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Yes, your fourth scenario fits quite well with the succession arrangements that Constantine I enacted later and Fausta's subsequent death/banishment (if we believe Jerome's account), but it ignores the way Constantine I governed, and the role of the bureaucracy. If Crispus was under suspicion, rather than believe just his wife's gossip, he would have checked with his top bureaucrats, especially those who were posted in the West. Especially Iunius Bassus, who was probably the PP assigned to Crispus, and who had been put here by Constantine I basycally to spy on his sn, manage affairs in his place and keep him informed about what was happening (the same that Constantius II did with Gallus and later with Julian). If Fausta was "poisoning" Constantine I's mind, then she would jave needed the full cooperation of such men, and if she fell in disfavor later because the emperor realized she'd been lying to him, then people like Iunius Bassus would have been purged too; instead he kept on being PP and was even appointed consul in 331 CE.

As an aside, Philip II of Spain governed in a similar way, and a comparable situation developed both with his half-brother John of Austria and with his own son and heir don Carlos. He also trusted more his secretaries than his close relatives in government affairs, with the possible exception of his two favorite daughters.
It may be that I have a Dutch view of Philip II but I don't think it very likely that both relatives earned the distrust that Philip showed them, and showed Margaret of Parma as well as the nobility of Aragon, Navarre and the Low Countries. No, this example only pushes me towards the fourth scenario.

To clarify, though, it's not my view that Fausta made up an elaborate plot which Constantine just swallowed. The usual way of such things is for small incidents, which always will happen, to be spun by an enemy who has the ear of the ruler. So Bassus reports an incident, Fausta retells it her own way, connects it to other incidents, suggests a pattern, questions motives; repeat after each incident. Bassus is at the beginning of the chain, he doesn't know how Fausta spins his reports. What he sees is that the tone of Constantine's messages to him changes as the emperor grows more suspicious of his son and, as men do around autocrats, Bassus may very well have bent his own tone to match. Constantine's own suspicion of rivals and his tendency to quick decisive action do the rest.
 
It may be that I have a Dutch view of Philip II but I don't think it very likely that both relatives earned the distrust that Philip showed them, and showed Margaret of Parma as well as the nobility of Aragon, Navarre and the Low Countries. No, this example only pushes me towards the fourth scenario.

To clarify, though, it's not my view that Fausta made up an elaborate plot which Constantine just swallowed. The usual way of such things is for small incidents, which always will happen, to be spun by an enemy who has the ear of the ruler. So Bassus reports an incident, Fausta retells it her own way, connects it to other incidents, suggests a pattern, questions motives; repeat after each incident. Bassus is at the beginning of the chain, he doesn't know how Fausta spins his reports. What he sees is that the tone of Constantine's messages to him changes as the emperor grows more suspicious of his son and, as men do around autocrats, Bassus may very well have bent his own tone to match. Constantine's own suspicion of rivals and his tendency to quick decisive action do the rest.

As I see it, we're both telling the same tale, except for Fausta's role in the affair. In my opinion, there's nothing that supports an active participation of Fausta in the events, or more importantly, in any sort of government function at all. There's nothing in the extant sources implying that Fausta played any part in the ruling of the empire, and I find it hard to imagine someone as autocratic and zealous of his own authority as Constantine I opening the private correspondence of his praetorian prefects and other ministers in front of his wife, sharing their content with her and asking for her advice in affairs of state. Other emperors, like Trajan or Justinian, ruled sharing much of their power with their wives and the sources reflect it, but this is not the case with Constantine I.

As a matter of fact, his mother Helena seems to have played a larger part in affairs of state than Fausta, but then only in matters affecting religion and the building program of Constantine I (her influence was decisive in pushing Constantine I to build the large church of the Anastasis in Jerusalem and the church of the Nativity in Betlehem).
 
6.1. THE SUCCESSION OF CONSTANTINE I, AND THE ROMAN ARMY AT THE START OF THE REIGN OF CONSTANTIUS II.
6.1. THE SUCCESSION OF CONSTANTINE I, AND THE ROMAN ARMY AT THE START OF THE REIGN OF CONSTANTIUS II.

Constantine I the Great died at a state villa near Nicomedia in Bithynia on May 22, 337 CE. Of all his sons and nephews, only the caesar Constantius (who was nineteen years old at the time) was present at his father’s deathbed. Immediately after his father’s death, he hurried to Constantinople and reached it before any of his other relatives and potential rivals could make a move (despite Thrace being an area under the administration of his cousin the caesar Dalmatius). His brothers Constantine and Constans had been posted to the West by their father, and Hannibalianus was presumably in Cappadocia.

Constantinople had been the capital of Constantine I’s government since 330 CE until his death, and it was in this city where all the key elements of governance were situated: the main ministers, secretaries, the imperial treasury, and probably also the will of his father. This gave Constantius an immense advantage over his relatives, and almost all modern historians agree that what happened immediately after was plotted, or at least instigated by him, with or without the knowledge of his two brothers. When his relatives and their supporters assembled for the deceased funeral at Constantinople in June 337 CE, Constantius had already secured the support of the army and was therefore able to use the soldiers to murder his uncles, cousins and all their supporters. The list of the main victims of the purge includes:
  • Flavius Dalmatius (known as Dalmatius the Censor), half-brother of Constantine I.
  • Flavius Dalmatius caesar, son of the latter, since 335 CE governed Thrace, Macedonia and Achaia.
  • Flavius Hannibalianus caesar, brother of Dalmatius and since 335 CE, Rex Regum et Ponticarum Gentium.
  • Iulius Constantius, half-brother of Constantine I. His eldest son (whose name has not been recorded) was killed alongside his father while his two youngest sons Constantius Gallus and Flavius Claudius Iulianus (respectively 11/12 and 5/6 years old at the time) were spared.
Gallus and Julian were left alive perhaps because Constantius was married to their sister. It is possible or even probable that the support of magister Ursus and comes Polemius had been instrumental for the success of Constantius against his cousins and they were therefore rewarded with consulships the following year. They could have been instrumental in spreading the rumor that Constantine I (hugely popular among the army) had been poisoned by Constantius’ uncles and cousins, thus legitimizing the purge in the eyes of the soldiery and making sure that no units revolted in support of the two executed caesares (as at least one of them, Hannibalianus, had probably been until recently commanding troops in the East). It’s unclear where and when were Constantius and his two brothers raised to the purple; the accession to the rank of augustus was not automatic in Roman custom (like it was in medieval Europe); an augustus had to be formally acclaimed by the people, the Senate and the army (the only acclamatio that really mattered). Did it happen at Constantinople itself immediately after the purge, and where the three brothers acclaimed at once? Or did the troops posted there and in the East acclaim only Constantius, leaving things unresolved with his brothers? The sources say nothing about Constantine II and Constans being present at Constantinople at the time of Constantine I’s burial, so they were probably either still in the West or on their way to Constantinople.

Solidus-Constantius-II-01.jpg

Solidus of Constantius II. On the obverse, CONSTANTIVS AVG(ustus). On the reverse, GLORIA ROMANORVM ("the Glory of the Romans"). Mint of Antioch, 337 - 342 CE.

After this, Constantius II had to fight a brief defensive campaign against the Sarmatians in Pannonia (perhaps the Limigantes), who had exploited the situation by invading; the probable reason for this invasion was that the death of the augustus had made the previous treaties void and the Sarmatians either wanted to improve their terms by a demonstration of military strength, or they just wanted to exploit the opportunity in order to obtain their full freedom and possibly land from Dacia. The Sarmatian invaders were quickly defeated by Constantius II.

Then in September 337 CE Constantius met his two brothers in Sirmium to discuss affairs. As is well known they discussed the division of the empire between themselves, but perhaps Constantine II and Constans (who probably had taken their armies with them, Constantius II for sure had an army with him, having just fought the Sarmatians near there) wanted to make things clear and ensure that all three of them would carry the title and rank of augustus.

In this meeting Constantius and Constans allied themselves against their half-brother Constantine II (who was the eldest and probably thought that he was entitled to a position of seniority) and outvoted him in the division of territories. Constantius II kept control of the East and gained possession of Constantinople and Thrace. Constans added Moesia and Macedonia to his domains (Italy, Africa and Illyricum, the praetorian prefecture of Italy and almost all of the praetorian prefecture of Illyricum), but Constantine II was left with his old domains (Gaul, Britannia and Hispania, the territory of the praetorian prefecture of Gaul) and was left deeply unsatisfied with the results. Constantine II was not happy with the result. But due to the renewed Sasanian assault in the East Constantius II was also forced to make concessions to his brothers; he had to cede Moesia and Macedonia to Constans, and had to accept the imposition of his two brothers (who adhered to the Nicene creed, while Constantius II was pro-Arian) that many of the exiled eastern Nicene churchmen (who had been exiled from their sees and churches by Constantine I, who in his last years had favored more and more the Arian party) had to be allowed to return to their sees and churches.

Division-3-Brothers.jpg

Territorial partition between the three sons of Constantine I as agreed in September 337 Ce in Pannonia.

Immediately after this division of the spoils, Constantius II hurried to the east in order to deal with the new massive invasion launched by Šābuhr II against Roman Mesopotamia. In the way to Mesopotamia though he made another victim: he ordered the execution of the praetorian prefect of the East Flavius Ablabius, who had been one of the trusted ministers of Constantine I; the reason is unclear. Some sources alleged his involvement in the “plot of the relatives” to poison Constantine I, others say that he showed himself too staunch a supporter of the return of Athanasius of Alexandria, and lastly, it’s possible that during Constantius II’s command of the army of the East as caesar he resented the control and interference of Ablabius on behalf of his father. The date of Ablabius’ death is unclear, and some historians believe that he was executed in the general purge that followed Constantine I’s death, together with the half-brothers of Constantine I and their sons.

While Constantius II defeated Narsē in Mesopotamia and later had to rush back to Constantinople and the Balkans to deal with the problems of his father’s succession, the situation in Armenia did not improve. It’s very difficult to get a clear picture of what happened there during these opening stages of the long war between Rome and Šābuhr II, and the main reason for these difficulties is that we only have the Armenian sources left to reconstruct what happened, and these sources are quite unreliable and very confused. According to the article in the Encyclopaedia Iranica by M.L. Chaumont, the account by the two Armenian historians Moses of Chorene and Faustus of Byzantium is full of mistakes, and there’s little that can be reused from it. According to them, king Khosrov (who is only attested by the aforementioned Armenian sources) was succeeded at around this time (338 – 339 CE) by his son Tiran, who was forced to send his son Aršak as a hostage to Šābuhr II. But modern historians, based on other sources, state that it was Aršak II who rose to the Armenian throne in 338 CE. Aršak II would rule until the 360s, and his reign was marked by his indecisive foreign policies and his constant wavering between Rome and Ērānšahr. Some historians even speculate if Aršak II was not put in the Armenian throne by Šābuhr II (who would have sent a second army into Armenia while Narsē attacked Mesopotamia) and would later try to navigate the dangerous straits between the two neighboring empires with little success.

This hypothesis is supported by the account in Julian’s First Oration (addressed to his cousin Constantius II), according to which the Armenians “revolted” against Rome and began raiding the Roman border provinces:

The Armenians, our ancient allies, revolted, and no small part of them went over to the Persians and overran and raided the country on their borders. In this crisis there seemed to be but one hope of safety, that you (i.e. Constantius) should take charge of affairs and plan the campaign, but at the moment this was impossible, because you were in Paeonia (i.e. Pannonia) making treaties with your brothers (…)

Constantius II also had to deal with a revolt of the Arab foederati. Once again in the First Oration, Julian told about to Arab raids that happened at the same time as the Armenian ones. Irfan Shahid wrote that this revolt could be related to the Christological controversies that raged in the Roman empire at the time. One of the assistants to the Council of Nicea in 325 CE was a certain Pamphilus, “bishop of the Arabs”, who belonged to the Nicene party. The last decade or so of Constantine's reign after 325 CE witnessed the progressive removal of the leaders of the Nicene party, a process almost complete in 335 CE. Among the exiles was possibly Pamphilus (or his successor), the orthodox bishop of the foederati. It is thus possible to assume that the Arab foederati were discontented in 335 CE, and with the death of Constantine I in 337 CE the foedus (symmachia in Greek) might not have been renewed with Constantius II. The outbreak of the war with the Sasanian empire would have provided the Arab foederati with an occasion for expanding their discontent into open revolt, and such was the situation when Constantius II rose to the purple.

Despite the fact that this is all based in speculations, Shahid supported his theory by the parallelism with a better documented case: the revolt of the orthodox Queen Mavia of the Arab foederati against Valens in the 370s, caused also by the latter’s pro-Arian policies.

In 337 CE, the Arab foederati of Rome comprised two large tribal groups: the Banū Tanukh in the northern part of the limes arabicus, and the Banū Lakhm in the south. It was not until 338 CE when Constantius II finally left Pannonia and arrived in Syria (according again to Julian’s First Oration), where his presence is attested in Antioch (Codex Theodosianus, XII.1.23) and in Emesa (Codex Theodosianus, XII.1.25), from where he issued edicts in the month of October. According to Shahid, the “Arabia” mentioned in Julian’s text thus could only have been the Arab peninsula, not the Provincia Arabia, and the Arabs he dealt with would also have been located extra limitem to the east of the provinces of Syria and possibly Phoenicia. This was the area where the foederati of the north, the Banū Tanukh, were settled. Julian also wrote of “embassies” (several, not one) that Constantius II dispatched
to the Arabs before he won them over. To Shahid, this suggests that the emperor was not dealing with disorganized nomads or marauding hordes, but with an organized group with whom he could negotiate, and this suggests that he was dealing with the foederati, whom he had perhaps already dealt earlier when his father dispatched him to Antioch to organize the counteroffensive against the Sasanian invasion of Mesopotamia.

Constantius II also managed to win back the Armenians as allies and pull them out of the Sasanian alliance. In his First Oration, Julian lavished praise upon Constantius II (with profusion of rhetorical floritures) for his ability in dealing with this situation:

This is perhaps the right moment to describe how you controlled the situation, encompassed as you were, after your father’s death, by so many perils and difficulties of all sorts: confusion, an unavoidable war, numerous hostile raids, allies in revolt, lack of discipline in the garrisons, and all the other harassing conditions of the hour. You concluded in perfect harmony the negotiations with your brothers, and when the time had arrived that demanded your aid for the dangerous crisis of affairs, you made forced marches, and immediately after leaving Paeonia (i.e. Pannonia) appeared in Syria. But to relate how you did this would tax my powers of description, and indeed for those who know the facts their own experience is enough. But who in the world could describe adequately how, at the prospect of your arrival, everything was changed and improved all at once, so that we were set free from the fears that hung over us and could entertain brighter hopes than ever for the future?

Even before you were actually on the spot the mutiny among the garrisons ceased and order was restored. The Armenians who had gone over to the enemy at once changed sides again, for you ejected from the country and sent to Rome those who were responsible for the governor’s exile, and you secured for the exiles a safe return to their own country. You were so merciful to those who now came to Rome as exiles, and so kind in your dealings with those who returned from exile with the governor, that the former did, indeed, bewail their misfortune in having revolted, but still were better pleased with their present condition than with their previous power; while the latter, who were formerly in exile, declared that the experience had been a lesson in prudence, but that now they were
receiving a worthy reward for their loyalty. On the returned exiles you lavished such magnificent presents and rewards that they could not even resent the good fortune of their bitterest enemies, nor begrudge their being duly honored.

We have no means to ascertain what exactly did Constantius II to settle the situation in Armenia; and modern historians don’t know who those “exiles” might have been; the confused account of the Armenian sources does not help in the slightest. Did Constantius II manage to set up a puppet government in Armenia? Or was this just the first of several changes of side by the Armenian king Aršak II between Rome and the Sasanian empire?

Having dealt by peaceful means with the revolt of the Arab foederati and the Armenian “rebellion”, Constantius II still had to deal with the main issue: the war against Šābuhr II, who in 337 CE had invaded Mesopotamia with a large army and put its main city Nisibis under siege.

Constantine I had enacted during his 31-year long reign the most important military reforms known to the Roman army since the time of Gaius Marius. After his final victory against Licinius in 324 CE, Constantine I reunited the several comitatus that had previously served each of the Tetrarchs once again into a single more powerful field army.

According to an edict by Constantine I issued in 325 CE and preserved in the Codex Theodosianus (C.Th. 7.20.4) shows that at this time his army was already divided into three types of forces:
  • The "mobile" (for lack of a better word) armies known as the comitatenses (adj.nom.sing. comitatensis; an evolution of the former comitatus)
  • The frontier armies, known as ripenses (adj.nom.sing. ripensis; the “river soldiers” in Latin, which would evolve into the later limitanei); referred also as riparenses.
  • The assorted imperial bodyguard units, known collectively as the protectores (adj.nom.sing. protector).
The protectores were commanded by the Comes Domestici, and although they were divided into a number of different units, when put together they formed an army by themselves, large enough to defend the Euphrates border on their own in 359 CE (according to Ammianus). They included the protectores proper, the protectores domestici and assorted units known as scholae. When Julian purged these units (edict preserved in C.Th 6.24.1), many of the men expelled from the protectores “returned to their own peoples and lands”, which suggests that foreigners (“barbarians” to the Romans and Greeks) as well as native Romans served in these units, as had been the tradition since the times of the Principate.

Codex-Theodosianus-VIc.jpg

Fragment of a VI century CE copy of the Codex Theodosianus kept at the National Library of France.

It is not known with certainty when did Constantine reform the military structure by withdrawing detachments from the ripenses to form the more sizable version of the comitatus that became known under his rule as the comitatenses. This also entailed the separation of the cavalry units from their mother legions. However, according to Ilkka Syvänne there’s the possibility that some of the units that had belonged to the comitati of the Tetrarchs retained their cavalry contingents even after Constantine’s reforms. The cavalry units of the comitatenses were then put under the command of the Magister Equitum (“Master of the Horse”) and the infantry units under the Magister Peditum (“Master of the Infantrymen”). The units of ripenses would also become progressively smaller as the IV century CE went by as new detachments continued to be detached from the older units.

To Ilkka Syvänne, this system could have resulted from the collection of forces by the Tetrarch Constantius for his British campaign and that Constantine would have made it permanent after succeeding in father during the course of the campaign at Eburacum (modern York) in 306 CE for two reasons:
  • He would have wanted to keep the sizable field army in existence in order to ensure that nobody could attempt to rise against him.
  • The billeting of the troops in the interior was cheaper for the imperial fiscus than the keeping of forces near the border.
One of the charges levied by Zosimus against Constantine I was that he withdrew forces from the frontier into the cities, so it is probable that he bolstered the size of this campaign army even more by attaching to it even more forces from the frontiers. The downside with the billeting was that it did not endear the ruler with the inhabitants of the cities, but it is possible that Constantine would have lessened the burden by extending exemptions to important persons (after all, they were those whose help he needed) and by lowering other forms of taxation for the rest. It is unfortunate that we do not know the date and details of Constantine’s reform, but it’s quite probable that he would have made most of the reforms early on while he ruled only in Gaul, Britannia and Hispania or at least would have experimented with them and then extended them to other parts of the empire as he conquered them.

What’s certain though (according to Marco Rocco) is that the term comitatenses is not found elsewhere before the 325 CE edict; in this year, due to the end of the civil wars, Constantine I had sent into retirement a sizeable part of his soldiers, and the edict was intended to regulate carefully (according to quite a complex set of regulations) the fiscal exemptions and legal privileges due to his veterans, according to their status and rank in the army.

According to the Notitia Dignitatum (a very late source for Constantine I’s army though), all the units that belonged to the comitatenses were labelled either as legiones (infantry) or equites/vexillationes equitum (cavalry). To this, Rocco adds also the new units of auxilia raised by Constantine I, which were only raised to the status of auxilia palatina (with higher privileges and pay than the units with status of comitatenses) in the mid-IV century CE. These auxilia (nom.sing. auxilium) had been recruited by Constantine I from Germanic war prisoners from the Rhenish frontier (or from Germanic volunteers) and he considered them good enough fighters to be included in his field army of comitatenses, along the legiones and equites.

Rocco stated that these comitatenses were not a separate army different from the one posted along the borders, but that the name comitatenses implied just an elite status within the army, and as Yann Le Bohec noted, a proximity to the imperial court which in the Latin of the time came implicit in their appellation, as comites (“companions”) of the emperor. Both of them were contrary to the opinion prevalent among other scholars that saw in them a sort of “army of maneuver”.

After his victory at Chrysopolis in 324 CE, Constantine I had to deal with the same problem as Augustus after Actium: he had subjugated the whole Roman world with a large army which was no longer needed, or better said, it was no longer needed as a single comitatus concentrated in the same location the emperor was at any given moment. This implied their retirement from the army (as attested by the edict of 325 CE) and their distribution into several “field armies” which were placed under the command of the caesares or the newly created offices of magister (nom.pl. magistri) and comes (nom.pl. comites). Those soldiers who remained after this in a physical proximity to Constantine I would be put into the new units of scholae palatinae (nom.sing. schola palatina) and the already existing protectores (which included several units with different names). After his victory against Maxentius in 312 CE, Constantine I abolished the praetorian guard and stripped the praetorian prefects of all their military functions; from this date on, the post of praetorian prefect would be an exclusively civilian office; albeit a very senior one, and which under Constantine I was extremely important.

According to Marco Rocco (who follows the Notitia Dignitatum, a source dated to almost a century after Constantine I’s death) the units which received the status of comitatenses were those which were already included in the assorted tetrarchic comitatus (Ioviani, Herculiani, Mattiarii, Fortenses, etc,), to which Rocco adds several other legions of Diocletianic era which either happened to be in the territories where Constantine I first ruled, or were lucky enough to choose the right side in the ensuing civil wars. In the Notitia Dignitatum, the old pre-Diocletianic legions posted along the borders do not receive the appellation of comitatenses or palatinae, so Rocco thinks that they probably received the status of ripensis under Constantine I.

The military hierarchy was also reformed. In the IV century CE, the Latin word praepositus (nom.pl. praepositi) was used to designate in a generic way any sort of commander of a unit of legionary size, or a fortress, or a fabrica armaturae … Legions were usually commanded by tribunes (nom. tribunus, tribuni), who were hierarchically superior to prefects (nom, praefectus, praefecti) and commanded almost any sort of military unit (legiones comitatenses and palatinae, vexillationes, scholae, cohortes…). Tribunes came usually from the ranks of the protectores, and from the time of Constantine I onwards they were increasingly referred to as domestici (nom.sing. domesticus).

As for the new auxilia units, they were the continuation of a trend which already existed during the III century CE, and which gave an ever-increasing importance and status to auxiliary units of “barbarian” origin. These units must’ve had a strong “ethnical” character according to Marco Rocco and were probably commanded by their own tribal leaders. Contemporary sources tell that a certain king Crocus of Alamannic origin was key in the proclamation of Constantine I as augustus at Eburacum in 306 CE. According to modern scholars, he was there probably as a commander of a group (or groups) of Alamannic auxiliaries whom the Constantius I Chlorus had either hired en masse or forced by treaty after a military defeat to serve alongside the “Roman” units of his comitatus. And the sources also refer repeatedly to a Frankish leader called Bonitus as one of the most trusted and effective commanders of Constantine I’s army; he was probably also a Frankish “king” who commanded Frankish auxilia in the service of Constantine I in his wars against Licinius. Marco Rocco remarks that the real change with the use of “barbarian” auxilia with respect to previous practices was that in Constantine I’s time they attained a military importance never seen before due to their numbers, numbers and effectiveness in battle and due to the fact that their command structure was completely unlinked to that of the regular Roman army; the auxilia were commanded by their own tribal leaders, who were answerable directly only to the ruling augustus.

Ammianus Marcellinus described these auxilia (in the archaic manner typical of classical writers) as velites, thus confirming their character of lightly armed and armored units. According to Zosimus, the comitatus with which Constantine I invaded Italy in 312 CE was formed by a hard core of “British” troops (meaning probably that they had been with him since the time of his proclamation at Eburacum six years earlier) reinforced with Gallic provincials and a great number of Germanic prisoners of war, who probably formed the new Constantinian auxilia (perhaps together with a few inherited from his father). According to Dietrich Hoffmann (writing in 1969), these original auxilia of Constantine I’s time were the units known as Sagittarii Nervi, Sagittarii Tungri, Leones, Exculcatores, Constantiani, Costantiniani, Defensores and Vindices. Marco Rocco believes that some of these units could have been raised from Gallic provincials or could have formed out of old bodyguard units which were already formed by Germanic warriors; this could be the case of the Leones, as according to Cassius Dio an unit of the same name formed by “Scythian” horsemen was already recruited by Caracalla as part of his household troops.

Constantine I created the units known as scholae palatinae, each one of which included 500 cavalrymen. Scholars believe that three of them already existed when Constantine I invaded Italy in 312 CE, known as schola scutariorum. They were probably a revamp of an old unit which is attested already under Gallienus, known as scutarii. Their reorganization into scholae though was due to Constantine I. At the time of the Notitia Dignitatum, there were twelve scholae palatinae, five in the West and seven in the East. Modern scholars have noticed that the iconography and official prosopography of these units seem to reflect a heavy Germanic influence (Frankish in particular), and that all the tribuni scholarum palatinarum mentioned by Ammianus Marcellinus had Germanic names. But that doesn’t mean the scholae palatinae included exclusively men of Germanic origin; emperors Jovian and Valentinian I had been officers in such units and they were both of Roman extraction (born in Pannonia).

The scholae were not ceremonial units; they were also elite field units. Their primary function was to protect the person of the augustus and his family whether in peace or wartime, and when in battle they were always posted in the vicinity of the augustus if he was present in the battlefield. They would enter the fight only if the emperor himself was in danger, or as a last resource to turn the tide of the battle; they were also deployed in the pursuit of a routed enemy. The scholae palatinae, together with older units like the protectores domestici (which were divided into infantry and cavalry) were part of the protectores, all of which formed the imperial household troops.

ND-Comes-Dom-Eq-East.jpg

Page of an illuminated manuscript of the Notitia Dignitatum with the insignia of the Comes Domesticorum Equitum of the East and the Comes Domesticorum Peditum of the East.

Finally, the Constantinian army included also the milites ripenses (“riverine soldiers”, from the Latin word for “river bank” ripa), who were posted as border guards along the rivers which marked the borders of the Roman empire (Rhine, Danube and Tigris/Euphrates in the East). While the comitatenses were commanded by comites, the ripenses were commanded by duces (nom. sing. dux, meaning “leader” in Latin), and their status was hierarchically lower as a whole than that of the comitatenses, with lower pay and fewer tax exemptions and legal privileges. The task entrusted to the ripenses was the control and policing of the borders in order to stop small-scale raids. In Europe, North Africa, Egypt and the Arabian limes they were dispersed in hundreds of small forts (the largest among which couldn’t have billeted 500 men tops, according to archaeological digs). In Mesopotamia and other areas of the East though they were billeted in fortified cities or in larger fortresses (like Singara or Bezabde), probably because dispersing them in such a way would have been ineffectual (or plainly suicidal) in front of a large-scale Sasanian invasion.

Qasr-Bashir-Jordan-01.jpg

Late Roman fort of Qasr Bashir in Jordan. Built during the times of Diocletian as part of his fortification efforts of the limes arabicus, this fort is typical of the Late Roman small fortified posts for the ripenses/limitanei. It hosted a unit of cavalry of around 200 men, and it followed the bulding scheme known as quadriburgium, which was very prevalent in the East and North Africa (it could also be found in Europe, but it was not so prevalent there). The generic Latin term for such small forts was castellum (nom.pl. castella).

According to Marco Rocco (following the Notitia Dignitatum) all the units of ripensis status were framed into infantry legiones and cavalry vexillationes equitum/equites (nom.sing. vexillatio equitum) and cunei equitum (nom.sing. cuneus equitum). The Notitia Dignitatum also lists several auxilia units in Pannonia and the middle Danube that were not auxilia palatina and that historians think could have been direct descendants of the old auxiliary alae of the Principate, which were now given ripensis status.

Then remains the pesky question of the total number of effectives of the Roman army under Constantine I and his successors. For all the minute detail it gives us about the organizational structure of the Roman army in the late IV and early V century CE, the Notitia Dignitatum gives no numbers, and scholars have speculated endlessly about the numbers of the units listed in it in order to get an idea of the total strength of the army. Most scholars believe that at the time of the Notitia, the Roman army (adding both parts of the empire) added up to 400,000 men (the navy excluded), so a similar number as it had under Diocletian and under the emperors of the III century CE.

