OTL and is perhaps proof that in the UK at least the trade war never got that heated as people kept drinking Guinness. The Park Royal factory supplied the South of England, while Scotland, Wales and the North got it from Dublin. I believe Guinness were a bit less precious about the "magic" of the St James' gate brewery at that point, so no-one noticed.

Ended up being a lot of huge brewery sites built in the north of England. Not sure why...cheaper space post war I suppose, but they're all mostly still going strong, and hiring out their stuff for foreign companies wanting to avoid import fees.

 

[nuclearslurpee]

Not all 'strategic' subsidies were as defensible, there was the unfortunate case of the War Office continuing to spend £5,000 a year on supporting the stables that breed their light horses. When set along side the £200 that was spent by the same department on subsidy for "Mechanical Transport" (i.e. lorries), at a time when a single new lorry cost somewhere around £250, the scheme does look at best farcical.

Not noted was the fact that due to various factors including inflation, corruption, and good old-fashioned makeshitupium in the water, a single new light horse cost somewhere around £6,250.

However, this achievement had taken a great deal of money and effort from almost the entire government. Leaving aside the cost of building the estate, which was just over £3 million when it was finished in 1938, the rents were below market rate, over half of the firms were also eligible for concessions on rates and taxes, and every government spending department was pressurised into making orders with firms based there.

One wonders how much of this might be justified as necessary government stimulus, versus how much might be due to--

The Special Commissioner for the region was also concerned at how many of the jobs were with firms who had moved premises to get those concessions and how many were actually new jobs for the region.

Ah.

The theory, if that is not too grand a name, was that making the Special Areas more attractive to industry was hard, but making London far less attractive was comparatively easy.

Ah, yes. If you can't build Rome in a day, you can certainly tear down London in that time instead.

Firstly, of course those subsidy numbers are real. No-one would dare invent a world where the War Office was spending £5k a year on breeding horses as late as 1939.

That God chap, what a cheeky bugger.

Regional industrial policy, I've done my best to make it interesting but it is just a bit of a grim area as no-one (not just UK but anywhere) seems to be able to make it work on a sustained basis.

It certainly sounds like a good idea in practice, after all if there's people out of work in a region then surely that would represent a source of cheap, available labor for the industries, and all they need is a little push in the right direction, right?

Of course like nearly all government industry plans this ignores the reality that businesses exist to do business, and if they don't do business somewhere then there's probably a damn good business reason, and if not that then at least a damn business reason. Supply and demand is often cited, but I'd not be surprised to discover that as often as not logistics played a similarly-significant role in these sorts of things (centralizing supply chains and all that).

This established, the only remaining solution for the affected regions is alcohol, and thus we have explained British history in a nutshell. Possibly world history, as well.

 

[roverS3]

Success! The update has arrived. Let us celebrate by subsidising the construction of a new industrial park in the middle of nowhere to which companies will flock to collect their tax rebates and profit from artificially low rent.

I also believe that light horses remain a staple of the modern army. What else will our tankers ride into battle when their tanks turn out not to work due to chronic underfunding, a lack of parts, and the fact the darn things were designed down to a budget rather than to fit a purpose. Alternatively, It'll probably be easier to feed a horse than to fuel a vehicle once the nuclear apocalypse has happened. Keeping the number of horses high should be a national security priority, hence fewer than 350.000 2020 pounds per year seems a little low, I'd say they should spend at least half a million to make sure.

Even more important for British National Security is that beer production can be maintained at an adequate level on the home island, even if all imports cease. Therefor, tariffs on beer imports should be increased, and subsidies be spent to secure the construction of even more breweries.

A lovely and humorous essay on the many benefits of industrial policies. It is very much appreciated.

Well. I'm off to create a new free economic zone in a high unemployment area. It'll be great for the economy in the long run!

 

[El Pip]

Well...that sounds like a terrible idea.

No, it sounds like something you'd see in a paradox game. It is, in fact, how economics work in most strategy games. Clearly someone at some point got confused.

But, since you've decided to cover it, you now have to attempt to fix it, or come up with something else for them to try.

Solving an intractable socio-economic problem that has baffled the finest minds in dozens of countries for well over a century, all as part of an update in an obscure AAR for a frankly somewhat buggy Swedish and niche strategy game. It's an ambitious plan I grant you.

Compelty forgot he was prime minister and Austen was dead. Mind you, that's much better than his OTL fate of a fairly bad premiership AND having that premiership be totally forgotten.

