The Butterfly Effect: A British AAR

[Vann the Red]

Excellent post. Mixed bag of lessons learned and still no decision on whether to focus on army-air or strategic air, but at least fighter command is getting beefed up.

Vann

 

[El Pip]

trekaddict - I can promise A European war before 1939, though between who I'll not be drawn on.

DonnieBaseball - Funny you should mention the Henley it was one of the ones on my little list.

Jerzul - Excellent, glad you liked it.

Jape - I do try to put a bit of effort into these updates, just saying 'The RAF wanted to do the wrong thing but Super Churchill ignored them and did everything right' would be fairly boring, out of character for old WSC (he was regularly spectacularly wrong) and, most importantly, not actually correct for what happens in the AAR.

Davout - It's always a relief to get comments like that. My mental update schedule is regularly shot to hell as I delve deep into the internal politics and prejudices and spend far longer on research and writing than I expected.

That makes getting confirmation the work is worth it is very welcome.

Sir Humphrey - It is important to balance the good and the bad, a few 'mistakes' are important. Though which decisions are the mistakes will depend on how the next few years pan out.

Nathan Madien - It is marvellous isn't it? Yet more proof that Germans do indeed have a sense of humour.

Vann the Red - The Fighter Command beef up is historic just brought forward, the ball really started rolling with Tizards work from ~1934 ish on 'stopping the bomber getting through'. OTL it took a few years to work through the system, this timeline its been accelerated by the war.

The strategic vs tactical debate though goes right to the heart of 'What the RAF is for', or at least what the offensive role of the service is. With so many vested interests, and still considerable uncertainty on the real effects of 'morale bombing', that debate will be running for years...

Duritz - In the finest British traditions the Air Council was a bit woolly, the whole problem complicated by the fact the Air Council was responsible for both Civil and Military aviation. Formally the split between the Secretary of State and the Air Council was very clear; ultimate responsibility always rested with the Minister. In practice many duties were passed down the chain to civil servants or RAF officers who were "responsible" to the Minister who was "accountable" to his Majesty and Parliament. So plenty of opportunities for buck passing for those so minded, which many were.

The 'authorised' membership of the Council was;
Secretary of State for Air - President
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air - VP
Secretary of the Air Ministry
Chief of the Air Staff
Air Member for Personnel
Air Member for Development and Research

The Under-Secretary covered Civil Aviation, the service members covered the obvious given their descriptions and the third Secretary did the finances and 'any other business'. So a 50:50 split civilian vs RAF. However in addition to the casting vote the President could appoint two additional members at his discretion. Moreover all divisions of work could be altered if the President 'reserved' any responsibility for himself, there being no limit on what he could 'reserve'.

Now historically for much of the 1920s and 1930s the Secretary of State for Air kept themselves focused on Civil Aviation (or were just non-entitles like Earl Swinton). Indeed when the Air Council was expanded it included more service members, picked on the recommendation of the Chief of the Air Staff. However they didn't have to and the Ministers could have dominated proceedings very easily if they had the will power, personality and support from the PM, things Churchill had in abundance (his deficiencies were elsewhere).

Of course Air Council instructions don't translate into a cultural change and it's still up to the RAF to implement the policies, issue specs and so on. But the Air Council controlled the purse strings and had big influence over appointments, "He who pays the piper" and all that.

 

[unmerged(133707)]

Really great AAR El Pip Its the reason I joined this Forum...
Can´t wait for the war to start, in what ever shape and form it may take.

 

[Lord Strange]

Oooh, air force. Plus that artillery silencer is priceless. Also I hereby award you a Lord Strange Cookie of British Awesomeness. ●

 

[El Pip]

Spanden - I'm touched sir, I hope I can live up to the high standards that tempted you onto this forum.

Lord Strange - Ahh, clarification. I shall ammend my sig accordingly to reflect this new honour.


OK the aircraft update is proving exceptionally tricky, matching reality to the game is maddening (A few months of work for a tech team then a few weeks for a unit upgrade doesn't match with the reality of years of work and development to get a new aircraft). My current problem is trying to include as much reality as possible while still reflecting what happens in the game, hence the delay while I think a few things through.

 

[Jerzul]

Spanden - I'm touched sir, I hope I can live up to the high standards that tempted you onto this forum.