But as Marco Rocco noted it’s possible that during the prolonged civil wars of the end of the Tetrarchy the total numbers of the army ballooned out of control due to massive recruitments by the several augusti that fought for dominance, just as it had happened during the civil wars of the end of the Roman Republic. According to Zosimus, for his invasion of Italy in 312 CE the comitatus of Constantine was formed by 90,000 infantrymen and 8,000 cavalrymen recruited in Britain, Gaul and from the Germanic peoples. Maxentius deployed against him in several field armies 170,000 men and 18,000 cavalrymen recruited in Italy, the Mediterranean islands and North Africa. According to Rocco, this means that the western half of the empire could mobilize 260,000 infantrymen and 26,000 cavalrymen without counting the forces that Constantine I had to leave to guard Britain and Gaul against “barbarian” attacks. If according to Rocco these data are extrapolated to the eastern half of the empire, that gives a total number around 600,000 soldiers for the whole empire. Against the Zosimus’ numbers we can oppose the numbers given for Constantine I’s comitatus in Italy in the Panegyric of 313 CE (40,000 men) and by the Anonymus Valesianus for the battle of Cibalae in Pannonia between Constantine I and Licinius in 314 CE (20,000 men for Constantine I and 30,000 for Licinius).

The numbers mentioned by Zosimus in the final campaign of 324 CE between Constantine I and Licinius are even higher, 120,000 infantrymen and 10,000 cavalrymen (or sailors and cavalrymen, Zosimus’ text is unclear) for Constantine I, and 150,000 infantrymen and 15,000 cavalrymen by Licinius. This adds up to 300,000 men mobilized for the last civil war, if the men left in garrison border duties both in the West and east are added to it, the total number adds up again to 600,000 men.

But Rocco continues stating that other authors like Otto Seeck believed that 98,000 infantrymen and 8,000 men would’ve been the total number of men available to Constantine I in 312 CE. Given that Constantine I basically inherited the army of his father the Tetrarch Constantius I Chlorus, and that Diocletian had probably divided the Roman army equally between the four Tetrarchs for political reasons, this means that the total number of men in the Roman army in 312 CE would have added up to roughly 400,000 men, as it had been under Diocletian.

As I’ve stated previously, Constantine I’s edict of 325 CE preserved in the Codex Theodosianus seems to indicate that a this date he sent into retirement a large number of men, which could lend further support to the idea that perhaps the total number of men had went up during the civil wars, to drop after 324 CE to the same rough grand total as it had been under Diocletian. As a matter of fact, according to Rocco, the number of laws and edicts de veteranis (“about the veterans”) included in the Codex Theodosianus reached a peak between 318 and 325 CE. Rocco also notes that this temporary increase in the numbers of soldiers could explain the differences between the numbers given for the “ancient” Roman army during the VI century CE by the eastern Roman authors Agathias and John Lydus (see my previous thread). The totals given by Agathias of 645,000 men fall near 600,000 men if we subtract the ca. 45,000 sailors and soldiers employed in the Roman war fleets. And the 435,266 men (adding army and navy) given by John Lydus for Diocletian’s army could have been the total numbers of the armed forces before the civil wars. After Constantine I’s victory, the numbers would have dropped again to this total, which was clearly what the fiscal and bureaucratic apparatus of the late Roman empire could hope to sustain in the mid to long term.

Rocco proposes that real inflation in numbers must’ve happened between the first and second wars between Licinius and Constantine I, when both augusti embarked in an “armaments race” before the final war.

According to a study by Michael Whitby (based on the data furnished by the Notitia Dignitatum), by 395 CE the cavalry amounted to a 28.6% of the comitatenses praesentalis (praesentalis means “in the presence” in Latin, a term that referred to any army commanded by the ruling augustus in person; at this time there still did not exist a fixed praesentalis army, it was just an adjective applied to any comitatensis army depending on the command arrangements) armies. The field army of the East (another comitatensis army) included 25% cavalrymen, and the proportion of cavalry was much higher among the border limitanei (between 60.6% and 71.4% except in Armenia, where it stood at 40%).

According to modern scholars, cavalry units (scholae, vexillationes equitum, equites, cunei equitum, etc.) would’ve been small, between 200-500 men tops. As for the infantry legiones, most recent estimates oscillate between 700 and 1,200 men. This must’ve been especially true for the comitatenses, while among the ripenses there must’ve existed still “ancient” legions with larger numerical strengths. As stated before, the comitatenses were usually billeted in the interior of the empire, but not always. Also, they seem to have been usually billeted in cities, but there are always exceptions. What archaeology seems to show though (validating the complaints of ancient writers like Vegetius) is that the art of building encampments and field fortifications (in which the Roman army had traditionally excelled) was mostly lost during the IV century CE.

ND-East-Scholae.jpg

Shield insignia of the scholae assigned to the eastern part of the Roman empire in 395 CE, according to the Notitia Dignitatum.

The division of the empire between Constantius II and his two brothers is considered by historians to have included also the division of the comitatanses and protectores of Constantine I between his three sons, probably on equal terms (one third of the soldiers for each brother) while for obvious reasons the ripenses remained where they were. This was a bad start of things for Constantius II, because this partition left him with only one third of the field army of Constantine I to employ against Šābuhr II. As we will see, he would receive no help from his brothers at all during his war against the Sasanian king. Also, of the traditional recruiting areas of Roman soldiers he only received Thrace, and he also had limited access to the recruitment of Germanic auxilia, although he made use of Arab and Caucasian foederati and auxiliaries.

The praesentalis army that Julian massed for his eastern campaign in 363 CE mustered between 85,000 and 95,000 men and included forces from all of the Roman empire (as Julian was sole augustus). The praesentalis army of Constantine I in 337 CE would have had the same number of forces and possibly even more, as by 363 CE the army had been eroded by the never-ending and costly war against the Sasanians, the recent war against the Franks and Alamanni in Gaul and the grievous civil war between Constantius II and the usurper Magnentius which caused disastrous losses among the comitatenses and auxilia palatina of the West. So, probably in 337 CE Constantius II was left with a field army of 30,000 – 40,000 men at most to fight Šābuhr II, with the added problem that recruitment to cover loses or raise new forces would not have been a straightforward affair.

The three brothers appointed their own magister peditum and magister equitum to assist them in the command and control of their own field armies. Constantius II’ share of the empire included not only the East but also Thrace. Because both fronts were at risk (the lower Danube could never be left disattended, and he had to keep an eye on his brothers), and Constantius II could not be in both places at once, he initially did not want to detach his magister peditum or equitum from his praesentalis army. His solution was to create the office of comes rei militaris (literally, “companion for the military affairs”) of whom there could be as many as the augustus appointed and who commanded small regional comitatensis armies detached from the main praesentalis army. The comites rei militaris were generals in their own right and were normally given commands of limited duration. For example, the comes Lucillianus commanded Nisibis during the 350 CE siege, while the comes Aelianus led a small army to reinforce Amida and took command of its defense upon his arrival in 359 CE. There were exceptions to limited-term commands such as the comes Constantius put in command of Thrace and the unnamed comes who commanded all the forces in Egypt.

According to John Harrel, the general structure and approximate numbers of Constantius II’s armies in 337 CE was thus:

Praesentalis field army under the direct command of Constantius II:
  • A force of 3,000 - 5,000 household troops (scholae, protectores domestici, etc.) answerable directly to Constantius II in person.
  • A praesentalis army of 30,000 – 40,000 men commanded by Constantius II and his magister equitum and magister peditum.
Permanent forces in the East:
  • A force of 10,000 - 15,000 men in the five regiones transtigritanae (in the “first line of fire” against the Sasanians), commanded by the comes rei militaris per regionem transtigritanam (or simply comes transtigritanus). as its commander held the rank of comes, this force was probably formed mainly by comitatenses.
  • A force of 6,000 – 9,000 men (mostly ripenses/limitanei) in eastern Anatolia under the dux Armeniae.
  • A force of 6,000 – 9,000 men (mostly ripenses/limitanei) in Syria under the dux Syriae.
  • A force of 10,000 – 14,000 men (mostly ripenses/limitanei) in eastern Mesopotamia under the dux Mesopotamiae.
  • A force of 5,000 – 11,000 men (mostly ripenses/limitanei) in western Mesopotamia under the dux Osroenes.
  • A force of 7,000 – 14,000 men (mostly ripenses/limitanei) in Arabia under the dux Arabiae.
  • A force of 7,000 – 17,000 men (mostly ripenses/limitanei) in Syria Phoenicia under the dux Phoeniciae.
  • A force of 7,000 – 15,000 men (mostly ripenses/limitanei) in Syria Palaestina under the dux Palaestinae.
Permanent forces in Thrace:
  • A smaller detachment of 15,000 – 20,000 comitatenses in Thrace under the comes rei militaris per Thracias.
  • A force of 11,000 – 15,000 men (mostly ripenses/limitanei) in the province of Moesia Secunda under the dux Moesiae Secundae.
  • A force of 11,000 – 15,000 men (mostly ripenses/limitanei) in the province of Scythia (at the mouths of the Danube) under the dux Scythiae.
According to Harrel, these two duces were probably answerable to the comes rei militaris per Thracias due to the fact that Constantius II spent most of the time between 337 and 350 CE in the East.

Permanent forces in Egypt and Cyrenaica:
  • A smaller detachment of 10,000 – 18,000 comitatenses under the comes rei militaris per Aegyptum.
  • A force of 18,000 – 26,000 men (mostly ripenses/limitanei) in Upper Egypt under the dux Thebaidis.
  • A force of unknown strength (mostly ripenses/limitanei) in Cyrenaica under the dux Libyarum.
According to Harrel, these two duces were probably answerable to the comes rei militaris per Aegyptum due to the fact that Constantius II never resided in Egypt.

And finally, a small body of 1,000 – 2,000 men (mostly ripenses/limitanei) in Isauria (southwestern Asia Minor) under the dux Isauricus, to police the troublesome Isaurian mountaineers.

Eventually, Constantius II detached his magister peditum to command in Thrace, and he was assisted in the East only by his magister equitum. After 353 CE, when Constantius II ruled the empire alone and unopposed, he commanded his praesentalis army assisted again by a magister peditum and a magister equitum. Each of the three permanent regional field armies (in Gaul, Illyricum, and the East) were then put under the command of their own magister militum ("master of the soldiers"; nom.pl: magistri militum).

Despite all the reforms, the Romans did not abandon their old and beloved principle of splitting command between two individuals. Two generals (comites or magistri) were normally put in command of large operations. While in theory the lines of seniority and command responsibility appeared clear, in execution they were modified by the character and temperament of the individuals involved. In 357 CE the magister peditum Barbatio, commanding an army of 25,000 men, and the caesar Julian, commanding 13,000 men, failed to cooperate in a joint operation against the Alamanni. And the magister equitum Sabinianus’ failure to cooperate with the magister equitum Ursicinus was one of the primary causes of the Roman defeat in 359 CE against Šābuhr II. Despite these notable failures due to the violation of the principle of unity of command, the Roman system of appointing two commanders for large armies when the emperor was not present seems to have worked in reality better than could have been expected otherwise.

These constraints dictated the strategy that Constantius II followed during the first round of the war against Ērānšahr between 337 and 350 CE: he remained on the strategic defensive, relying on the resistance of the walled cities and fortresses of Mesopotamia while trying to catch the Sasanian royal army by surprise with his praesentalis army, as he had achieved at Narasara in 336 CE.
 
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Despite these notable failures due to the violation of the principle of unity of command, the Roman system of appointing two commanders for large armies when the emperor was not present seems to have worked in reality better than could have been expected otherwise.
I think the conclusion is that two commanders working to the same goal and with only a middling amount of cooperation will still work quite nicely, especially when the alternative is a sluggish response from everything being directed by only one general. In addition, if both are somewhat competent, their agreed-on strategy would probably be a better one than what either alone could have achieved - and by having two 'equals' you allow a much more sensible discussion with, if well organized, less pain from ego because they are supposed to take eachother's advice (where bowing to the ideas of an underling might hurt a general's prestige).

It all mostly boils down to 'if two people want to cooperate they can do it just fine, a single commander has upsides and downsides in comparison'.
 
6.2 THE ARMY OF ŠĀBUHR II.
6.2 THE ARMY OF ŠĀBUHR II.

In contrast to the abundant information available for the Roman army, contemporary sources for the Sasanian army of the IV century CE are almost nonexistent; they all come from Graeco-Roman authors of whom the best source is by far Ammianus Marcellinus. Unlike the III century CE with the ŠKZ, there are no surviving Middle Persian texts from the IV century CE.

In my previous thread, The Rise of the Sasanians, I offered a detailed description of the geography and demography of the Sasanian empire (The physical environment, Political structure and demographics of the Iranian plateau, The western territories, The eastern territories) , and a review of the military of the Sasanian empire in the III century CE (The early Sasanian army).

I can’t add much to what I wrote there due to the scarcity of sources, but I will try and do my best. Given the deplorable state of the sources, most that has been written about Šābuhr II’s army comes either from Ammianus Marcellinus and other western authors, or from educated guesses by modern historians. A point which is important to grasp about the Sasanian army though is that unlike the army of the earlier Arsacids, this was a combined arms army and not a cavalry only army (some cavalry only Sasanian armies are attested, but only when what was intended was a raid and not a conquest campaign proper). Infantry played an important part since the beginning, it included some sort of engineer corps (made clear by the proficiency in siege warfare already during the early reign of Šābuhr I) and it also had an elephant corps. Contemporary western sources agree that the Sasanian invasion armies mustered large numbers of men for extended campaign seasons, and there’s no trace in said sources about a recurrence of the old problem of the Arsacid army (armies dissolving at the end of summer due to the lack of a proper supply system), so it seems clear that the Sasanian kings managed to put up a sophisticated logistic machine since the early days of the dynasty.

The general organization of the army (spāh in Middle Persian)remained possibly the same as during the previous century, although it’s practically impossible to reconstruct the chain of command of the Sasanian military due to the scarcity of sources and the inflation of titles and offices that was so characteristic of Sasanian society since an early stage (see this post in my previous thread: Iran under Šābuhr I: the society of Ērānšahr, about said “inflation” applied to the civilian society). The sources give us a dizzying array of resounding offices and titles about whose exact meaning and functions modern historians and Iranologists have been bickering for decades, with little consensus to this date.

The commander in chief of the Sasanian spāh was of course the Šāhān Šāh himself and Šābuhr II is described both in the eastern tradition (Tabarī and the Šāh-nāma) and by contemporary western authors as commanding the army in the field. But as for the lower command echelons immediately under the throne, the confusion begins. According to the sources (both written and epigraphical) there were several high commanders, but scholars don’t agree about which was the hierarchy amongst them and who was subordinated to whom.

The highest-ranking official listed in the ŠKZ (and in third place in the Paikuli inscription) was the hazārbed (Middle Persian for “commander of a thousand” in Middle Persian), which now disappears from sight after the Peace of Nisibis. In the text of Peter the Patrician describing the negotiations between Diocletian’s envoy and king Narsē and his two ministers, one of them (Burz-Šābuhr) is called “the praetorian prefect”; modern historians have assumed that the term was used by Peter the Patrician in its ancient sense of “commander of the praetorian guard” (in the VI century CE when Peter the Patrician wrote, it was merely a senior administrative post that he himself occupied for many years), and so have most modern scholars have assumed that this character was the hazārbed. The problem is that although the title is attested under the Arsacids (Parthian hazāruft) and even the Achaemenids (Old Persian hazārapati), it’s completely absent from the extant Middle Persian sources (apart from the epigraphical ones) and from later Islamic sources. If the guess by modern scholars that Peter the Patrician’s “praetorian prefect” was the hazārbed is correct, then this office could’ve been the commander of the royal guard,
and he could perhaps have had some sort of courtly role as master of ceremonies. In the V century CE, the office appears again, when confusingly both the offices of Ērān spāhbed and hazārbed were held by the same person, Mehr-Narsē Sūrēn.

Mehr-Narsē Sūrēn would also hold the office of wuzurg framādār. The wuzurg framādār was a sort of “prime minister” (from which the Abbasids would derive the office of wazīr, or “vizier” in English), and judging by the Armenian evidence this post could have become equivalent to that of hazārbed, if the Armenians were copying the Sasanian administrative practices, as was usually the case. After Mehr-Narsē Sūrēn, the office of hazārbed disappears from the records. It’s unclear again if the office of wuzurg framādār existed yet under Šābuhr II.

It’s unclear if the old Arsacid title of aspbed (“Master of Horse”, meaning “chief of the cavalry”) was still in existence during the IV century CE; it appears in the SKZ but not in the Paikuli inscription. Under the Arsacids, the aspbed (who was usually a member of the Sūrēn Pahlav clan based in Sakastān) was the second in command after the king. As we will see, during Julian invasion of the Sasanian empire in 363 CE, the force of cavalry that shadowed Julian’s advance downstream along the Euphrates was led (according to Ammianus) by “the Surena”, probably a member of the Surēn Pahlav; and so it’s possible that the Surena of Ammianus implies that the office of aspbed still existed and was still held by the Sūrēn Pahlav clan.

Sasanian-Spahbed-02.jpg

British reenactor Nadeem Ahmad from the reenactment group Eran ud Turan in the garb of a Sasanian spāhbed. Notice the broadsword typical of the early and middle Sasanian eras.

According to Ṭabarī, the three most important military Sasanian titles after the king were the argbed (most important), followed by the artēštārān-sālār and the spāhbed. The literal Middle Persian translation of argbed is “commander of a castle (or fortress)” (arg) or “citadel chief”. This title is seen in early Sasanian times as Ardaxšīr I began his public career as the argbed of the fortified city of Dārābgerd in Pārs, and some scholars have suggested that the title could have some sort of dynastic significance and be mostly a ceremonial office, while Theodor Nöldeke defined the argbed as a district commander and Josef Wiesehöfer identified it as a “supreme tax collector”. A similar sounding office is listed in the ŠKZ (dizbed, meaning “commander of a fortress), but it is ranked as quite a lowly office in the inscription. The artēštārān-sālār is unattested in sources other than Tabarī, and it means “Master of the Warriors” in Middle Persian. The artēštārān formed the warrior (or aristocratic) estate in Sasanian society, so this could’ve been also a largely ceremonial office (if it indeed existed). As for the office of spāhbed, it means simply “general” in Middle Persian, and it was the title that any commanding officer received when he was commanding an army (in the absence of the king), and in a loose sense it could’ve been used to refer to any high-ranking military official. This latter title was copied by the Armenians with the same meaning (“general”) as sparapet.

Ahmad Taffazoli hypothesized that perhaps the title of artēštārān-sālār was equivalent to that of spāhbedān-spāhbed (“general of generals” in Middle Persian), and according to Shapur Shahbazi it lost most of its functions over time, becoming more and more a merely ceremonial role.

According to later Islamic sources, the second in command after the king was the Ērān spāhbed (“general of the Iranians” in Middle Persian), an office which seems to have been always held by a member of the wuzurgān; it’s not clear if this title existed in the IV century CE yet, because it does not appear either in the ŠKZ or in the Paikuli inscription. According to several modern Iranian scholars, the Ērān spāhbed would have been the commander-in-chief of the entirety of the spāh’s troops (after the king) and would have differed from the artēštārān sālār by lacking the latter’s ceremonial-religious roles. The Ērān spāhbed would also have been entitled to a large portion of the spoils in victorious scenarios. The specific roles of the Ērān spāhbed would’ve been:
  • To ensure (as commander of all provincial and district forces) the efficient distribution of military forces throughout Ērānšahr to maximize the empire’s defense assets against foreign attacks as well as providing internal security.
  • To fulfill the role of what today we would call a war minister.
  • To act as the military chief of staff when the Šāhān Šāh assumed personal command of the spāh.
  • To partake in meetings with other military and civilian top officials in the war council of the empire when war was imminent.
  • To negotiate peace terms with enemies when authorized by the king.
The array of high officials in the sources doesn’t stop here. Two more high officials were the savārān sardār (Commander of the Horsemen) and the paygān sālār (Commander of the Infantry). Notice how these two offices are the exact equivalent of the late Roman offices of magister equitum and magister peditum respectively which raises the question of who was copying whom, and as if like in the Roman case there could be more than one of each in existence at the same time. Another office attested is that of framādār savārān, who could’ve been the same as the savārān sardar.

In the Paikuli inscription of Narsē, the hierarchy of titles appears listed by order of precedence:
  • Harbed (a new title, scholars know nothing about its meaning and functions).
  • Bidaxš
  • Hazārbed
The bidaxš was the king’s lieutenant, and it’s unclear what were his functions. The confusion that surrounds this office is considerable, because according to the SKZ and the Paikuli inscriptions, there was just one bidaxš, but other sources contradict this. From the Armenian and Georgian chronicles, it appears that after the annexation of Armenia Šābuhr I appointed a bidaxš for Iberia, which was not annexed to the Sasanian empire and was allowed to keep its own king. presumably, this bidaxš acted as Šābuhr I’s plenipotentiary in the Iberian court and made sure that the Iberian king acted according to the wishes of the Šāhān Šāh. As for the bidaxš who resided in the Sasanian court, modern historians speculate if his role was not that of acting as the king’s lieutenant during his absence, but if that was the case, it seems strange that it ranked only second in the court hierarchy (and keep in mind that before the harbed, bidaxš and hazārbed came all the members of the Sasanian royal family).

The Latin transcription of bidaxš is vitaxa (nom.pl. vitaxae) and here we get another intriguing account by Ammianus Marcellinus (Res Gestae, Book XXIII, 6, 13-14):

And as the pens of geographers have drawn it, the whole circuit just described has this form. In the northern direction, to the Caspian Gates it borders on the Cadusii, on many tribes of the Scythians, and on the Arimaspae, wild, one-eyed men. On the west it touches Armenia, Niphates, the Asiatic Albani, the Red Sea, and the Scenitic Arabs, whom men of later times called the Saracens. Under the southern heaven it looks down on Mesopotamia. Opposite the eastern front it extends to the Ganges river, which cuts through India and empties into the Southern Ocean.
Now there are in all Persia these greater provinces, ruled by vitaxae, or commanders of cavalry, by kings, and by satraps (for to enumerate the great number of smaller districts would be difficult and superfluous) namely, Assyria, Susiana, Media, Persis, Parthia, Greater Carmania, Hyrcania, Margiana, the Bactriani, the Sogdiani, the Sacae, Scythia at the foot of Imaus, and beyond the same mountain, Serica, Aria, the Paropamisadae, Drangiana, Arachosia, and Gedrosia.

In this fragment, Ammianus says clearly that there were several vitaxae, that they were “commanders of cavalry” and that they governed “greater provinces”. Ammianus is generally a well-informed source; he was a member of the protectores domestici and spent many years in the East fighting in the war between Constantius II and Šābuhr II; he eventually became an officer and a member of the staff of the magister equitum Ursicinus, and so he had direct contact with Sasanian prisoners and access to whatever intelligence the Roman command had about the Sasanian empire, so it’s quite risky to just ignore this bit of information like most historians do. The problem is that this is not supported by any eastern source. Ilkka Syvänne interprets this passage by Ammianus in quite an unconventional (and to me, unconvincing) way: that (as it happened in Armenia) the Sasanian empire was divided into four large “military regions” according to the main four cardinal points, and that each of them was under the military command of a vitaxa, in whom he sees an equivalent of the Roman magister equitum. In my opinion, the only thing that could render this (quite creative) reading of Ammianus’ text is the comparison with Armenia, as the Armenian military, territorial and administrative system was usually inspired (or directly copied) on the equivalent structures that existed in the Arsacid and Sasanian empires, as Armenia shared with them a very similar social system and a similar strategical situation, with potentially dangerous enemies in all the cardinal directions.

The first mention in the sources of such a system being in existence in Ērānšahr appears in Islamic sources which attribute its creation to Xusrō I during the VI century CE; evidence recently published from the study of Sasanian clay bullae has confirmed this.

In the entry for “bidaxš” in the Encyclopaedia Iranica, written by the German scholar Werner Sundermann, after a long discussion about the probable origins and etymology of the word, he concludes that the bidaxš was probably a sort of “prime minister” or “grand vizier” of the empire (hence its exalted position in the Paikuli inscription) which would be later substituted by the office of wuzurg framādār during the following century. But at the same time (confusingly) the could also be more bidaxšes (as attested by Ammianus’ fragment) acting as military governors of military provinces within the empire; the original etymological meaning of bidaxš as “lieutenant (of the king)” or “second after the king” would cover both functions.

It’s interesting to make a comparison with the Armenian practice: Armenian historians describe the bidaxšes (bdeaxškʿ in Armenian) as lords of the marches (sahmanakał), and the “great bidaxš” as a high position at the court, hereditary in the family of the rulers of Arzanen. These sources mention the existence around 300 CE of four bidaxšes or sahmanakałs and the positions of the “great” and the “other” bidaxšes, but they are unclear about the relationship between these titles.

Sasanian-Spahbed-05.jpg

Again, British reenactor Nadeem Ahmad in the full regalia of a Sasanian spāhbed, this time on horseback.

The “kings” of Ammianus were the šahrdārān (sub-kings who were members of the House of Sāsān) who ruled over parts of the empire subordinated to the Šāhān Šāh. As time went by, the tendency was to do without them, and after Šābuhr II’s reign, no more šahrdārān are attested, and all the empire was put under a uniform administration of administrative, military and judiciary officials appointed by the Šāhān Šāh and his ministers. During the reign of Šābuhr II, only two šahrdārān are attested in the sources:
  • Šābuhr, king of the Sakas (Sakān Šāh) and brother of Šābuhr II.
  • Pērōz 2, king of the Kušan (Kušan Šāh; 303 – 330 CE), succeeded by Bahrām Kušan Šāh (330 – 365 CE).
It’s interesting to note that although Šābuhr II had several other brothers, none of them was appointed king (at least according to the extant sources) during his reign.

The “satraps” of Ammianus were the military and civilian governors of middle and lower grade, which according to Middle Persian, Arabic and New Persian sources were the marzbānān. The office of marzbān was mainly of a military nature, although they also held civilian attributions. According to the Arabic IX century CE author Ya'qubi, a marzbān was the military governor of a border province (a “march”), and thus the commander of the military forces stationed there as garrisons and with the faculty of mobilizing its non-permanent forces (militias, allied tribes, noble levies, etc.) in case of foreign attack. But in the ancient and medieval sources the provinces that appear as ruled by a marzbān include also interior provinces like Spāhān, Pārs and Kirmān which were not under any foreign menace. Thus, it’s possible that a marzbān was just a military governor and that it existed in all provinces, but that in border provinces this office was more important, because in case of a foreign invasion the marzbān was responsible for defending the province until the king sent reinforcements. Apart from being military governors, the marzbānān also acted as civilian governors, but in the ranks under him the civilian and military administrations became divided into separate branches, with the civilian administration (especially fiscal duties) being entrusted to the šahrab (from Old Persian xšaçapāvan; cognate to Sanskrit kṣatrapa; from whence Greek satrápēs, Latin satrapes and English satrap).

One of the characteristics of the Sasanian spāh in its four centuries of existence that set it clearly apart from the Roman army was that most of higher offices in the army were the patrimonial property of the wuzurgān. This was an inevitable consequence of the structure of the Iranian society. It would have been very problematic to appoint a marzbān to a province if its nobility did not like him, so the post of marzbān to any given province was usually inherited within the most powerful clan in that province, like in the case of the province of Abaršahr (modern Khorasan in northeastern Iran) where the title of kanārang (local equivalent to marzbān) became hereditary within the ruling family of Tūs, which became known as the Kanārangīyān. Thus, the kanārang (until the military reforms of Xusrō I in the VI century CE) became responsible for the defense of the Sasanian empire against attacks from Central Asia, a threat that would become extremely acute from 350 CE until the end of the dynasty.

Another regional command was that of pāygōsbān, who was possibly initially responsible for managing state affairs in his respective region (according to Ali Sami), but whose title was translated by Ya’qubi as “the one who drives enemies away from the homelands”. Tabarī described Xusrō II’s commander Šāhēn Vahmanzādagān (late VI – early VII centuries CE) as Fādhūsbān, which could be Arabic for Pāygōsbān “of the West”. The term remains challenging to decipher, as seen in the varying interpretations by modern scholars. Josef Wiesehöfer for example defines the pāygōsbān as the military commander of a province in contrast to Nicholas Adontz who saw it as a civilian authority in contrast to the military functions of a spāhbed. By the late Sasanian era the pāygōsbān office may have changed in its function, possibly resembling at times the marzbān (i.e. the marzbān of Spahān is referred to sometimes as pāygōsbān).

Not many titles have survived from the lower ranks of the hierarchy. The dezhban (Middle Persian for “guardian”) officers supervised the conduct and efficiency of the spāh’s various combat units, a function attributed by Firdawsī to as early as the reign of Ardaxšīr I. The dezhban was also responsible for punishing soldiers who had transgressed the rules as well as having license for slaying fleeing troops who had deserted the army in battle (again, according to Ammianus Marcellinus, such a thing would have been quite in line with Šābuhr II’s character).

The key branch of the spāh was the cavalry, whose members (savārān) were members of the warrior estate (artēštārān). Modern academic consensus states that in the IV and V centuries CE (as it had been during the III century CE and during Arsacid times) the Sasanian cavalry was still mostly a seasonal “feudal” levy: when the Šāhān Šāh summoned his subjects, the warrior estate joined the small royal army; each nobleman raised its own small army which varied according to the status and wealth of each noble, from the huge armies of the wispuhrān (members of the House of Sāsān without a royal title) and the greatest clans of the wuzurgān (which in some cases could muster perhaps 10,000 horsemen or more, equaling in size the permanent cavalry force of the Šāhān Šāh himself) to the very small retinues (perhaps only the nobleman himself with his horse of the lesser nobles (āzādān) and country esquires (dehgān).

