Chapter CLII: The Pressure of Foreign Designs
Chapter CLII: The Pressure of Foreign Designs.
There are three main factors that determine the range of most naval vessel; the efficiency of the engines, how much fuel it carries and how it's turbines have been geared. There are other factors such as the condition of the hull and the quality of the fuel, but generally these can be controlled while the first three are set at the time of design and require a major rebuild of the ship to change. The three main factors were all in tension with other desirable qualities, if you used less displacement for fuel then you had more tonnage for guns and armour for instance, and as the Admiralty considered the question of range and propulsion it became apparent that they had generally sacrificed range in favour of those other qualities. For the Abyssinian War this had worked well, but it was becoming clear that the Far East was a different proposition entirely. The problem was not distance per se, the Admiralty had well developed plans to deploy an entire fleet the 9,000 odd nautical miles from the UK to Singapore, but the adverse geopolitics of the region. To take one of the classics of Far Eastern war planning it was around 1,400 nautical miles from Singapore to Hong Kong and any planning had to assume there wouldn't be any fuel in the city when the relief force arrived, as an un-modernised Queen Elizabeth-class battleship could do about 1,600 nautical miles at full speed before running out of fuel the issue should be obvious. Of course operating at cruising speed improved things, even the worst of the battleships could expect around 5,000 nautical miles of range at most economical cruising speed, the problem was that this was barely 12 knots. While we have seen that the Admiralty had disavowed the cult of speed that did not mean they were happy for the fleet to move around at the speed of a tramp freighter. There was also the matter of the carriers, air operations of the time required carriers to sail into the prevailing winds and maintain a decent speed while doing so, as a consequence even if the main fleet was transiting at cruising speed the carriers would still be burning considerable quantities of fuel. In the rest of the Empire the solution had been a network of bases, over half of the fuel reserves of the Navy were stored at bases outside of the UK in strategic waypoints such as Aden, Trincomalee and indeed Singapore. Once North East of Singapore that was not an option, Hong Kong was very much a lone outpost and recent events had demonstrated the inadvisability of assuming bases in French Indochina to be available, let alone those in the US controlled Philippine Islands. Hindsight would suggest that refuelling at sea was the obvious solution but at this point in time that was still something of a black art in the Royal Navy, the preference very much being for stationary refuelling in secured anchorages, as much due to lack of suitably equipped tankers as anything else. The only remaining choice was to find a less official refuelling point, the Spratly and Paracel Islands both being identified as possible choices that had suitable anchorages, secure enough to allow stationary refuelling and close, but not too close, to the expected areas of operation. Inconveniently the two sets of islands were claimed by France and China, but as neither had done much about their claims the Admiralty decided to just survey the islands and anchorages without telling either party. For the Foreign Office this became just another headache as the lingering Francophile element in the department would have preferred to support the French claim, just to help repair relations, while the Navy was pushing the Chinese claim on the basis that China had the least capacity to interfere (or indeed be aware) of the Royal Navy using the islands.

Speed-Fuel Use curves produced by the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors for a King George V-class battleship and a notional 'Far Eastern' battleship of the same design but with a revised propulsion system. The actual numbers are not particularly important at this point as they depend heavily upon other factors (auxiliary equipment use, if unused boilers are kept lit or cold, etc) it is the difference in the curve shape that is relevant. The standard KGV was optimised for high speed cruising, useful when hunting down commerce raiders or trying to dash through contested seas under hostile skies, the price it paid for this ability was the extra fuel use at normal cruising speeds. In contrast the 'Far Eastern' battleship could cruise faster and further for the same fuel use, ideal for long transits far from friendly bases, but would burn enormous amounts of fuel if asked to travel at high speed. As with so much in naval engineering, and indeed design in general, optimising for one desirable quality almost always comes with a cost elsewhere. Traditionally the Admiralty had always chosen the high speed option, confident that for the North Sea or Mediterranean theatres this was the best choice. For the South China Sea, not to mention the wider Pacific theatre, things appeared to be very different.