Lord Strange - Ahh, clarification. I shall ammend my sig accordingly to reflect this new honour.


OK the aircraft update is proving exceptionally tricky, matching reality to the game is maddening (A few months of work for a tech team then a few weeks for a unit upgrade doesn't match with the reality of years of work and development to get a new aircraft). My current problem is trying to include as much reality as possible while still reflecting what happens in the game, hence the delay while I think a few things through.

Take all the time you need. I sometimes have trouble remembering that this is an AAR and not an alternate history novel...

 

[trekaddict]

Spanden - I'm touched sir, I hope I can live up to the high standards that tempted you onto this forum.

Lord Strange - Ahh, clarification. I shall ammend my sig accordingly to reflect this new honour.


OK the aircraft update is proving exceptionally tricky, matching reality to the game is maddening (A few months of work for a tech team then a few weeks for a unit upgrade doesn't match with the reality of years of work and development to get a new aircraft). My current problem is trying to include as much reality as possible while still reflecting what happens in the game, hence the delay while I think a few things through.

Rest assured that I feel you. That's why I pretty much chucked out the tech tree in my own AAR. I mean Chieftains by 1950? Lightnings by 1951?

 

[Nathan Madien]

Rest assured that I feel you. That's why I pretty much chucked out the tech tree in my own AAR. I mean Chieftains by 1950? Lightnings by 1951?

I know how you feel. When I was writing my American AAR, I did research on the weapons you can develop. When it turned out that certain weapons historically came out much later than Paradox picked, I got the impression Paradox sometimes get ahead of themselves obscenely. I mean, what is the point of having an weapon available in 1944 when it doesn't come out for another ten or twenty years? This was especially noticeable with the carriers.

 

[trekaddict]

Indeed. That's why I have decided to use the ingame tech tree as a rough guidline at best. I'll insert techs in the narrative that make actual sense.

 

[caffran]

excellent update El Pip, fascinating stuff on the early RAF years.

awaiting the next update keenly

later, caff

 

[El Pip]

Jerzul - Too kind sir, but very heartening to see all the research pays off.

trekaddict - They are some crazy dates, indeed I would say impossible dates.

Nathan Madien - I can only think someone at Paradox set the tech-tree dates with an eye to gameplay and then just filled it out with historical weapons in the order they were produced, not bothering to look at the in-service dates.

I can understand putting the priority on gameplay, that is after all one of the main points of the exercise, but surely a bit of time spent checking such things wouldn't go amiss? Even it it's just for the major players it would be nice.

caffran - Thanks a lot, such feedback is important. And on an update related note;


Here's a question for the readers; do I put out the 'air porn' update in one big part of two (maybe three) smaller parts? Smaller means more frequent, I'd get the first out this afternoon hopefully, but perhaps people prefer all their planes in one sitting. Thoughts anyone?

 

[caffran]

personally i'd rather seperate, smaller posts mate. must admit it's rather daunting to see a huge wedge of text to sift through, no matter how interesting (and yours is very interesting).

however it's entirely up to you so do whatever is easiest, we'll all still read it

later, caff

 

[unmerged(34050)]

I'd say 4 posts, one for each command--fighter, bomber, coastal, strike. Smaller bits digest easier. : )

 

[unmerged(78085)]

Aircraft Porn - The Most Fun You Can Have With Your Trousers On...

Good update there, El Pip, and sorry to have taken so long to put in my thanks and appreciation - for the record, I was skiing Somewhere In Europe.

As to the updatery itself, I see big positives for how the RAF has come out of the Med War. Bringing forward the Fighter Command prioritisation is very good, as is the clear tilting towards CAS and Tactical formations - let's get dear old Winston breathing fire and brimstone all over the Fairey Battle and it's clear inadequacies, eh?

Upgrading RAF Luqa makes sense for all kinds of reasons, and is a natural response to the fighting in the desert and Med. I'd like to ask a question here about radar though - in 'vanilla' HoI2 it was very useful, (and good old 'Stuffy' Dowding was always allowed to build a goodly number of stations), but from 'DD' onwards I think it has been downgraded a lot - only affecting the area the radar station is placed in, rather than the surrounding ones - what do you think of that?