According to a passage of a Sasanian law book of the VI century CE (and thus a late source, 200 eyars after the period we’re covering) titles Mādayān ī hazār dādestān, it seems that there was an official registry of professional cavalry hailing from the upper nobility known as Asābar Nipēk (“List of Horsemen” in Middle Persian). Apparently, the Asābar Nipēk also described specified land allotments required for “fully equipping” an elite mounted warrior. Each of the wuzurgān also appears to have had a list of dependents known as “free members of a community” whom he armed at his own expense, so essentially every grandee had his own private army of professional warriors. During the 363 CE failed campaign of Julian, a member of the Sūrēn Pahlav house led the cavalry screen that harassed the Roman advance, and a member of the Mehrān Pahlav house led the first attack against the retreating Roman army. According to Ammianus, “the Surena” again led the peace negotiations with Jovian that resulted in the Second Peace of Nisibis that very same year, as he was “the second after the king” (Surena potestatis secundae post regem).

According to modern historians, even after the reforms of Xusrō I in the VI century CE the permanent cavalry royal army still amounted to less than half of the total cavalry force available to the Sasanian kings. And the situation must’ve been obviously even more markedly “feudal” two centuries before under the reign of Šābuhr II. Kaveh Farrokh assumed that at this point in time the royal army (Gund Šāhān Šāh) mustered 12,000 men (based on the probable size of this very same force under the Arsacids). This army was a permanent professional force available to the Sasanian kings at all times (although it was still formed still exclusively by member of the artēštārān) and may have included several recognizable “elite” units.

Sasanian military organization was based on the wašt-drafš-gund system of their Arsacid predecessors. The wašt, commanded by the wašt sālār was a small detachment of troops. A larger unit of possibly one thousand troops was the drafš (meaning “banner” in Middle Persian and Parthian) with the drafš sālār in command. Each drafš unit displayed its own exclusive banners and heraldry consistent with their clan of origin. The largest known unit was the gund of possibly 12,000 warriors, led by the gund sālār (a rank also adopted by the Armenian military as gundsałar). The term gund originally meant “legion” or “regiment” but Pahlavi texts also refer to this as “army”. Based on Achaemenid practice, the names of the military ranks and units, and the numbers of the Sasanian armies quoted by ancient sources, it’s possible that a decimal system was used in the organization of the spāh.

The permanent royal army (according to the numbers theorized by modern historians) certainly seems to have followed this model, organized into 10 or 12 drafšes. But it’s unclear if the armies of the magnates and princes would be also broken up and recombined into mixed drafšes, or if each nobiliary army kept its own unity and was formed by a close number of drafšes that were never mixed with drafšes from other “feudal” contingents. A group of 10 drafšes formed a gund (a division; notice again how the number fits well with the alleged size of the permanent royal army) and several gunds formed an army. According to later Islamic authors, the seven great families of the wuzurgān (a highly suspicious number for its symbolical recurrence in Iranian culture and tradition) were expected to provide each a gund when the king called for their help, meaning that in theory the Šāhān Šāh could count in case of a general levy with 80,000 well-trained heavy cavalrymen at his disposal (although assembling such a force in one place would have been logistically impossible for many reasons).

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Silver head of a horse, found in Kerman (Iran) and dated to the IV century Ce; probably part of a full equestrian statue of a king, a prince or a great noble.

The Sasanian Pahlavi term for the Šāhān Šāh’s guards was hām harzan (singular: hām harz; found also in Armenian) a term derived from Parthian and which implied the possibility that such elite royal units may be traced to the Parthian era. The Parthian word may variously mean “guard with spear”, “guardian” and “spear-bearer”. An early Sasanian prestige unit, the Jāvidān (“Immortals” in Middle Persian), which was led by a commander designated as Varhragh Nighan Xwadāy, may have been founded by Ardaxšīr I. This unit appears to have remained in service centuries after Ardaxšīr I, as reported in western sources.

Another prestige heavy cavalry unit that may be traced to early Sasanian times was the Jan Separān. The term Jan Separ is quoted in reference to the savārān of Ardaxšīr I in the Kār-Nāmag ī Ardašīr ī Pābagān and the Mēnōg ī xrad (both late Sasanian sources though, dated to the VI century CE). The unit may have been in place as late as the VII century CE, as the Šāh-nāmah names the Janvespar as having been in service during the reign of Xusrō II. The unit may have recruited Greco-Roman (deserters, mercenaries or volunteers) and other non-Iranian recruits. One of the unit’s leaders for example is cited as Jālinus (possibly Iranian for Iulius or Iulianus).

Šābuhr II’s “royal escort” may have been the prestige cavalry unit known as the Puštigbān (“life guardians” in Middle Persian) led by the Puštigbān Sardār and who was considered as one of the honored members of the Šāhān Šāh’s immediate entourage. Clive Foss speculated that the officers of this unit received the title of Puštigbān Sālār. The commander of this unit may have also been the Hazārbed (commander of one thousand) quoted previously and who possibly escorted the king during battles. It is possible that Ammianus Marcellinus’ report of the “royal escort” escorting Šābuhr II during the siege of Amida in 359 CE may have been the Puštigbān. While it is not clear however when exactly this unit had been formed, one possible time could be Šābuhr II’s Arab campaign. In reference to that campaign Ṭabarī wrote that Šābuhr II selected “one thousand cavalrymen from among the stoutest and most heroic of the troops”.

Scholars consider that in the III century CE the savārān of Ardaxšir I and Šābuhr I had been more lightly armored than their Arsacid counterparts, and so they would have been more mobile. The rock reliefs of Ardaxšir I that portray his victory over Ardavān V show him and his retinue wearing mail armor, while his Arsacid foes wear a less technologically advanced and heavier form of armor made of metal strips (similar to the Roman so-called lorica segmentata) and what seem to be leather vests. Both Middle Persian and Islamic sources also stress that Ardaxšir I was an accomplished bowman himself and he even invented a thumb lock/draw that allowed the archer to increase substantially the speed of his shoots. It’s thus thought that during the III century CE the Iranian heavy cavalry became less heavy and more of a medium cavalry, tending towards versatility, so that the savārān could act both as charge lancers or as mounted archers depending of the circumstances.

Based on Ammianus’ account of the Sasanian cavalry war between the Romans and Šābuhr II and other ancient sources like the oration of Libanius of Antioch that I quoted in a previous post, it seems that Šābuhr II decided to increase again the armor of his heavy cavalry, which according to the descriptions of Roman authors became now a form of super-heavy cavalry that caused a deep impact on its Roman foes. The side effect of this increase in protection and weight was a loss of mobility and possibly a partial abandonment of archery techniques by the savārān. In Šābuhr II’s army, archery would have been restricted to its foot bowmen (which were excellent and as we will see managed to save the Sasanian army from a complete defeat at Singara) and mounted archers recruited from subject or vassal peoples, or foreign mercenaries (steppe peoples), although that doesn’t seem so sure according to Ammianus. This is a passage in which he describes the first large Sasanian attack against Julian’s retreating army after the failed storming of Ctesiphon in 363 CE (Res Gestae XXV, 12-13):

Moreover, all the companies were clad in iron, and all parts of their bodies were covered with thick plates, so fitted that the stiff joints conformed with those of their limbs; and the forms of human faces were so skillfully fitted to their heads, that, since their entire bodies were plated with metal, arrows that fell upon them could lodge only where they could see a little through tiny openings fitted to the circle of the eye, or where through the tips of their noses they were able to get a little breath. Of these some, who were armed with pikes, stood so motionless that you would think them held fast by clamps of bronze. Hard by, the archers (for that nation has especially trusted in this art from the very cradle) were bending their flexible bows with such wide-stretched arms that the strings touched their right breasts, while the arrow-points were close to their left hands; and by a highly skillful stroke of the fingers the arrows flew hissing forth and brought with them deadly wounds.

Another western depiction of Sasanian heavy cavalry can be found in the novel Aethiopica, by Heliodorus of Emessa, that has been dated either to the mid-III or mid-IV centuries CE:

For in fact it is this brigade of Persians (i.e. the heavy cavalrymen) which is always the most formidable in action; placed in the front line of battle, it serves as an unbreakable bulwark. Their fighting equipment is furnished in this way: a picked man, chosen for his bodily strength, is capped with a helmet which has been compacted and forged in one piece and skillfully fashioned like a mask into the exact shape of a man’s face; this protects him entirely from the top of the head to the neck, except where eye-holes allow him to see through it. His right hand is armed with a pike of greater length than the spear, while his left is at liberty to hold the reins. He has a sabre slung at his side, and his corselet extends, not merely over his breast, but also over the rest of his body. This corselet is constructed thus: plates of bronze and of iron are forged into a square shape measuring a span each way and are fitted one to another at the edges on each side, so that the plate above overlaps the next one to it, all forming a continuous surface; and they are held together by means of hooks and loops under the flaps. Thus, is produced a kind of scaly tunic which sits close to the body without causing discomfort, and clings all round each limb with its individual casing and allows unhindered movement to each by its contraction and extension. It has sleeves, and descends from neck to knee, with an opening only for the thighs so far as is required for mounting a horse’s back. Such a corselet is proof against any missiles and is a sure defense against all wounds. The greaves reach from above the flat of the foot to the knee and are joined on to the corselet. The horse is protected by a similar equipment: round his feet greaves are fastened, and his head is tightly bound all about with frontlets. From his back to his belly hangs on either side a housing of plaited strips of iron, serving as armor, but at the same time so pliable as not to impede his more rapid paces. The horse being thus equipped and, as it were, encased, the rider bestrides him, not vaulting of himself into the saddle, but lifted up by others because of his weight. When the moment comes to engage in battle, he gives his horse the rein, applies his spurs, and in full career charges the enemy, to all appearance some man made of iron, or a mobile statue wrought with the hammer. His pike projects with its point thrust far ahead: it is supported by a loop attached to the horse’s neck and has its butt-end suspended by a strap alongside the horse’s haunches; so that it does not recede in the clashes of conflict, but lightens the task of the rider’s hand, which only directs the blow. He braces himself and, firmly set so as to increase the gravity of the wound, by his mere impetus transfixes anyone who comes in his way and may often impale two persons at a single stroke.

In Ammianus’ text, the armored savārān are armed partly with spears (the long and sturdy charging kontos) and partly with bows; as we will see in a moment, this was a standard tactic of Iranian cavalry armies that they had adopted from the steppe peoples. And it’s clear that Ammianus (who was a Roman army officer and took part in person in Julian’s expedition) was deeply impressed by the armor worn by Sasanian heavy cavalrymen.

Also, as we will see in later posts, Sasanian cavalry performed much better than Roman cavalry during Julian’s invasion of Āsōristān in 363 CE, according to Ammianus’ detailed account of the campaign. During the Roman march along the Euphrates towards Ctesiphon, they were shadowed and harassed constantly by a corps of Sasanian cavalry led by “the Surena”, which defeated several Roman cavalry units who tried to oppose them and turned foraging into a very dangerous activity for the Romans, who also had to take special precautions against surprise attacks against their forces and encampments during day and night by the Sasanian horsemen. According to Ammianus’ account (and implicit admission), Sasanian cavalry seems to have been altogether much superior to the Roman one, even if Constantius II had spent decades raising new units of cataphracts and clibanarii to oppose them. In his Res Gestae, Ammianus considered the savārān from Parthia and Sakastān as the best fighters of the Sasanian army.

The primary weapon of the savārān was the nēzak, the evolution of the ancient Arsacid kontos 3.65-meter long heavy lance which was held in battle with both hands and had a sword-like blade of iron (23.2 to 37.5 cm) socketed onto the lance shaft. It’s probable that Sasanian heavy cavalrymen of the III and IV centuries CE carried no shields; at least the horsemen carved at Fīrūzābād and other places carry no shields, and Ammianus describes the Sasanian heavy cavalry without shields. Rock reliefs from the III century CE and late VI or early VII centuries CE at the end of the dynasty show the horsemen wearing mail armor, which seems to have been the preferred form of personal armor.

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The example of Sasanian horse armor found during excavations at Dura Euroropos, III century CE.

According to the extant Iranian sources describing the martial equipment of a heavily-armed Sasanian horseman, the horse armor (zēn-abzār in Middle Persian, also named as tiğfāf and bargostvān) was very important. Digs at Dura Europos revealed an example of a late Arsacid or early Sasanian bargostvān, which covered the horse’s torso with an armor of metallic scales with an oval opening for the rider’s seat. In addition, separate sets of armor protected also the neck and head of the horse. As stirrups had not yet been invented in the IV century CE, the stability of the rider was entrusted to a four-horn saddle (two at front and two at back) to brace the cavalryman in place.

The early Sasanian sword still in use during all the IV century CE was approximately 1.00 to 1.11 m in length with the blade’s width ranging between 5.0 and 8.5 cm. These swords were slung in the traditional scabbard slide suspended from the belt resulting in the weapon standing vertical in relation to the ground when the cavalryman was at rest. The savārān suspended their swords on the left side, a martial tradition prevalent among the Arsacids and the steppe peoples. Early to middle Sasanian era swords were built with long and broad blades, wide guards and broad pommels.

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Silver plate with Šābuhr II hunting lions with bow and arrow on horseback.

Sasanian heavy cavalry was proficient in firing missiles at full gallop from either their left or right sides, enabling them to direct their arrows against enemies pursuing them and even when retreating. Archery was certainly critical to the savārān who are reported by Ṭabarī as having had two spare bowstrings as part of their standard equipment after the military reforms of Xusrō I in the VI century CE. Like under the preceding Arsacid dynasty, horse archery was one of the spāh’s vital military assets from the first days of the Sasanian dynasty. Herodian attributed the destruction of one of Severus Alexander’ three invasion armies in 233 CE to the effective horse archery abilities o of Ardaxšīr I’s army. The pivotal role of horse archery in the spāh may partly explain why a large proportion of excavated Sasanian metalworks to date frequently appear to be dedicated to the manufacture of arrows and other metal parts related to archery.

Obviously, the Sasanian army also included infantry, and it’s obvious just by reading Ammianus’ account of the war that infantry had increased its importance in the Sasanian army compared to Arsacid and early Sasanian times. By this time, the Sasanian empire held a large network of fortresses and fortified cities in the west as a defensive system in depth against the Romans, as well as the defensive line that Šābuhr II built against the Arabs in central and southern Mesopotamia. This raises an important question: if the Sasanian army was a “feudal host”, how did the Šāhān Šāh manage to garrison all these fortresses? Obviously, a feudal host is a seasonal army, and that is pretty much useless to act as fortress garrisons. Either the Sasanian kings organized some sort of territorial militias that have been lost in historical record (no such militias are recorded in either western or eastern sources), or the Sasanian empire had by this time a considerable permanent professional army. It’s clear that in the V and VI centuries CE such an army existed, but it’s unclear if this was the case already during Šābuhr II’s reign. Several modern historians like James Howard-Johnston think that it’s most probable that Šābuhr II already had a large professional army at his disposal: in Ammianus’ account of Julian’s expedition, the Roman army encounters a string of fortresses in their trip downstream the Euphrates towards Ctesiphon, and Ammianus describes all of them as being heavily garrisoned by professional forces.

Iraj Jalali divided the Sasanian infantry into three categories:
  • The heavily armed and armored paygān (which means “foot soldiers” in Middle Persian), with a subdivision of nēzak-dārān (spearmen). This was the professional core of the Sasanian infantry. This is supported by Ammianus, who wrote about heavy infantry in the armies of Šābuhr II “armed like mirmillones”, which was a type of Roman gladiator. This means that in Sasanian armies of the time there was infantry provided with heavy shields, metal helmets and swords, as well as some body armor.
  • Lightly armed infantry from peasant levies.
  • Foot archers.
If we’re to believe the confusing accounts of the Pahlavi Books and later Islamic authors, the infantry of the spāh was under the overall command and supervision of the paygān sālār. The primary duty of the infantry during peacetime was to garrison the empire’s cities and fortresses and police the roads. Accounts from the late Sasanian era suggest also that at least during Xusrō II’s reign the paygān sālār also was the warden of the king’s prisons. Notice that only nobles could serve in the cavalry, while service in the infantry was open to commoners; this translated automatically in a lower social status for the infantry, which was reflected in the official hierarchy of the army where the paygān sālār came behind the commander of the cavalry (savārān sardar or framādār savārān, depending on the sources).

The term payg (which means just “foot soldier” in Middle Persian, and which passed into Armenian as payik) is somewhat confusing for researchers, because it’s used indiscriminately to refer to “infantryman” (including the heavy infantry) or to refer just to the peasant levies, both in the ancient sources and by modern historians. Jane Penrose for example warned that Roman sources often described professional Sasanian professional infantry and the poorly armed and trained peasant levies as one single force, when in practice they were separate services.

Modern historians also diverge with respect to the role (battlefield combat or support levies) and equipment of the paygān. Iranologist Touraj Daryaee described the paygān as being lightly armed with spear only and (for battlefield protection) having a shield but no armor. Contrary to Daryaee’s analysis, military historians Iraj Jalali and Ali Sami described the paygān as having been the spāh’s standard professional heavy infantry until the recruitment of the Deylamites in the late Sasanian era. To the, an indication of the paygān’s professional status is provided by their registration on the state’s rolls allowing them to be paid (like the savārān) for their military services to the empire.

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British reenactor Nadeem Ahmad wearing the garb of a Sogdian infantrymen. It's simialr to that of a Sasanian professional infantryman, except for the lack of armor and the use of a war axe; war axes seem to have been rare in Iran proper, but quite extended in East Iran (Soghdia, Bactria, etc.).

The heavy infantry’s tasks on the battlefield were to support the cavalry and elephants’ corps as well as protecting the lightly armored and armed foot archers and light infantry (often peasant levies), who according to classical authors were “pitiable peasants”, poorly armed and with no training, who were only fitted to act as servants for the cavalrymen and to be used as cannon fodder in sieges and to build fortifications. They were raised by forced levies from amongst the peasant populations of the estates of the king and the nobility, and they were treated with brutality and contempt by their leaders. According to Ammianus they were armed with large wickerwork or animal hide shields, carried a spear as their single weapon, and were unarmored. Obviously, they were no match for Roman heavy infantry.

Professional Sasanian heavy infantry was evidently in the spāh’s service from the earliest times of the empire, especially during Šābuhr I’s campaigns against Rome. Archaeological digs at Dura Europos, notably the excavations by a French-American team in the 1930s that discovered the remains of a fallen Sasanian infantryman at Tower 19 allows for a reconstruction of the equipment of early Sasanian soldiers as they would have appeared in the III century CE. The soldier’s equipment was as follows:
  • A short-sleeved shirt of chain mail which reached to the soldier’s hips.
  • A wickerwork shield (of Achaemenid-style construction).
  • A two-piece ridge helmet which was possibly also used by cavalry.
The heavy paygān’ typical close quarters combat gear, as described by Yahya Zoka and Ali Ashgar Hekmat as sword, dagger and mace (Middle Persian warz). Jalil Ziapour also speculated that the heavy paygān could have worn leg armor of the metal lamellar type that would have been worn over leather trousers.

Roman authors systematically described Sasanian infantry as inferior to its Roman counterpart, but at the battle of Ctesiphon in 363 CE, the Sasanian infantry fought for over six hours against Julian’s army before withdrawing back into the city. While these troops may not have been as well trained or armed as their Roman counterparts, no Roman historian of the IV century CE reports Sasanian infantry being routed into a disordered flight by a Roman legionary attack. And during the numerous sieges of the war between Rome and Šābuhr II, the Sasanian infantry had to endure repeatedly the gruesome and bloody task of assaulting the Roman fortifications, which it always did with great tenacity, often fighting for hours against the Roman defenders before being forced to retreat.

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Silver boss of a Sasanian shield (IV century CE), British Museum.

The archers were the elite of the Sasanian infantry. The Sasanian way of war emphasized speed of delivery rather than precision archery, and so Sasanian bowmen were masters in area shooting, and their training was geared towards delivering rapid and overwhelming “saturation” fire against selected areas in the battlefield, a tactic that was probably developed specifically to hit the massed ranks of Roman infantry. In planned battles, Sasanian infantry archers usually shot their arrows protected behind large wickerwork and ox hide shields and acted in coordination with the cavalry. Battles were usually opened by them with an arrow storm against the enemy ranks to “soften” them for the oncoming cavalry charge (cavalry was always the decisive weapon). In sieges, it was their task to keep the defenders under a constant deluge of arrows when the infantry attacked the walls. Ammianus lets it be clear in his account that Sasanian archery was excellent and a real danger for the Romans.

Sasanian archery performed four main functions for the spāh:
  • Providing support for the savārān lance charges during battlefield attacks.
  • To repel enemy infantry and/or cavalry assaults.
  • Providing support for siege operations against enemy fortresses and cities.
  • Providing support in counter-siege operations against enemy besiegers attempting capture Sasanian-held cities and fortresses.
The tirbad (“arrow commander” in Middle Persian) was the leader of a contingent of archers, and confusingly (as usual) the term also signified a regional command term as tirbad units often acted as government security forces in the empire’s villages. Foot archer units were integral to the Sasanian battle doctrine, often bombarding enemy formations from a static position with massed arrow salvoes in set-piece battles. Expert archers could form elite units and were probably accorded a high status in the spāh. In set-piece battles, foot archers would deliver missile barrages against the enemy ranks to weaken them prior to the charges of the savārān. Foot archers were also entrusted with the suppression of enemy archery as well as defending the main army against enemy cavalry and infantry attacks. Depending on the army commander’s tactical choices, foot archers could also advance forward to shower the enemy with massed missile volleys. For shielding against enemy counter-archery, foot archers often placed large palisades to their front.

Siege operations often relied heavily on foot archers and Ammianus wrote about the frightful shower of arrows that the Sasanian besiegers delivered against the Roman defenders during the siege of Amida in 359 CE. Expert archers could also be used for the infiltration of besieged fortresses and cities. This happened also at Amida when seventy royal archers infiltrated one of the city’s towers; they then directed their arrows with accurate fire into the city’s interior in coordination with Šābuhr II’s general assault outside the city walls. The besieged Roman forces however eliminated the small infiltration force once their arrow supplies were exhausted.

There were a number of different methods for shooting arrows with the most common technique apparently having been the traditional Sasanian draw whose invention is attributed to Ardaxšir I himself. This entailed pointing the index finger in the forward position parallel to the arrow with the little finger parallel to the index finger (or pointing at an angle downwards). It is possible that the thumb was placed next to the index finger on the inside of the bow. By late Sasanian times the spāh adopted also the Mongolian draw with the thumb locked around the bowstring that is blocked by the index finger. This was most probably adopted by the Sasanians after their military encounters with the Hephthalites and Turkic peoples of Central Asia.

The foot archer suspended a buckler from his shoulder for the protection of his head and neck. Nevertheless, foot archers were very vulnerable if they were caught at close quarters after exhausting their supplies of arrows, as they lacked the countermeasures necessary to repel enemy infantry attacking their positions. For this reason, combat infantry would often be placed to the rear of the archers at the onset of the battle. Once they became arrow-less, the archers would relocate to the rear of the combat infantry, who having moved to the front, would now be engaging the attacking enemy troops. In any case, as the description of the battle of Carrhae shows and as recommended by later Islamic military treatises which were based on earlier Sasanian war manuals, an Arsacid or Sasanian army would always have carried with it abundant supplies of spare arrows and lances in camels and other pack animals (as well as spare horses for the cavalry) which were kept in a camp well behind the battle lines, so the archers would have reloaded their quivers, rested for a while and once recovered they would’ve been able to rejoin the fight if needed.

The (foot and horse) archer’s equipment consisted of the bow and bow case (Middle Persian: kamām), a wide variety of arrows and quiver and finger guards to reduce pressure on the fingers when drawing the heavy compound bow. The bow used was the Parthian bow, a variety of compound bow of Central Asian origin which in the VI century CE changed to become more similar to the bows used by the Avars and Turks. In practice the Sasanians appear to have built different bow types to meet different battlefield) requirements, and bow construction also varied in accordance with the raw materials available from different geographical regions.

Sasanian arrows were approximately 80-85 cm long, and generally they had tanged arrowheads (according to finds at Dura Europos) as well as socketed arrowheads. Various arrows and arrowheads were designed for different battlefield tasks, and even the Avestan Mehr Yašt reported on a variety of arrowheads (iron-bladed, lead-poisoned, etc.). There were maybe also incendiary arrows for sieges. In general, heavier arrows for penetrating the enemy armor were fired at shorter ranges and lighter arrows were discharged over longer distances to harass and disrupt enemy formations, massive barrages, etc. The total number of arrows carried in the quiver (Middle Persian: tirdan) was thirty, a tradition already reported in the Avestan texts. Reforms implemented in the VI century CE resulted in the adoption of the Central Asian lappet system (discussed previously for sword suspension) also for bows and quivers.

In addition to the traditional compound bow and arrow, the spāh also deployed other missile systems such as the one quoted in Libanius’ reference to dart-type weapons used by infantry. The savārān also used a device known as nawak for launching darts (10-40 cm in length), which as noted by David Nicolle, was probably an “arrow-guide held against the bow to form a temporary crossbow”. Advantages afforded by the nawak-dart were greater range than regular arrows, difficultly to detect by the enemy when the nawak-propelled dart was in flight, more effective penetration and the enemy’s inability to fire back the dart with regular bows. There was also a device described by the Āʾīn nāmah as being capable of firing five arrows simultaneously, however its exact characteristics have been challenging to decipher by military historians. The term for this weapon in later Arabic sources such as Ṭabarī, Jāḥiẓ, and Maqdisī is derived from the Middle Persian word panjagān. Ahmad Tafazzoli’s analysis of Middle Persian military terminology led him to conclude that the panjagān was “a sort of arbalest” for firing five arrows, raising the possibility that this may have been a crossbow type weapon, opposed to Roy Boss’ suggestion that this was just an archery technique for firing five arrows in quick succession.

Another branch of the Sasanian army which is first attested firmly and without a doubt at this time (perhaps it existed already during Šābuhr I`s reign in the previous century, but that’s far from supported by ancient sources) is the corps of war elephants. Ammianus describes them very clearly, in the continuation of the fragment I quoted before in which he described the first large Sasanian attack against Julian’s retreating army after the failed storming of Ctesiphon in 363 CE (Res Gestae XXV, 14-15):

Behind them the gleaming elephants, with their awful figures and savage, gaping mouths could scarcely be endured by the faint-hearted; and their trumpeting, their odor, and their strange aspect alarmed the horses still more. Seated upon these, their drivers carried knives with handles bound to their right hands, remembering the disaster suffered at Nisibis; and if the strength of the driver proved no match for the excited brute, that he might not turn upon his own people (as happened then) and crush masses of them to the ground, he would with a mighty stroke cut through the vertebra which separates the head from the neck. For long ago Hasdrubal, brother of Hannibal, discovered that in that way brutes of this kind could quickly be killed
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It’s interesting to note than in the Sasanian way of war, the elephants were often used as an offensive weapon and as such they were always deployed alongside the savārān; as Ammianus wrote elephants usually scare horses (and so, the Sasanians found them useful against Roman cavalry) so their deployment alongside the savārān means that their horses must’ve been trained to become familiar with the smell, sounds and size of the elephants. In battle against the Roman infantry, elephants played two roles: as moving platforms por accurate, precision archery fire by bowmen posted on turrets on their backs, and as psychological weapons during charges against the ranks of Roman infantry. If the enemy infantry was formed by green troops, or just by troops unused to the sight of these animals, it was possible that just their approach could cause the Roman soldiers to break ranks and flee, thus facilitating the task of an oncoming heavy cavalry charge. But their employment in battle also had a risk as Ammianus noted; if the enemy stood fast and managed to injure and/or scare the elephants, these animals could panic and turn against their own lines, trampling everything under them in the flight.

Plate-Sapur-II-309-379-Los-Angeles-County-Maksymiuk.jpg

Drawing by Katarzyna Maksymiuk from a silver plate in the Los Angeles County Museum, showing king Šābuhr II hunting from atop an elephant.

Julian (Third Oration) also described “hoplites” (presumably meaning heavy infantry forces) being deployed in tandem with Sasanian battle elephants following the defeat of the savārān’s attacks during Šābuhr II’s siege of Nisibis in 350 CE. According to Ammianus’ report, during the battle of Ctesiphon in 363 CE, Sasanian infantry was placed between the savārān (at the front line) and the elephants (situated to the rear); this type of tactical formation failed to repel the advance of Julian’s Roman army, although it was able to keep the fight for six hours before retreating. Also, in Julian’s Third Oration, Šābuhr II’s elephants are described as having “iron towers” manned with archers.

