The Rise of the Sasanians

[Semper Victor]

8.1 THE REVOLT OF ARDAXŠIR I. THE OBSCURE ORIGINS OF THE HOUSE OF SĀSĀN IN PĀRS.

Modern scholars mostly agree that the Sasanians were newcomers in Pārs, and not members of the traditional nobility of the area; most probably they were even completely unrelated to the royal family of Pārs. Graeco-Roman sources are practically useless to reconstruct the rise of the Sasanians in this province, and so the only ancient sources left are Middle Persian ones, Islamic ones (above all, Tabarī and Ferdowsī) and Armenian ones (especially Agathangelos and Movses Khorenats’i). These are the sources mostly used by modern scholars.

In this post, I will use mainly one paper by a modern scholar:

• Ardaxšir and the Sasanians’ Rise to Power, by Professor Touraj Daryaee, from University of California, Irvine published in Anabasis: Studia Classica et Orientalia No.1 (2010).

I will follow mainly Daryaee’s paper for a general view of the questioned origins of the House of Sāsān, and then in a following post I will resort to other two works, which tie the Sasanians with eastern Iran and previous conflicts which had happened within the Arsacid royal house and some of the great clans of Iran, especially the Sūrēn.

Working with Perso-Islamic sources is difficult because the conception of writing history in these eastern cultures was different from the one prevalent in the Graeco-Roman world. The renowned American Iranologist R.N.Frye notice time ago how, in these histories, facts and people are always made to fit into preexisting patterns, usually of religious or cultural origin. For example, Darius I was helped by seven Persian families to overthrow the “false king” Gaumata, Aršak I entered the Iranian plateau with a following of seven clans, and there were supposedly seven great “Parthian” clans during the Sasanian era.

The origins of the Sasanian family are surrounded in mystery, as there are scarcely two ancient sources, eastern of western that agree between them. Graeco-Roman and Armenia sources are markedly hostile to the Sasanians for historical reasons and seem to compete between them to give Ardaxšir I the humblest origins possible:

• Agathias (VI century CE) mentions that Ardaxšīr’s mother was married to Pābag whose lineage was obscure, but whose profession was a leather worker, while Sāsān was supposedly a soldier who spent the night at the house of Pābag, and Pābag then gave his wife to Sāsān.
• George Syncellus (IX century CE) stated that Ardaxšīr was an unknown and undistinguished Persian.
• George of Pisidia (VII century CE) mentioned that he was a slave by station.
• John Zonaras (XII century CE) said that he was from an unknown and obscure background.

In their own way, these sources reflect that in the West there was almost no knowledge about the origins of the Sasanians.

Meanwhile, Tabarī and Ferdowsī both stated that Ardaxšir I came from aristocratic origins, from among the nobility of Pārs. Most scholars tend to take Tabarī’s account as authentic or more acceptable; in it Pābag was the son of Sāsān, while the VI century Middle Persian book Kārnāmag ī Ardaxšīr ī Pābagān, like Ferdowsī’s Šāhnāme both stated that Pābag’s daughter married Sāsān. And the Zoroastrian “sacred encyclopedia, the Bundahišn, gives another genealogy:

Ardaxšīr the son of Pābag, whose mother (is said) to be the daughter of Sāsān, son of Weh-āfrīd

The royal inscriptions of Ardaxšir I state that Pābag was his father, and Sāsān their “ancestor”, but without implying that Sāsān was Pābag’s father. And the inscriptions of Šābuhr I follow the same scheme; plus in both cases Sāsān is not called “king”, but merely “lord”, while Pābag is called “king”. Then, why did the family call themselves “Sasanians”, if Sāsān was such an obscure character? If that was not enough, Sāsān is a very rare name in western and central Iran. Before Ardaxšir I, it’s completely unattested in Pārs, Media and Parthia and it only appears in “eastern Iran”, the large land area inhabited or ruled by Iranian peoples east of the Arsacid empire proper: Soghdiana, Bactria, Sakastan, etc.

Ardaxšīr of course claimed Sāsān as the patriarch of the dynasty. An ostraca was found in Central Asia by Soviet archaeologists in the late 1980s which contained the epigraphic form ssn designating Sāsān as a deity. But because of its absence in the Avesta and the Old Persian documents, it is difficult to know how it was related to the Zoroastrian religion. Recent scholarly research seems to show that the deity represents Sesen, an old Semitic god which is found in Ugarit as early as the second millennium BCE. Be that as it may, in the first century CE coins can be found in Taxila in Gandhara with the name Sasa, which may be connected to Sāsān because the emblem on the coin matches the "coat-of-arms" for Šābuhr I.