As for further updates, I say you should go ahead and release whatever way pleases you the most. If you asked me my opinion, you'd only get something silly, like give every RAF Group it's own release, with biographies of each up-and-coming commander (including accurate measurements of moustache length), or somesuch... :rofl:

Go Pippy! Go Winston! Go RAF!

 

[El Pip]

caffran - That is a good point and an excellent argument in favour of smaller updates.

DonnieBaseball - A reasonable sounding split, I'lll see how it works out when I write them.

RAFspeak - I'm attempting to try and match every 'mistake' Winston corrects with a corresponding new error, though the problem is with actual wartime experience on hand there's less scope for fundamental mistakes.

That said I think I've found a few things that can go wrong.

The downgrading of radar was something of a shame, though it's arguable it was perhaps over-powered to start with. Certainly it didn't really get the whole 'battle of the beams' thing, though that would be tricky to model well I concede. More importantly it's not all bad, the BoB may be a bit trickier but the strat bombing of Germany is easier.


I'll give this smaller bite updates a plan, with a bit of luck the Fighter Command update will be up this afternoon.

 

[unmerged(78085)]

Somewhere in England...

...RAFspeak puts his flying boots up on the nearest chair/table-edge, and sips at his second cider, patiently though eagerly waiting...

 

[trekaddict]

Somewhere in the Fatherland....

trekaddict puts on his BoB soundtrack, fills his Union-Flag Coffee mug and eagerly waits for the proceedings to begin.

 

[El Pip]

Chapter LXVII: New Kites All Round.​

The previous chapter concluded on the observation of the delay in the translation of new thinking into new designs caused by the aircraft design 'pipeline' at the Air Ministry. This was an inevitable consequence of the extended gestation period behind a new aircraft, to illustrate this consider the story of the Hawker Hurricane. The process started deep within the RAF's Directorate of Technical Development in 1933 with the decision to break away from biplanes, this work was evolved into a Operational Requirement by the Autumn and from there into a Air Ministry Specification (F.36/34) issued at the start of 1934. This specification drew together several strands of Air Ministry thinking and specified which engine to use (The Rolls Royce 'PV-12', which would become the famous Merlin), the eight gun armament and various other features such as retractable under-carriage. After progressing through several design iterations, wind tunnel tests and full scale mock ups a prototype was constructed in Summer 1935 and put through full scale testing with a final operational decision made at the end of the year. At this stage the process was overtaken by events and the Hurricane was rushed into full scale production by an Air Staff keen to get a modern fighter into service to be ready for war. Even with the best efforts of Lord Beaverbrook and the highest priority the Air Ministry could set, the first Hurricane squadrons only made it to theatre by the spring and Hawker weren't into efficient volume production until well into the summer. Had it not been for this dramatic intervention the production decision wouldn't have been made till the summer of 1936, that decision would have lead to a 'production prototype' being constructed by the end of the year for further testing and development throughout 1937. The final model would then have been approved for volume production, with squadron delivery beginning either at the end of 1937 or, more likely, the beginning of 1938.

It's important to note that the Hawker Hurricane was, as we shall see later, a relatively straight-forward aircraft being produced to a well defined specification and yet, even after being pushed to top priority, it still took three and a half years to make it from idea to squadron service. Without the war, and the extra funding and priority that brought, that timespan would have been nearer five years. While some of the delays were a consequence of tight budgets at the Air Ministry, decisions were often delayed till the next financial year when funding could be scrapped together, the simple fact is that the testing and development of aircraft and their engines was a time consuming task that could not be rushed, not without risk to the price, reliability, performance or all three of the final aircraft. Thus, despite the extra money the Air Staff had available and Air Minister Churchill's best efforts to speed up the process by moving to engineering led timetables, not budgetary ones, the speed of development was never as fast as the Ministry would like, inevitably this led to the occasional disastrous prototype as designers under pressure tried to cut a few too many corners. Such thinking was a very long way from the frugal caution of the 1920s and was perhaps not the most fiscally efficient way to procure new aircraft, but it was certainly effective at pushing the envelope and rapidly advancing aircraft and engine design. This approach would be applied not just to the new specifications being issued, where the changes in strategic thinking would not filter through until almost the end of the decade, but to the designs being proposed for the existing specifications, leading to the progression of designs that would not have passed muster with the previous, more conservative administration.