Alongside the royal forces and the forces of the Iranian “national” levy raised among the inhabitants of the Iranian plateau (the large and small retinues and contingents of the wuzurgān and the highlanders and nomadic peoples that lived there and who owed military service to the Šāhān Šāh), there were also the contingents of the sub-kings and vassal and allied peoples and kings. Of these contingents, the more important ones at the beginning of war between Šābuhr II and Rome were the armies of the Sakān Šāh and the Kušan Šāh. In Ammianus’ description of the Sasanian siege of Amida in 359 CE, it’s clear that such contingents preserved their own identity and integrity when they were in campaign under the overall command of the Šāhān Šāh and were commanded by their own commanders who were answerable directly to Šābuhr II, as if they were merely allied armies. According to Ammianus’ account, during the siege of Amida Bahrām Kušan Šāh was absent (it’s probable that by that time Kušanšahr had ceased to exist under the onslaught of the Chionites or Kidarite Huns) and instead the Chionite king Grumbates accompanied the Sasanian king as an ally or vassal, along the Albani (probably the Caucasian Albani) and the Gelani, another Central Asian people about whom nothing is known (Khodadad Rezakhani refuses their association with the region of Gelān in north Iran, as this name is not attested at all before the IX century CE).

As a major crossroads between Iran, China, and India Central Asia was an extremely important region with respect to developments in military technology (i.e. equestrian equipment, lappet suspension systems, etc.) and cavalry warfare tactics (especially horse archery) tactics. This made the region a valuable asset from early Sasanian times for the recruitment of high-quality cavalry auxiliaries, especially light cavalry. The primary role of auxiliary light cavalry was to support the savārān by attacking enemy lines at their flanks and exploitation, harassment and skirmishing raids behind enemy lines. These types of light auxiliary cavalry were somewhat alike the horse archers of the previous Arsacid dynasty who were lightly armored and armed by highly proficient in horse archery, like the ones that were described in the Roman accounts of the battle of Carrhae. Auxiliary light cavalry could also be employed to disrupt and scatter the enemy’s light cavalry. Recruitment of Central Asian contingents however could also prove double-edged, as the same auxiliaries could turn against the Sasanians and invade their empire, as it happened with the Hephtalite auxiliaries employed by king Pērōz in the V century CE.

Armenian armored cavalry exhibited a significant Iranian influence with respect to equipment and fighting methods and like their Sasanian counterparts, Armenian sparapets maintained a consistent martial tradition and training standards. Elite Armenian cavalry from the naxarar (a word itself borrowed from the Parthian term naxvadār) nobility and their retinues that joined the spāh were the most highly valued allied units of the spāh and were often reviewed by the Šāhān Šāh in person upon their arrival to Ctesiphon. The cavalry of the naxarars was also proficient as infantrymen in mountain warfare.

Caucasian Albania also provided high quality cavalry auxiliaries (armored cavalry and light cavalry) for the spāh. The recruitment was made in part possible by the presence of a number of local Caucasian princes loyal to the Sasanians. Albanian cavalry was present in the armies of Ardaxšīr I and fought under Šābuhr II at Amida in 359 CE. The spāh also recruited other warriors from across the Caucasus range such as the Alans recruited for the armies of Šābuhr II, the Suani and Sabirs who fought in Kawād I’s armies (late V – early VI centuries CE) and the Sunitae.

The spāh also sought to recruit nomadic tribes and mountain warriors from within the Iranian plateau into regular military service. When war was imminent, leaders of tribal clans such as those of the Pārizi of the modern-day Kermān province often arrived with their respective cavalry and infantry forces to join the banner of the spāh. Another important region in the southeast of Iran proper was Sakastān. The Sakas of the region had served in the Arsacid armies and were among the earliest contingents to join the campaigns of Ardaxšīr I. Especially esteemed by the spāh for their proficiency as cavalrymen, the Sakas are cited by Ammianus Marcellinus as having been “the fiercest warriors of all” during Šābuhr II’s siege of Amida in 359 CE, where they formed a separate contingent.

Another important group were the Gīls of modern-day Gīlān (or Gelān) who provided light cavalry auxiliaries for the spāh since the III century CE. A prominent nomadic group identified by the Middle Persian term “Kurd” resided in the west to northwest regions of the Sasanian empire. Touraj Daryaee has noted that this term was used in Sasanian term loosely to refer to the nomadic populations that at that time lived in the Zagros and other mountain ranges in the northwest. This term is often (wrongly) correlated to the ethnonym for the broad category of modern-day Kurds in the Middle east who speak a western Iranian language. These “Kurds” were recruited into the spāh, to serve as slingers and javelin throwers in light infantry tasks. Roman accounts of the battle of Singara in 343/344 CE attest to the use of slingers by the Sasanian army.

During Julian’s Mesopotamian campaign in 363 CE, the Sasanian cavalry screen that harassed Julian’s advance included also a force of allied Arabs under the command of their leader Malechus Podosaci (whom Ammianus describes as phylarcus Saracenorum Assanitarum, which according to some modern scholars could be perhaps a Latinization of “Ghassānid”, an Arab tribe that would later switch to the Roman side). The importance of the Arabs to the Sasanians is perhaps indicated in their depiction as allied troops in Šābuhr I’s relief IV at Bišāpūr. Arab auxiliary forces performed two important strategic functions for the Sasanians. First, they provided critical protection for the empire’s trade routes, irrigated lands and urban centers situated in the empire’s southwest which were vulnerable to Arab raiders emanating from the Arabian Peninsula and which were economically vital to the Sasanian monarchy. The second role of the Arab auxiliaries was to prevent fellow Arabs from the Arabian interior from raiding the empire’s Persian Gulf coastal trading ports (as it happened during Šābuhr II’s minority). Arab auxiliary forces also provided two militarily important assets to Sasanian armies who fought in Mesopotamia and Syria. First, there was their expert knowledge of the deserts. This made them valuable assets as guides and trackers for Sasanian armies during campaigns along or across the empire’s southwestern regions. The second military asset of Arab auxiliaries was their proficiency as light cavalry, notably in launching rapid raids and pull back just as rapidly before the enemy was able to organize effective counterstrikes. Both empires (Rome and Ērānšahr) soon realized that the best defense against each other’s Arab raiders was to provide themselves with their own Arab auxiliaries, and through them both empires fought a constant “proxy war” that often extended deep into the Arabian Peninsula.

Discipline in the Sasanian of Šābuhr II army seems to have been strictly enforced (see the description above about the dezhbanān). Acts of blatant indiscipline are not accounted for by western authors, and Ammianus reports that the penalty for traitors was the execution not only of the traitor, but also his whole family, which goes along well with what we know about the personality of this Sasanian king. Of course, Sasanian deserters to the Roman side are unaccounted for in Ammianus’ account (while there were a couple of high-ranking Roman deserters to the Sasanian side).

A surprising feature of Sasanian (and indeed of Iranian armies in Antiquity) of which modern readers are mostly unaware of is that female Sasanian fighters were reported by Graeco-Roman sources. Zonaras noted that, after a battle in 260 CE, women dressed and armed like men were found among the dead of Šābuhr I’s army. Libanius also wrote that, at the battle for Singara in 343 CE, women had been conscripted as sutlers into the Sasanian army. These Roman reports are reinforced by Iranian epic poetry that mentions women fighting as savārān knights. Gordāfarīd, daughter of Gaždaham, is one of the heroines of the Šāh-nāma written in the X century CE but referring to pre-Islamic events. In Ferdowsī’s epic, Gordāfarīd fights a duel in defense of the fortress of Dež-e Sapid against the warlord Sohrāb who was leading an invading Turanian army. She fights mounted in full cataphract armor with bow, kontos, sword, and a rumi helmet:

But one of those within the fortress was a woman, daughter of the warrior Gaždaham, named Gordāfarīd. When she learned that their leader had allowed himself to be taken, she found his behavior so shameful that her rosy cheeks became as black as pitch with rage. With not a moment's delay she dressed herself in a knight's armor, gathered her hair beneath a Rumi helmet, and rode out from the fortress, a lion eager for battle. She roared at the enemy ranks, "Where are your heroes, your warriors, your tried and tested chieftains?”

Gošasb Bānu, daughter of the hero Rostam, was another heroine who fought as a savārān. She is the heroine of an epic poem entitled Bānu Gošasb-nāma, written by an anonymous poet between the XI and XII centuries CE. Sir Richard F. Burton’s translation of The Book of the Thousand Nights and a Night tells the story of princess Al-Datma who was “accomplished…in horsemanship and martial exercises and all that behooved a cavalier”. Epic poems are difficult to pin down to a specific period; Iranian female savārān disappear from western sources after the IV century CE but remain in the Iranian tradition. Historic and legendary female savārān were all daughters of members of the noble class.

Sohrab-fights-Gordafarid.jpg

The duel between Gordāfarīd and Sohrāb, from a medieval copy of the Šāh-nāma.

Some authors have speculated that this could be a legacy of the nomadic East Iranian origin of the Arsacids and Sakas. The Arsacid dynasty and nobility came from the Parni tribe, which was East Iranian “Scythian” in origin, same as with the Sakas. The Scythian tombs (kurgans) excavated in southern Russia and Ukraine dated to the VIII to III century BCE have revealed that approximately 20% of the “warrior graves” contained females dressed in battle attire (which in turn could have been the origin of the Greek legend of the Amazons).
 
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I am curious to what exactly the relationship between the Sasanian Empire and the Sogdian states were. Were they an official part of the Empire or simply allied/subservient city-states or something else?
 
I am curious to what exactly the relationship between the Sasanian Empire and the Sogdian states were. Were they an official part of the Empire or simply allied/subservient city-states or something else?

Sogdia was only under Sasanian control (as a whole) between the reigns of Šābuhr I and Šābuhr II, and perhaps partially between the reigns of Xusrō I and Xusrō II. Unlike in Bactria, the Sasanians never minted coin there and they never installed a cadet branch of the House of Sāsān as kings, so their control of the area must’ve translated into the acknowledgment of the Sasanian Šāhān Šāh as supreme ruler by the Sogdian principalities (Samarkand, Bukhara, Ustrushana, Pianjikant, Afrasyab, etc.).
 
Sogdia was only under Sasanian control (as a whole) between the reigns of Šābuhr I and Šābuhr II, and perhaps partially between the reigns of Xusrō I and Xusrō II. Unlike in Bactria, the Sasanians never minted coin there and they never installed a cadet branch of the House of Sāsān as kings, so their control of the area must’ve translated into the acknowledgment of the Sasanian Šāhān Šāh as supreme ruler by the Sogdian principalities (Samarkand, Bukhara, Ustrushana, Pianjikant, Afrasyab, etc.).

Ah, I see. That particular relationship has always confused me.
 
6.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE WAR THEATER AND LOGISTICS.
6.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE WAR THEATER AND LOGISTICS.

The war that began in 336 CE and wouldn’t end (with a hiatus between 350 and 359 CE) was fought almost exclusively in Mesopotamia, especially in upper Mesopotamia. Sometimes it’s referred to as the Nisibis War.

Climate in Mesopotamia is quite different from the Mediterranean one prevalent in the province of Syria and the major centres of Graeco-Roman civilization. The climate of Mesopotamia, as described by primary sources in the IV century CE, was similar to its current climate, with differences between the city of Nisibis in the north and the city of Ctesiphon in the south.

Northern Mesopotamia is a plain bounded on the north by the Tur Abdin and Tarsus mountain ranges that form the southern escarpment of the Armenian highlands, on the south by the Jebel Sinjar ridge, on the east by the Tigris river, and on the west by the Euphrates river. This region was divided in 337 CE between the Roman provinces of Mesopotamia (east) and Osrhoene (west), and it receives sufficient rainfall for dry farming and wild grass that survives the summer dry season.

In contrast, the central and southern portions of Mesopotamia to the south require irrigation for agriculture to exist, and those areas that are not irrigated remain desert (now and back in the IV century CE). Temperatures are slightly colder in the north (especially in the Taurus and Tur Abdin mountains), winters are usually mild, and summers can be extremely hot:
  • Record low winter temperature in Baghdad (near ancient Ctesiphon): -11 ºC (January)
  • Average winter temperature in Baghdad (November / December / January / February): 16 ºC / 11 ºC / 9 ºC / 12 ºC
  • Record high summer temperature in Baghdad: 51 ºC (July)
  • Average summer temperature in Baghdad (June / July / August / September): 32 ºC / 34 ºC / 34 ºC / 30 ºC
  • Record low temperature in Nusaybin (next to ancient Nisibis): -11 ºC (January)
  • Average winter temperature in Nusaybin (November / December / January / February): 13 ºC / 8 ºC / 6 ºC / 7 ºC
  • Record high summer temperature in Nusaybin: 48 ºC (July)
  • Average summer temperature in Nusaybin (June / July / August / September): 28 ºC / 32 ºC / 31 ºC / 27 ºC
The harvest in upper, middle, and lower Mesopotamia (then and now) takes place in June; olives ripen in the fall and do well after a cold winter. The harvest in the eastern Mediterranean region was earlier than in Mesopotamia. Legumes, such as lentils, are harvested in the Levant in April and May, barley in April, wheat in May, and chickpeas as late as June. The campaign season for northern Mesopotamia lasted from March to October. During the winter season (November to March) the region can be subjected to heavy rains and very cold night temperatures as far south as the modern city of Mosul, so campaigns usually started in the spring and ended with the onset of winter, normally in November.

Amida-walls-05.jpg

The walls of Diyarbakir (ancient Amida) in winter.

According to John Harrel, the Roman army of the IV century CE (the whole army, including all parts of the empire) required between 15,000 and 30,000 new recruits yearly, depending on whether its total strength was nearer to 300,000 or 600,000 men. The two main sources of recruits from inside the empire came from volunteers and conscripts (conscription of Roman citizens had been introduced by Diocletian, and legally it was treated as a sort of tax in kind). Typically, a Roman soldier was conscripted in his late teens or early twenties, was by law a free man, usually from a rural area, and was often the son of a veteran (according to the legislation of Diocletian and Constantine, the sons of veterans were forced to follow in their father’s professional path). Vegetius reported that, traditionally, peasants made better recruits than city dwellers because they were accustomed to hard labor. Despite the fact that Christianity was the religion of all the Roman augusti after Constantine (except for Julian) for this period, the majority of Roman soldiers were not Christian.

Bringing food supplies into Roman Syria and Mesopotamia for military stockpiling or overcoming effects of famine required detailed planning by the imperial government. The eastern Mediterranean was dangerous for shipping between September 22 and May 27 and closed to shipping between November 11 and March 10. Individual shipper’s grain fleets were often tied up for up to twenty-four months on a single run from Alexandria to Constantinople. Thus, it usually took months for the imperial government to shift the flow of grain from its routine sea lanes to build up supplies for a military expedition or alleviate the effects of a localized famine. Only the imperial government could afford to move grain long distances over roads. As a result, grain was always more expensive in cities than in villages due to the distance it had to travel. In 362 CE, the emperor Julian prided himself on bringing to Antioch the help needed to overcome the effects of the famine; to achieve this he’d transported the grain using the wagons of the cursus publicus from the city of Hierapolis, which was located a mere 160 km inland from Antioch. This was considered by Julian as an achievement important enough for him to boast about it in his Orations.

According to Vegetius, “time and opportunity may help reverse misfortune”, but:

(…) where forage and provisions have not been carefully provided, the evil is without remedy. An exact calculation must, therefore, be made before the commencement of war of the number of troops and the provisions needed to support all aspects of the operations (…)

This is an echo of the traditional meticulous Roman approach to logistics. Food, wood, fodder, and water were the four key requirements of any campaign. Availability of these commodities dictated the time of year campaigns commenced and concluded, as well as the routes. The basic requirements for man and beast would have been similar for both the Roman and Sasanian armies.

Donald W. Engels’ study of the logistics of the Macedonian army provides a baseline of an ancient army’s support requirements. A soldier required a minimum of 1,36 kg of grain and 2 liters of water per day. Based upon weather and activity, the water requirement could increase to 7,5 or more liters per day. Horses and mules needed 4,5 kg of fodder and 4,5 kg of grain per day, plus 30,3 liters of water. Along with the combatants and their warhorses, non-combatants and supply animals needed the same rations. Pack and draught animals were required to carry an army’s non-consumable supplies (tents, siege machinery, cooking equipment, extra weapons, etc.). A force of 5,000 infantry required 1,200 pack animals (mules can carry 100 kg and camels 175 kg for extended periods). It was theoretically possible for an army to carry grain for about twenty days’ supply for the men on the soldiers’ backs. When the 27 kg of food (twenty days’ rations) was added to the weight of a soldier’s weapons and equipment, the total load carried by an infantryman could exceed 45 kg. Without water transportation, the army’s supply train could only carry about ten days’ supply of grain for man and beast. Alexander’s Macedonians did not use wagons because they reduced an army’s march rate and manoeuvrability. Romans used wagons drawn by oxen, which increased their carrying capacity but reduced the army’s speed of advance.

Rome relied heavily on wagons. In the Roman period wagons are depicted in reliefs as two- and four-wheel vehicles pulled by a team of two oxen or mules. The carrying capacity is difficult to determine, but the Theodosian Code sets the limit at 1,075 Roman pounds (352 kg) while Diocletian’s Edict on Maximum Prices attests to a wagon load as 1,200 Roman pounds (393 kg). A tariff from Palmyra, dated to the II century CE, equates a wagon load with four camel loads or approximately 700 kg. Fourteen hundred mules carried 140 tons of supplies and equipment while 350 oxen wagons (700 draught animals) carried the same load (400 kg per wagon). Oxen can only maintain a rate of march of 38.6 km per day at a speed between 4 to 4.8 kph over an extended period of time. Horse and mule teams could maintain over 38.6 km per day at a faster rate of march.

Augsburg-wagon.jpg

Relief of a Roman load wagon pulled by two oxen, from a grave found near Augsburg in southern Germany.

To move large armies like Julian’s praesentalis army of 65,000 men with a minimum daily consumption of 251 tons of grain and 65 tons of fodder for the soldiers and cavalry horses alone, all sorts of draught animals were required, plus 1,100 boats and barges. These figures do not consider the additional grain needed to feed the thousands of pack and draught animals and their handlers. The forage requirement for the thousands of pack animals and cavalry mounts for pre-industrial armies was difficult to procure, which was why they normally waited until late spring or early summer to begin a campaign when foraging parties could gather the fodder from the seasonal grass.

The Syriac chronicle of Joshua the Stylite recorded the events of the Roman-Sasanian war of 502 to 507 CE. During the 501 to 502 CE campaign, two Roman armies, totalling 52,000 men, were operating in the vicinity of Edessa. The army bakers were unable to make sufficient biscuits for the combined force so the commissary-general, Appion, ordered the people of Edessa to make the biscuits (bucellatum, nom.pl. bucellati) for the army at their own cost with 630,000 modii of grain. One modius, approximately seven and a half dry liters, weighs about 9 kg and fed a contubernium (tent group) of eight soldiers for one day. This amount of grain could feed 52,000 men for approximately 90 days and weighed nearly 5,040 tons. The chronicler only took note of the grain made into biscuits and listed the event as a “first baking”. A document from 360 CE lists individual daily rations in a garrison at the equivalent of 1.36 kg of bread, 0.90 kg of meat, 0,94 liters of wine, and 0.06 liters of oil.

If one adds the grain and fodder for the cavalry horses and fodder for the draught animals to the tonnage required to feed the army for 90 days, totals are doubled to a minimum of 10,080 tons. When these logistical planning factors are applied it becomes apparent that a besieging army of 50,000 men must either capture a fortified city within 90 days or pack up and return home. If the army’s operation exceeded the ninety-day limit, it starved or needed to receive more supplies. As reported by Ammianus, during the 359 CE campaign which led to the fall of Amida, the Sasanian army left 30,000 dead in Roman territory. The siege lasted 73 days, and the manoeuvres before the siege lasted between 15 and 30 days. Šābur II’s total operation lasted between 90 and 100 days. Most of the 30,000 deaths would have been caused by starvation and related diseases, not Roman weapons.

For a comparison, scholars consider that a common Roman merchant ship could carry between 10,000 and 20,000 modii of grain each one, while the ships involved in the imperial grain annona between Carthage and Ostia (or between Alexandria and Constantinople) could carry a standard cargo of 50,000 modii, and perhaps up to 200,000 modii for the largest ships of the fleet, which really brings forth how much more effective sea transportation was in the pre-industrial world. Under Justinian I, the total amount of the Egyptian grain dole sent to Constantinople has been estimated by scholars to be between 7.5 and 11.25 millon artabas of grain. An Egyptian artaba is usually equated to 4.5 modii italici (some authors put it at 3.33 modii), so that means that the annual tax of Egyptian grain bound for Constantinople alone amounted to between 33.75 and 50.62 million modii.

Roiman-Merchant-Ship.gif

Wall painting of a Roman grain ship, II-III centuries CE, found at Ostia.

Expendable weapons required for a campaign, such as javelins and arrows, were included in an army baggage train. In the X century CE, a Byzantine army of 34,000 men carried with it 800,000 arrows and 10,000 javelins. A Byzantine or late Roman archer carried 30 to 40 arrows in his quiver. If this army only contained 9,000 bowmen, the supply would have provided 88 arrows per man. The weight of the expendable weapons in the baggage train would have been insignificant compared to the weight of the food and fodder required for the campaign.

Diocletian had established arsenals (fabricae) for the manufacture of weapons and armour. According to the Notitia Dignitatum, there were arsenals for weapons, armour, and shields in the eastern part of the empire at Damascus, Antioch, Nicomedia, Sardis, Adrianople, Marcianopolis, Horreum Margi (modern Ćuprija, in Serbia), Ratiaria (near the modern village of Archar in northern Bulgaria), Thessalonica, and Naissus. Cavalry armor was produced at Antioch, Caesarea in Cappadocia, and Nicomedia.

The difficulty of supplying an army limited its size. Despite the Roman army’s total size during the IV century CE (varying between 345,000 and 600,000 depending on the sources), armies in the field rarely exceeded 40,000 men, and the majority of armies in the late Roman period never exceeded 25,000. Vegetius recommends the optimal size of an army at 20,000 infantrymen and 4,000 cavalrymen for a magister militum (a ratio of four infantry to one cavalryman). Based upon this ratio, Julian’s praesentalis army of 65,000 would have contained 52,000 infantrymen and 13,000 cavalrymen. Larger armies, like Julian’s 95,000-man invasion force in 363 CE, were divided into two or more operating armies that coordinated manoeuvres but operated in different regions. Any other approach would have over-taxed the land and the army would starve.

Ammianus and other historians, including Julius Caesar, fail to record the time-distance factors of marching armies, which have a bearing on their narratives. Understanding these factors often clarifies passages made cloudy over time. Marching in a close column six soldiers wide 5,000 men occupied 1,220 m of road space. 52,000 infantrymen in a close march column thus occupied at least 12,200 m of road space. Adding the baggage train extended the column to over 20 km. When the advance guard reached the site of a new camp, at 4.8 kph, it would have taken over four hours for the rear guard to reach the camp. Julian solved this problem by marching his army in parallel columns, but wanting to appear stronger than he was, he had the column extended to 16 km by having greater intervals between units. Recruits during training were expected to conduct route marches at 6.4 kph carrying a 30 kg load. During campaigns this rate of advance would have been reduced considerably as the soldiers’ load was increased with twenty days’ rations and the reduced speed of the siege and supply trains.

As the main source of surplus grain in Constantius II’s part of the empire was Egypt, and a sizeable amount of that surplus was extracted as a tax by the Roman state since the time of Augustus, it’s most probable that the army of the east was feed with Egyptian grain, at least when it was fighting in Syria and Mesopotamia. The main logistical base of the army would’ve been Antioch; the grain would’ve been shipped to its port of Seleucia in Pieria and from there pulled upstream the Orontes river to Antioch, where it would’ve been loaded in wagons to be transported along the Roman road system, crossing the Euphrates at Zeugma.

Obviously, the same logistical considerations apply to the Sasanian army, with some variations specific to an army that was structurally quite different to the Roman one. First of all, the Sasanian king would’ve needed to notice his vassal kings, subject tribes and the Iranian nobility that he would be launching a campaign against Rome the next year, so they could prepare, assemble their forces in advance and start marching overland with enough time to make it to the designed gathering point of assembly for the invading army. That in itself was no small task. The loss of the regiones transtigritanae to Rome after 299 CE meant that all the northern passes across the Zagros were unusable, and that the army needed to assemble at Ctesiphon or farther to the south. The main pass across the Zagros that led from Ecbatana (modern Hamadān) to Ctesiphon is the Diyala Pass, which according to ancient authors was closed usually until June due to the snow. Obviously, it was possible to cross the mountains more to the south, from Pārs, but that would’ve lengthened considerably the distance to be covered by the contingents from northern and northeastern Iran.

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Aerial view of the central Zagros near Hamadān in winter.

The Sasanians did not have an internal sea at the center of their empire, so all displacements had to be made overland, and the distances involved were considerable. There are 2,078 km in a straight line between Balkh (the capital of Bactria, and probably the point of assembly for the armies of the Kušān Šāh, and Ctesiphon. And 2,510 km between Puruşapura (modern Peshawar) and Ctesiphon, having to cross the Hindu Kush and the Zagros. Furthermore, crossing the Iranian plateau could not be done in a straightforward line, as most of the interior is either dry steppe or dreary salt deserts, so the trip must be done either along the northern or southern edges of the plateau, where the environment is more hospitable. Also, due to the unstable political situation in the central part of the Eurasian Steppe, the Sasanians simply could not leave their eastern possessions undefended.

Nothing is known about the logistical system of the Sasanian army, except that it existed. It´s unclear if, in case of a general levy, the Šāhān Šāh supplied the contingents of his vassals and nobles during their march to Mesopotamia, or if the logistical apparatus of the spāh only supplied them once they had joined the rest of the royal army in Mesopotamia; personally, I believe this second option to be the one nearer to reality. The Sasanians had the advantage that their main geographical areas of agricultural surplus (central and lower Mesopotamia and Khuzestan) were nearer to the war theater than in the Roman case. But their advantages stopped here. If contemporary accounts are true, the invading armies of Šābuhr II were huge, and so the most probable way of transportation for the huge amounts of supplies needed would have been the Tigris (unlike during Šābuhr I´s reign, in this war the Sasanians never used the Euphrates route), which conveniently linked the surplus areas downriver with the main theater of war ... but upstream, which meant that the Sasanians would have needed to tug the supply boats all the way from Ctesiphon, either with draft animals or with conscript levies.

And an added difficulty was that in addition to probably fielding more men than their Roman foes, the Sasanians also fielded many more horses, and also elephants, which implied the need to transport significantly larger amounts of fodder than in the Roman case. Another additional problem for the invading Sasanian armies would’ve been water; in the regiones transtigritanae this was not as serious a problem as in the north Mesopotamian plain, which is a dry semi-arid plain with few water wells or springs, most of which were located within the Roman fortified cities and fortresses. In the case of Singara, the problem would’ve been even worse, as this Roman fortress was located on the southern slopes of the Jebel Sinjar, where the north Mesopotamian plain becomes a desert. In order to operate in these environments during summer, any campaigning army would’ve needed to secure its water supply or risk disaster, and the Romans had the advantage that they controlled all the main wells and springs.

Contemporary sources don’t provide exact numbers for the size of the invading armies of Šābuhr II. Later sources for other wars record Sasanian field armies ranging from 20,000 to 60,000 men. In 578 CE, the Sasanians had 70,000 registered warriors. Most likely, this number represents just the total number of the noble-class savārān and neither the infantry recruited from the lower strata of Sasanian society nor the mercenaries and allies.

Ammianus informs us that in 359 CE Šābuhr II’s army was reinforced by the armies of the kings of the Albani and the nomadic Chionitae along with contingents of Gelani and Sacae but does not provide the estimated total strength of this invasion force. In 530 CE, Procopius of Caesarea recorded that the Sasanians invaded Roman Mesopotamia with 40,000 cavalry and infantry, reinforced with 10,000 men from the Sasanian Nisibis garrison. Based on V and VI century CE examples, it may be assumed that Šābuhr II’s invasion armies, with the addition of feudal, allied, and regional contingents, numbered between 40,000 and 50,000 men, excluding garrison and frontier forces. Like it happened in the Roman case, logistics would have limited the size of any Sasanian field army.
 
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If the Sasanian Shahanshah had to inform his people of the possibility of war with the Romans how could he ever do a suprise attack against them? Wouldn't word get out that the Sasanians are mobilizing?
 
If the Sasanian Shahanshah had to inform his people of the possibility of war with the Romans how could he ever do a suprise attack against them? Wouldn't word get out that the Sasanians are mobilizing?

I doubt that a strategic surprise was possible in case of a major invasion by either side; the mobilization and gathering of forces was such a major entreprise that hiding it would've been impossible, for the Sasanians as well as for the Romans, who in case of a major offensive needed to move forces from Europe to the Near East.
 
