Void Dragon said:
We also see the continued presence of an Iberian state, a Anatolian state, and a Norwegian state.
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We also see the continued presence of an Iberian state, a Anatolian state, and a Norwegian state.
Tiny Norwegian and Anatolian states, and a very different Iberian state. I never said they don't exist, but I am saying the process of state formations is much faster and easier in flat, open areas. Hungary was Hungary in the Year 1000, Poland was Poland, but there was no such thing as Spain. Spain was still centuries from forming. I could counter that well since France emerged from Gaul, it's still been unified for a far longer time.
When I have time I can also do it for other areas, like the Middle East, China and India. Infact just about anywhere where I can find sufficent maps, it really works quite well.
Edit: This GIF, showing the expansion of China from the Shang to Western Han works quite well:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0a/Early_China.gif
When I have time I can also do it for other areas, like the Middle East, China and India. Infact just about anywhere where I can find sufficent maps, it really works quite well.
Edit: This GIF, showing the expansion of China from the Shang to Western Han works quite well:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0a/Early_China.gif
Void Dragon said:
This is a well-established notion in history.
Mountainous areas are harder to rule because of the difficulty of travel through them and the weakness of cavalry (horse or camel or elephant).
Even the Incan and Aztec and Maya empires - definitely in difficult and mountainous terrain - were not unified states in the way China or France or Hungary were, but a series of vassalages and semi-independent city-states.
There are exceptions, of course. Italy is mountainous too, but the Romans definitely unified the region for a long time.
Mountains have always formed 'national' or state boundaries precisely because they are difficult to maintain control over. Anyone heard of Switzerland? Dioes anyone imagine such a state could have existed in a flat part of the world? And even it is a confederation of many smaller states, sometimes even single valleys.
Void Dragon said:
Are you suggesting that any of the states you listed were the same in 1000 as they were in 1740?
At any rate, pointing out that geography can help to form "natural" state boundaries doesn't necessarily reach your next point about competition and innovativeness. India was historically a collection of many small states and yet competition didn't lead to the same sort of innovation as you are suggesting happened in Europe, and gave Europe an advantage.
Void Dragon said:
topography has nothing to do with nations forming faster or slower, neither does advancement in technology, take ITALY, number 1 in renaissance times, yet one of the last to form a nation as we see it today (1870) .
Nations are formed by the stability and strength of the state itself, that is why some nations, like Spain, had it easier to unite (castile and aragon) because there was only 2 identities/cultures , yet Italy and Germany had many identities/cultures and yet where stable in their own kingdoms to prevent such a unity.
Modern day, we see the instability of Yugoslavia and its break up, a parting of ideas between 2 cultures of czechs and slovaks and we might even see a basque break up.
There are always exceptions to every historical principle one might definitively establish.
I would like to think that this is what makes Interregnum intriguing and believeable, because we do both: we have likely outcomes that sit well with historical principles and we also turn those principles on their heads sometimes and have less likely outcomes.
So, let us not be swayed overly by things that 'ought' to happen.
If we want to cast aside the notion that nationalism did not rise until the mid-1800s and have a proto-nationalism in the low countries two centuries earlier, then great. Build it around a charasmatic and forceful individual and away we go.
Let us not oppose any idea on the groups of historical principle, only challenge a proposed storyline or game feature to prove itself, to flesh out its features and character.
I would like to think that this is what makes Interregnum intriguing and believeable, because we do both: we have likely outcomes that sit well with historical principles and we also turn those principles on their heads sometimes and have less likely outcomes.
So, let us not be swayed overly by things that 'ought' to happen.
If we want to cast aside the notion that nationalism did not rise until the mid-1800s and have a proto-nationalism in the low countries two centuries earlier, then great. Build it around a charasmatic and forceful individual and away we go.
Let us not oppose any idea on the groups of historical principle, only challenge a proposed storyline or game feature to prove itself, to flesh out its features and character.
MattyG said:
Which also suggests that many historical principles are flawed (untenable/not particularly useful) as they have a tendency to overgeneralize and assign undue importance towards the aspect being highlighted out.