We begin with the Hawker Hurricane, as mentioned above the aircraft was rushed into production and so an immediate post war priority was to correct some of the more glaring design problems that had sneaked through. The greatest strength of the MkI Hurricane was also it's greatest weakness; it was basically a monoplane Hawker Fury with a better engine and a few other refinements. This made the design cheap, allowed a very rapid ramp up of production (Sydney Camm had produced a design that used as many Fury jigs and tools as possible) and also contributed to the forgiving handling, stability and reliability that became hallmarks of the Hurricane 'family' of designs. On the negative side the 'old fashioned' construction techniques used (mainly the choice of mechanical fastening instead of welding and the use of steel tube sub-assemblies rather than a single monocoque) resulted in a design that was significantly heavier than it's contemporaries, around 25% more than a Spitfire for most comparable marks, and had thicker, more drag inducing wings. While none of those problems could be changed without re-doing almost the entire design there were several other Fury legacies and rushed decisions that could be, and were, enthusiastically changed. The most obvious visual change was the switch from a wooden two bladed propeller to a metal three bladed one, moving back the pre-production Merlin 'C' engines that had been rushed in were replaced with the far more reliable Merlin IIIs and provision added for a permanent chin mounted dust filter instead of the hastily fitted bolt-on filters used in the Abyssinian War. Based on the reports of pilots back from that war a new gun sight and a much 'clearer' radio were added as priorities, as well as the very welcome addition of armoured glass for the cockpit. One interesting change was the switch from fabric covering to stressed metal coverings for the wings; the use of doped Irish linen had been partly a legacy from the Fury and partly a conscious choice to keep the unit cost down. With the resumption of the Anglo-Irish trade war the supply of cheap fabric was cut off, eliminating the cost advantage, and so the stiffer and more durable duralumin wings were substituted. While the change was probably inevitable, the aircraft would only get heavier as it evolved while the rapidly increasing power of the Merlin engine would put ever greater loads on the wings, the jump in price (and some not so subtle political pressure) perhaps brought the decision forward. This economic blow, though slight in itself, was just one of the hundreds raining down on the Irish economy with, as we shall examine in later chapters, dramatic political consequences.

The Hawker Hurricane MkII, clearly showing the new variable pitch three bladed propeller, the revised 'thrusting' exhausts of the Merlin and the all metal wings. The extra power from the new propeller, or more technically the higher all altitude efficiency of the new propeller, and the ducting of exhaust gases into thrust more than offset the extra weight of the other alterations. The less visible benefit of the new Merlin was the significant increase in engine reliability, Rolls Royce's 'run to destruction' testing programme had produced a quantum leap in reliability, a benefit all Merlin engined planes would enjoy.​

Returning to aircraft we move onto arguably one of the most famous fighters in the history of the RAF, the Supermarine Spitfire. If the Hurricane was a workhorse design then the Spitfire was more of a thoroughbred racer; smaller, lighter, faster but considerably more temperamental, a slightly unfair pair of caricatures but not without a few grains of truth. Where Hawker had designed for ease of production and maintenance, Supermarine had pushed for peak performance, producing a far more complex design that proved considerably harder to prepare for mass production. The extra work was undoubtedly worth it as the Spitfire comprehensively outperformed the Hurricane in flight, save for turning circle where the thicker winged Hurricane could be put into turns that none but the bravest of Spitfire pilots would even contemplate. Despite the excellent achievements of the Hurricane in the war the Air Ministry recognised that the higher performance of the Spitfire would be needed against foes more formidable than the Regia Aeronautica. Therefore the final production design was approved in the autumn of 1936 with a target of volume production starting early in 1937 leading to 'full rate' squadron deliveries beginning in the summer.