I suspected a few people might have forgotten Eden was in power, so thought I'd remind everyone.

Some machevellian minds going down their way, or smart enough at least to flummox post war labour governments. Which...was not that difficult, admittedly. Any particular reason why the government kept trying to nationalise it?

The original nationalisation was a bit of a bodge and Labour wanted to 'fix it' by making it full on nationalised. Tate & Lyle invented "Mr Cube" an innocent sugar cube cartoon character fighting off the nasty grey government men in suits as part of their PR campaign. Second time round it was more of the same, plus the usual post-war consensus idocy - namely deal with the massive loss making problem (in this case sugar beet) by forcing it to merge with the profitable company (Tate & Lyle) so they could subside the losses and government could stop worrying about it. Words cannot express how stupid this plan is and was when implemented elsewhere.

Ended up being a lot of huge brewery sites built in the north of England. Not sure why...cheaper space post war I suppose, but they're all mostly still going strong, and hiring out their stuff for foreign companies wanting to avoid import fees.

I just told you - Industrial Development Certificates. Brewers weren't allowed to build or expand sites in the South/Midlands so had to go to the North, only place they were allowed to build. The IDC scheme was only scrapped by Thatcher, it was ruining the economy for decades.

Not noted was the fact that due to various factors including inflation, corruption, and good old-fashioned makeshitupium in the water, a single new light horse cost somewhere around £6,250.

I see you are familiar with government procurement practices.

One wonders how much of this might be justified as necessary government stimulus, versus how much might be due to--

Ah.

I give the Comissioners their due, they didn't pull any punches in their report. Their solutions were crap, but at least they accurately diagnosed the problem.

Ah, yes. If you can't build Rome in a day, you can certainly tear down London in that time instead.

Rome wasn't burned in a day. It took a while to thoroughly trash London and they 'only' managed to shrink the population by a quarter before it started rebounding.

That God chap, what a cheeky bugger.

Divine audacity or inspired prank.

It certainly sounds like a good idea in practice, after all if there's people out of work in a region then surely that would represent a source of cheap, available labor for the industries, and all they need is a little push in the right direction, right?

Of course like nearly all government industry plans this ignores the reality that businesses exist to do business, and if they don't do business somewhere then there's probably a damn good business reason, and if not that then at least a damn business reason. Supply and demand is often cited, but I'd not be surprised to discover that as often as not logistics played a similarly-significant role in these sorts of things (centralizing supply chains and all that).

"Technical Trade Reasons" was the most common reason given when firms were asked why the didn't setup in the "Special Areas", logistics was second. Lack of demand was fairly low down but was on the list. "Technical Trade Reasons" appears to be lack of local suppliers, the network of firms around that supply the bits you need (specialist fixings, the right paints, etc) as well as the lack of local specialist labour.

It is incredibly how unpopular the Special Areas were. The Commissioner ran a survey and out of 1,800 firms asked only 64 had 1 positive thing to say about working in a Special Area, the rest were all negative on all aspects. The political response was people complaining that industry not "co-operating". They were co-operating! Industry was saying "We really, really, don't want to setup there and it will be a disaster." Yet the post-war governments (of both colours) ignored them and decided they knew better.

This established, the only remaining solution for the affected regions is alcohol, and thus we have explained British history in a nutshell. Possibly world history, as well.

Post-war Britain is the strongest argument in favour of the minimal state I have yet seen. There was no limit to their ability to bugger things up. As you say, thus alcohol.

Success! The update has arrived. Let us celebrate by subsidising the construction of a new industrial park in the middle of nowhere to which companies will flock to collect their tax rebates and profit from artificially low rent.

What better way is there to celebrate?

II also believe that light horses remain a staple of the modern army. What else will our tankers ride into battle when their tanks turn out not to work due to chronic underfunding, a lack of parts, and the fact the darn things were designed down to a budget rather than to fit a purpose. Alternatively, It'll probably be easier to feed a horse than to fuel a vehicle once the nuclear apocalypse has happened. Keeping the number of horses high should be a national security priority, hence fewer than 350.000 2020 pounds per year seems a little low, I'd say they should spend at least half a million to make sure.

The British Army is way ahead of you - even to this day they have more horses in service than tanks. Admittedly this is mostly due to having a surprisingly large number of horses for ceremonial duties and a distressingly small number of tanks, but the point still stands.

Even more important for British National Security is that beer production can be maintained at an adequate level on the home island, even if all imports cease. Therefor, tariffs on beer imports should be increased, and subsidies be spent to secure the construction of even more breweries.