Garbon said:
Perhaps, and it is always good to challenge orthodoxy.
Are there, then, no historical processes that are worthy?
As it may have gotten lost in the whole larger debate, I will restate my original proposal that technological development should be based more on the number of neighbours you have as opposed to religion/culture.
As I am not intimately familiar with the Game Mechanics, I don't know if this is feasible.
As I am not intimately familiar with the Game Mechanics, I don't know if this is feasible.
MattyG said:
Well, we don't have to have revolts in the same places as real history. The Dutch Revolt wasn't a nationalist revolt in the modern sense, but the way it works in vanilla EU2 makes it one for all intents and purposes, so this is ground already covered. (Arguably the northern Netherlanders developed the characteristics of a nation later on in the war, when it became a 'war of independence' and they thought of parts of the south as a kind of irredenta, but that's not how it started.) That's not to say we can't have it in Interregnum, but I think we should focus on developing alternative stories.
For example, in my TO events I included a 'national revolt in Poland'; it's initially about freedom of confession and other rights desired by the local gentry and nobility, but could develop into a more general idea of 'Polishness' that unites the people of that area and distinguishes them from the nearby Balts, Germans etc. Or the revolt could fail, and Poland could end up divided along religious or other grounds, with Catholic Poland ruled by the TO or H-V, and Protestant Poland joining with Hungary or Bohemia. Similarly, there's the Duke of York's rebellion in the Scotland file. If his rebellion succeeds, the Yorkists could paint themselves as restoring the English nation, and so make it a nationalist issue. But for most of the game period I think this development would be mostly running parallel to and following any revolt, rather than the primary or sole cause of a revolt - think 'national awakening' rather than 'violent nationalism'.
Ideally, we want to tie this kind of thing to the level of 'political tech' a country has. If countries are relatively politically advanced compared to real history, maybe ideas will develop earlier than historically. But we can't really measure this in the same way as we can trade tech. Perhaps we could tie it to innovativeness/free citizenry? A greater propensity for nationalism could be one of the downsides of having a more politically aware populace.
I didn't mean to suggest that at all, I was largely speaking with regards to the two historical principles that were outlined in the previous discussion.MattyG said:
Void Dragon said:
I don't think it is actually possible to do so.
As a side note, could actually be the level of competition that one has that drives how innovative one has to be to survive? If a state has one rival that is a big threat, that seems like it would cause a bigger push to innovation than a state that has several rivals that are minor threats. (Just throwing out a random thought, no real position on either side)
Not neccesarilly. The greater the number of competitors the more likely at least one of them is going to try and implement any given idea/technology etc. Of course once they do it susccesfully others will soon follow, or risk being wiped out by one of their many competitors all of which have the potential to adopt the new innovation. Now that the innovation has spread the process repeats building on each advance.
When there is a small number of competitors, say two or three, there is a much higher chance they will reach an equilibrium and simply become more or less content with the status quo.
When there is a small number of competitors, say two or three, there is a much higher chance they will reach an equilibrium and simply become more or less content with the status quo.
Void Dragon said:
The North China Plain is generally seen as the cradle of Chinese civilization, being the center of the Shang culture (don't confuse Shang with the historically documented "dynasties" of later history) and the home of the Qin and Han dynasties, but it's importance waned heavily as time went on. By the Song Dynasty, the principal source of revenue was in the south, as well as the regions of greatest population density.
I don't think that five is so many; there are other regions that have been more unified in the world than that, and my principal point was regarding the amount of time spent as a unified state vs. the amount of time spent as a bunch of disparate polities. The "disunity" of China also did not always produce large blocs; numerous small kingdoms came and went between the fall of the Han dynasty and the rise of Sui, for example.
Also, I'm not entirely sure what you mean by the "pinnacle of the Chinese Art of War". The Three Kingdoms period is seen as a romantic time of heroism and literature, rather like the late Middle Ages are seen in many parts of Europe, but it was not a period of high technology by any means. In fact, the Song Dynasty is generally seen as the time of the greatest development in Chinese military technology, whereas the Qing period, when China controlled its largest expanse, is certainly the apex of pre-modern Chinese military power. As for your choice of terms, Sunwu/Sunzi/Sun Tzu's Art of War (孫子兵法, more literally "Sunzi's Rules of Soldiering") was clearly written during the Spring and Autumn period, way earlier than anything we're discussing.