It was into this febrile atmosphere that the Yarrow request to export high pressure boilers arrived. The request itself was easily dismissed, but as Yarrow had doubtless anticipated it did re-start the debate inside the Admiralty about high pressure steam. To grossly oversimplify matters the maximum efficiency of steam propulsion is limited by the difference between the temperature at which steam is raised in the boiler and the temperature at which steam leaves the turbine, the bigger the difference, the higher the maximum possible efficiency. If you increase the temperature of a boiler then, all else being equal, you will also increase the pressure it operates at. High pressure steam has another advantage, namely that it is more space efficient which is often a very different thing from being fuel efficient, in this case it meant you could either generate more power from the same sized plant or shrink the size of the equipment required for the same power. All of this was somewhat theoretical with a great many assumptions that were often difficult to achieve in practice, as a result it was quite easy to build a high pressure propulsion system that was larger and less efficient than a similarly sized low pressure alternative. Indeed the Admiralty had several examples of this in hand, the collection of battered cruisers taken from Italy during the Peace of Valletta had boilers that ran at higher pressures and temperatures than those in Royal Navy warships of the same vintage, yet used more fuel because the inefficiencies in the boiler systems and turbines swamped any gains from higher pressure operation. The result of the study of the Italian ships had fortified the Admiralty in their view that high pressure steam had severe practical issues and just was not worth the effort, so while existing designs were refined and new types of boilers were trialled in at least one destroyer of every new flotilla, no effort was made to increase the pressure of those systems. As a result the Yarrow request had been a nasty shock; the still under construction Tribal¬-class destroyers had standard Admiralty three drum boilers that ran at 300psi/600ºF and Yarrow were proposing to offer the Russian navy a destroyer with plant running at 500psi/700ºF, on the basis of their belief that an actual state of the art plant would be running at 650psi/850ºF or more. The Admiralty had expected that setting a limit on pressure would mean they were no longer on the cutting edge of propulsion technology, but not that they would fall so far behind. It must be said that Yarrow were somewhat over-optimistic in their belief of what state of the art was, based on their belief that power station technology could easily be adapted for naval use. This was not a completely unreasonable belief and would eventually prove to be correct, however the firm had grossly under-estimated the challenges involved in fitting a large and heavy land-based plant inside a ship's hull.

The A-class destroyer HMS Acheron while on service with the ASDIC trials and training base at HMS Osprey near Portland. Laid down in late 1928 the Acheron was an experimental ships, while her sisters had either the standard Yarrow or new Admiralty pattern three-drum boilers the Acheron had experimental Thornycroft boilers that produced steam at 500psi/750ºF. It was hoped this higher temperature operation would translate into a considerable improvement in fuel efficiency, which it duly did as the Acheron used 25% less fuel than the rest of the class. Unfortunately she could not do so reliably, despite regular refits and a far more intensive (and expensive) maintenance regime she was still crippled with constant mechanical problems, the boilers themselves were reliable but the associated piping and high pressure turbines were not. While her speed and operational trials were officially "inconclusive", despite a second set of trials being carried out just before the Abyssinian War to see if regular service had improved matters (it had not), all the follow up destroyer designs would use the Admiralty three-drum boiler and the Admiralty Engineering Laboratory imposed a limit of 400psi/700ºF on future boilers, effectively curtailing future high pressure steam development in the fleet. Withdrawn from regular flotilla service the Acheron became the trials ship for the Type 128 ASDIC set, a task which did not require her to move particularly quickly or be especially reliable.
Once it was clear the Admiralty had indeed fallen behind the initial response was straightforward enough; the ban on high pressure research was lifted and work started to investigate the proposed Yarrow designs, both the 'export' design and the cutting edge one, as well as look again at the Acheron system to see if modern materials and details could make it reliable. The next step however was less clear, standard practice would be to conclude the investigation and, if promising, specify that one of the destroyers in the next ordered flotilla include a boiler of that design. Realistically that would mean a ship ordered under the 1938/39 Naval Estimates, allowing the usual build and commissioning time and time for trials of the new ship this meant the Admiralty would be reviewing the results sometime in late 1940. By that point it was hoped that most of the new construction agreed by the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee would have either have been built or already laid down, so there would no chance to include the advances in any of the next generation of capital ships. The alternative was the so called Admiral Fisher solution; just build the things in the expectation that any problems would be sorted before the ships were commissioned. There was a strong argument that the current technology was 'good enough', the Abyssinian War had been won and there were enough low-risk incremental developments available that range could be increased without a radical and risky jump in technology, particularly now design was no longer limited by the naval treaties. Conversely bitter experience had shown that it was slow and expensive to upgrade a ships engines and it had also shown that the Cabinet and Treasury expected capital ships to live a long life, so if the Admiralty played safe they would be stuck with the consequences for quite some time, as a result the example of the Revenge-class loomed large over the decision making. In the end therefore the Fisherite solution won out, partly due to concerns over Far Eastern operations, partly due to a recognition that great efficiency and range would also be helpful in hunting down German raiders but mostly because the Admirals worried they would laying down ships that would be obsolete before they even launched. They knew the Italian navy had been working on high pressure steam (unsuccessfully admittedly) and it was likely they had also provided information on that to the Soviets as part of their ongoing co-operation. The USN had very publicly announced it ships would use a new and more powerful form of steam propulsion, combined that with it's termination of all contracts with Parsons and the many contracts issued to General Electric (which had no naval experience, but was pre-eminent in power station engineering) and it was obvious they too were looking at high pressure steam in the same way as Yarrow proposed. Naval Intelligence had correctly identified that Germany was using very high pressure boilers for the Scharnhorst-class battlecruisers, while it was admitted that they had no real firm data on what the Japanese were doing save that it was likely optimised for range given their Pacific ambitions. The sole bright point was that it appeared the French Navy were at least no further forward, though for the Admiralty to be reduced to the level of such a comparison was damning in itself. So from that perspective for much of the Admiralty board it had in fact been no choice at all.