Had anyone been thinking it would have been hop supplies they should have been concerned with. Strip out Guinness and the UK was a net beer exporter pre-WW2. Even if you ignore shipping stuff around the Empire, Britain still exported more beer than it imported. Biggest import was from Denmark and most British beer exports went to Belgium.

I may have over-researched pre-WW2 beer trading.

A lovely and humorous essay on the many benefits of industrial policies. It is very much appreciated.

Thanks you kindly.

Well. I'm off to create a new free economic zone in a high unemployment area. It'll be great for the economy in the long run!

That's the spirit! After all, you have never worked in the industries that will be forced to work there, so you know their trade better than they do.

 

[TheButterflyComposer]

I just told you - Industrial Development Certificates. Brewers weren't allowed to build or expand sites in the South/Midlands so had to go to the North, only place they were allowed to build. The IDC scheme was only scrapped by Thatcher, it was ruining the economy for decades.

Had anyone been thinking it would have been hop supplies they should have been concerned with. Strip out Guinness and the UK was a net beer exporter pre-WW2. Even if you ignore shipping stuff around the Empire, Britain still exported more beer than it imported. Biggest import was from Denmark and most British beer exports went to Belgium.

I may have over-researched pre-WW2 beer trading.

Always had a lot of beer production in England. Lots of alcohol production in the british Isles generally, its a pretty good climate and place to make it.

 

[nuclearslurpee]

"Technical Trade Reasons" was the most common reason given when firms were asked why the didn't setup in the "Special Areas", logistics was second. Lack of demand was fairly low down but was on the list. "Technical Trade Reasons" appears to be lack of local suppliers, the network of firms around that supply the bits you need (specialist fixings, the right paints, etc) as well as the lack of local specialist labour.

So, Logistics 1A and Logistics 1B, sounds about right. In business, as in literally every other field of endeavor in human history, the amateurs study the flashy bits, the professionals study logistics, and the politicians don't study at all but claim they got straight As.

It is incredibly how unpopular the Special Areas were. The Commissioner ran a survey and out of 1,800 firms asked only 64 had 1 positive thing to say about working in a Special Area, the rest were all negative on all aspects. The political response was people complaining that industry not "co-operating". They were co-operating! Industry was saying "We really, really, don't want to setup there and it will be a disaster." Yet the post-war governments (of both colours) ignored them and decided they knew better.

Government is like parenting. There's a lot of saying "no" invoved - No, TimmyCorp, you can't dump industrial waste into the local river, and no, Johnny Inc., you can't just hire hitmen to kill your competitors and buy up their assets at cost. And then everyone complains that you're just no fun and must be done away with lest you constrict the entire nation to death, as is traditional. But go too far into the realm of helicopter parenting and just telling everyone what to do all the time and you get this nonsense. waves grandly

Of course on the other hand sometimes TimmyCorp pays off Mummy to look the other way while he pushes Paula Public into a puddle and takes her doll, so certainly there's a balance to be struck here.

nuclearslurpee said

nuclearslurpee said

nuclearslurpee said

nuclearslurpee said

Oi, don't blame me for what these lot said!

 

[Wraith11B]

The British Army is way ahead of you - even to this day they have more horses in service than tanks. Admittedly this is mostly due to having a surprisingly large number of horses for ceremonial duties and a distressingly small number of tanks, but the point still stands.

Well, they have the Royal Navy for--oh wait, I'd imagine you all could use some more ships (looks concerningly at the Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales that will have an escort pulling from a grand total of a whopping SIX destroyers and thirteen frigates)...

Speaking of alcohol, I'm enjoying a lovely Irish whiskey (Slaine) which I didn't notice until after I had purchased it but bears my ancestral family coat of arms on the bottle.

 

[TheButterflyComposer]

don't blame me for what these lot said!

You said it.

Well, they have the Royal Navy for--oh wait, I'd imagine you all could use some more ships (looks concerningly at the Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales that will have an escort pulling from a grand total of a whopping SIX destroyers and thirteen frigates)...

Someone explain to me modern naval thinking because it seems absurdly outdated. The vast majority of new upgrades for all the new British ships have been about trying to not be obliterated in one shot by a missile or aircraft, and its dubious as to whether it works that well. What's the point in having very expensive floating targets anymore? Aside from transporting actually useful stuff like infantry, aircraft etc to a war zone of course, is there any chance of any large naval skirmish every occurring again with modern weapons being what they are? I understand why you might want gunboats for dealing with pirates, and carriers for moving aircraft and serving and mobile floating bases, but what's everything's else for?
I don't know, so I'll ask the navy buffs.