Actually, as I recall, the Mongols ran into trouble first, chronologically speaking, in Palestine and Syria. But whatever. Large armies are not necessarily more effective in the open; the Mongols were generally outnumbered in all of their engagements, but won through superior tactics and organization. As for the horse empires of the steppes-- they came and went with great frequency, involving a ridiculous amount of struggle and competition, but very little technological advance at all.
Actually, longbows, crossbows, and composite bows were all capable of piercing plate. I stand by my previous statement that the real advantage of firearms was in cost; note that their acceptance invariably led to the destruction or reduction of elite warrior classes/castes. Firearms were easy to use and relatively cheap compared to full armor and horses.
I think culture is the one thread that carries through all of this. Adversity does stimulate technological advance, particularly military technology, but not without both the cultural and economic base to accomplish this. Similarly, times of peace lead to technological advance in other areas, e.g. those related to trade, goods production, and agriculture, but also not without the proper cultural outlook.
In short, I think the geography hypothesis fails at least as often as it succeeds, meaning that's it not any better than guessing, and therefore not particularly useful to us. Culture and prosperity do generally hold up as motivators for technological progress, except when one is pitted against the other, and much more importantly, these are factors that we can control.
In a much previous post, I quoted a long section from Huckley, and I think that says it as well as possible; the reasons for technological progress are incredibly complicated, and we are able to contrive such reasons as needed without having to constrain ourselves to physical factors. Cultures can and do change over time, and as writers of alternate history, we have the ultimate control over these forces. Put plainly, we can decide based on other criteria, like fun and game balance, which states should have which tech groups and then come up with the reasons for it later if needed.
Garbon said:
This is logical. Unfortunately, things tend to work in the opposite direction. Once they've kicked out the English, a fat, complacent France under the control of an averagely competent player will hypertech and become virtually omnipotent in economic terms, whereas if the same player were in charge of Albania, they might spend the first century of the game struggling along at the edge of survival, spending most of their meagre income on troops to fend off the enemy hordes and with large parts of their country under occupation at any one time, so they'd come out of this period with low tech and high inflation. In some ways this is fair, but in others you feel the complacent state should stagnate while the 'on the edge' state would adapt and later recover.
We've partly covered this with negative 'large country events'. Maybe we also need some positive random small country events? I'm thinking small countries whose inhabitants would hate to be conquered by their neighbours should be able to pull together and make certain sacrifices in the name of survival in a way that wouldn't be possible for a large country. The extreme options would be B options for the AI in some cases, but they'd still be there. For example, a one-province minor under attack could flip into 'war mode', gaining a conscription centre or fortifications at the cost of tax value or inflation, or get volunteers, free troops at the cost of population. On the other hand, a stable, medium-sized country at peace, with low badboy but high inflation and backward tech (from earlier defensive wars; also, medium-sized countries get screwed over when it comes to tech) could eventually recover by learning from its former enemies and cracking down on corruption more than a very large state could.
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Nothing "happened" in India, infact they were doing quite well for themselves. India's militaries were only marginally behind Europe's militaries in technology. India is noteable for its widespread use of quality gunpowder weapons and advanced artillery, including famously rockets which the British saw fit to copy.
India wasn't conquered because of superior European power, but because the East India Company, much like Crotez, was able to utilize the local resources to their own ends in a highly effective manner. Enabling them to defeat enemies that would otherwise have easily crushed them.
If they had run up against a strong united India then they would have been thrown off the subcontinent with little effort.
India wasn't conquered because of superior European power, but because the East India Company, much like Crotez, was able to utilize the local resources to their own ends in a highly effective manner. Enabling them to defeat enemies that would otherwise have easily crushed them.
If they had run up against a strong united India then they would have been thrown off the subcontinent with little effort.
Void Dragon said:
Actually India didn't get guns because they developed them but rather because they were introduced via many invaders.