6.4 TACTICS.
6.4 TACTICS.

For legionary infantry, the traditional Roman way of war assumed that only training, discipline, and cooperation between units and arms could ensure victory. Roman training methods turned a recruit (tiro) into a soldier with endurance and expertise in the use of his weapons. Before being enrolled, a conscript or volunteer would be tested to ensure that he could sustain the rigors of military training. The campidoctor (training officer) and his junior drill instructors were responsible for training the recruits. At least until the reign of Gratian (375 CE to 383 CE), all infantrymen were equipped with helmets, mail, or scale body armour no matter what their combat specialty was within their unit. When a recruit completed his training, he was promoted to pedes (infantrymen) or eques (cavalry trooper). If a perspective recruit enlisted with a horse, he was enrolled as an eques automatically. It is unlikely that enlisting with a horse allowed a recruit to skip the recruit training, but it guaranteed him a billet in the cavalry and thus higher pay and prospective access into the elite schola units that served as recruiting pools for military officers.

It took time to turn a recruit into a soldier and sending untrained troops into battle was considered by the Romans to be a waste of lives. The Achilles’ heel of the Roman army was the time it took to train recruits to replace battle casualties. Vegetius stated that training a recruit took approximately four months; at the end of that period, the recruits took the oath (sacramentum) and were tattooed or branded (to prevent desertion). The new soldier then joined a veteran contubernium of eight to ten men (depending of the sources). These veterans incorporated the new pedes into their mess and ensured that they continued to develop as members of their unit. While this is not made clear in ancient sources, in an infantry unit the contubernium probably formed a file in its unit´s battle formation with the caput contubernii or or decani (squad leader) being the file leader and a veteran being the file closer when the unit was fighting in close order (in a phalanx-like array). Training continued within the unit under the supervision of the campidoctor. Heavy casualties normally equated to a proportionally high loss of veteran leadership from decani to tribuni. Ancient historians ignored the loss of veteran junior leaders and recorded heavy losses as the number of tribuni (legionary commanders in the late Roman army) lost in combat. While it required two years to train a newly formed unit for battle, it took twenty years to train the average centurion or legionary tribunus. A shortage of veteran leaders equated to lower training standards and a lack of discipline. During the war against Šābuhr II, Roman indiscipline during the pursuit of defeated Sasanian forces would twice turn a Roman tactical victory into a bloody operational draw or a strategic defeat.

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IV century CE Roman soldiers, from the "Great Hunt" mosaic at the Roman villa in Piazza Armerina, Sicily.

Information about the training process for non-legionary IV century CE units has not survived the ravages of time. Newly recruited auxilia regiments were formed from Germanic war bands and were led by their own tribal chiefs. When enrolled into Roman service, they were given Roman ranks and pay. Eventually, as they became institutionalized, they would have needed to establish a Roman training system to replace losses from war, service, and retirements. Vegetius and Ammianus state that auxilia units thought that the fatigue duty of the legions was beneath their dignity as warriors and refused to do menial tasks such as digging trenches or building encampments and they also refused to carry the same amount of personal equipment when on the march as regular legionaries did.

In the late Roman army, only officers in the staff corps, legionary commanders, and higher would be commissioned on the emperor’s authority. Roman NCOs performed the function of modern junior officers. Ducenarii and centuriones were the equivalent of modern company commanders. They were given small independent commands, such as escorting foreign dignitaries to the court of the emperor. In the IV century CE, officers could be appointed from the ranks, or through patronage, into the protectores domestici serving as the emperor´s personal guard under his direct command. In this corps, the potential unit commanders were trained and tested to determine whether they were fit to command large units. Unit commanders were called tribuni, praefecti, or praepositi. The title tribunus was also used for army staff officers. Such men, like Ammianus, were attached to generals like Ursicinus to serve in the field. In 357 CE, the future augustus Valentinian I was promoted from the staff regiment to command a comitatensis cavalry unit at age thirty-six. The surviving evidence seems to show that successful, experienced soldiers could achieve appointment to “regimental level” command, regardless of the status of their unit. Also, heavy casualties could reduce the available experienced manpower pool required to provide competent unit commanders and reduce the training and discipline level of newly formed and rebuilt units.

This system of training future military tribuni, duces, and comites by apprenticing them as junior officers of the protectores domestici to senior military leaders had advantages not readily apparent. The realities of protecting the empire from invaders and usurpers still required independent combat formations the size of the antique legions. These forces, between 2,000 and 5,000 men, were detached from the main armies for specific missions. Prior to the late III and IV centuries CE, a senatorial legate would command a force of this size. In the IV century CE, with a portion of legionary and “regiment-level” commanders promoted to their commands from the protectores domestici, there were five to ten senior officers who owed their career to the current augustus and whose presence served to rein in the ambitions of any ambicious commander with an eye on the purple robes of the emperor. In 351 CE, after Magnentius’ usurpation in Gaul, part of his army (led by Silvanus) deserted back to the sole remaining legitimate emperor (Constantius II) at the first opportunity. Based upon the length of Constantius II’ and Constans’ reign, the majority of these legionary and regiment commanders would have owed their position to the legitimate ruling emperors, not to the usurper. It is therefore not surprising that after this Magnentius executed those commanders whom he suspected of remaining loyal to the House of Constantine.

Traditional legionary infantry was the backbone of the Roman eastern until after 363 CE, while auxilia units were an important element only in western armies. Both eastern comitatenses and limitanei legions had evolved into combined arms units during the late II and III centuries CE and included archers and skirmishers along with the traditional heavy infantry armed with body armour, large shield, sword, and various types of spears, javelins, and darts. The early III century CE funeral monuments of Legio II Parthica near Apamea in Syria depict a skirmisher (lanciarius) with bundles of javelins, an archer (sagittarius legionis), an artilleryman (scorpio), and a close-formation trainee (discens phalangarius). Based upon the career of Aurelius Gaius, vexillationes during the late III century CE contained legionary cavalry, close order infantry, and lanciarii. In a papyrus pay record from ca. 300 CE, a full twenty per cent, or the equivalent ten centuries (878 to 899 men out of 5,000) of Legio II Traiana stationed in Egypt consisted of lanciarii. Vegetius’ recommendation that recruits be trained in archery may have compensated for the lack of archer (sagittarii) units in the eastern order of battle as illustrated by the Notitia Dignitatum. In a theater where Rome’s primary enemy’s decisive arm was heavily armoured horse archer-lancers, such scarcity seems unusual. Based upon Ammianus’ and other eyewitness battle descriptions, the eastern Roman army’s decisive arm in the IV century CE was still its legions rather than its cataphract cavalry. Legionary units apparently formed exclusively by lanciarii are listed in the Notitia Dignitatum, and most of their unit names seem to be derived from names of border provinces. The historian Martijn J. Nicasie theorized that they were originally formed by withdrawing lanciarii from border legions. This conclusion does not mean that the limitanei legions lost lanciarii capabilities. These lanciarii centuries could have been raised again over time.

In place of auxilia units, the eastern army contained legions trained primarily for skirmishing and scouting. At the siege of Amida in 359 CE, comes Aelianus commanded a small army of six legions, including the light legions Superventores (catchers) and Praeventores (interceptors). Fifteen hundred skirmishers from the legions Lanciarii (spearmen or spear throwers) and Mattiarii (club wielders) are also mentioned by Ammianus acting as a forward security screen for Julian’s army.

Despite the increased number of cavalry units, the Roman legionary and auxilia remained swordsmen first and foremost. Both Vegetius’ Epitoma rei militaris and the Strategikon agree that training with the sword and shield was critical for the infantry. Until the end of the IV century CE, infantry remained the “queen of battle” for the Roman army and it dominated the battlefield due to its discipline and training.

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Roman cavalry from the early IV century CE, from the reliefs at the Arch of Galerius in Thessalonica.

The expanded IV century CE Roman cavalry retained the four basic types of cavalry from its III century CE predecessor: horse archers, javelin-armed light cavalry, various types of general-purpose medium cavalry, and heavily armoured cataphracti/clibanarii heavy cavalry. Up to the IV century CE the various types of cavalry (whether armed with bow, shields, spears, javelins, or the long heavy contus) wore some sort of body armor. There was a significant difference between the versatility of the Roman medium cavalry and the heavily armoured cataphracti and clibanarii. Constantius II improved the Roman cavalry by expanding its heavy cavalry component as noted by Julian in his First Oration as a response to the superiority of Sasanian and Gothic cavalry. These heavily armored men on armored horses, supported by horse archers, were crucial in Constantius II’ victory against the usurper Magnentius at the Battle of Mursa in 351 CE. The exact number of these units in the early IV century CE is unknown. The Notitia Dignitatum lists sixteen cataphracti and clibanarii units in total, of which seven were stationed in the east.

During the IV century CE, Roman light and medium cavalry provided key support functions to the infantry. Due to its relative speed and manoeuvrability over marching infantry columns, cavalry provided reconnaissance during the advance, screened the army from enemy reconnaissance and ambushes, covered foraging parties, and provided dispatch riders. Its primary task in battle was to protect the infantry’s flanks, support the attacks of the cataphracti and clibanarii, and if possible, drive off the opposing cavalry from the field. If successful in defeating enemy cavalry, Roman cavalry attacked the flanks and rear of the enemy infantry. A potential problem for all types of cavalry (in all armies alike) was loss of cohesion, resulting in uncontrolled charges or disorderly withdrawals. In the IV century CE, Roman cavalry played a secondary role in battle, but its members were considered in an increasing way as elite soldiers.

The tactics employed by the Roman army of the IV century CE had adapted to changing conditions but were still firmly grounded in Roman military traditions. The demise of the legio antiqua complicated command and control on the battlefield. As described by Vegetius and Julius Caesar, antique legions formed one to three battle lines of cohorts (triplex acies) depending on the tactical situation. The Strategikon recommends that the lines of a cavalry army be deployed a bowshot apart (100 to 300 m). This would be the maximum distance between infantry lines. Running 300 m in full armour to conduct a passage of lines on foot would reduce the effectiveness of the fresh infantry formations. In large battles during the I to early III centuries CE, a legate of senatorial rank, assisted by six tribunes (also of senatorial rank), commanded a legion (up to ten cohorts plus support troops) and supervised the battle, feeding fresh cohorts into combat as required. During the IV century CE this mid-level command staff of the antique legions disappeared with the creation of and reliance on smaller-size legions. At first glance, there appears to be no replacement mid-level command structure during the IV century CE.

In battle, Roman armies of all periods divided battle lines into right, left, and centre with a general in charge of each sector. In the case of a large army like Julian’s eastern invasion force, each of these generals had thirty small legions or comparable units in size within their sector of responsibility. In the heat, dust, limited visibility, and friction of battle, command and control of more than ten units would have been probably impossible. The antique legion’s battle formation, as described by Vegetius, had four cohorts in the first line and three cohorts in the second and third lines. Thus, a legionary legate of old controlled a 400 m frontage occupied by ten cohorts in three battle lines. There are passages in Ammianus that suggest that a mid-level command structure did exist: unit pairs. There are seven unit pairs listed by Ammianus, and they include paired legions and auxilia. When these units are listed in the narrative, they are always listed as fighting together as if they were organic (similar to a modern brigade structure).

Command and control of a battle in the IV century CE was a continuation of traditional Roman methods. Roman success on the battlefield depended upon discipline and drill, not individual heroics. The V, VI, and VII centuries CE would see Roman command and control drift away from the rule of discipline and drill, and Roman commanders and senior officers would start to fight duels with opponents before the beginning of a formal battle. But in the IV century CE, Roman generals stayed near the fighting but only joined it in emergencies, with the exception being Julian.

In a field battle, the Romans initially only committed thirty to forty per cent of their forces to combat. Commitment of the second and third battle lines was the responsibility of the commanding general or his immediate subordinates who commanded the left, right, or centre of the army formation. The augustus, caesar or senior general present surveyed the battle mounted while being protected by a mounted bodyguard. By judging the ebb and flow of battle, the commander could encourage his men, commit reserves, or ride to a point of crisis to prevent disaster.

An infantry army fighting a cavalry army faced a number of challenges. Formal field battles with the main Sasanian army tended to last six to twelve hours in extreme heat. Horses are not very intelligent creatures, but they will not charge into a wall of spears or a wall of compact men. As a result, a cavalry force fighting a well-trained and disciplined infantry force resembled the ebb and flow of waves upon a beach. If the Roman formations stood firm without losing their cohesion like a large rock on the beach, the cavalry would flow around the “rock” to its limit and then it would withdraw. If the legions remained like a rock barrier, the “water” would smash into the rock halting its momentum, only to recede and then repeat the process. Following the analogy, if the legions were unexperienced, they stood like a sand castle and each wave of cavalry would erode the legionaries’ cohesion until, like a sand castle, the legionary formation would crumble, and the fleeing infantry would be washed away like individual grains of sand by the assaulting enemy cavalry. Initially, to face the ebb and flow of Iranian cavalry tactics (which were essentially the same ones employed by steppe peoples like the Sarmatians and Huns), the basic tactical formation of the eastern Roman army was a combined arms cohort of six centuries which, by the middle of the III century CE, was evolving into a large combined arms manipulus, cohors or numerus of 300 to 400 men. Vegetius informs us that, within a Roman six-rank battle line, the first two ranks consisted of seasoned veteran soldiers whose job was to hold the line. The third rank consisted of young and fast armoured archers and soldiers armed with heavy javelins, light spears (lanceae), and possibly lighter shields. The fourth rank consisted of young archers and javelin throwers that used lighter javelins and darts (plumbatae) and carried lighter shields. The fifth rank consisted of staff slingers, slingers, and crossbowmen (manuballistarii). The sixth rank consisted of experienced veteran soldiers like the first two ranks and most likely served as a file closer to prevent the faint of heart from leaving the formation upon seeing a charging war elephant. Carriage-mounted ballistae fired in support over the heads of the battle line. Each file occupied three feet and each rank was six feet deep. This space was needed for the javelin and dart throwers to take a short hop to launch their missiles. One thousand six hundred and sixty-six files occupied a Roman mile of frontage and a six-rank line equalled 9,995 soldiers or approximately ten full-strength “new type” legions of around 1,000 men each.

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A Roman carriage-mounted ballista, from Trajan's column, Rome.

In a field battle against a Sasanian army, the first and second ranks stood their ground in front of an oncoming cavalry charge while the third and fourth ranks would rush out as skirmishers and challenge the enemy with arrows, darts, and javelins when the Iranian horsemen stopped in front of the Roman formation and turned their horses to ride along the line. When pressed, these skirmishers would fall back into the formation and resume their positions in their ranks while the first and second ranks would fight off the enemy. While not mentioned by Vegetius, the heavier missile weapons (staff slings, manuballistae, and carriage-mounted ballistae) were probably designed against the heavily armoured savārān cavalry (according to Graeco-Roman sources, the Kingdom of Chersonesus used them in this way against the Sarmatian and Gothic heavy cavalry). These armour-piecing weapons with slow reload times would launch their missiles over the heads of their comrades into the confused ranks of Sasanian horsemen after the forward momentum of their charge was halted. As the enemy cavalry started to turn and withdraw, the third and fourth ranks would sally forth trying hamstring the Sasanian warhorses, and attack the savārān with swords, javelins, and clubs. The increase of missile capacity of the legionary formations could explain the alleged decrease in the penetrating capacity of Sasanian arrows. The greater missile capacity of Roman infantry formations would have forced Sasanian horse archers to shoot their arrows from a longer range.

Legionary formations with mixed weaponry were not an invention of the IV century CE eastern Roman army. During the II and III centuries BCE, republican Roman legions comprised 3,000 close order infantry and 1,200 velites (young skirmishers). The Roman governor of Cappadocia Lucius Flavius Arrianus, writing in the II century CE, described his preparations to fight an invasion of Alans in his Array against the Alans (Ektaxis kata Alanon, Ἔκταξις κατὰ Ἀλανῶν) and he described legionary formations with mixed weaponry and combining close order heavy infantry and skirmishers in the same formation. Thus, adapting to changed battlefield conditions within existing traditional force structure was nothing new for the Romans. It is significant that the Strategikon supports Vegetius and recommends the ratio of close order infantry to skirmishing infantry as 2:1 and that the skirmishers should be young and nimble and, based upon the tactical situation, able to operate within and without the close order infantry formation.

There are indications that the basic tactical formation in battle was a manipulus-size unit and that each cohort contained two of them. Ammianus recorded Roman army units organized into centuriae, manipuli, and cohortes. Detachments are recorded as being manipulus-size. In 360 CE, Constantius II ordered the (then caesar) Julian to provide him with massive reinforcements to replace Roman losses during the renewed eastern war against Šābuhr II. The reinforcements ordered equated to over thirty per cent of the army of Gaul. With the exception of three named units ordered to be transferred, the reinforcements were to be provided as 300-man detachments from each unit in the army of Gaul. When comes Sebastianus formed a special command to fight the Goths, he was assigned 300-man detachments from units in the local army. Three hundred men equals four centuries (80 x4 = 320 men) or three over-strength centuries (300 men). If the legions were of a combined arms nature and the ratio of heavy infantry to light infantry was 2:1, then detachments consisting of two heavy infantry centuries and one lanciarii century seem probable. Sending three over-strength centuries ensured that, despite the attrition of moving long distances in winter, the detachment would arrive in fighting strength. Written 200 years later, the Strategikon describes the basic heavy infantry formation of the past as 256 men. Three normal strength centuries equal 240 men and is very similar to the formation the Strategikon refers to. The type and size of reinforcements to the eastern theater becomes important when determining the size of the Roman forces opposing Šābuhr II’s campaign in 360 CE. A cohesive organic manipulus, cohors or numerus of 300 men is more tactically useful than a “marching unit” of 300 soldiers thrown together for administrative purposes.

The “marching camp” continued to constitute a critical aspect of Roman tactics into the IV century CE but sources hint at significant changes in the establishment of such a camp compared to the I, II, and III century CE model. The marching camp provided the Roman soldier a safe haven in hostile territory. Its uniform layout provided the mental comfort for the Roman soldier where he could relax in relative safety. Tactically it was so important to the Roman method of warfare that it remained a main stay of successful Roman military operations from the Republic to late antiquity. The Strategikon recommends a safety ditch, caltrops, defensive ditch, and wall made from the army’s supply wagons instead of the former traditional ditch, turf wall, and wooden palisade. This different configuration would prevent a surprise cavalry and elephant attack into a Roman camp and compensate for the lack of wood in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys. And effectively, according to Ammianus during Julian’s expedition in 363 CE, the Roman army adapted its marching camp to the conditions of Mesopotamia by using shields and wagons instead of a wooden palisade. Even as late as the X century CE, Byzantine military theory still considered the march camp extremely important. Its basic organization was still based on its imperial Roman predecessor.

Sasanian tactical manuals existed, but they have not survived; however, there’s quite a sizeable corpus of later Islamic texts (mainly Arabic ones) which drew heavily from old Sasanian militray treatises and manuals. The Strategikon also provides descriptions and analyses of Sasanian tactics from the Roman VI century CE perspective which can be applied also to the tactics employed by the armies of Šābuhr II. For the most part, the Sasanians preferred planning and generalship to blind attacks, and they stressed an orderly approach rather than a brave and impulsive one. According to the Strategikon, they “easily endured heat, thirst, and lack of food”. They were also formidable both when laying siege and when being besieged. They coped bravely with adversity, often turning adverse circumstances to their advantage. When giving battle in the summer, they took advantage of Mesopotamia’s heat to dampen the morale of the Romans, often delaying battle for extended periods of time. According to the Strategikon, the Sasanians were thus skilled adversaries who exploited every trick and tactic available to their advantage before they engaged a Roman army in open battle.

The decisive branch of the Sasanian army was its cavalry. The best extant description of an eastern cavalry army fighting Roman legions is the battle of Nisibis in 217 CE between the army of the Roman emperor Macrinus and the Arsacid army of Ardavān V (Carrhae was rather an exception). During this three-day battle, the ebb and flow of a cavalry battle becomes apparent. The legions on day one formed into multiple battle lines with light infantry stationed between the lines and gaps between cohorts. The Arsacid horsemen showered the Roman formations with arrows before rushing into close combat with armored cavalry and mail-clad dromedary riders armed with long kontoi. During one of the ebbs of the Arsacid tide, the Romans dropped caltrops and, after covering them with sand, fell back. When the Arsacid mounted troops charged forward again, the points of these devices mauled their mounts’ hooves and feet. As the cavalry attack dissolved into a disordered mass of buckling animals and thrown riders, the Roman troops, in open order, attacked killing and capturing a large number of their foes after they had been thrown from their mounts.

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Iranian-American reenactor Ardeshir Radpour in the garb of a lightly armored savārān.

On a closer look, Sasanian tactics combined assaults by waves of armored cavalry supported by massed arrow attacks. The Sasanian cavalry would approach the Roman line in waves divided into columns of horse archers followed by a wave of heavy savārān. The wave of horse archers would shower the Roman line with arrows, hoping to disrupt the formations, then it would wheel, and then it would ride to the rear. The second wave of armored cavalry would then charge the Roman line with their heavy thrusting kontoi. If the Roman formations did not break, like an ocean wave, the savārān would then wheel in turn and withdraw to the rear as the horse archers rode forward to renew their missile assault, and the maneuver would be repeated for hours on end, as an Iranian army always carried with it into campaign plenty of spare mounts for the cavalry, as well as large supplies of arrows and spare lances for the heavy cavalry.

Roman historians and writers of tactical manuals systematically misinterpreted this ebb and flow of Iranian cavalry tactics as disinclination for close combat, or as pure and simple cowardice (or “effeminacy”), which for Greek and Roman authors was a defining quality of “eastern barbarians” since the days of Marathon. But all cavalry tactics, including Roman ones, have the same “ebb and flow” pattern. These eastern open field battles were not short affairs. They tended to start in the early morning and last until the heat of the midday sun would force both sides to disengage.

During the retreat of Julian’s army from Ctesiphon, the Persians employed cavalry and elephants to harass the retreating Romans. The savārān and elephants worked effectively together and twice came near to breaking the cohesion of the Roman column and destroying Julian’s army. Ammianus’ account makes clear these task forces were not last-minute ad hoc groupings of combat units. Their successful performance against the Romans indicates that the Sasanians took the time to train their elite cavalry horses and elephants to fight together, since untrained horses were afraid of the smell and sight of these animals.

Sasanian commanders used standards, trumpets, drums and verbal commands to control their forces. The “national standard” (the legendary Drafš-e Kāvīān, later captured by the Rashidun army at Qādisiyyah) was used only on special occasions to encourage the men. Before a battle, the troops were encouraged with religious ceremonies and speeches by their leaders. Contrary to the Roman practice, Iranian warriors were eager to seek single combats before the battle. The outcome of such battles could decide the entire conflict in cases when both sides agreed to abide by its result, or because the outcome of such fights affected the morale of the soldiers.

If possible, the Sasanians sought to position their forces in the most advantageous way before a battle, which usually entailed the positioning of the entire force or at least its centre on higher ground so that the army had the advantage of the wind and sun behind them. The Sasanian main aim in doing so was to facilitate their ability to shoot arrows from their advantageous position and only then to charge, once the enemy had been “softened” by its projectiles. However, when the Sasanians considered it advantageous or necessary, they could still charge immediately without a premilinary exchange of missiles. When they attacked, they attempted to lower the enemy morale with loud shouting, war cries and loud drumming.

The cavalry battle line had two basic formations and several variants, which could also consist of specialized sections with differing equipment. This resulted from the use of allies. In such cases the Sasanians often placed their (preferably left-handed) mounted archers on the left wing and the lancers on the right wing. The two principal cavalry battle formations were the single-line and double-line formations. The single-line array placed the light cavalry vanguard and rear guard alongside the heavy savārān so that the formation consisted of five parts (outer left, left, centre, right and outer right).

The position of the light cavalry depended upon the tactic chosen. If the light cavalry was placed on the outer wings, then the purpose was to outflank the enemy, and when they were placed amongst the savārān, the purpose was to harass the enemy frontally, so all used archery, including the heavy cavalrymen. The second variant of this array was that the entire line consisted only of the armored cavalrymen. In such situations most of the Sasanian units were deployed as rhomboids that allowed the units to face threats from all directions. It is possible, however, that only the flank divisions used rhomboids (just like it had been done by the Macedonian army), while the armored savārān in the centre used the square/oblong formations.

The standard double-line formation consisted of the light cavalry in front (used to soften up the enemy with arrows) and savārān reserves that charged at the right opportunity. The second variant of this array was that both lines consisted only of the heavy savārān. The standard tactic even with this array was to withdraw the first line to replenish ammunition after they had run out of arrows, while the second line moved forward in turn to pepper the enemy with arrows. The intention was always to destroy the enemy with arrows rather than through fighting at close quarters if at all possible.

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Sasanian field camp and battle arrays, according to Ilkka Syvänne (The Military History of Late Rome, Vol. 1).

The Sasanian, Arsacid and Armenian rhombus (following A. M. Devine’s study of the Byzantine Interpolation of Aelian’s Tactics) typically consisted of mounted archers. The paper strength for the rhombus was one hundred and twenty-eight men. The Sasanian square/oblong order appears to have consisted of ranks and files with a frontage of eight and depth of four for a total of thirty-two men. In addition to this, Sasanian cavalry forces did include tribesmen that employed the skirmishing version of the small wedge array. The heterogeneous composition of the Sasanian forces ensured that there were variations in the unit orders and equipment of the troops.

When infantry and other forces accompanied the army, these were placed in the rear so that the footmen with wagons were usually deployed in front of the camp proper to form a defensive bulwark for the cavalry if it needed to retreat and regroup, or replenish its supply of arrows, or change horses. Occasionally, however, the infantry was also used as part of the battle formation and in these cases, it was either deployed behind the cavalry (and elephants), or between the cavalry wings. The elephants could also be deployed with the infantry.

The standard tactics with all formations were:
  • To outflank the enemy on both flanks (crescent formation), if the Sasanians possessed numerical superiority.
  • To outflank the enemy only on one flank (preferably on the right because of the needs of archery), if they were only slightly superior.
  • To destroy the enemy centre with a charge (convex formation), if they were outnumbered.
  • To place the entire army on higher ground and use archers, if the commander considered it unwise to deploy in the open.
In desperate situations, the Sasanians formed a defensive circle on the spot.

The type of bows and the shooting technique employed varied according to the nationality and region of the force. Some employed the so-called Sasanian bow (long composite bow with long ears), while others used the so-called Hunnish bow (long composite bow that could be asymmetric) and still others a variant of the Scythian short composite bow. The names of the bows are quite misleading. The “Sasanian bow” was best suited for delivering rapidly shot volleys of arrows either with the so-called “Sasanian draw/lock” (supposedly invented by Ardaxšir I himself) or with the “thumb/Mongolian draw/lock”. The “Hunnish bow” was best suited for delivering powerful long-range shots with the so-called “thumb draw/lock”. Both of these bows enabled the use of a prolonged archery barrage at long range and the avoidance of having to get into hand-to-hand combat range with the enemy.

The ideal length the stiffness of the bow depended upon the user’s height, muscle-power and length of arms. There were also several different variants of the thumb lock each of which had its advantages (and supporters), in addition to which the size of the hand and the lengths of the fingers affected which of the locks the archer could use. Furthermore, the archery tactic did not depend only on the type of bow and lock used. The bow’s materials and the quality of the construction, as well as the type and material of the string, all affected the performance of the bow. Similarly, the length, weight, and material of the arrow and the type of arrowhead all affected the performance. As a general statement one can say that the longer and heavier the arrow, the shorter its range and the greater its penetrative power, while the lighter the arrow, the longer its flight range would be at the cost of penetrative power. The length of the arrow also had to be suitable for the length of the bow and its user. That is, within the limits stated above, the Sasanians and their allies could change the type of arrow employed according to the distance and type of protective equipment worn by the enemy. It was possible to pick and choose the best tactic and combination to the situation by varying the type of arrow, bow and lock.

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British reenactor Nadeem Ahmad shooting a composite bow; he's dressed in VI-VIII century CE Sogdian garb, which is quite similar to Sasanian archery equipment of the IV century CE.

All Sasanian armies of IV century CE described by Roman sources were combined arms formations. The Sasanian arm of decision was the cavalry, but Roman commanders took Sasanian infantry, and especially its infantry archers, seriously. The Roman victory at the battle of Singara was turned into a bloody draw by a night arrow attack by the Sasanian infantry archers. Learning from previous errors, in 363 CE Roman legionaries repeatedly charged Sasanian cavalry and infantry at the first opportunity instead of engaging them previously with a missile exchange as they would have done against Germanic enemies.

Arsacid and Sasanian armies were famous for their archery and in particular for their “shower archery” technique. Sasanian horsemen were also ready to dismount to increase the effectiveness of their archery. We know from extant Muslim treatises that were based on previous Sasanian practices that, as stated before, Ardaxšir I invented a thumb lock/draw which was named after him. This suggests the possibility that the use of the thumb lock of Ardaxšir I may have given his troops a slight advantage in archery over that of the Arsacids, which later disappeared as they too adopted Ardaxšir I’s version as one of the locks in use. Muslim archery treatises, all of which were based on Iranian originals, state that both Ardaxšir I and Šābuhr I paid a lot of attention to archery and after them archery declined until it was revived by Bahrām V Gōr in the V century CE. This “decline” probably resulted from the increased use of armor by the cavalry during the reign of Šābuhr II from the year 328 CE onwards.