 

[Killerduck]

Ah, fresh coffee and new Butterfly update on a rainy Sunday morning, life can be good.

Also, I also forgot Eden was the PM.

Is the next planned update the conference itself?

 

[nuclearslurpee]

Someone explain to me modern naval thinking because it seems absurdly outdated. The vast majority of new upgrades for all the new British ships have been about trying to not be obliterated in one shot by a missile or aircraft, and its dubious as to whether it works that well. What's the point in having very expensive floating targets anymore? Aside from transporting actually useful stuff like infantry, aircraft etc to a war zone of course, is there any chance of any large naval skirmish every occurring again with modern weapons being what they are? I understand why you might want gunboats for dealing with pirates, and carriers for moving aircraft and serving and mobile floating bases, but what's everything's else for?
I don't know, so I'll ask the navy buffs.

I'm guessing it's some split of two things. The first, of course, is defense spending politics and the associated cuts which are a fact of life, but not one I know much about in the British case thus I will defer to Lord El Pip or another British forumAAR who keeps up with such things.

The second is more interesting, basically what I read into it is that the British are chiefly concerned with fighting the last war, as usual, and in this case that means the Falklands War. In that war, from the naval perspective the key threat to the ships was indeed missile and air attack which took quite a toll on the Royal Navy in-theatre. Flip side, the actual mission of the Royal Navy in that war was essentially support of land operations, so indeed it makes sense if the primary design mission is land support.

Frankly, the Royal Navy has a couple of things going against it, from the perspective of ruling the waves again. On one hand, Britain simply lacks the modern shipbuilding base (to say nothing of political will) to construct a world-leading navy, so why bother trying to focus on anything else? Just build up a small but modern force that can be deployed to support land operations anywhere she still has interests, and leave everything else to the big bad US Navy that nobody can beat anyways (not for lack of trying, China...). Which brings me to the second point, Britain has no need to fight anyone else with a significant navy. The only countries with larger navies are Russia and China, in some order, and arguably Japan depending on how you count tonnage, then below that there's a bunch of countries like India, South Korea, France...basically, no one you anticipate an armed conflict with anytime soon. The fact is, like it or not (and with the people we keep putting in charge, I'll understand entirely if "not") the US is in charge of things navally, other than Russia, China, and a few minor states like Iran and North Korea the rest of the naval world is allied with (for a loose definition of alliance, these days) or on non-combative terms with the US. So from the British perspective, it makes sense to get lined up to fight a small war like the Falklands and leave the contingency of Russia or China going crazy up to the US to handle - simply put, why do the US's job for them (please do our job for us, I'm begging you)?

Is the next planned update the conference itself?

Even if it is, this is no guarantee that the next update will in fact be what is planned. If anything, once an update is planned to be next this becomes less probable. This is the El Pip Paradox and while a wild and arbitrary creature it is rather superior in every way to the other sort.

 

[Wraith11B]

The second is more interesting, basically what I read into it is that the British are chiefly concerned with fighting the last war, as usual, and in this case that means the Falklands War. In that war, from the naval perspective the key threat to the ships was indeed missile and air attack which took quite a toll on the Royal Navy in-theatre. Flip side, the actual mission of the Royal Navy in that war was essentially support of land operations, so indeed it makes sense if the primary design mission is land support.

Certainly, the old adage of "The British Army is a projectile to be fired by the Royal Navy" is certainly no longer very apt. But Navies all support ground operations, because these days, naval warfare is expensive. Hence why places like Iran and North Korea go towards asymmetric warfare rather than trying to build a (sub)surface force that can defend against their nemeses (ie, their neighbors and the United States).

I would venture to say that the Royal Navy expects to fight a similar war to the Falklands campaign, and that's probably what they'd get into. They're either supporting the NATO in the GIUK gap (where having a supercarrier from the USN is overkill or out of their strategic/operational purpose) or they're off fucking up Argentina's navy and air force--to be fair though, I doubt that there exists a future where the United States doesn't join the UK if something like that popped off again, honestly.

