Chapter XX: Decisions and Doctrines.
After the comprehensive success of the opening stages of Operation Vulcan hopes were high for a rapid advance and a victorious arrival in Tobruk before the month was out. For Alexander's III and IV Corps that did indeed seem possible, after the victory at the border Sollum itself was captured in the face of minimal resistance. While the victory was welcome, that did leave the question of where the Italians had gone. That question would be partially answered by at Fort Capuso.
In the initial stages there had been an argument for bypassing Fort Capuso, cutting it of from supply and leaving it to 'wither on the vine'. Despite the merits of this plan, namely the ability to concentrate forces on the drive for Tobruk and increasing the forces assigned to the reserves it was dismissed. The Fort was known to be a strong point in the Italian defence lines and hence believed to be well supplied for a siege. So supplied it could potentially hold out for a considerable time, during which it would remain a threat to the flanks of the advance and tie up large numbers of troops protecting supply lines. With that issue decided the II (Middle East) Corps, containing the British Army's most experienced desert units, was assigned the Fort as its objective.
Alanbrooke's advance hit two serious problems at least one of which could, and some would argue should, have been foreseen. The first problem however was unplannable for; a sudden 'Haboob', the fierce desert sand storms that characterise the Sahara in early spring and late autumn. Such storms can spring up without warning and completely immobilise all operations until they dissipate. They can last for minutes, hours or sometimes day, in this case the storm came and went in less than twenty four hours, but that was time enough for the Italians. The second problem was the assumption that the Italians would take the shortest route back to their lines and thus any retreating units would head for Sollum. While their is no fault in that logic, a longer retreat means more time when a unit is vulnerable and so should be avoided, the criticism is that there should have been more contingency planning. This is a valid point, while you cannot plan for every eventuality the British commanders should at least have considered the options the Italians faced. The consequence of this oversight would significantly impact operations throughout the theatre and cause concern in the higher reaches of both the military and the government.
A typical Haboob. First named in the mid 1920s, from the Arab word for 'to blow' (Habb) the term covers any wind-driven sandstorm or dust storm. Technically the dust storms that plagued the 'Dust Bowl' of the United States in the early and mid-1930s were Haboobs, even if the causes of those storms were more man-made than the metrological conditions that cause a Saharan Haboob.
To return to the aftermath of the initial breakthrough, it is a axiom of military theory that delay favours the defenders and the rallying of IX Corps re-affirmed it. While elements of the Italian IX Corps had withdrawn in good order, most notably the 11th Bersaglieri brigade, the other divisions, the 27th Brescia and the 44th Cremona, where in head long retreat bordering on rout. When the 'Haboob' descended those units were forced to stop fleeing and the Italian commander, General Frusci, could rally his troops. With control re-established over his Corps Frusci was faced with two options; pull back to Bardia as the pre-war plan had stated or make for the nearer and more secure Fort Capuso.
There was of course a third option, to follow Italian doctrine and launch an immediate and vigorous counter-attack to “overcome the resistance with continuity of effort.” as the doctrine stated. This was, of course, never considered by Frusci or his staff, despite regaining control of their unit they knew IX Corps was in no state for attacking anything, if only for the reason that what little heavy equipment they possessed had been abandoned during the retreat. The decision came down to a choice between the pre-war plans, with the attendant risk of bombardment from the Royal Navy causing another rout, or of maintaining the cohesion of the unit by pulling back to Fort Capuso. There was no real choice and Frusci ordered his Corps to make for Capuso when the storm lifted. This decision would prove to have grave consequences for the Italian units around Sollum who had expected IX Corps presence but who Frusci, due to the chronic shortage of radios, was unable to communicate with.
The third option Fursci had, of the immediate counter-attack, although never credible does provide a valuable insight into the Italian Commando Supremo's thinking and explains a great deal of the North African campaign. When the first Italian units crossed the Libyan border they were not prepared for an extended campaign but were compelled to take the offensive at the earliest possible opportunity, doctrine and the supreme command demanded it. This lack of proper planning, and the pressure to always advance, precluded the forward Italian units from digging in and preparing positions, time digging in was considered a waste of advancing time. This was a doctrinal weakness that would, despite the efforts of lower level commanders, dog the Italians throughout the war and one the British commanders regularly tried to exploit.
Up Next:
Well you decide! We can stay in North Africa, head of to East Africa or world politics could also be done. Personally I was going to stay with Operation Vulcan till it's conclusion. But at this rate that could take a few more posts. On which note: little and often or long and infrequent for these updates?