It rapidly became apparent that, despite vigorous protests to the contrary, Supermarine did not have the capacity to fulfil anything but the smallest order, busy as they were with the Walrus and Stranraer amphibious aircraft. With Supermarine's parent Vickers equally busy, and fanatically opposed to sub-contracting the work out, Churchill's solution was to scrap the entire Stranraer contract, freeing up capacity at Supermarine. While something of a radical solution the Stranraer design was, at best, marginal and had only narrowly scrapped through to production as it was a 'low risk' design, being essentially the final evolution of the venerable Southampton line of flying boats. It's loss then was not a major blow to Coastal Command, particularly given the more promising designs in the pipeline, and it should be noted that scrapping a design pushed forward by predecessors is considerably easier than admitting your own mistakes. As we shall see later Churchill was less keen on cancelling un-promising programmes or prototypes that he had initiated and championed, a problem made all the more embarrassing by the precedent he himself had set. However in the short term it ensured the Spitfire programme stayed on schedule and sent a clear message to aircraft manufacturers the optimistically promising capacity in the assumption of getting delays would be seriously dealt with by the Ministry.

Moving from production to prototypes let us now look into the Air Ministry's fighter pipeline, the specifications that had just left the drawing board and were moving towards the initial prototype stage. The designs for the 'hot climate' high performance specification, F.5/34, were all overlooked for Fighter Command service, after the success of adapting the Hurricane to desert conditions the Ministry considered the requirement fulfilled. The blow was somewhat lessened as it became apparent that the Fleet Air Arm was interested in several of the designs for it's own purpose, an area we will look into in future chapters. That left two very different, almost contradictory, specifications; F.9/35 for a 'turret fighter' and F.37/35 for a 'cannon fighter'. Somewhat ironically for fighters the source of the contradiction was in bomber tactics, a subject of much debate and discussion in RAF circles. The early 1930s had seen bombers, particularly the bigger multi-engined bombers, being significantly faster than the comparable fighters of the time. This had lead to the doctrinal concept of unescorted bomber streams; fast multi-engined bombers that could out-run enemy fighters. The problem came as fighters inevitably caught up in performance, first matching and then overtaking the bombers. The reaction from Bomber Command, and the bomber arms of many other air forces the world over, was defensive guns, bombers bristling with everything from pintle mounted machine guns to powered twin turrets, yet the central idea of unescorted bomber streams remained.

To counter these well armed but alone bombers Fighter Command resurrected the 'turret fighter' idea that had produced the Hawker Demon, producing specification F.9/35 for a two seat fighter with a powered quad turret to serve in a dedicated bomber destroying role. That last part is important to emphasise for the Air Staff were fully aware that 'turret fighters' would be at a severe disadvantage in a dog fight and was never expected to have to engage enemy fighters. However in the bomber destroyer role the 'turret fighter' was expected to be far superior to conventional fighters, able to close on bombers in their blind spots and blaze away with carefully targeted concentrated firepower. With assurances from Bomber Command that unescorted bomber streams would certainly be the tactic of choice of any enemy the specification process continued, the field narrowing to the Hawker Hotspur and the Boulton Paul Defiant. With Hawker heavily committed to several other high priority programme they had fallen significantly behind the development timetable and were convinced to drop out, leaving the Defiant alone to progress. Despite the lack of competition it would not be until the start of 1937 that the go ahead was given for a full scale prototyping, the Ministry requiring an un-turreted version by the summer for basic flight testing with a full production aircraft for some time in the late autumn. These long lead times were a reflection on both the difficulty of the project and the lingering uncertainty about the basic concept, the delay therefore gave Boulton Paul a chance to iron out problems and the Ministry time to reach a conclusion on the basic doctrine underlying the design.

The Bristol Type 153A, one of the final three contenders for the 'cannon fighter' specification. The most unusual design submitted it attracted significant comment in the Ministry, it's set back cockpit in particular dividing opinion. As with all the designs the Ministry's biggest concern was over engines, Bristol having selected to use a pair of somewhat under-powered Aquilas. Though put forward for prototyping the Ministry had heavily hinted that a switch to the larger Perseus would be looked upon most favourably, a decision Bristol reluctantly accepted, effectively signing the death warrant for the almost unused Aquilas.​