Tabarī mentions the mysterious Sāsān as the ruler and custodian of the Anāhīd fire-temple at Istakhr, while his son Pābag became later king of Istakhr. This seems to be in accordance with the ŠKZ inscription, and so it represents the “official” position. Early Islamic sources based on Sasanian tradition emphasize the religiosity of Sāsān and his devotion and even mention him as an ascetic. In fact, Sāsān’s lineage is said to originate in India, the bastion of asceticism (according to Bal’ami). Only in this way could Ardaxšīr claim to have both priestly and royal lineage, meaning the story of Pābag as the king of Istakhr marrying the daughter of the priest (Sāsān) of the most important fire-temple at Istakhr. It is in this manner that Ardaxšīr could manufacture the double (king-priest) lineage topos which is such an important part of Sasanian religious and political tradition. And it’s not surprising that in the priestly tradition the religious origin of Ardaxšīr is emphasized, becoming connected with royalty, while the epic / royal tradition such as the Kārnāmag ī Ardaxšīr ī Pābagān emphasizes the royal origin and then its connection with the religious tradition of Ardaxšīr.

Aerial photograph of the remains of Istakhr.

Some iconographical features of Pābag’s coinage and imagery have provided scholars with some clues, which could help to shed some light into this mess. On the earliest coinage of Pābag with his elder son, Šābuhr, his headgear is unlike any of the Arsacid or Persis kings. It is only Šābuhr who presents himself on the obverse wearing the headgear (the bejeweled kolah / kulaf) symbolizing kingship or political power. The royal narrative informs us that Pābag dethroned the king of Istakhr, Gozīhr (according to the East Roman historian Agathias, whose informant Sergius apparently had access to the royal Sasanian archives). Pābag however, had designated his elder son, Šābuhr, and coins were struck showing the two on either side. Ardaxšīr did not accept this and removed his brother and those who stood before him and subsequently had coins minted in the image of his father and himself. But in the joint coinage of Ardaxšīr-Pābag, the father bears the kingly crown of Persis.

Silver drachm with Šābuhr (wearing the bejewelled kolah of Persian kings) in the obverse and his father Pābag in the reverse, wearing what scholars believe to be some kind of priestly headgear.

Silver drachm with Ardaxšīr in the obverse and his father Pābag in the reverse, wearing this time the royal kolah.

Drawing of a graffito from Persopolis assumed by scholars to represent Pābag.

In several extant sources sources Pābag is said to have been the priest of the fire-temple of Anāhīd at the city of Istakhr and this must have been a stage for the rallying of the local Persian warriors who were devoted to the cult of this. Pābag’s priestly function can also be seen in an extant graffito from Persepolis. Or could it be that the inability of the Persian royalty in the face of Arsacid power caused a priest-king to take the lead and revolt? This is a difficult question to answer, but it would not be the only time in the history of Iran that a holy man or religious leader rose up and attempted the conquest of the Iranian Plateau. Sāsān and Pābag were the priests / caretakers of the Anāhīd fire-temple at Istakhr and so Pābag’s function in relation to the fire-temple may have given backing to Ardaxšīr’s claim to rulership after the initial civil wars.

Anāhīd is important, since she was an object of devotion for heroes, warriors and kings in the Zoroastrian sacred text, the Avesta (for example in Yašt V, Ābān Yašt). During the Achaemenid period, in the beginning of the fifth century BCE, Artaxerxes II also worshipped Anāhīd (Anahita) along with Mīhr (Mithra) and Ohrmazd (Ahurā Mazdā). Thus, her cult must have been an old one in Persis and the temple may have been a location where the Persian tradition was kept alive. Her warlike character was the symbiosis of ancient Near Eastern (Ištar), Hellenic (Athena) and Iranian traditions which was used to legitimate kingship in the Sasanian period.

The goddess Anāhīd in a Sasanian silver jar.

Scholars may never know who Sāsān really was but his dual function of priest-king of Persepolis-Istakhr seems to be a well-established tradition. Daryaee suggests that if Pābag was anyone of rank, he was a local ruler at best, taking Tabarī’s assertion that he ruled a small area by the salt lake of Bakhtagān to the south of Istakhr the south called Khīr. And it's Pābag who first aspired to rule in Istakhr and took it over with his elder son Šābuhr, and not by the order of Ardaxšīr as Tabarī wrote. To Daryaee, this is made clear by Pābag’s coins with his elder son, Šābuhr.