According to the Arab Archery (an anonymous manuscript dated to 1,500 CE; its full name is Book on the Excellence of the Bow and Arrow, in Arabic Kitāb fī bayān fadl al-qaws w-al-sahm wa-awsāfihima), there were five (if Bustam’s version is counted as one) versions of “shower shooting”:
  • 1 to 3: a maximum of six arrows was placed on the right hand with varying gripping techniques.
  • 4: a bundle of arrows was placed in the left hand, which in the opinion of the author of the book resulted in a weak grip (this was definitely used by the Arsacids).
  • 5: Bustam, who lived during the reign of Xusrō I, appears to have invented the most effective version of the shower/successive shooting with five, ten or fifteen arrows.
The favourite tactic of the Sasanians and most of the peoples of the Middle and Near East after them was shower-archery, as can be read in the texts of Procopius of Caesarea, the Strategikon and the Arab Archery. In sum, considering the fact that Ardaxšir I was allegedly himself an expert archer and had invented one of the locks, it is more than likely that he had invented at least one of the versions (1 to 3) in which the arrows were gripped with the right hand, and this invention would have given his forces a slight advantage over his Arsacid foes.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to make any definite comparisons regarding the capabilities of Roman and Sasanians archers beyond the general statement that the Sasanians usually had an advantage over the Romans in the sheer number of arrows shot. This advantage could have resulted from the greater numbers of archers among them, but the archery techniques used by the Romans may have contributed to this. During the VI century CE the Romans favoured the slower Hun-technique and bow, but powerful bows and thumb-locks were not unknown before the arrival of the Huns. Similarly, we do know that the Romans used at least one version of the Sasanian “shower-archery” technique, but we do not know which one, and it is possible that the Romans also changed their practices as they copied their enemies. However, we do know that at the Battle of Mursa in 351 CE the commander of the Armenian mounted archers in Constantius II’s army fitted three arrows at a time to his bow, which does suggest the probability that the Romans and Armenians still used the slower variant and not the one allegedly invented by Ardaxšir I.

Unlike the Graeco-Roman sources state, Sasanian close quarter combat techniques were very sophisticated and quite varied. The Sasanian savārān and kontos-bearers employed their long spears with different types of two-handed grips that enabled them to vary their attack technique according to the situation. And at least the richest amongst the savārān were also using two-edged straight long swords made from Indian steel (then the best in the world) with the sophisticated “Italian grip” as well as pick-axes and maces against armoured and helmeted opponents, and at really close quarters several martial arts techniques. In short, the principal weapon of the Sasanians was their bow, but they were still well trained and equipped for close quarters fighting if the situation was favourable 8at least the elite savārān).

If imitation is the highest form of flattery, then it can be said with good reason that the Sasanian cavalry equipment, archery, and tactics were outstanding, as the Romans copied much of their cavalry tactics and equipment from their Arsacid and Sasanian foes. Regardless of this, it is still clear that the Romans had the advantage in close quarters combat thanks to their cultural inclination to fight that way, while the Arsacids and Sasanians had the advantage in long-range combat. The Iranians rather fled and fought another day.

Sasanian siege techniques were basically the same as those employed by the Romans with the varioation that they excelled in archery. Their offensive siege tactics included the use of surprise attacks, treachery, bribery and intimidation, blockade, assault, as well as the use of siege equipment. If the enemy could not be surprised or taken through treachery, the Sasanians first offered terms and if these were not accepted, they resorted to the actual siege. The siege techniques included the use of complex hydraulic works, battering rams, ballistae, ladders, incendiary arrows, mining, “fire-bombs” (as described by Ammianus for the sieges of 359 – 361 CE), stone throwers, mantlets and wicker screens, elephants as siege towers, regular siege towers, and siege mounds. The Sasanians were also more prepared to risk heavy casualties in offensive sieges and assault against the walls regardless of the cost in lives than the Romans, probably because their leaders considered the peasant levies and allies as expendable “cannon fodder”.

Defensive tactics were basically the same as those employed by the Romans, except that the Sasanians were more prepared to sally out and endanger their lives. They were also more stubborn as defenders than the Romans thanks to what Ammianus labelled as their “patriotism” and especially thanks to the fact that those who surrendered were considered traitors with the result that their families and relatives would face capital punishment. It was therefore with a good reason that the VI century CE Strategikon regarded the Sasanians as formidable when laying siege, but even more formidable when besieged. On the basis of the fact the Romans were still using an abandoned gigantic Sasanian battering ram from the 250s during the wars against Šābuhr II, the Sasanians probably possessed better and bigger battering rams that the Romans. It should be noted, however, that Julian’s eastern campaign shows that the advantage held by the Sasanians in this field was only slight. By contrast, the Romans appear to have had better field and siege artillery, which enabled them to suppress Sasanian archers during sieges. Consequently, the Sasanians always took with them Roman artillery pieces after a successful offensive siege and employed those in subsequent sieges against the Romans.

A field in which the Sasanians excelled, and which has drawn little attention from ancient western sources and modern historians was that of intelligence gathering. In order to be able to react fast to any emerging trouble Ardaxšir I established an efficient network of informers and spies, probably in accordance with the Achaemenid model. According to the Letter of Tansar, Ardaxšir I had informers and spies everywhere with the result that all the people “were trembling in fear”. However, according to the same text, “innocent and upright men had nothing to fear, because only those who were trustworthy, obedient, pure, devout, learned, religious and abstinent in worldly things were made the ‘eyes’ and informers of the King”. As a result of this, everything was supposedly reported accurately. The apparent effectiveness of this system becomes evident for example during Julian’s campaign when the Sasanian high command was clearly aware of every action initiated by the Sasanian troops and their commanders.

Similarly, according to the XV century CE Afghan author Mohammad ibn Khwāndshāh ibn Mahmud Mir-Khwānd, who referred to the final form of the system already in full operation, Ardaxšir I increased the vigilance of the government with the introduction of a system of inspectors who had the duty of reporting to him every morning what had happened in the preceding day. With this in mind, he appointed intelligence officers for each part of his empire to provide him reports on common and particular matters of interest. In this way he was kept abreast of the general mood of the populace and of particular events taking place everywhere within the empire. The surprising thing about this is that even after Ardaxšir I had enlarged his empire to encompass all the territory from the Euphrates to the borders of the Kushan empire, he still expected to be able to learn of events taking place in the furthest corners of his empire within twenty-four to forty-eight hours. It was the duty of the local postmasters to forward the relevant information for the Head Postmaster and the Šāhān Šāh. The value Ardaxšir I put into the gathering of intelligence is also apparent from the fact that the first thing he did every morning was to listen to the intelligence reports.

Due to the secrecy that surrounded the system we do not know the exact details of this organization, but some educated guesses can be made. Firstly, the sources make clear that the royal postal service was used for internal security purposes, as were the inspectors/judges/counsellors of the clergy that were attached to each province, court and larger unit of the army. Secondly, one can speculate that the same was also true of the scribes (dibirān) that were attached to every organization in the realm. Notably, the scribes were taught the so-called “secret script”, which would have enabled them to communicate secretly. In addition to this, the Sasanians also appear to have had a foreign intelligence service of some sort that included (depending on the time period) at least Zoroastrian priests, Manicheans, and traders. On the basis of the events of 359 CE it seems probable that the merchant spies were controlled by the governors of the frontier regions (marzbānān). The same was probably true about the scouts detached from military units. The marzbānān in their turn must have reported any suspicious activities to their superiors, and they in turn to the Ērān Spāhbed.

It is obvious that the extent to which the king would have been expected to take charge of matters in person was exaggerated by Middle Persian chronicles and later Islamic authors, but the all-encompassing nature of this police state system is still apparent. It is clear that such a large network of spies and informers had to be centrally directed so that only the most important pieces of news were brought to the king’s attention while the less important decisions were left for the local authorities to decide. For example, the priests as judges would have been expected to carry out punishments for common crimes on behalf of the state at the local level.

The Sasanian spy organization seems to have worked relatively well against the Romans. The Sasanians appear to have been usually well informed about the military preparations that happened deep inside the Roman territories. It is also important to understand that (if the system of informers worked as described by Mir-Khwānd) Sasanian rulers would’ve learnt of a Roman invasion within twenty-four to forty-eight hours from the time the invasion occurred regardless of where they were in the vast empire. And again if the system worked as described, if they had reserves available, they could send orders for the troops to assemble and proceed towards the invaders within forty-eight to ninety-six hours. However, just like any such organization all of the Sasanian security systems could fail, especially in the case of internal security; there’s no better proof for this than the internal revolts of the princes and magnates. The system could work only when the Šāhān Šāh could retain the loyalty of his subjects. When the magnates and priests considered the ruler to be a “tyrant” they did not forward the necessary information to the king and did not hesitate to act against him.

Unlike a Roman army, a typical Sasanian army was not well suited to fight defensive battles. A Roman army, formed basically around a core of heavy infantry, could just be deployed in a strong position waiting for the enemy to attack and ceding the tactical initiative to its foes. That was just not possible with an army centered around a core of cavalry; even if it was fighting a defensive campaign, a Sasanian army could not allow its enemy to seize the initiative, as a static defense was not an option. Thus, Sasanian armies were always forced to fight defensive campaigns as a series of hit-and-run engagements designed to weaken their opponents, until the situation became ripe for a major attack in open field; this was exactly how the field army of Šābuhr II fought against Julian’s invasion in 363 CE. Although the Sasanians were by far the most sophisticated and dangerous of the enemies the Romans faced, whenever the Romans had enough men available, they were confident that they could win pitched battles against them. So, they usually sought to force the Sasanians to fight pitched battles while the spāh often tried to avoid these unless the situation demanded it, or unless the Roman army had been weakened through harassment, heat, exhaustion or lack of supplies. As the Romans knew that Iranian cavalry armies usually suffered only light casualties even when defeated, they always sought to surprise their enemies or force them against an obstacle that prevented or hindered any possible retreat (like the Rashidun army achieved in its great victories against the Sasanians at Qādisiyyah and Nihāvand).
 
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6.4 THE ROMAN STRATEGY OF DEFENSE AGAINST THE SASANIAN STRATEGY OF OFFENSE.
6.5 THE ROMAN STRATEGY OF DEFENSE AGAINST THE SASANIAN STRATEGY OF OFFENSE.

The Peace of Nisibis of 299 CE gave the Romans access to three invasion routes into Armenia and Media on the Iranian plateau. The first and northernmost invasion route followed the valley of the Araxes river across Armenia into the kingdoms of Iberia and Albania and then into Media Atropatene and Media proper. The Roman general Corbulo campaigned in this region during his I century CE campaign.

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The Roman East after the First Treaty of Nisibis in 299 CE.

The second central route was a fourteen-day march from the Roman fortress of Bezabde on the eastern bank of the Tigris across the Greater Zab river and then across the Zagros mountains via the Rawanduz Pass into the vicinity of the great Zoroastrian sanctuary of Adur Gušnasp in Media. Another fortnight’s march would have brought a Roman army to Ecbatana (modern Hamadān), the main city of Media. This route, in reverse, was used by Heraclius to invade Sasanian Mesopotamia from the Iranian plateau.

The third and southernmost route required the Roman army to take Ctesiphon before marching up the Diyala River anc across the Zagros range in order to reach Hamadan. This route was weather dependent since the passes were blocked by snow until as late as June. This invasion route had two possible approaches into Sasanian Mesopotamia that followed the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. In 363 CE, the Euphrates invasion route that Julian’s army followed was defended by a series of island city fortresses, supported by the heavily fortified city of Pirisabora (Peroz-Šābuhr, later Arabic Anbār), downstream from the major canal intake that linked both rivers.

The second invasion approach on the southern route followed the Tigris. Little is known about fortifications along this route. On the eastern bank of the Tigris, its tributaries the Great Zab, Lesser Zab, Adheim, and Diyala form natural defensive barriers; while the west bank is primarily desert. During Heraclius’ 627 CE campaign, the Lesser Zab had fortifications defending its four bridges and it’s possible that it was similarly defended in the IV century CE as well. The Euphrates river was fed almost exclusively by the melting snow packs on Armenian plateau. The melting snow of the Armenian plateau and Zagros mountains fed the Tigris and the crossing of all these rivers was a difficult enterprise. Until the Zagros passes became snow-free in June, an invading army attacking from Ctesiphon could not march into the heart of Ērānšahr.

Both the Euphrates and Tigris avenues of approach led to the city of Ctesiphon. Ctesiphon (Greek: Ktēsiphôn; Middle Persian: Tisfun) was the capital of Ērānšahr and one of the great cities of late Antiquity; little is known with exactitude about its layout due to the lack of serious and systematic excavations and the moving course of the Tigris. Ctesiphon’s importance was due to its being the main distribution centre for the overland spice and silk route and sea trade with China and India. Today, the ruins of this once great city lie 35 km southeast of modern Baghdad and comprise 75 km2. In comparison, IV century CE Rome occupied a surface (within the Aurelian walls) of 21.5 km2. Originally, Ctesiphon was a small fortified settlement built by the Arsacid king Mihrdāt II in 120 CE on the eastern bank of the Tigris just across the great Hellenistic metropolis of Seleucia. Initially, Ctesiphon was just a fortified settlement that contained an Arsacid garrison with the mission to control the Greek city of Seleucia across the river, as well as the small administrative apparatus and court of the Arsacid kings. The Arsacid king Walaxš I (r. 51 – 78 CE) founded near both cities the new settlement of Walaxškert (Vologesocerta in Latin), a foundation which some modern historians have viewed as an attempt by the Arsacid king to weaken the Greek city of Seleucia by attracting part of its inhabitants to the new settlement. Seleucia though did not begin its decline until the late II century CE, due to a succession disasters which hit the city in close succession: the two sacks by the Roman armies of Avidius Cassius and Septimius Severus, and especially the change of the course of the Tigris river (probably caused by an earthquake) that moved the riverbed several kilometers away from the city, which lost its fluvial port and thus its main commercial asset. In the space of a few decades, Seleucia became a mere shadow of its former self, to the benefit of Ctesiphon, Vologesocerta and, after the rise of Ardaxšir I, the new Sasanian foundation of Wēh-Ardaxšir on the west riverbank of the Tigris, opposite Ctesiphon. This city (built as a round fortified city, as Ardaxšir-Xwarrah in Pārs) was known to Graeco-Roman authors as Coche, after the name of its southeastern district of Kōḵē. It was the seat of the Jewish Exilarch (the Jews called the city Māḥozā) and would later in the V century Ce also house the Nestorian patriarch of the East. The three cities were heavily fortified, and the surrounding territory was crisscrossed by irrigation channels and smaller unfortified suburbia. The area was so densely populated, and the confusion between neighboring settlements was such that the Arabs called it simply al-Mada'in, meaning “the cities” in Arabic; the local Aramaic population also called the whole metropolitan area Māḥozā (literally meaning “the city”).

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Evolution of the metropolitan area of Seleucia-Ctesiphon between the I and VI centuries CE.

Ctesiphon proper (which the Arabs would refer to as the “Old City”) was the seat of the palace of the Sasanian kings, which ancient and medieval sources refer to as the White Palace. In the VI century CE, a new unwalled residential district called Aspānbar grew to the south of it, where Xusrō I built a new palace with a massive audience hall that is the only part of the ancient metropolis still visible above ground level today. At the start of the IV century CE, Ctesiphon and Wēh-Ardaxšir were connected by a bridge over the Tigris, and according to Tabarī Šābuhr II ordered another bridge to be built during the initial years of his reign. The configuration of the Tigris combined with challenging locaal conditions such as canals, flooding, swamps, insects, extreme humidity, and scorching heat, made capturing the metropolitan area of Ctesiphon a complicated military problem in the IV century CE.

Scholars have debated for decades whether the late Roman emperors, and especially Diocletian and Constantine, devised a such a thing as a grand strategy for the defence of the Roman Empire. The Roman limes stretched over 6,000 km from the North Sea along the Rhine and Danube Rivers to the Black Sea, along the Tigris River, along the edge of the Arabian Desert to the Red Sea and then along the edge of the Sahara Desert to the Atlantic Ocean.

There’s no evidence proving that Diocletian and Constantine ever formulated any sort of a grand strategy. Only criticism of their strategy by near contemporary historians like Zosimus could gives us a hint that it could have existed. There is circumstantial archaeological evidence, however, that could validate its existence. Massive public and private resources were spent to develop fortified zones along the eastern limes and the army was reorganized and expanded in order to defend the empire. The Peace of Nisibis of 299 CE illustrated Diocletian’s intent not to expand the empire into Ērānšahr proper. The fact that augusti, comites, and duces attacked across the limes, winning battles and burning “barbarian” villages or sacking Sasanian cities does not invalidate the fact that the Roman empire had adopted a stand of strategic defense and was not attempting to add new provinces.

Diocletian’s reorganization of the security of the East put Rome on the strategic defense against the Sasanians. No emperor who followed Diocletian, with the notable exception of Julian, made any serious attempt to expand the empire further east. Based on the Notitia Dignitatum, A.H.M. Jones argued that the defensive system established by Diocletian survived almost intact in the eastern portion of the empire, having been relocated only due to the Roman defeat and the resulting Second Treaty of Nisibis in 363 CE.

The British historian Hugh Elton stated that the limitanei provided three functions along the border: policing, intelligence gathering, and deterring raids. Due to the open terrain in the east, the policing function fell to the limitanei cavalry. Surviving military records indicate that the limitanei were also assigned responsibilities for recruitment, tax collection, and administration of justice in the communities near their forts. The police function included preventing deserters from leaving and spies from entering the empire. Limitanei interaction with the tribes along the border provided intelligence on Sasanian military movements.

Contemporary Roman literary sources did not record minor events; for example, Ammianus admitted that he failed to record battles that (in his opinion) were indecisive or insignificant. In the east, Saracen raids targeted isolated travellers and small groups, but left walled cities unmolested. The main roads and pilgrimage routes in Palestine were patrolled and protected by small forts, while important pilgrims (like Constantine I’s mother Helena) were provided military escorts. Bloody skirmishes were never recorded since they were unimportant by the standards of contemporary historians. Church historians followed different criteria and, as an example, they recorded an event in 276 CE in which a large Roman combat patrol returning from Sasanian territory mistook a local regional agricultural ceremony as an enemy encampment. This event was recorded due to its tragic results: 1,800 Roman civilian casualties and attempted official cover up of the incident.

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View of the Tell Brak archeological site in the upper Khabur area (today the al-Hasaka governorate in northeastern Syria) in high summer after the harvest; it gives a good idea of the nature of the terrain in the north Mesopotamian plain during the summer.

The main reason behind the improvement of fortifications in the East during the IV century CE was the failure of previous fortifications to prevent Sasanian invasions into Syria during the III century CE. Diocletian and Constantine turned the province of Mesopotamia into a defensive border zone of fortified cities to protect the rich provinces of Syria and the eastern metropolis of Antioch. Between the I and III centuries CE, Roman soldiers built towers flush with their fort’s wall. Fighting was expected to take place outside the walls, not upon them. In the middle of the III century CE, forts began to be built with towers projecting out from the fort wall. This change in military construction signified a change in tactics, as forts were now intended as fighting platforms. These towers allowed defenders to protect vulnerable walls and gates from assaulting troops with enfilading fire from mural artillery, archers, and slingers. When they were not stationed in cities, limitanei units were stationed in forts ranging in size from garrison forts (accommodating a middle-sized legion of 2,000 to 3,000 men) to small watchtowers and blockhouses (burgi) occupied by a rotating eight-man garrison.

The Roman forces in the East, fighting mostly from fortified positions, relied heavily upon torsion artillery: ballistae and scorpiones, as well as onagri (nom.sing. onager). Ballistae worked like a huge crossbow firing a bolt or stone and were built in assorted sizes, some small enough to be transported on a small cart or hand carried by its crew while others were so large that they had to be disassembled to be transported. The onager (literally “wild ass”) was just beginning to be deployed in the IV century CE. It was simpler in design but “kicked like a wild ass”. The larger versions were mounted on fortresses and required reinforced walls and towers due to the stresses produced by their operation. Regardless of the size of the weapon, both types were primarily anti-personnel weapons. These machines were very dangerous for the crews to operate. Ammianus took pleasure in describing the gruesome death of a crewman of an onager when the weapon malfunctioned, tearing itself and the soldier to pieces. With that appalling picture in mind, it’s understandable why the Gallic legionaries at Amida were not helpful in defending the walls of the city and preferred sallies outside the walls to engage the Sasanian besiegers with swords.

By studying the deployment of the limitanei armies of the provinces of Phoenicia, Syria, Euphratensis, Osrhoene, and Mesopotamia in 395 CE, an educated guess for the Roman defensive strategy between 337 and 363 CE can be made. The provinces of Phoenicia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Osrhoene contained a higher proportion of cavalry regiments than did other regions. The legions were stationed in fortress cities on possible Sasanian invasion routes and guarded the main caravan routes and major road junctions. With the exception of Phoenicia, the cavalry was stationed along river lines forming a defensive screen connecting the legionary fortress cities. In close support of each legion (either stationed with the legion or in a nearby fortified town) was an equites promoti cavalry units prior to the start of the Nisibis War. The limitanei legions and equites promoti were deployed in such a way as to give each dux a provincial rapid reaction force or strike force.

The cavalry was also stationed in depth along the Balikh river and the crossing point at Zeugma on the Euphrates. Most of the cavalry was stationed in the Mesopotamian steppes or along the Tigris and Euphrates valleys. Some remaining old auxiliary infantry cohorts were stationed to patrol rough ground and mountainous passes. This deployment allowed these armies to scout the limes for raiders, protect caravans, enforce trade regulations, and provide early warning of a Sasanian invasion. The Romans could have dispatched legionary detachments, supported by equites promoti, in response to intermediate threats and, in the case of a serious invasion, they could have defended their fortresses until the Field Army of the East based at Antioch deployed to their area. In 395 CE, the Field Army of the East mustered nineteen legions, two auxilia units, and eleven cavalry units. Thus, assuming that A.H.M. Jones’ estimated strengths for late Roman army units are correct and that the units were at full strength, the Field Army of the East comprised approximately 21,000 infantrymen and 5,500 cavalrymen.

Phoenicia had no river line for its limes. The Strata Diocletiana, which connected Damascus to the legionary fortress of Palmyra and continued to the fortified city of Circesium on the Euphrates, became the border. Phoenicia’s problem, not being located across the Euphrates’ invasion route, was Saracen raiders rather than Sasanian invaders. Its limitanei army was deployed in two echelons. The first echelon of tightly grouped units stretched along the Strata Diocletiana from Damascus to Palmyra along the edge of the desert. The second echelon was deployed on the hilly terrain along the road network north of the Strata Diocletian centred on Danaba, headquarters of Legio III Gallica. A few cavalry units were deployed in the Syrian desert southeast of the Strata Diocletiana in oases to deny Saracen raiders key watering points.

Looking at the Notitia Dignitatum, American scholars Michael H. Dodgeon and Samuel N.C. Lieu. argued that the cavalry unit Ala Quintadecima Flavia Carduenorum (“from Corduene”) and the infantry unit Cohors Quartodecima Valeria Zabdenorum (“from Zabdicene”) had been raised originally in the five Trans-Tigris regions. If they are correct, there would have been at least three other Trans-Tigris regiments that did not survive the Nisibis War. Based upon its title the Legio Pseudocomitatenses Transtigritani from the Field Army of the East might have been one of the missing Trans-Tigris units. Such units would have been raised to police and patrol their home regions operating from forts east of the Tigris which hended over to the sasanians by the Second Treaty of Nisibis in 363 CE. Empires often recruit local soldiers from tribal regions to help police tribal lands (just think of the examples among European colonial powers during the XIX and early XX cebturies). The Sasanians treated such soldiers as traitors and, after the fall of Amida in 359 CE, captured survivors who came from these regions were executed. Michael H. Dodgeon and Samuel N.C. Lieu also argued that Legio I Parthia Nisibena, stationed at Constantina in 395 CE according to the Notitia Dignitatum, had been stationed at Nisibis during the Nisibis War. Raised by Septimius Severus, Legio I Parthica had been originally stationed at Singara. Šābuhr II’s three failed attacks against Nisibis and the legion’s honorific epithet “Nisibena” could support the proposition that sometime before the war began the legion’s headquarters were shifted and only a detachment remained deployed forward as part of the garrison at Singara.

In determining the Roman defensive strategy during the 330s CE, primary sources provide a partial picture and archaeology fills in the blanks. The only province that was greatly impacted by the peace treaty of 363 CE was Mesopotamia. During the period 298 to 363 CE, the defensive foundation for the province of Mesopotamia was provided by the network of fortresses formed by the fortified cities of Amida north of the Tigris, Bezabde on the eastern bank of the Tigris, Singara on the southern slope of the Jebel Sinjar, and Nisibis in the centre of the north Mesopotamian plain.

The fortress of Castra Maurorum in the Tur Abdin mountains supported Bezabde. Taking the example of the defensive pattern in the Notitia Dignitatum, each city would have been supported by cavalry forts in open terrain and infantry forts in rough terrain. The Singara limes surveys completed in the XIX and XX centuries supported their fieldwork with the Peutinger Itinerary. Their findings included structures that could have been forts controlling routes from the Mesopotamian desert to the south into the Singara limes, as well as possible crossing points of the Tigris near Nimrud and Nineveh. The Amida limes was supported by forts along the Tigris as depicted in the Notitia Dignitatum and as described by Ammianus for the 359 CE siege. The Bezabde limes was supported by Castra Maurorum just west of Bezabde on the road to Nisibis and other forts such as the one at Seh Gubba along the Tigris. In addition, the Bezabde limes projected a forward presence in the form of forts and routine patrols in the Trans-Tigris region of the Roman sphere of influence east of the Tigris.

Based upon the information available and following Diocletian’s and Constantine’s formula of two legions per province, the John Harrel proposed the following template for the 337 CE deployment of the limitanei army of Mesopotamia. Legio I Parthica Nisibena would’ve been headquartered at Nisibis with a legionary detachment in Singara. Legio II Parthica occupied Cefa, Bezabde, and Castra Maurorum. In 395 CE, Amida did not have a legionary garrison, and Harrel believes that this may have also been the case at the beginning of the war in 336 CE (as the Sasanians seem to have been able to capture the city with relative ease before Constantius’ victory at Narasara). Legio V Parthica was Amida’s primary garrison in 359 CE and was probably created and/or deployed there after Amida was captured by the Sasanians in 336 CE when the city was rebuilt and heavily fortified.

Hierapolis, just south of the key bridges at Zeugma, was the yearly mustering point and training ground for the eastern field army. Constantius II, Gallus, and Julian all mustered their armies at this city before starting their campaigns. The city was located in a central position blocking the three Sasanian avenues of approach toward Antioch (the Mesopotamian plain, the Singara limes along the Jebel Sinjar, and the Euphrates) while acting as a staging and training area for the eastern field army so that it could use the same avenues as advance routes against the Sasanians. Edessa (located east of the Euphrates), with its weapons factories and storehouses, acted as a forward assembly area for the field army. While walled, Edessa was not considered part of the fortified zone. It was the eastern field army when located at Edessa that made the city a significant military threat to any Sasanian army operating in northern Mesopotamia.

The actual manpower required to man the defenses along the limes is still an open issue. The Arabian limes provides a baseline for the study of the real rather than the theoretical manpower required for the defense of the Eastern border. Unlike the Rhenish-Danubian limes, the Arabian limes never collapsed during the IV and V centuries CE, neither was it adjusted due to a defeat as happened with the Mesopotamian limes. Unlike the old rebuilt forts along the Rhenish-Danubian limes, Diocletian and Constantine established new forts east of the Jordan River and Dead Sea along the old military road, the Via Nova Traiana. The limitanei armies of Arabia and Palaestina were organized much like the other ducatus of the East. The official strength of the armies varies depending upon which theory of late Roman unit strength is accepted. Using the Notitia Dignitatum, A.H.M. Jones (writing in 1964) estimated that the ducatus of Arabia was garrisoned by a limitanei army of between 13,500 and 19,500 men (consisting of two legiones, twelve cavalry equites and alae units, and five infantry cohortes). Samuel T. Parker (writing in 2006), and his team excavated the Arabian limes and estimated the effective strength of the Arabian limitanei army at between 6,050 and 8,050 men. While A.H.M. Jones and Samuel T. Parker agree on the number and type of units, Parker based his reduced unit size upon the small size of the fortresses and Roman military records found in Egypt. These records and the excavated barracks suggest that limitanei cavalry units were comprised of 120 horsemen and infantry cohortes had around 160 footmen rather than A.H.M. Jones’ theorized strength of 500. After the war started again in 338 CE, it would be surprising if Contantius II had maintained the two legion per province deployment. By 359 CE five additional legions could be found garrisoning key fortresses within Mesopotamia.