The second design, the 'cannon fighter' was a sign of the Ministry hedging it's bets, not just on the tactics for a bomber destroyer but on the whole idea of unescorted bombers. The specification was essentially a response to the Luftwaffe's Messerschmitt Bf 110, a twin engined, long ranged, cannon armed 'heavy fighter' that was rumoured to be able to defeat single-engined fighters with ease. While the reports were treated with entirely justified scepticism (the Bf 110 was in fact distinctly lacking in agility and would prove vulnerable to all but the most unwieldy single engined fighters) the potent combination of heavy firepower and long range was felt worthy of further investigation and a specification prepared. To avoid Bomber Command interference the specification only called for a day/night fighter armed with four cannon, however the manufacturers were unofficially informed that long range and endurance were most desirable. Out of the six responses received the Hawker F.37/35 and the Supermarine 312 were rejected early in the process, being essentially cannon armed variants of the Hurricane and Spitfire respectively the Ministry instructed the firms to concentrate on getting the basic versions reliably into service first. The Boulton Paul submission, the single engined P.88, was next to fall by the wayside due to concerns over the lack of range and a wish to avoid producing an aircraft too similar to the Hurricane or Spitfire. That left only the three twin engined submissions, the small and light Westland P.9, the elliptical winged Supermarine 313 and the somewhat unconventional Bristol Type 153A. Within the Air Ministry the Westland design was the leading contender, though that had more to do with Westland's lack of work than the actual merits of the designs. At the other extreme the unconventional Type 153A would likely not have passed muster with the old regime and even for the more broad minded it was very much the outsider, it was progressed as much out of curiosity as to how the design would work as out of interest in seeing it in service. The manufacturers were given a similar timeframe to that for the Defiant, the Ministry keen to put the designs up against each other, as much to test the concepts as to test the designs. Theses trials would be watched with interest throughout the RAF, not least by the still influential Bomber Command who had strong views of their own on the merits, or otherwise, of escort fighters and bomber interceptors.

--
Game Notes;
First things first aren't you all glad I only did a brief fighter only update, just think how long a whole RAF one would have been. I think I need to join long-updates Anonymous and try and cure my inability to write short updates....

Anyway next most important thing; the second picture is not a Bristol Type 153A it's a Grumman XF5F Skyrocket. However the two were very, very similar by all accounts and, more importantly, I can find nothing but a bad line drawn sketch of a 153A. With that confession over onto the actual game effects;

Hurricane MkII - What's described isn't an OTL MkII, more a late MkI (for some reason the huge host of changes to the MkI didn't merit a Mk change) with bits from the MkII, significantly though not the Merlin XX engine. However as I've just got Lev IV INT I decided to make more of a meal of those changes than the RAF did and justify the upgrades.

Spitfire MkI - In game I'm researching Basic Fighters (or whatever Lev I is called) so allowing for R&D time then production time those dates are probably about right for getting the first in game unit built.

Defiant - The turret fighter, had a fairly bad war as people kept using it as a fighter, a role it was frankly awful at and even the RAF knew it. However desperate times and all that. This timeline, much as I'd like to kill it off, I think it has to stay. Bomber Command still believe in unescorted bombers as do most other airforces (or so the RAF think). Hence the turret fighter makes sense to the Air Staff. Though who knows what may have changed by late 1937?

Cannon fighter - Now OTL the P.9 (Whirlwind), the Boulton Paul P.88 and the Spitfire 313 were selected for prototyping, then the treasury took an axe to the budget and only the Whirlwind survived. This time round that isn't a problem, however with the Hurricane and Spit further along I can see the P.88 being dropped (and the cannon armed Hurry/Spit being rushed along if necessary) and the 'radical' 153A making it as the Air Ministry is less cautious.

 

[unmerged(78085)]

"New Kites! New Kites!"

<Zzzz- *huh*> Wha-what?

RAFspeak pulls himself up from the floor of the Mess, bangs his head on the underside of the table, salutes a beaming Wing Commander Pip groggily on his way to the door and rushes outside to join the throng of admiring squadron types...

Look at the gleaming sleekness of that improved Hurricane!

<gasp> at the nearly out-of-this-world beauty of the prototype Spitfire!

Finally the ciders catch up with him as he is trying to climb into Bristol's racy new twin-engined cannon machine, and he slumps into a grateful, dream-filled sleep on the verge of the runway itself... o

Cheers El Pip, for an excellent update - worth waiting for, and packed full of detail as ever!

 

[trekaddict]

Oh dear the Defiant..... *shakes head*


Anyway. Yay for Supermarine. One can never have enough Spitfires.

Once can only hope that Fighter Command realizes the idiocy of 110-class fighters. Bomber Command however might be interested. Has Westland submitted anything?