The RMS Queen Elizabeth under construction in John Brown's Yard in Clydebank, Glasgow. While the hull and internal structure had been completed prior to the boilermakers strike her owners, Cunard White Star, had been forced to chose between a long suspension of work or instructing John Brown to adopt welding to finish constructing the upper decks. Given the financing of the ship was dependent on government guarantees the line's chairman, Sir Percy Bates, soon discovered the board had very little choice in the matter; the government was keen to see welding adopted, so Cunard White Star would have to be equally keen if they wished to keep their financing guarantee. The dozen Yarrow boilers deep in the heart of the vessel had also been completed prior to the strike and careful enquiry by the Admiralty Engineering Laboratory had revealed that they were intended to operate at a much higher temperature than those going into the Royal Navy's capital ships. The Trans-Atlantic route was tough on liner machinery, four days of constant near maximum power output to maintain the 30knots speed demanded by the timetable, repeated every week. That the owners and builders of the Queen Mary had selected high pressure steam for such a high profile ship was taken as another sign that the technology had become reliable.
This decision prompted a flurry of urgent orders to flow down from the Sea Lords to their many subordinates. The naval constructors prioritised rapidly modifying the plans for two of the upcoming J-class destroyers, one to include Yarrow's proposed "export grade" boilers and plant and the other with an updated version of the machinery used in Acheron incorporating modern welding and materials. The lucky ships would be Jupiter (because Yarrow's shipbuilding arm had already won the contract to build it) and Jaguar (because it was planned to be the last to be laid down and so gave the designers the most time to update the old Acheron plans), the two ships would serve as test beds with the knowledge that one would prove to have been built with the 'wrong' boiler. The next priority was to start on-shore testing of the designs in order to decide exactly which sort of high pressure boiler should be used for subsequent ships. It was at this point that a particularly unfortunate issue was noticed by the Admiralty Board, they had two departments looking at marine propulsion and the demarcation between them had not been well done, resulting in both duplication and far more worryingly gaps. The Admiralty Fuel Experimental Station (AFES) at Halsar had done excellent work on optimising the burning of fuel inside boilers, but considered fundamental questions about pressure outside their scope because the rest of the system (turbines, piping, etc) would also have to be improved to cope. Conversely the Admiralty Engineering Laboratory (AEL) in West Drayton had a large team looking at ship propulsion from the point of view of propellers, gearboxes, turbines and so on, but they also considered boiler pressure outside their scope as they believed all matters to do with boilers sat with the AFES. After a meeting between the First Lord Viscount Monsell, the First Sea Lord Admiral Keyes and the heads of the AEL and AFES that was both frank and direct it was agreed that number of senior officers would take up challenging new posts to help spread engineering knowledge to the more distant stations in Africa and the South Atlantic. It was also decided that all surface ship propulsion work from boiler to propeller would be concentrated at one site in Halsar, under the renamed Admiralty Propulsion Research Station while the AEL would focus on it's mechanical and electrical work, along with the diesel-electric propulsion for submarines which was recognised as being very much it's own specialised area. The first priority of the new station was to produce a recommendation on the boiler system from the many options available and to do so by the end of October at the very latest. The deadline was important because while some of the ships allowed under the 1937-38 estimates had been laid down (the Swiftsures and most of the J-class destroyers) much of the programme had not. In the autumn and into the spring of 1938 the Admiralty had planned to lay down another destroyer flotilla (pencilled in as the K-class), some repeat Town-class cruisers, the first batch of Diadem light escort cruisers and two fleet carriers. It was likely some of these ships would have to use the existing Admiralty three drum boilers at the standard pressures just due to limits on time and manufacturing capacity, but for the carriers and ideally most of the cruisers the Sea Lords wanted high pressure installed. The development programme was a chastening experience for the Navy's engineers, forced to lean on the experience of the power station boiler makers at Yarrow and Babcock & Wilcox it soon became apparent it was not just advances in high pressure they had missed. The lack of economisers on the standard Admiralty three drum boiler was greeted with incredulity and a team hurriedly formed to add them to the boilers destined for the rest of the J-class, this simple addition alone improved fuel efficiency by 10% at all speeds. To the relief of the naval engineers it was not all one way traffic, their experience with several more exotic types of boiler, such as the forced circulation La Mont boilers fitted to HMS Ilex, was valuable to industry if only from a 'what not to do' perspective and several of the innovative details of the Admiralty three drum system were much admired and would find their way into power station systems before the end of the decade. In the longer term, after the initial rushed efforts had been completed, the Admiralty moved to put these industrial co-operation efforts on an more official footing and to include the shipbuilding firms as well. While many would grumble about giving up 'trade secrets' it was clear the previous fragmented approach had not worked and a move to the same co-operative approach used for guns and armour plate seemed only logical to the Admiralty. Time would tell if this would be correct.