Lake Bakhtagān.

Daryaee also notices Pābag’s name as an important pointer to his religious function as Pābag is a hypocrastic from Pāb, which means “father” in Middle Persian. Furthermore, Ardaxšīr at the time may have been in the south at Dārābgird far away from the Pābag-Šābuhr takeover of Istakhr. Daryaee suggests Ardaxšīr was an usurper in his own family who upon seeing his father taking charge of Istakhr and nominating his elder son and the brother of Ardaxšīr, began his campaign initially not against the Arsacid king Ardawān, but against his own father and then brother.

Daryaee points out that the German scholar Michael Alram suggested that Šābuhr and Ardaxšīr could have been portraying the dead image of Pābag on their early coinage. If so, then Ardaxšīr was only rebelling against his own brother. This could also explain why Ardawān did not send troops at first to meddle in the family feud. Again, these are only mere speculations and show that Ardaxšīr probably did not have a strong claim to any throne and was not in line for rulership.

When Ardaxšīr finally became the sole ruler of Iran, he constructed an elaborate genealogy which is captured in the late book Kārnāmag ī Ardaxšīr ī Pābagān:

Ardaxšīr the Kayānid, the son of Pābag, from the race of Sāsān, from the family of King Dārāy.

When looking at this line, Daryaee notices that every possible connection to divinity, royalty and nobility was being exploited by Ardaxšīr, which to him likely suggests that he was heir to none of them! The Kayānid dynasty in the Avesta, the mysterious protective deity Sāsān, and the connection to Dārāy (probably the conflation of the Achaemenids, Darius I and Darius III, and the kings of Pārs, Dārāyān I and Dārāyān II) all suggest to him that the first Sasanian king falsified his lineage. Ardaxšīr’s falsified connections, however, would have given him the prestige of being the first human to be shown receiving the diadem of rulership from Ohrmazd, something that was never shown in Achaemenid reliefs. A noble Persian would not have needed to be shown receiving the diadem from Ohrmazd; only an upstart would be in need to make the claim of being from the race of the yazdān. Looking at the early Sasanian rock reliefs, they show the king and the gods as having similar physical features, size, clothes, horses and harnesses. In terms of proportion, the Sasanian king is an exact mirror image of the yazatas / yazdān.

Perhaps it’s because of this “sacrilege” that some Zoroastrian texts like the Dēnkard and the Nāme-ye Tansar (Letter of Tansar) questioned Ardaxšīr’s legitimacy and his attempt at changing the tradition.

Perso-Arabic sources state that Ardaxšīr was the argbed (castellan) of Dārābgird in eastern Pārs when he began his campaign. However, the earliest physical evidence for Ardaxšīr can be found at Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah (literally meaning “the Glory of Ardaxšir”, a city founded by him, near modern city of Fērōz-ābād, also known in late Sasanian and early Islamic times known as Gōr), on the southern fringes of Pārs. Daryaee thinks that it is from here, far from Khīr, the stronghold of Pābag, and Istakhr, the stronghold of the kings of Pārs, and still further away from the king of kings, Ardawān, that Ardaxšīr began his campaign. Daryaee thinks that Ardaxšīr moved from the remote Dārābgird to Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah which was behind the mountains and still defensible, but closer to the center of power in Persis, Istakhr, when Pābag’s revolt took place against the king of Pārs at Istakhr. However mountainous the road from Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah to Istakhr is, it’s still an easier route to traverse than from Dārābgird to Istakhr.

Remains of Dārābgird.

Remains of Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah, the city founded by Ardaxšīr I. Notice how both it and Dārābgird are built following a circular plan.

Superimposed sketch of the main streets, gates and roads of Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah.

Ardaxšīr’s beginnings may be connected to his first rock-relief which shows him receiving the diadem of rulership from Ohrmazd in front of his retinue at Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah. Based on the date supplied by Šābuhr I’s inscription at Hajjīābād, Daryaee agrees with the German scholar Josef Wiesehöfer that the year 205/206 CE (which Šābuhr I chose as the beginning of the Sasanian era) does not mark the date of Ardaxšīr’s uprising but rather Pābag’s rebellion and movement from Khīr to Istakhr. This date coincides with the rule of the Arsacid king Walāxš V (192–207 CE) and the wars with the Roman emperor Septimius Severus.