The two-legion provincial defense formula is probably not realistic for the decades-long Nisibis War. It is more suited to the relatively peaceful period ca. 395 CE when the Notitia Dignitatum was compiled. Chris S. Lightfoot pointed out that scholars usually disregard the policing of the regiones transtigritanae when trying to unravel the deployment of Roman garrisons after the First Treaty of Nisibis. Lightfoot provides a defensive deployment for the Roman East by templating the legiones pseudocomitatenses found on the Notitia Dignitatum and mentioned by the sources as operating in the region during the Nisibis War. Lightfoot concluded that Legiones I and II Armeniacae, I and II Flaviae, and VI Parthica were deployed along the Tigris prior to the beginning of the Nisibis War.

The key fortress cities of Amida, Cefa, Bezabde, and Castra Maurorum guarded not only the approaches to Nisibis but also provided law enforcement, and administrative and military control to the regiones transtigritanae. Amida was responsible for Greater Sophene, Cefa for Arzanene, and Bezabde for Zabdicene. John Harrel proposed that there were elements of additional legions assigned to Mesopotamia prior to or after 337 CE. Adjusting the template for the additional legions, the deployment according to Harrel would be as follows:
  • Legio IV Parthica at Circesium on the Euphrates.
  • Legio III Parthica at Apatna (modern Tell Fdyin, northern Iraq).
  • Legio I Parthica at Nisibis.
  • Legio I Flavia at Singara (perhaps with part of Legio I Parthica reinforcing it).
  • Legio VI Parthica at Castra Maurorum.
  • Legio II Flavia at Bezabde.
  • Legio II Parthica at Cefa.
  • Legio V Parthica at Amida (assigned after the city was retaken from the Sasanians in 336 CE).
  • Legio I Armeniaca in the Anzitene region.
  • Legio II Armeniaca in the Lesser Sophene region.
Chris S. Lightfoot, who wrote a detailed study about Bezabde, discounted its value as an obstacle to a Sasanian attack south of the fortress. But a concentration of two or three legions and their supporting cavalry would be a threat to the Sasanian lines of communication that could not be ignored. A significant blocking force would have had to be detached from the invading army to prevent Legiones VI Parthica, II Flavia, and II Parthica, and their supporting units, from interdicting the Sasanian lines of communication. It is, therefore, not surprising that Sasanian invasions took place mainly along the Singara axis of advance, which was defended by only one legion: Legio I Flavia. This wartime deployment placed five legions and elements of a sixth in the province, instead of the normal two, but the command responsibility could have been divided between the dux of Mesopotamia and a military comes. Giving a military comes command of a troublesome region was not unusual. Isaurian, Egyptian, and, originally, Thracian armies were commanded by military comites. Responsibility for the garrisons at Amida and Cefa may have belonged to such an official. That official could have been a certain comes Aelianus, reported by Ammianus as the commanding general of the unusual grouping of the light legions Superventores (“catchers”) and Praeventores (“interceptors”) who out of the blue appeared to take command of the defence of Amida in 359 CE, according to Ammianus. Roman units with unusual functional titles normally were associated with intelligence and reconnaissance functions. Such activities would be needed to police and administer the regiones transtigritanae.

Roman-Meopotamia-337.png

Roman defensive deployment in northern Mesopotamia in 337 CE, according to John Harrel (The Nisibis War: The Defence of the Roman East AD 337-363).

Thus, according to Harrel there were after 337 CE five limitanei legions with elements of a sixth within Mesopotamia with a combined strength of between 10,000 and 20,000 men. In the Notitia Dignitatum, the province of Mesopotamia contained thirteen cavalry units and two auxiliary infantry cohortes. In 337 CE, at least an additional three auxiliary cavalry regiments should have been added for the three regiones transtigritanae not represented in the Notitia Dignitatum, in addition to at least one additional unit of equites promoti. Assuming A.H.M. Jones’ estimate of 500 per regiment-size unit as correct, the cavalry and auxiliary strength in the whole region would have been 10,500 men (9,500 cavalry and 1,000 infantry). Applying Samuel T. Parker’s figures of approximately 200 men per cavalry unit and cohors, the total would be 4,200 (3,800 cavalry and 400 infantry). Pre-XX century armies commonly allowed their regimental strength to drop below fifty per cent when engaged in constabulary operations, which could perhaps explain the discrepancy between the two figures.

In addition, at least three additional legions would have been responsible for the east side of the Tigris and a military comes could have been appointed to have supervised these units. The legions deployed beyond the Tigris probably occupied an unidentified fortress on the east side of the Tigris supported by the normal auxiliary cavalry and infantry units. Comes Aelianus commanded a brigade-type force, consisting of two “light” legions, to provide a reaction force to counter stronger Sasanian incursions. Their skirmishes would have been considered too insignificant for Ammianus to take take them into account in his Res Gestae.

Regiones-Transtigritanae.jpg

Map of the five regiones transtigritanae annexed by Rome in the First Treaty of Nisibis in 299 CE.

This defensive strategy employed between 10,000 and 20,000 men in fortified positions across the province of Mesopotamia with at least 3,800 cavalrymen patrolling the limes. For this defence strategy to work properly though, the field army of the East had to advance into the defensive zone and counter any large Sasanian invasion. Added to these numbers would be the small garrisons beyond the Tigris and the attached “light brigade”. As the Nisibis War unfolded, considerations in other regions of the empire dictated where the field army of the East was committed. As a result, the five legions assigned to Mesopotamia successfully defeated Persian invasions, often alone, unsupported by Constantius II for most of the twenty-five years the war lasted.

The Sasanian kings faced a strategic dilemma similar to that of the Romans. They faced the Romans and their Arab and Armenian allies on their western border, and they had to contend with nomadic tribal confederations on their northern and north-eastern borders. After Constantine I’s official adoption of Christianity, they had an additional, perceived internal threat from their Christian population. Like the Roman empire, Ērānšahr had turned Mesopotamia into a fortified zone. Sasanian Mesopotamia had developed fortified cites along the Euphrates similar to what the Romans had done. The cities of Anatha, Thilutha, Achaiachaia, Baraxmialcha, and Pirisabora (Pērōz-Šābuhr) on the Euphrates and Maozamalcha on the canal between the Tigris and Euphrates (all described in Ammianus’ account of Julian’s campaign) were significant fortifications. In addition to the fortified Euphrates cities, there was a system of moats and earth walls west of the Euphrates to hinder raiding Saracens and defend the irrigated lands of central and southern Mesopotamia, complete with permaments garrisons.

The region east of the Caspian Sea up to the oasis of Marv (Mu-lu to the Chinese) was where the Eurasian steppe met the Iranian plateau. After 350 CE, this section of the Sasanian biorder would be under constant pressure from Central Asian tribal confederations. The situation became so troublesome that during the V century CE, the Sasanians built a 193 km-long wall between the Caspian Sea and the Kopet Dagh Mountains just north of and parallel to the Gorgan river. The wall had fortresses along its length with a barracks capacity of up to 30,000 men. Further east though there was a huge gap between the Kopet Dagh range and the western slopes of the Afghan mountains that was impossible to cover with linear defenses. The security of this part of the border was entrusted to the fortified oasis city of Marv, where in addition to the city walls proper, there was a wall around the oasis that was almost 240 km long that dated back to Hellenistic times. It’s unknown though whether these outer walls were operational during the fourth century. Further back from Marv, a second line of defense was provided by the fortified cities of Tūs and Nev-Šābuhr.

Throughout the entire war, Šābuhr II adopted an offensive strategy to regain the cities and regions lost as a result of the Peace of Nisibis of 299 CE. During the period 337 to 350 CE, the Sasanians launched at least five major offensives where they massed the full resources of their empire against Constantius II. In three of the offensives they were able to break through the ring of outer Roman fortresses and unsuccessfully besiege the fortress city of Nisibis. Geography limited the armies of Šābuhr II to three avenues of approach to attack Nisibis. The first route required the spāh to muster at Ctesiphon and move west along the canals linking the Tigris to the Euphrates. The army would then march north along the Euphrates to Syria. This route was well supplied with water and, during the campaign season, would provide adequate fodder for the animals of the army. Its main problem would have been supplying rations to the army, and a supply fleet would have had to be towed against the Euphrates’ current. Ammianus informs us that 20,000 soldiers would have been required to pull Julian’s 1,000 supply boats and barges up the Tigris in his retreat (if he hadn’t burnt them). It is likely that, if the Persians used the Euphrates route for a large army, they would have had to overcome an equally difficult supply problem. A fast-moving and small cavalry force could use this route to appear suddenly in Roman Syria, but it would be impractical for a large combined arms army.

Despite its disadvantages, during the 250s, Šābuhr I used the Euphrates invasion route with great success, but as we saw in my previous thread practically no reliable contemporary information about this invasion has arrived toi us. After the destruction of Dura Europos by Šābuhr I, Circesium, at the confluence of the Euphrates and Khabur rivers, became the new Roman bastion on the Euphrates. Garrisoned by Legio IV Parthica, and closely supported by Legio III Parthia at Apatna, Circesium blocked any Sasanian offensive up the Euphrates. During the Nisibis War Šābuhr II did not use the Euphrates avenue of approach for a major invasion.

Tigris-Cizre.jpg

View of the Tigris river near the Turkish town of Cizre, which is generally assumed to correspond to the site of the Roman fortified town of Bezabde.

During the IV century, routes two and three seem to have been the traditional Sasanian invasion routes into Roman Syria. The spāh would muster first at Ctesiphon. During is march northwards, it would increase its strength with contingents and allies joining it from across the Zagros passes. In the vicinity of Nineveh, it would cross the Tigris behind a large reconnaissance and security screen of cavalry. Not burdened with slow marching infantry, elephants, and logistics trains, this cavalry advance guard would be raiding and scouting deep into Roman territory before the Persian main body crossed the Tigris. During the third century, Šābuhr I used this avenue of approach in the second of his two campaigns against the Roman East. In the III century CE though, there were no Roman garrisons at Bezabde and Castra Maurorum. As a result, Šābuhr I treated routes two and three as a single avenue of approach. During the IV century CE, the garrisons at Bezabde and Castra Maurorum complicated the problem of using the route in the vicinity of these fortresses. During the III century CE, Roman soldiers and civilians in bypassed fortified cities and fortresses actively fought Sasanian outriders and raiding parties, and there is no reason to believe that their descendants would’ve acted differently. Because of these fortresses, Šābuhr II favoured route two across the Singara limes for his invasions throughout the war.

Roman strategy against Ērānšahr varied, but with the exception of Julian there is one common feature for all of the emperors, which was that they all sought to form alliances against the Sasanian empire in order to isolate it and to seek the help of fortresses and the geography in their defensive strategy.
 
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6.6 THE FIRST SIEGE OF NISIBIS.
6.6 THE FIRST SIEGE OF NISIBIS.

The death of Constantine I on May 22, 337 CE put an end to the plans for a great Roman offensive against the Sasanians, and Šābuhr II took the opportunity to seize the initiative again. The rapid recovery of the Sasanian offensive capabilities so soon after their defeat at Narasara indicates that their losses in this battle must’ve been not that important, or at least that they did not affect significantly the core element of the Sasanian army (the armored cavalrymen from the noble class). Constantius II would be busy for the following year and a half settling affairs in Europe with his two brothers and in Constantinople, and his presence is not attested firmly again in the East until October 338 CE (when he issued two rescripts in Antioch and Emesa). During time, he probably took with him a sizeable part of the mobile army assembled in the East for the invasion of Ērānšahr, and so he left the defense of the East completely in the hands of the ripensis/limitanei forces that garrisoned the network of forts and fortified cities in Mesopotamia and the regiones transtigritanae. Luckily for him, the defensive deployment carefully built up by Diocletian and Constantine during the previous four decades would prove its value against this first Sasanian assault.

According to several ancient sources, in the summer of 337 CE, Šābuhr II invaded Roman Mesopotamia at the head of a large army and besieged Nisibis. The best Roman souce for this war is Ammianus Marcellinus’ Res Gestae, but sadly its first thirteen (out of a total of thirty-one) books have been lost, including the part that covers the events of the war before 359 CE, so in order to reconstruct the events before this date we have to use other sources which are much less detailed than Ammianus’ work. According to Jerome’s Chronicon:

Shapur, king of the Persians, besieged Nisibis for two months after laying waste to Mesopotamia (…) Bishop Jacob of Nisibis came to be recognized. The city was frequently delivered from danger through his prayers.

Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Religious History:

After the passage of time that great and admirable emperor (i.e. Constantine I) yielded up his life, with its crowns of piety, and his sons inherited his authority. At this moment the king of the Persians, whose name was Shapur and who despised the sons of Constantine as being less capable than their father, marched against Nisibis at the head of a vast army comprising both cavalry and infantry, and also as many elephants as he could muster.

Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Ecclesiastical History:

Nisibis, sometimes called Antiochia Mygdonia, lies on the confines of the realms of Persia and of Rome. In Nisibis, Jacob whom I named just now was at once bishop, guardian, and commander in chief. He was a man who shone with the grace of a truly apostolic character. His extraordinary and memorable miracles, which I have fully related in my Religious History, I think it superfluous and irrelevant to enumerate again. One, however, I will record because of the subject before us. The city which Jacob ruled was now in the possession of the Romans and besieged by the Persian army. The blockade was prolonged for seventy days.

Chronicle of Ephrem the Syrian:

A little later the great and famous Constantine, the victorious emperor, died; after him his sons took up the dominion. However, when a few days had passed, Shapur, king of Persia, despising the youth of Constantine’s sons, set forth against Nisibis with a huge army and countless horses and elephants. After dividing up his army, they got ready to prosecute the siege. When the siege had been dragged out for seventy days (…)

Theophanes, Chronographia:

In the same year (337 CE), Shapur, the king of the Persians, came up to Mesopotamia to attack Nisibis and besieged it for sixty-three days, but not having the power to capture it, he departed. Jacob, the bishop of the Nisibenes, who persevered in the practice of piety, easily accomplished with his prayers the purposes of his resolve. It was he who foiled the hope of the Persians in capturing Nisibis. As soon as they retired from the city, pursued by the blast of his prayer, and returned to their own land, they received famine and plague as wages in payment for the impiety they had committed.

Chronicle of Michael the Syrian:

When Shapur, king of the Persians, learned that Constantine was dead, he again mounted an attack against Nisibis, which is on the frontiers of the Romans and the Persians. It was called Antioch of the Mygdonia. When Shapur reassembled his army and went up against it (i.e. Nisibis), Constantine’s son also gathered an army and came to Antioch. Shapur besieged Nisibis for seventy days (…)

Today the ancient city of Nisibis lies mostly under the Turkish city of Nusaybin, located just next to the Syrian border; it belongs to the Mardin district and the place had been inhabited by humans since the Neolithic. The city lies near the southern escarpments of mountain range that separates the eastern Anatolian plateau from the Mesopotamian plain. The western part of this range is known as Mazı Mountain (as it’s covered by Mazı trees; in Roman times it was called Izalla Mons) and the eastern part is known as the Tur Abdin mountains; nowadays this name is often used to refer to the whole range. During the Late Antiquity and Middle Ages, these mountains became studded with monasteries and ermites belonging to the Assyrian Orthodox Church. Nisibis is traversed by the Çağ Çağ river (known as Mygdonius in Roman times) which is born out of the joining of the White (Beyaz) and Black (Kara) streams which stem from the highlands between Nisibis and Midyat; the Çağ Çağ river flows into the Khabur river which in turn is a tributary of the Euphrates.

Beyaz-Su.jpg

The Beyaz Su (White Stream), upstream from Nusaybin.

Nisibis was given the status of a Greek polis by the Seleucids and renamed as Antiochia Mygdonia (as you can see in the fragments quoted above). It was mainly inhabited by Semitic Aramaic speakers, and it was a strongly Christian city already in 337 CE, judging by the relevant paper given to its bishop Jacob during Šābuhr II’s first siege (the chronicler Ephrem the Syrian was also a native of Nisibis), and by the renowned theological School of Nisibis which flourished in it between 325 and 363 CE, when it was relocated to Edessa after the Romans lost the city to the Sasanians. It also had an important Jewish community and a famous yeshiva.

Beyaz-Su-Qara-Su.jpg

Confluence of the Beyaz Su (White Stream) and Kara Su (Black Stream) to form the Çağ Çağ river, upstream from Nusaybin.

Although the presence of the Mygdonius river meant that the surrounding lands could be irrigated, the importance of Nisibis did not come from the fertility of its lands, but from its geographical position. Its proximity to the wooded mountains to the north ensured its prosperity since ancient times, as in woodless Mesopotamia whoever could trade in timber had a sure livinghood. Nisibis also sat astride the main road that from Edessa led to the upper Tigris along the southern slopes of the Tur Abdin mountains, but most importantly since Assyrian times onwards, it held a key location at the crossroads between Mesopotamia and Anatolia. It was on the way of important trade routes leading towards Edessa, Resaina, Singara, Amida, Hatra and further east to Nineveh and Mosul.

Septimius Severus had raised it to the status of colonia, and Severus Alexander had given it the title of metropolis. The city also held a mint during the late II and III centuries CE, probably to pay the Roman garrisons in Mesopotamia and Osrhoene.

Today, nothing remains above the ground of the ancient city, except for the ruined church of Saint Jacob, which dates probably to the IV century CE. There’s no trace of famed walls of the city which resisted so many sieges, and as far as I’m aware, no systematic archaeological digs have been conducted in the place, so nothing is know with assurance about the layout of the ancient city. Our only source of informations are the written sources and educated guesses. The Peace of Nisibis of 299 CE probably gave a huge boost to the city, because Diocletian imposed upon the Sasanian Šāhān Šāh Narsē that all trade between Rome and Ērānšahr would be conducted from that moment on through this city, and it’s significative that of all the points of the treaty, Narsē only tried to resist this one (according to the account of Peter the Patrician). During the course of the war between the Romans and Sabuhr II, Nisibis withstood three large-scale Sasanian sieges; this implies that it was heavily fortified and, in his Res Gestae, Ammianus labeled it the "impregnable city" (urbs inexpugnabilis) and "bulwark of the provinces" (murus provinciarum).

Nisibis-01.jpg

Together with the church of Saint Jacob (Mor Yaqub) these are the only remains of ancient Nisibis visible above ground level.

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The church of Saint Jacob.


According to the chronicles of Theodoret of Cyrrhus and Ephrem the Syrian, this first siege of Nisibis was an all-out affair, conducted with all sort of siege methods and devices by the Sasanians, including hydraulic works on a large scale.

Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Religious History:

He divided his army as for a siege and completely surrounded the city, setting up machines of war, commissioning towers, erecting palisades, the areas between strewn with branches placed crosswise, then he ordered his troops to raise embankments and build towers against the city towers. Then, while dispatching his archers to ascend the towers and direct their arrows at those defending the walls, at the same time he charged others with undermining the walls from below. Yet all these plans came to nothing, rendered useless by the prayers of Jacob, that inspired man, until finally, by prodigious effort, Shapur stopped up the course of the river which flowed past the city and when as vast an amount as possible of the accumulating water had piled up behind the dam, he released it all at once against the walls, using it like a tremendously powerful battering-ram. The wall could not withstand the force of the water, and indeed, badly shaken by the flood, the whole stretch of that side of the city collapsed. Then there arose a great shout, as though the city were now ready for the taking; for they had overlooked the great wall formed by the city’s inhabitants. However, the Persians postponed their assault, since they could see that the water flooding into the city made access impossible. Retreating, then, some distance, as though relaxing their efforts, they rested themselves and tended their horses. The citizens, on the other hand, redoubled their prayers, with the noble Jacob as their intercessor. All those old enough to be of use set to in earnest to rebuild their defences, without regard to appearance or neatness of construction: indeed, they threw everything together, pell-mell, stones and bricks, whatever they could carry, and in one night the work progressed and attained a sufficient height to prevent either a cavalry charge or an assault by troops with scaling-ladders. Then everyone begged the man of God to show himself on the ramparts and hurl imprecations down over the enemy. He agreed and mounted the wall and looking out over the vast multitude of the enemy he prayed to God to send upon them a cloud of gnats and mosquitoes. He spoke, and the Lord, persuaded as he was by Moses, delivered. The men were mortally wounded by the heaven-sent darts, the horses and elephants broke their tethers and escaped, plunging this way and that, unable to bear the stings.

The impious king saw now that all his machines had brought him no advantage, that the flooding of the river had been in vain-for the breach in the wall had been repaired—, and that his entire army was exhausted from its
labours, suffering badly from exposure and lack of shelter and harassed by this blow from the heavens. When, on top of this, he saw the holy man walking upon the ramparts, he supposed it was the emperor in person who presided over the operations—for he seemed to be wearing the purple robe and the diadem—, and then he turned in anger on those who had deceived him and advised him to undertake this campaign, guaranteeing that the emperor was not present. He condemned them to death, disbanded his army and returned to his royal palace as quickly as possible.

Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Ecclesiastical History:

“Helepoleis” and many other engines were advanced to the walls. The town was begirt with a palisade and entrenchment, but still held out. The river Mygdonius flowing through the middle of the town, at last the Persians dammed its flow a considerable distance upriver, and increased the height of its bank on both sides so as to shut the waters in. When they saw that a great mass of water was collected and already beginning to overflow the dam, they suddenly launched it like an engine against the wall. The impact was tremendous; the bulwarks could not sustain it but gave way and fell down. Just the same fate befell the other side of the circuit, through which the Mygdonius made its exit; it could not withstand the shock and was carried away. No sooner did Shapur see this than he expected to capture the rest of the city, and for all that day he rested for the mud to dry and the river to become passable. Next day he attacked in full force and looked to enter the city through the breaches that had been made. But he found the wall built up on both sides, and all his labour vain. For that holy man, through prayer, filled with valour both the troops and the rest of the townsfolk, and both built the walls, withstood the engines, and beat off the advancing foe. And all this he did without approaching the walls, but by beseeching the Lord of all within the church. Shapur, moreover, was not only astounded at the speed of the building of the walls but awed by another spectacle. For he saw standing on the battlements one of kingly mien and all ablaze with purple robe and crown. He supposed that this was the Roman emperor, and threatened his attendants with death for not having announced the imperial presence; but, on their stoutly maintaining that their report had been a true one and that Constantius was at Antioch, he perceived the meaning of the vision and exclaimed “their God is fighting for the Romans”. Then the wretched man in a rage flung a javelin into the air, though he knew that he could not hit a bodiless being, but unable to curb his passion. Therefore, the excellent Ephrem (he is the best writer among the Syrians) besought the divine Jacob to mount the wall to see the barbarians and to let fly at them the darts of his curse. So, the divine man consented and climbed up into a tower; but when he saw the innumerable host, he discharged no other curse than to ask that mosquitoes and gnats might be sent forth upon them, so that by means of these tiny animals they might learn the might of the Protector of the Romans. On his prayer followed clouds of mosquitoes and gnats; they filled the hollow trunks of the elephants, and the ears and nostrils of the horses and other animals. Finding the attack of these little creatures past endurance they broke their bridles, unseated their riders and threw the ranks into confusion. The Persians abandoned their camp and fled headlong. So, the wretched prince learned by a slight and kindly chastisement the power of the God who protects the pious, and marched his army home again, reaping for all the harvest of the siege not triumph but disgrace.

Chronicle of Ephrem the Syrian:

When the siege had been dragged out for seventy days, some distance away he dammed the flow of the river which entered and divided in the middle of the city; and the wall was unable to withstand the force of the great quantity of water so that it tottered and collapsed. Shapur thought that he could then capture the city without trouble. But the bishop Jacob and the Blessed Ephrem with all the church through the whole time of the siege were interceding with God. Finally, the holy bishop raised the strength and morale of the cavalry and of all the inhabitants of the city: he rebuilt the wall and he set up a structure and ballista on it, by means of which he checked and drove back the besiegers. He accomplished these things although in person he was far removed from the wall, being in God’s temple and interceding with the Lord of all. However, Shapur was astounded not so much by the ease with which the wall had been raised as by the vision which was afforded to his eyes and had a great effect upon him. For he saw a man standing on the wall who was in an emperor’s attire and whose robe reflected the rays of the light. Since he thought that he was the Roman emperor, he poured forth threats against those who had asserted that the Roman emperor was then present in Antioch. Afterwards he understood that the signs were of a vision of the God of the Romans who was fighting on their behalf. Unaware indeed that he was striking the disembodied, the wretched Shapur poured out his threats and hurled his arrows, but soon he was obliged to calm the frenzy of his madness. Then the admirable Ephrem, whom we mentioned earlier, requested of the holy Jacob that he be allowed to climb up on the wall, to look upon the barbarians and to hurl at them his curses’ darts. When the glorious (Jacob) heard him, relying on the grace which had accompanied (Ephrem) in the miracle that had once been performed at his hands, he allowed him to climb up. Ephrem climbed up on one of the towers of the wall and, after beholding the great number of their myriads, he raised his gaze to heaven, and requested God to send upon the enemy gnats and midges that by the help of those tiny animals he could so fight the enemy that they should be forced to recognize the power of God. The blessed man had scarcely finished praying when a cloud of gnats and midges went out, which overwhelmed the elephants especially—they have smooth and hairless skin—and filled the noses and ears of the horses and other animals. But those animals, since they could not withstand the might of this punishment, broke their reins, threw their riders, broke rank and quitting the camp hurriedly took flight. But the wretched man (i.e. Shapur), apprised of the power of God the Strengthener of the Christians by (this) small chastisement, departed from there, gathering disgrace instead of victory from his toil. Thus, the city was saved by the prayers of the blessed Ephrem.

The three texts tell basically the same story. The Sasanian army surrounded Nisibis in its entirety and the proceeded to set up all the paraphernalia necessary for besieging a large fortified city. The Sasanians were obviously not going to starve the city out, for they set up trenches and palisades, but they also built siege machines and siege towers, the Sasanian archers climbed onto these towers which were then moved near enough to the walls to allow them to pour arrows onto the defenders. At the same time, the engineers of the Sasanian army began to dig up mines to breach the walls, but all these efforts were unfruitful. According to Harrel’s analysis of IV century CE logistics, the Sasanian army probably took with it supplies for a maximum of ninety days, and in order to reach Nisibis they had left behind them several important Roman fortresses with large garrisons; if they had followed the route along the Jebel Sinjar (like Harrel suggested), then Singara lay directly atop their lines of communications (and Bezabde would have been not that far away too), so unless Šābuhr II had left a sizeable force blocking Singara and patrolling the Tigris valley and the roads between the Tigris and Nisibis along the Jebel Sinjar, getting supplies to the army gathered in front of Nisibis would’ve been a difficult enterprise. And then there was the added uncertainty about the field army of the East gathered at Antioch. As long as Constantius II remained busy in Europe and Constantinople, it was not that nuch of a danger, but with every passing day the risk increased that Constantius II could return with reinforcements from Europe and led the praesentalis army into Mesopotamia; after his dashing victory at Narasara the Sasanian commanders (Šābuhr II included) seemed to have developed a healthy respect towards Constantius II’s abilities as a field commander, and having to fight his main field army with an army tired after a long siege and with their backs against the walls of Nisibis (and deep behind the outer screen of Roman-controlled fortified cities) was not an appealing thought.

The texts are contradictory in some points; according to Ephrem the Syrian it took seventy days for the Sasanian king to decided that Nisibis was not going to fall to “conventional” siege methods and he decided to try other approaches, while Theodoret of Cyrrhus wrote that the siege lasted in total seventy days; is we accept Harrel’s estimate for the duration of an army’s own supplies, then Theodoret’s duration seems more credible. In Theodoret of Cyrrhus’ Ecclesiastic History there’s an interesting mention to the use of a “helepoleis” by the besieging Sasanian army. In the Hellenistic and Roman texts of Diodorus Siculus, Vitruvius, Plutarch, and in the Athenaeus Mechanicus, it’s described as a movable siege tower, but in the Byzantine era it changed meaning and referred to a trebuchet; usually the first mention to it in this new meaning is considered to be its use at the siege of Tiflis by Heraclius as described by Theopilact Symocatta, but I’ve been unable to find any explanation as to which meaning is to be applied to this reference. I’d lean towards the ancient meaning, as the trebuchet was a Chiese invention and is considered to have been brought to Europe by the Avars and Turks.

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Model of a "helepolis" or "helepoleis" according to the descriptions of ancient authors, Thessaloniki Science Center and Technology Museum.

All three texts agree that Šābuhr II ordered to build a dam upstream the Mygdonius river and waited until enough water had accumulated in it, and then ordered the dam to be torn down so that the water thus delivered would slam against the walls of Nisibis. Ilkka Syvänne made the interesting observation that Šābuhr II seems to have been interested in hydraulics, and I agree with him. According to Tabarī, while he was still a minor, he had already ordered a second bridge over the Tigris to be built between Ctesiphon and Wēh-Ardaxšir, and the War-ē Tāzīgān that he ordered to be built to protect Āsōrestān against Arab raiders also consisted of an artificial canal behind which earthworks, watchtowers and small forts were erected.