Frankly, the Royal Navy has a couple of things going against it, from the perspective of ruling the waves again. On one hand, Britain simply lacks the modern shipbuilding base (to say nothing of political will) to construct a world-leading navy, so why bother trying to focus on anything else? Just build up a small but modern force that can be deployed to support land operations anywhere she still has interests, and leave everything else to the big bad US Navy that nobody can beat anyways (not for lack of trying, China...). Which brings me to the second point, Britain has no need to fight anyone else with a significant navy. The only countries with larger navies are Russia and China, in some order, and arguably Japan depending on how you count tonnage, then below that there's a bunch of countries like India, South Korea, France...basically, no one you anticipate an armed conflict with anytime soon. The fact is, like it or not (and with the people we keep putting in charge, I'll understand entirely if "not") the US is in charge of things navally, other than Russia, China, and a few minor states like Iran and North Korea the rest of the naval world is allied with (for a loose definition of alliance, these days) or on non-combative terms with the US. So from the British perspective, it makes sense to get lined up to fight a small war like the Falklands and leave the contingency of Russia or China going crazy up to the US to handle - simply put, why do the US's job for them (please do our job for us, I'm begging you)?

I'd imagine that the RN is going the way of the French MN, that is: you have a navy, but it only cruises when you need it to do so. So it looks nice, but no need to have it putting miles on the engines and hours on the systems other than for some training now and again.

 

[TheButterflyComposer]

So what's the point? It just seems to be burning resources we don't have and can't afford, resources we could be putting into the army and airforce, which are already underfunded.

 

[Wraith11B]

Well, technically, I'd imagine that the more pressing funding priority of the UK (as borne out by two world wars) is that they don't survive without the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) being open. Thus, their air and naval needs preempt their ground forces need by a considerable margin. Basically, the UK needs to be able to find, fix and fight any naval or air forces that come their way, as those are going to be more threatening to their existence than an army that can't get to them anyways. I don't think that they need to go quite so high-tech though: I don't think they'll "need" the Sixth Generation fighter (Tempest) project in any sense, and they support their defense projects as if they're going to outproduce (or produce in sufficient quantity) the enemy.

 

[nuclearslurpee]

So what's the point? It just seems to be burning resources we don't have and can't afford, resources we could be putting into the army and airforce, which are already underfunded.

Because the UK is expected the next war, and any future war, to be similar to the Falklands, which means they need a sufficient naval capacity to support, essentially, a large amphibious operation at extreme distance. That means amphibious capabilities (both landing and supply), logistics defense, AA and AM defensive systems, air support/CAP, and so on.

It's a reasonable expectation, however we might characterize the implementation. On one hand, the idea of anyone invading the home islands is frankly far-fetched in the modern post-Cold War era, so home defense is not really a primary mission which is admittedly not a normal state of affairs for the Royal Navy historically. On the other hand, there are something like 14 UK overseas territories, ranging from small research stations to military base islands up to populated islands like the Caymans, Falklands, and so on. That's a lot of very disperse possessions that some enterprising third-world* dictator or military junta might decide to claim casus belli over to make a political show of standing up to the evil imperial capitalists.

*In the geopolitical sense

What Wraith is talking about with sea lines of communication and find-fix-strike in the open seas at large is really not in the mission for Britain anymore in the same way as it was historically, any future conflict is expected to be localized at extreme distance and thus you need a navy that can fight that conflict.

Worth noting, while I am indeed making the case as to why Britain does not need a large navy, I am emphatically not claiming that they do not need an effective navy - the losses sustained during the Falklands campaign stand as clear evidence that even a minor conflict against a relatively backwards military force is still a serious threat requiring proper technology, doctrine, and training (see also: In the Middle East, Wars and The United States, 21st Century Wars of).

 

[Wraith11B]

Well, to counter the above counterargument, I mean to say that the RN is going to need a capability to counter subs, and ASW is historically the only thing that might save the Isles. For sure, no one in their right mind is going to bother invading the Isles, but strategic strikes or cutting off the SLOCs are well within the realm of possibility. I shudder to think of the impacts a low-intensity hybrid war against Europe perpetrated by the Russians would have against the lone man of Europe right now.

The opposite is as we've all agreed, a teetering idiot who thinks that trying to go for one of Britain's Commonwealth members (yea, you, Cuba) or territory proper (Looking at you, Argentina) would require a long range expeditionary force, which the RN has been hollowing out for years. That said, they can do the fancy shit and claim the W while the USN and USMC go kick doors down to actually fight in the mud.