As we have seen in previous posts, the Arsacids were not only involved in a bitter war with the Romans, but also with dynastic squabbles and provincial revolts. Septimius Severus, first in 196 CE, and then again in 198 CE invaded the Arsacid realm and was able to sack Ctesiphon. At the same time, we hear of the revolt by the Medes and the Persians against the Arsacid king in the Syriac Chronicle of Arbela which caused internal problems. The kings of Pārs could not rely on their Arsacid overlords anymore to support them in the face of local uprisings, such as that of Pābag.

Daryaee is reluctant to accept the “official” version of history where according to Tabarī, Ardaxšīr was the argbed of Dārābgerd at this time and told his father Pābag to revolt against the Arsacids in 211/212 CE. To him, it’s more probable that between 205/206 and 211/212 CE Pābag had taken the throne at Istakhr and then chosen his eldest son Šābuhr as the heir. Ardaxšīr as an act of rebellion would then have moved from Dārābgerd to Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah and built himself a fortification from where he could launch his attack against his elder brother when Pābag died.

Ardaxšir’s first investiture rock-relief at Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah.

Ardaxšir’s rock-relief at Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah would then have been the symbol of his rebellion against his father, or more probably against his brother. Pābag must have died sometime before 211/212 and so by this date both Ardaxšīr and Šābuhr minted coins with the title of “king,” with the image of their recently deceased father on their coins. Daryaee also cites the important notice in the Zainu’l-Akhbar (a chronicle written in the XI century at the Ghaznavid court by Abū Sa’id al-Dahhāk) which to him seems to corroborate the thesis that Ardaxšīr indeed proclaimed himself king in 211/212 CE. According to the Zainu’l-Akhbar, when Ardaxšīr began his conquest Ardawān came to face him. What´s noteworthy to Daryaee is that the text states:

and twelve years had passed from the rule of Ardaxšīr when he killed Ardawān.

This clearly places Ardaxšīr’s claim to kingship and local investiture (at Istakhr or Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah) in 211/212 CE. The event of 211/212 CE which is the defeat and death of his elder brother Šābuhr also most probably coincided with his coronation relief at Naqš-e Rajab and the coinage that Ardaxšīr minted without his father’s image.

Ardaxšīr's "second" investiture relief, at Naqš-e Rajab near Istakhr.

Between 211/212 CE and the defeat of the Arsacid ruler Ardawān in 224 CE Ardaxšīr consolidated his power in the province of Pārs and the adjoining regions. In 216/217 CE he would certainly begin his propaganda campaign against the Arsacids as their prestige had been marred by the Roman actions at the Arsacid family sanctuary. How could a dynasty who was not even able to protect their own family be able to defend the Iranians? The kings of Pārs had been defeated by 211/212 and others a bit later as they may have been involved in aiding the Arsacid king of kings at Nisibis and therefore would have been ill prepared to fight the upstart. Ardaxšīr might have felt that a new house had to wrest away control of the royal throne, as the old one (the Arsacids) had been soundly humiliated. Daryaee also adds that apparently other brothers of Ardaxšīr were also worrisome to him and he had them killed at this time. Once he had the province of Persis and the adjoining regions under control he began to call himself “King of Iranians,” (šāh ī ērān) in his coinage.

Gold coin of Ardaxšīr I as “King of Iranians,” (šāh ī ērān).

Thus, he still refrained himself from taking the title of “King of Kings”, which would’ve been an open defy to Ardawān V. The šāh ī ērān title would probably refer to his conquest of Pārs and the wresting of Istakhr from the hands of the local rulers and those in his family who contended for his rule over it. According to Daryaee, it’s then that he had his rock-relief at Naqš-e Rajab, close to Istakhr, carved. Thus, one may surmise that the Naqš-e Rajab relief represents his victory over the kings of Pārs and the control of Istakhr as the center. The investiture scene is at the center of this event. That may well be the reason that Ardawān is still not under the hoof of Ardaxšīr’s horse on this relief, as he is at the Naqš-e Rustam relief. The importance of the local kings also made Ardaxšīr mindful to respect them as seen in the iconographical remains of this period. He also co-opted them into his genealogy and adopted their characteristic dress and headgear, thus representing himself as the continuer of the old Persian tradition existing at Istakhr.

Having consolidated his power in Pārs and having subdued the kadagxwadāyān “petty-lords”, he conquered adjoining regions which would have alarmed Ardawān. Then the fateful battle of Hormozdgan in 224 CE brought the defeat and death of Ardawān and brought about a new phase of Ardaxšīr’s rule. The Battle of Hormozdgan was carved in the location where he rose up in Pārs, at Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah. By then he could claim to be the “King of Kings of the Iranians”, and he reflected this in his coinage.