Šābuhr II’s idea was a success, but then he found there was a problem he hadn’t accounted for (probably because he was still relatively inexperienced in siege warfare and because such “drastic” tactics were rarely employed in siege warfare, although they were not by any means an invention of this king): although the walls had been breached (according to Theodoret of Cyrrhus’ Ecclesiatic History, it had been berached on two opposite sides, in the places where the water current had entered and then left the city) now the land around the walls had tuened into an unpassable swamp of shallow water and mud; Theodoret and Ehprem don’t say it explicitly, but it was probably more of a problem for the Sasanian savārān and elephants than for its infantry, but due to the perceived superiority of Roman infantry in close quarter combat Sabuhr II probably did not want to run risks leaving his best shock forces behind. So, the Sasanian king made a mistake that would cost him the siege (a rookie’s mistake) and decided to wait for the terrain to dry up.

The Romans wasted no time, and while the Sasanians waited, they raised a new wall in place of the ruined ones; according to Theodoret of Cyrrhus’ Ecclesiastical History, the waiting period lasted one day and one night, during which every able-bodied citizen of Nisibis was conscripted for the task of building the provisory wall. And when the Sasanian army launched its assault the next day, it found the breaches blocked by the hastily erected defences.

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The Çag Çag river (ancient Mygdonius).

No ancient account gives us the name of the military commander of the Nisibis garrison. The ones who give them, like Theodoret’s and Ephrem’s, only name bishop Jacobas responsible for the “miraculous” delivery of the city. Both Theodoret and Ephrem were Christian priests (Theodoret was bishop of Cyrrhus), and their works were first and foremost ecclesiastical histories, so the hagiographic element is inevitable. But it could be possible that bishop Jacob took an important and even active part in the defense of Nisibis, just by helping to sustain the morale of the soldiers and populace, and apparently, if we’re to believe Theodoret’s and Ephrem’s accounts, he even showed himself from the walls, praying for the divine help against the “barbarians”. Again, according to Theodoret of Cyrrhus’ Ecclesiastical History, his appearance on the battlements had an unexpected effect on the morale of the enemy, because Šābuhr II, upon seeing a figure dressed in purple and gold standing on the walls, thought that Constantius II had managed to arrive to the city, and ordered to lift the siege.

John Harrel noted that a task such as daming the Mygdonius could not have been achieved in a few days; some historians even doubt the feasibility of such task (and the veracity of ancient accounts) due to the nature of the terrain around Nisibis and the Mygdonius river iyself. But doing so goes against several ancient accounts which all of which are unamimous in that the Sasanian siege army did indeed dam the river. Harrel though thought (and I find his guess to be quite sound) that the works for building the temporary dam must’ve begun as soon as the Sasanian army began the siege, and that seventy days would’ve been a reasonable amount of time for the task to be finished (after all, Sasanian armies regularly incluend a few thousand of “expendable” peasant conscripts that were levied expressly for such labors) and that Šābuhr II, who probably feared that Nisibis would be a tough nut to crack and that the time opportunity available to him was limited, ordered the dam to be built as a last-resource measure as soon as the siege began.

The three accounts offer though as the main reason for the lifting of the siege (apart from the failure of Šābuhr II’s costly engineering procedure) is a plague of gnats and mosquitoes “sent by God” through the prayers of bishop Jacob and the “blessed Ephrem”, which would’ve been particularly onerous against the horses and elephants of the Sasanian army. This could be considered merely as a piece of Christian hagiography (with obvious biblical parallelisms to the Plagues that God sent against the Egyptians in the Book of Exodus), if Ammianus Marcellinus (who was not a Christian) had not also made a reference to it in his Res Gestae, when writing about the Sasanian war elephants in later campaigns. If we don’t want to believe in divine interventions, the reason for this could be in the very same tactics used by Šābuhr II, which probably turned the environs of Nisibis into a swamp during the midst of the Mesopotamian summer.

The Chronicle of Ephrem the Syrian though adds a detail that doesn’t appear in the two accounts by Theodoret of Cyrrhus: according to him, it was a “huge ballista” that prevented the Sasanian troops from approaching the breach, and not any hastily built walls.

The Chronicon of Michael the Syrian offers an account very similar to the two I’ve quoted above:

Shapur besieged Nisibis for seventy days: he built ramps against it, he dug ditches and dammed the course of the river which entered and divided itself in the middle of the city. This river was called Mygdonius. Shapur had dykes built on both banks, and had the dam strengthened so that it would resist the raging torrent. The waters flowed over the wall which, unable to withstand the pressure, tottered and fell; he also made a breach in the opposite part, through which the waters escaped. Shapur was confident he could subdue the town without trouble following the collapse of the wall. Having done nothing that day, the next day he saw the wall rebuilt on both sides. The bishop Jacob filled the cavalry and the people with strength by prayer; they built the wall, set up a structure and ballistae above it. He did that while persevering in prayer inside the church. Shapur was astonished, not only at the rebuilding, but also at the vision which appeared to him. He saw a man wrapped in a cloak, who was standing on the wall; his garment and his crown were shedding rays of light. He thought that it was the Roman emperor, and he cursed those who had said to him: “He is not here”. When he had ascertained that Constantius was at Antioch, he understood and said: “It is the God of the Romans who is fighting for them”. It is why this wretched man shot an arrow into the air, knowing that he could do no harm. The blessed Ephrem asked the bishop if he could climb up on the wall to curse the barbarians. Seeing their hordes, he prayed to God to send clouds of insects and mosquitoes upon them: they came upon them (immediately); the elephants were particularly bothered by them, because their skin is smooth and hairless. They also entered the nostrils and ears of the horses which, unable to stand the pain, broke their halters, threw off their riders and ran away. And Shapur returned, covered in shame. Ignatius of Melitene says: “God also sent torrential rain upon the Persians; the plague descended on them and they fled”.

Michael the Syrian though adds another detail absent from the previous three accounts: “God sent torrential rain upon the Persians; the plague descended on them and they fled”. In this, he’s quoting bishop Ignatius of Melitene (? – 1104 CE), and this could very well be the reason for the plagues of mosquitoes and gnats that fell upon the Sasanian army.

A detail that is also present in the accounts of Ephrem, Theodoret and Michael is that Šābuhr II was (wrongly) surprised by the supposed appearance of emperor Constantius II on the battlements of Nisibis (mistaking bishop Jacob for him), and that he then proceeded to threaten with death and/or curse those who had misinformed him. This is a confirmation that the Sasanians did indeed have spies behind the Roman lines, and that they feared the capabilities of Constantius II as a military commander. It also brings forth another point that is commonplace in the Roman accounts about Šābuhr II or indeed about practically any eastern king or leader: the Sasanian king is described as the quintessential eastern despot, prone to fits of rage and punishing others for his own mistakes, following a time-honored tradition began by the Greek accounts of the Persian wars and which has survived to our days. It reappears time and again in Graeco-Roman accounts of this war, and even in Ammianus, who is overall the one of the soberest western writers of antiquity. In comparison, the eastern sources (Tabarī, Ferdowsī, the Pahlavi Books) depict Šābuhr II as the “ideal prince”, and as a mirror of virtues.

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Silver drahm of Šābuhr II.

The first siege of Nisibis ended as a Roman defensive victory, but all in all, it was not as great a victory as it could’ve been. In the first place, the Roman defensive system did not work as planned, because the field army of the East never came to the rescue of the city, and Nisibis had to endure a large-scale siege by the whole Sasanian field army with its own resources, something that was not expected of Roman fortresses. And due to a large part to this strategic Roman failure, Sasanian offensive capabilities were not blunted; if the Sasanian army did suffer losses, most of them must’ve been due to the “plague” and perhaps also to hunger (if the siege stretched for more than seventy days, and we add to this the time spent during the approaching and retreating marches, the Sasanian army spent more than ninety days behind the Roman-controlled outer ring of fortresses in northern Mesopotamia), but probably these losses must’ve affected mainly the most “expendable” assets of the Sasanian army (the peasant levies and the infantry) and not the elite forces of the savārān. And this meant that Šābuhr II, who was nothing if not obstinate, would resume his offensive against the Roman East at the first possible opportunity. But in 337 CE he had wasted a golden chance, because it would not be until 350 CE that Constantius II would leave the East again for a protracted period of time.
 
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Great if long stories again :)

I do think you may be underselling the Romans in your final paragraph, though - for all intents and purposes it seems Sabuhr II struck at the worst possible moment for Rome (i.e. only the local troops were able to do anything, no reinforcements were forthcoming) and he still got beaten back. Not harshly, but still; if Rome had scored a major victory in those circumstances it would mean Rome was ridiculously more powerful in any cases where the rest of the Empire could respond.
 
Great if long stories again :)

I do think you may be underselling the Romans in your final paragraph, though - for all intents and purposes it seems Sabuhr II struck at the worst possible moment for Rome (i.e. only the local troops were able to do anything, no reinforcements were forthcoming) and he still got beaten back. Not harshly, but still; if Rome had scored a major victory in those circumstances it would mean Rome was ridiculously more powerful in any cases where the rest of the Empire could respond.

As you will see, between 337 and 350 CE Šābuhr II would continue his attacks and besiege Nisibis twice more, but this time Constantius II would be in a position to employ his praesentalis army to thwart his attempts, which is the way the defensive system of the late Roman empire was supposed to work. In 350 CE, both monarchs had to leva the Middle east to deal with urgent threats elsewhere (Constantius II with the usurpation of Magnentius in Gaul, and Šābuhr II with the attacks of steppe peoples in his Central Asian borders. Šābuhr II would be the first to return in 359 CE after reaching some sort of peace settlement with his Central Asian enemies while Constantius II was still busy in Europe, and once more the Roman defenses in the East were left to their own devices against a full-scale Sasanian offensive. But this time, the Roman fortresses would be unable to cope, and in three years Šābuhr II managed to take Amida, Singara and Bezabde, leaving the Roman defensive perimeter around Mesopotamia completely unhinged. This time, unlike in 337 CE, Šābuhr II had lots of experience fighting the Romans behind him and did not make the mistake of attacking Nisibis without securing his lines of communication and he conducted a systematic three-year long campaign against the outer perimeter of Roman fortresses, with complete success.

In my opinion, the Romans were lucky in 337 CE, mostly due to the inexperience of the Sasanian king. Twenty-two years later, they would not be so lucky. The system was not designed to work without a mobile campaign army supporting the fortresses in Mesopotamia and beyond the Tigris, and in 359-361 CE the Romans reaped the consequences of this.
 
6.7 CONSTANTIUS II RETURNS TO THE EAST. ARMENIA, AND THE WAR OF ATTRITION AGAINST ŠĀBUHR II.
6.7 CONSTANTIUS II RETURNS TO THE EAST. ARMENIA, AND THE WAR OF ATTRITION AGAINST ŠĀBUHR II.

Constantius II’s presence back in Antioch is attested for October 338 CE. It’s probable though that before entering Antioch, he’d campaigned in Armenia in order to restore some semblance of order in that kingdom (under a pro-Roman king, that is). The only Graeco-Roman source that mentions this Armenian settlement is Julian’s First Oration (usually referred to as In praise of emperor Constantius), in a highly rhetorical and embellished form:

On that subject, however, I shall have a chance later to speak in more detail. This is perhaps the right moment to describe how you controlled the situation, encompassed as you were, after your father’s death, by so many perils and difficulties of all sorts — confusion, an unavoidable war, numerous hostile raids, allies in revolt, lack of discipline in the garrisons, and all the other harassing conditions of the hour. You concluded in perfect harmony the negotiations with your brothers, and when the time had arrived that demanded your aid for the dangerous crisis of affairs, you made forced marches, and immediately after leaving Paeonia appeared in Syria. But to relate how you did this would tax my powers of description, and indeed for those who know the facts their own experience is enough. But who in the world could describe adequately how, at the prospect of your arrival, everything was changed and improved all at once, so that we were set free from the fears that hung over us and could entertain brighter hopes than ever for the future? Even before you were actually on the spot the mutiny among the garrisons ceased and order was restored. The Armenians who had gone over to the enemy at once changed sides again, for you ejected from the country and sent to Rome those who were responsible for the governor’s exile, and you secured for the exiles a safe return to their own country. You were so merciful to those who now came to Rome as exiles, and so kind in your dealings with those who returned from exile with the governor, that the former did, indeed, bewail their misfortune in having revolted, but still were better pleased with their present condition than with their previous power; while the latter, who were formerly in exile, declared that the experience had been a lesson in prudence, but that now they were receiving a worthy reward for their loyalty. On the returned exiles you lavished such magnificent presents and rewards that they could not even resent the good fortune of their bitterest enemies, nor begrudge their being duly honoured.

Julian’s panegyric to Constantius II doesn’t give much details about events that he supposed his audience already knew well. What can be deduced from the text quoted above is that Constantius II left “Paeonia” (probably a classicizing Homeric archaism for “Pannonia”) in a hurry and reached Syria by way of forced marches. Julian then alludes to a mysterious “mutiny among the garrisons” about which nothing else is known; a possibility is that Julian was referring to the revolt of the allied Arabic tribal confederations of the Banū Tanukh and the Banū Lakhm along the limes Arabicus. Then, Julian mentions that Constantius II “ejected from the country (i.e. Armenia) and sent to Rome those who were responsible for the governor’s exile, and you secured for the exiles a safe return to their own country”; in other words, Constantius II restored king Khosrov to the throne of Armenia. This is not supported by any other Graeco-Roman source, but Armenian chronicles support it, although these texts are not very reliable and are full of fantastic tales, chronological mistakes and anachronisms.

As Hannibalianus was now death, Constantius II reversed Roman policies towards Armenia and went back to the now traditional Roman policy of supporting its Arsacid royal house. According to Faustus of Byzantium, after the double invasions/rebellions of Armenia, king Khosrov had taken refuge in the fortress of Dariwnk’ and had sent the magnate Vache Mamikonian to ask for Roman help. According to Faustus when Vache returned (supposedly in 338 CE; chronology is almost non-existant in Armenian sources) from “Greek” territory, he attacked the camp of the enemy at “Mount Tzugloukh” at dawn and put them to flight with his Armenian feudal forces, thus relieving Khosrov from the siege. Faustus ignores Roman participation, as according to Julian the Romans took active part in restoring Khosrov to the throne.

The Roman intervention is supported by Moses of Chorene, who stated in his History of the Armenians that the Roman “Palace Prefect” Antiochus made Khosrov king and then re-established the same military organization (four military zones plus the royal army under the sparapet) in place as had existed under king Tirdat:

Agreeing to this, Constantius sent Antiochus, his palace prefect, with a strong army, and purple robes, and a crown (…)
When Antiochus arrived, he made Khosrov king and appointed to the same command over the army the four generals whom Trdat had established in his own lifetime (…)

This is interpreted by Ilkka Syvänne as meaning that this “Antiochus” reappointed Bagarat the Aspet as general of the Western Gate; Mirian, the prince/king of Iberia and Vitaxa of Gugark as general of the Northern Gate; Vahan Amatuni as general of the Eastern Gate; and Manachihr, prince of Rshtunik as general of the Southern Gate. To Syvänne, it’s noteworthy the position of the King of Iberia as a noble and general of Armenia, because this would impluy that Iberia was a client state of Armenia. Also, according to Syvänne, it’s probable that the “Antiochus” in question was Iulius Antiochus who was praefectus vigilum between 313 CE and 319 CE and would have been promoted by then to the post of magister officiorum (Syvänne’s guess as the late Roman equivalent to Moses’ “palace prefect”). Syvänne also estimated that considering the difficulty of the task, it is probable that the Roman army sent to Armenia would have consisted of at least of 35,000 - 40,000 men, which would have been almost the entirety of Constantius II’s mobile reserves in the East.

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Landscape near Oshakan, in the modern Republic of Armenia.

According to Faustos of Byzantium, after the surprise attack against the enemy camp Vache Mamikonian (and the Roman army led by Antiochus) led his army down to the plain of the district of Ayrarat. After this, Vache (and Antiochus) attacked the enemy army at Valarshapat and forced them to flee to the fortress of Oshakan. There the armies fought still another battle in which Sanatruk was defeated completely and then pursued all the way up to the country of Paytakaran. According to the chronicle of Faustus of Byzantium, the head of Sanatruk was finally brought to king Khosrov. According to Moses of Chorene, after having reorganized the Armenian kingdom it was Iulius Antiochus who advanced together with the Armenians against Sanatruk in Paytakaran. This implies that there was a short pause in the campaign after the enemy had been forced to flee from Oshakan. According to this version, Sanatruk chose not to fight, but put a Sasanian garrison inside the city and then continued his flight to Sasanian territory. The Roman troops pillaged the rebel territories and then returned back home leaving the war in Armenian hands.

According to Moses of Chorene, while Antiochus pursued Sanatruk to Paytakaran, a second operation commanded by Manachihr of Rshtunik was launched against the rebel Bakur of Aghdznik and his Sasanian helpers “in Assyria”. Aghdznik corresponded (totally or in part) to the satrapy of Anzitene, one of the regions transtigritanae annaexed by Rome in 299 CE. Bakur of Aghdznik was killed in battle and his son taken captive; according to Moses, Manachihr of Rshtunik brought back many captives, including Christian deacons, from the territory of Nisibis. Considering the location of this campaign (inside Roman territory), Ilkka Syvänne considered that it would’ve been strange if Manachihr of Rshtunik’s forces had not supported by the Romans, just like the other Armenian army in Paytakaran was, but in this case, Moses doesn’t specifically mention these. The domains of the lord of Aghdznik (totally or in part) belonged to the Romans, which means that he had not only revolted against his “feudal” lord, but also against the Romans. Moses’ text says:

When Manachihr arrived in the regions of Assyria with the Armenian southern force and the Cilician army, he offered battle to Bakur the bdeashkh and slew him, putting to flight his army and the Persians who had come to his aid.

In Illa Syvänne’s opinion, Moses of Chorene’s reference to this “Cilician army” would’ve referred to a Roman field army posted in the region, which could also imply that the actual command of the operation was in Roman hands as it happened with the other army further north. Whatever the truth, it is still clear that the Armenians were acting as Roman allies and effectively secured the northern approaches to Nisibis with the victory they achieved.

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Landscape of Aghdznik, today in eastern Turkey.

But the war continued in Armenia; the campaign of 338 CE did not end king Khosrov’s troubles. After the Roman forces had withdrawn, the Sasanians invaded Armenia once more. Khosrov made the mistake of ordering Databe, the nahapet of the Bznuni, to collect irregular levies and take the elite-contingent with him and then block the enemy’s route. According to Moses of Chorene, Databe betrayed his army to the sasanian commander and delivered it to be ambushed, with the result that his force was massacred. Now Khosrov gave command of the remnants of his army to Vache Mamikonian who led it against the invaders and defeated the Sasanians at Arest on the shore of Lake Van. After this episode Khosrov entrusted his forces only to two commanders; Vache Mamikonean (sparapet of Armenia, the equivalent to the title of Ērān spāhbed) and Vahan Amatuni (who was, according to Moses of Chorene, commander of the East Gate), and kept the rest of the magnates at court so that he could keep an eye on them. This was not the end of the war between the Khosrov and Šābuhr II, however for it continued unabated until about 345 CE.

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The regions of Greater Armenia.

The combination of these Roman-Armenian succeses with the failure of the Sasanian siege of Nisibis ensured a respite from further major Sasanian offensives for a few years, until 344 CE. John Harrel hypothesized that as Šābuhr II did not take the field in 338 CE and declined a general engagement between 339 CE and 343 CE, his losses during the siege of Nisibis could have been heavy. Or alternatively, Šābuhr II could have faced trouble on his northeast border, and he and the royal army were not in Āsōrestān, leaving the defence of the region to his local generals. A war of attrition was conducted during this period in which the Roman forces defended their territory against constant Sasanian raids.

With the death of Constantine I, his praesentalis army had been divided between his three sons. Bad relations between the brothers and the military requirements of the unstable Rhenish-Danubian border resulted in Constanius II being left unsupported by the rest of the empire during the first phase of the Nisibis War. In his First Oration, Julian stressed that Constantius II controlled only one-third of the empire’s resources at the beginning of the war. With only these limited resources, scholars have guessed that the goal of Constantius II’ foreign policy was merely to maintain the territorial integrity of the Roman empire as established in the First Peace of Nisibis in 299 CE. The means by which he executed this policy varied based upon a realistic assessment of the available resources. Complete reliance upon the fortified zone would have handed the initiative down to the Sasanians, something that no Roman commander of the time with an undefeated army would have willingly done. While a full-scale invasion of the Sasanian empire was not possible with his limited resources, Constantius II’ operational plan included military and political offensive elements, such as securing the help of the Armenians and neighboring Arab tribes. In 338 CE, Constantius II had succeeded in restoring the pro-Roman Arsacid king Khosrov in the Armenian throne (and with it he’d probably also regained control of Caucasian Iberia), and that very same year Constantius II managed to reach an agreement with the Banū Lakhm and the Banū Tanukh and renew the foedi with them.

Around 338 – 339 CE, after Constantius II had gathered enough money and provisions through extra taxes, built riverboats for use as pontoon bridges and transports, collected enough horsemen to match the Sasanian cavalry, conscripted new troops, and had retrained his army, he started to conduct yearly raids across the border just as the Sasanians were doing. Constantius II conquered and pillaged a number of forts, towns and cities, but he did not make the mistake of penetrating too deeply into enemy territory by bypassing enemy fortifications as Julian later did. In the course of the next decade Constantius II built safe harbours at Seleucia in Pieria (the harbor of Antioch) to facilitate the transport of supplies, arms and troops. Antioch became his base of operations as well as his headquarters. During the winters he rested his army and planned the next summer’s operations and during every summer he then put the plans into practice. At the same time, he strengthened the fortifications in Mesopotamia so that the enemy could not exploit his absence from some sector of the border. His main goal was to attempt to force the enemy to fight a decisive pitched battle of the kind they had fought in 336 CE, but with no result because the Sasanians retreated in haste whenever they heard that they faced the emperor and his praesentalis army. Constantius II knew that he had to destroy the enemy’s main field army first in order to be able to invade the enemy territory unhindered so that he could besiege the large number of fortresses in Sasanian Mesopotamia without having to fear enemy relief armies. Šābuhr II’s heavy cavalry seems to have made such an impression upon Constantius II that despite his victory against it at Narasara he decided to imitate it. He equipped his cavalry with similar equipment so that both the rider and horse were fully armoured with chain mail from head to foot.

In 340 CE, a grave event took place in Europe that had grave repercusions for the future of the Constantinian dynasty; the ongoing war against the Sasanians forced Constantius II to remain passive in this conflict. In 340 CE Constantine II decided to wrest control of Italy and Africa from his brother Constans, as he considered them to be his by birthright; after all he was the eldest of the brothers. When in 340 CE Constantine II learnt that his brother, who was at Naissus in Dacia Mediterranea (one of two provinces created south of the Danube to “mask” the loss of Dacia proper by means of imperial propaganda), was facing problems in his ongoing war against the Sarmatians, he decided to act. Naissus undoubtedly served as Constans’ headquarters for a campaign across the Danube. Constantine II convinced his brother Constans that he intended to send reinforcements to him, or alternatively that he intended to send reinforcements for Constantius II through Constans’ territory. As a result, Constantine II was able to march his army across the Alps unmolested and launch a surprise invasion, but Constans acted quickly when he realized his mistake. He immediately dispatched a vanguard (evidently cavalry) under his generals to secure Aquileia in northeastern Italy, while he would follow behind them with the main army. When Constans’ generals came face-to-face with Constantine II near Aquilea, they placed part of their forces in ambush and advanced forward with the rest in order to feign a flight. Constantine II with his cavalry swallowed the bait and set out in pursuit, with the result that the ambushers managed to surround them all. Constantine II and his cavalry were annihilated leaving Constans as the sole ruler of two-thirds of the Roman empire.

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Statue of Constantius II. Piazza del Campidoglio, Rome.

Thanks to the troubles he was facing in the East Constantius II had no other alternative than to accept what had happened, but from now on Constans would not be hesitant about showing his strengthened position vis-à-vis his older brother. After this, Constans would be constantly moving from one front to another against fighting against invaders along the Rhine and the Danube, even moving to Britain briefly. Constantius II’ response to the enlargement of Constans’ domains and power was to create a separate Senate with traditional magistracies for the city of Constantinople in 340 CE; his obvious purpose was to stress his equal standing with his brother. Constans’ strong attachment to the Nicene creed and Constantius II philo-Arrian position only helped to create further animosity between the siblings.

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Bust of Constans. Musée du Louvre, Paris.

There is a document of interest dated to ca. 340 Ce and closely related to the war of Constantius II against Šābuhr II; the “Itinerary of Alexander” (Itinerarium Alexandri), which could have perhaps been written by Constantius II’ courtier and comes Flavius Iulius Valerius Alexander Polemius. He was a very prominent person and apparently a close supporter of Constantius II for he was consul in 338 CE. The Itinerary is dedicated to Constantius II and in the extant manuscript tradition it is united with the Latin version of the “Alexander Romance” to act as a sort of historical counterbalance for the less reliable and fictious Romance. The author’s intention was to include the itineraries of both Alexander and Trajan with an eye towards the forthcoming operations against the Sasanians. It is notable that both Alexander and Trajan sought to engage the Persians in pitched battles in the open. In other words, it foresaw that Constantius would launch an offensive campaign against the Sasanians like Alexander and Trajan. Unfortunately, the extant text breaks up immediately after the death of Alexander, so we are only left with a summary of Alexander’s campaign, which is mostly based on Arrian. Scholars suppose that the account of Trajan’s campaign would also have been based on Arrian. The extant Itinerary portrays Alexander’s good and bad qualities realistically and thereby offers advice on what to imitate and what to avoid. Through the study of this document, several modern scholars have guessed the total strength of Constantius II’s praesentalis army in 340 CE to have stood between 30,000 and 47,000 men.

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Bust of Constantius II.

Between 340 CE and 343 CE Constantius II continued his previously adopted strategy. He attempted to force the Sasanians into a decisive battle by leading his army across the Tigris. The crossing of the river was done by using mobile pontoon bridges that could then be broken into pieces and reassembled as needed. This procedure made it possible for the Romans to invade any sector they chose quickly, but they were still not quick enough to catch the enemy unprepared. The Sasanians avoided open battles and resorted to the use of guerrilla warfare. The situation remained the same until about 343 CE; it was then that Constantius was able to capture an unnamed city in Adiabene and deport its entire population to Thrace. It is also possible that Constantius further reinforced Bezabde at this time to serve as a bulwark against the Sasanians. This campaign finally brought about the desired Sasanian response in the form of a large-scale summer offensive in 344 CE.
 
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if there's one particular thing I'm thankfull for in this series is how much you've shown me that the roman-persian engagements were very much in flux

from what I've seen people seem to hold carhea as the norm rather then the exception because horse archers>everything (personally I partially blame the popular image of the mongols for this view)
 
if there's one particular thing I'm thankfull for in this series is how much you've shown me that the roman-persian engagements were very much in flux

from what I've seen people seem to hold carhea as the norm rather then the exception because horse archers>everything (personally I partially blame the popular image of the mongols for this view)

I personally have almost the opposite experience (although I have heard such opinions as well) with the Romans being presented as never loosing wars until the end of their empire, only a few battles.
 
if there's one particular thing I'm thankfull for in this series is how much you've shown me that the roman-persian engagements were very much in flux

from what I've seen people seem to hold carhea as the norm rather then the exception because horse archers>everything (personally I partially blame the popular image of the mongols for this view)

Yeah, Carrhae was to a large degree the exception rather than the norm. The Romans learnt quickly to take countermeasures and avoided playing the game according to Parthian/Sassanian rules, but still across the centuries some Roman commanders kept making the same dumb mistakes that Crassus made and paid the price for it. Although the armies and social and administrative structures of both empires were so essentially different that any war between them was automatically an assymetrical war, in which two very different ways of waging war were pitted against each other. The Romans for example seemed unable to grasp the notion that they could take and sack Ctesiphon as many times as they liked without sapping the military strength of their Arsacid and Sasanian foes, because as long as the tribes and nobles of the Iranian plateau kept their allegiance to the idea of a united kingdom under the ruler of a single king (which was reinforced by the strength of the dynastic principle in Iranian culture), they were not going to be defeated unless their home turf was invaded, something that only Mark Anthony and Heraclius were able to do on a very limited scale. The real weakness of these Iranian empires lay in the very core of their own social organization: its ruling class was formed by a warlike nobility always ready to start civil wars between them or against the king (and the Romans learnt quickly to exploit this), and it was also limited in numbers, which put a serious handicap on the Arsacid and Sasanian armies: large losses amongst their armored cavalrymen left the state decapitated, because the social leaders of Iranian society would be physically removed, and because it was unthinkable to let someone who did not belong to the arteshtaran "warrior" class to become a savaran. In the VI century CE Xusro I managed to overcome this somehow by including the dehqanan into the ranks of the savaran (impoverished minor nobility who were provided with a horse, armor and weapons at the king's expense) but still, the Arsacid and Sasanian empires were less well prepared than Rome to fight a protracted attrition war. And if we add to this that the territories occupied by these empires were poorer in natural resources and less populated than those of the Roman empire (even if we take into account just the eastern Roman empire) and that they also needed to take care of a very exposed Central Asian border, it becomes clear that the very survival of the Arsacid-Sasanian empire for ca. nine hundred years is quite remarkable.
 
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