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Notes:
This one was a bugger of an update that has fought me every single step of the way. Four complete re-writes and thousands of words sitting in my "this will be useful later (hopefully)" file. However in the end there is only so many times something can be re-done before one has to just hit Post and be done with it.
This all started from me wondering why the Royal Navy ships had a reputation for being short legged, if nothing else because many of them weren't. Ark Royal had the same cruising range as Yorktown for instance. The Illustrious-class and the KGVs however, very much were short legged. A large chunk is just not carrying much fuel, a KGV had maybe 60% of the fuel capacity of a North Carolina or South Dakota. Another large part was the gearing as per the pretty graph, the KGV data is indicatively about right and the 'Far East' battleship is actually from a North Carolina, but the principles holds if not the exact numbers. The Admiralty didn't see a role for high speed cruising but did want max endurance for full speed dashing around after raiders or racing in and out of enemy air cover/Straits of Messina/whatever.
That just left boiler efficiency and the words around that are indeed grossly simplified as I felt a long discourse on Carnot's theorem, the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the Ideal Gas Laws would be a bit of distraction as well as easily available on the internet if anyone truly cared. Royal Navy boiler technology inter-war is a funny one, the Acheron trial did kill off high pressure steam research but everything else carried on and so the Admiralty 3 Drum boiler was still a very good design and incredibly reliable. It also makes comparison very hard because you are never really comparing like for like. There were also very different decisions on priorities being made, the Germans went for crazy high pressure because for them fuel saving was absolutely vital, both due to lack of fuel and to give their ships the long range to get out into the Atlantic and stay there for extended periods. In contrast the British were still over-concerned about the treaties, for instance the lack of economisers on the Admiralty boiler (essentially you use the exhaust from the boiler to help heat up the incoming water) was because that wasn't very weight/space efficient, on a destroyer you would add say 100t of weight to your machinery to save 50t of fuel (assuming the same range). Under the Treaty system that was not a good trade and so the Royal Navy did not fit them, by the time even they had thrown off the treaties there was a mania for efficient mass production, so the design was frozen as it was thought that would help get machinery built faster. In Butterfly different pressures, different decisions.
At Sea Refuelling for large ships while abeam (side by side) had a fearsome reputation inter-war, the USN tried it multiple times in exercises and it kept being called of by the supervising officers as 'too dangerous'. They didn't manage to succeed at it until Nimitz personally ran an exercise in late 1939 and just held his nerve about it. Interestingly abeam refuelling for destroyers was basically routine in the USN so it was just fear of the lack of manoeuvrability of larger ships. On the RN side there are some 1932 trials where they came up with exactly the right answer (abeam refuelling, you can refuel multiple ships and you should use more than one fuel hose per ship for speed) but then did bugger all with it, no doubt in part because there was no reason to. As I am trying to have the British make mistakes the RN will not be making that leap quite yet, forcing them to look at other solutions. Such as the OTL plans to just use some reefs that the French and/or Chinese had not claimed properly, at least until the Japanese invaded China and then the IJN did garrison them. Here though they remain the emergency option.
As to the decision, well high pressure steam does work at sea (a few issues about graphitisation and tricky welding aside) but the learning curve is unpleasant, the USN did take the plunge first in OTL (and have done again in Butterfly) and their first high pressure class did use GE land based power station tech, so had a torrid few months during and after commissioning the first ships as there were a lot of detail problems. But after they were sorted then the system worked reliably so I'm assuming a similar thing will happen on the RN side. the J-class test beds will be challenging ships but by the time the big ships are launched it will all be understood. The overlapping research stations is of course OTL but the fix isn't, in part because wartime panics meant something else was always more important.
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