Silver drachm of Ardaxšīr I as King of Kings of Iran.

 

[Semper Victor]

8.2 THE REVOLT OF ARDAXŠIR I. THE POSSIBLE EASTERN ORIGINS AND CONNECTIONS OF THE HOUSE OF SĀSĀN.

I will try to explain now a topic quite recent in Iranian historiography, which is the possible origin and connections of the Sasanians in “East Iran”, and which could have been key in their success. This is still a disputed topic, and should be taken merely as a further expansion of the basic narrative of my previous post, which sticks more closely to the surviving documentary and numismatic evidence. Also, as you will see, in some important topics this “eastern hypothesis” merely complements the basic, established narrative that I explained in my previous post, but in some key aspects, it directly contradicts it. It’s because this that I want to emphasize the more hypothetical nature of this second narrative, which is far less supported in surviving textual sources. It’s far more recent, and its main basis comes from numismatics, reinterpretation of late literary works (especially Ferdowsī and the epic cycle of Sistān) and some oblique and obscure references found in documentary sources, interpreted in a new way with the support of the aforementioned resources.

In this post, I will use mainly two works by modern scholars:

• The Sistani Cycle of Epics and Iran's National History: on the Margins of Historiography, by Saghi Gazerani.
• The paper Dynastic connections in the Arsacid Empire and the Origins of the House of Sasan, by Professor Marek Jan Olbrycht from University of Rzeszów, published in the book The Parthian and Early Sasanian empires: adaptation and expansion, a collection of scholarly papers edited by Vesta Sarkosh Curtis, Elizabeth J. Pendleton, Michael Alram and Touraj Daryaee and published in 2016.
• The paper Ardashir’s Eastern Campaign and the Numismatic Evidence, by the expert in numismatics Michael Alram, from the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna, published in the Proceedings of the British Academy No.133 (2007).

This will be a difficult enterprise, because the main narrative is the one provided in Olbrycht’s paper, but Gazerani and Alram make important contributions, which in some cases support Olbrycht’s narrative and in others undermine it.

In a previous post of mine, I already made reference to Olbrycht’s paper and his reconstruction of the eastern Indo-Parthian kingdom ruled by the Gondopharid dynasty. I will take over now the narrative from where I left it in that post. One important precision that I forgot to make in that post is that Ardawān II, the king who replaced the Sinatrucid line, was only an Arsacid on his mother’s side (according to Tacitus’ Annales). Understandably, this would have risen quite a wave of opposition in a society so preoccupied about the dynastic principle s was the ancient Iranian one, especially if there were other candidates to the throne who could claim to have full Arsacid ancestry on their father’s side, and additionally, given that all the main clans (the Arsacids included) intermarried between them, there were probably also several candidates with Arsacid ancestry on their maternal line who felt they were equally entitled as Ardawān II to the throne.

And another important precision made by Classical authors about Sanatruk is that before becoming the Arsacid šahanšah, he’d lived “for a long time” among “the Scythians”. Usually, this has been interpreted by historians meaning that Sanatruk had lived among the nomadic Iranian peoples that lived in the Eurasian steppe to the north of the Arsacid empire, but both Olbrycht and Gazerani raise the interesting possibility that in fact they had been living amongst the Sakas. The Sakas were the Scythian people who’d invaded eastern Iran in the II century, and who finally had been repulsed by one of Mihrdat II’s generals, a man who would later receive Sakastan (literally, “the land of the Sakas” as his fiefdom), an event which most scholars assume marked the beginning of the House of Sūrēn as an important power in Iranian politics. Their rule over Sakastan would endure until the Muslim invasion in the VII century CE.

Sakastan was a very badly defined area, which corresponded roughly to the ancient Achaemenid satrapy of Drangiana, which geographically corresponds to the Sistān basin and the valley of the Helmand river (although sometimes the term “Sakastan” described very loosely all the territories east of the Iranian plateau, south of Bactria and west of the Indus river). Today, this territory is divided between Iran and Afghanistan. According to ancient accounts, the Sakas were driven out by Mihrdat II’s general towards the east. And here, numismatic evidence has led modern historians to record the existence of an Indo-Scythian kingdom that would have endured in the ill-defined region of the ancient territories of Arachosia, Bactria and Gandhara until the rise of the Gondopharids in the late I century BCE. Some other Saka leaders advanced further east into India, where they founded several dynasties, the last of which would perdure until the IV century CE. The most important Indo-Scythian kings were Maues, Azes I and Azes II. All of them minted coins with Greek inscriptions, although apparently several “satraps” or warlords under their suzerainty also minted coins. The names of these kings and most of their satraps are Scythian, but surprisingly Maues was succeeded by a king who bore the typically Parthian / Arsacid name “Vonones”, suggesting that, as it was usual in ancient times, ethnical borders were very fluid.