All this, however, belies a certain fact that in this day and age, the real threat is missiles and torpedoes. We have counters to the former, but do we ever have enough? A Type 23 Frigate carries 32 SAMs, the Type 26 will carry 48. Even the Type 45 Destroyers carry only 48. The Queen Elizabeth-class only carries CIWS, and no missiles (for comparison, the Nimitz-class carries a pair of Sea Sparrow ESSM launchers for 16 SAMs). As insight, I use this article to build the idea of what the RN Carrier Battle Group might look like: the carrier (no SAMs), two Type 45 destroyers, two Type 23 frigates. Discounting foreign ships attached to the battle group that's a total of 160 SAMs to engage any incoming missiles or aircraft. Even granting a high tolerance for two SAMs per incoming missile and a 100% kill rate for those salvos of two, that's still only eighty targets down; further, much like the IRA said, the escorts have to be lucky all the time, their enemy only have to be lucky once or twice before the capability is so intensely degraded as to be combat-ineffective. For comparison, a single Ticonderoga-class cruiser of the USN (really just scaled up destroyers) carry 80 SAMs out of 122 total missile slots, and an Arleigh Burke-class (using the three quarters number) can carry 72 or 68, depending on the model.

 

[RobbieAB]

@Wraith11B Surely in a modern context the numbers game assumes an opponent with the numbers to actually overwhelm your defences. How many such opponent's exist? How many of those do not have access to nuclear weapons?

It is probably safe to assume any nuclear armed nation, in a full scale shooting match with the UK, will happily expend a warhead or two to remove the UK carrier capability.

 

[TheButterflyComposer]

Hence the problem with building any ships these days: anyone can sink them with much cheaper weapons from very far away.

So from whats been said, the UK requires something capable of housing its nukes (so nuclear submarines, and something capable of fielding a medium sized amphibious assault force anywhere in the world (which requires aircraft carriers, and some ships to protect them). With all that said, what is actually required to defend an air craft carrier from attack is...mind numbing. At the very least, it requires a full compliment of fighter jets, a few ships purely to sweep the air of missles and some more to sweep the sea of torpedoes and a few submarines shadowing the surface fleet to make sure they won't be murdered from below.

Essentially, naval warfare as it currently stands seems to be an all or nothing affair. If you have a carrier, you need an absurdly massive fleet designed purely to defend it. If you don't have a carrier, you might as well not have a fleet because it won't be able to do anything.

Since we have disputed territory, we have to have a big fleet like this. But we don't. We actually have an even worse middle ground than having nothing or going overboard. Having half a fleet and two carriers means only one can be used at any time, and still won't have proper fleet cover on the surface or below. Massive cock up, or so it seems to a layman.

 

[Wraith11B]

@Wraith11B Surely in a modern context the numbers game assumes an opponent with the numbers to actually overwhelm your defences. How many such opponent's exist? How many of those do not have access to nuclear weapons?

It is probably safe to assume any nuclear armed nation, in a full scale shooting match with the UK, will happily expend a warhead or two to remove the UK carrier capability.

For sure, but for instance, Iran, has lots of conventional missiles. Using nukes is something of a gigantic red line/third rail: touch it and die. More that Iran, Argentina, DPRK have loads of missiles to overwhelm any surface groups' supply of SAMs.

 

[Wraith11B]

Hence the problem with building any ships these days: anyone can sink them with much cheaper weapons from very far away.

So from whats been said, the UK requires something capable of housing its nukes (so nuclear submarines, and something capable of fielding a medium sized amphibious assault force anywhere in the world (which requires aircraft carriers, and some ships to protect them). With all that said, what is actually required to defend an air craft carrier from attack is...mind numbing. At the very least, it requires a full compliment of fighter jets, a few ships purely to sweep the air of missles and some more to sweep the sea of torpedoes and a few submarines shadowing the surface fleet to make sure they won't be murdered from below.

Essentially, naval warfare as it currently stands seems to be an all or nothing affair. If you have a carrier, you need an absurdly massive fleet designed purely to defend it. If you don't have a carrier, you might as well not have a fleet because it won't be able to do anything.

Since we have disputed territory, we have to have a big fleet like this. But we don't. We actually have an even worse middle ground than having nothing or going overboard. Having half a fleet and two carriers means only one can be used at any time, and still won't have proper fleet cover on the surface or below. Massive cock up, or so it seems to a layman.

The UK does have a credible nuclear deterrent capability, and a fairly good subsurface arm. There is nothing wrong, necessarily, with their choices, it's just they seem to be reliant on the US or European allies for anything, but they want to play independent.