Silver tetradrachm issued by Maues.

Silver tetradrachm issued by Vonones.

The Sūrēn established in Sakastan a domain where they ruled practically as independent kings. And since the XIX century, there’s been historians and scholars who have tied the rule of this clan in Sakastan with one of the most important cultural legacies of ancient Iran, the Sistani Cycle of Epics (SCE), which included many separated tales (all of which were written down in Islamic times in New Persian) and most of which was also included in Iran’s national epic, Ferdowsī’s Šāh-nāma in the late X – early XI centuries CE in New Persian. These stories would’ve been initially composed, recited and popularized by the Parthian minstrels, the gōsān, probably under the patronage of the great clans who wished to have their actions immortalized, and over time they became part of the popular lore of eastern Iran, and especially of Sistān.

Starting with Theodor Nöldeke in the XIX century, several scholars have noticed intriguing parallelisms between the Arsacid victor at Carrhae, Surena (as described by Plutarch) and the most important heroic character of the Šāh-nāma, Rostam. The most important of these is the fact that Plutarch wrote that Surena had the right to crown the Parthian king, and that this privilege was hereditary in his family, and in the Šāh-nāma and other stories of the SCE, the same is said about Rostam. And because of this and other reasons, there’s an increasing consensus among scholars that the House of Rostam was actually the House of Sūrēn, and that it was this clan who acted as patrons for the gōsān who composed all these tales, “in pahlavani style” to borrow an expression from Ferdowsī. Another of these coincidence is that in the Šāh-nāma Rostam is continuously ridiculed by his enemies for having Saka blood, which would have been quite possible for a Suren: their territory bordered the Saka kingdom, and probably part of the Sakas had not fled Sakastan after the Arsacid reconquest of the territory.

Thus, Sanatruk having been living “among the Scythians” could actually mean that he’d been living among the Indo-Scythians to the east of the Arsacid empire, or that he’d been living amongst the Sūrēn, or both.

This would actually explain the extraordinary powers and privileges enjoyed by the Sūrēn under the Sinatrucids, and why they fought so bitterly against the takeover by Ardawān II; it would also explain why some other noble clans joined with Ardawān II; in Tacitus’ Annales, the nobles who supported him are said to do so “for fear of being under the rule of the house of Abdagases”, who as I wrote in my previous post was probably a Sūrēn.

And it would also explain the sudden appearance of the Indo-Parthian kingdom, although here begins the disagreement between Olbrycht and Gazerani; which could be summarized in a very simplistic way as this: Olbrycht thinks that the Gondopharids were a branch of the Arsacids, while Gazerani thinks that they were actually the main branch of the Sūrēn clan, which seceded from the Arsacid empire outright and built an eastern empire for themselves by conquering the main Indo-Scythian kingdom in Bactria, Arachosia and Gandhara.

That the first Gondophares was not an Arsacid vassal is made clear by his coins. In the reverse, he is shown being crowned by Nike (the Greek goddess of Victory), and uses the titles “autokrator” and “great king of kings”, which would have been unthinkable in a vassal of the Arsacid king of kings. An interesting detail is that it bears a sign that scholars assume to have been a tamga of the Gondopharids:

The Gondopharid "tamga".

Detail of the great "victory" relief near Ardaxšir-Xwarrah. Notice the caparison of the knight supposed to be Šābuhr I.

In the Eurasian steppes, nomads used tamgas mainly for marking cattle and horses, and to make clear their ownership by a family or clan: thus these signals acted like kind of an “heraldic” sign for a family or clan. This same sign had appeared before in Arsacid coinage minted during the reigns of Ūrūd II and Frahād IV, and interestingly it appears again decorating the caparison of one of the companions of Ardaxšir I in his great relief at Ardaxšir-Xwarrah where he portrayed his victory over Ardawān V.

The Indo-Parthian kingdom was defeated by the Kushan king Kujula Kadphises in the second half of the I century CE, and it lost Bactria, Gandhara and eastern Arachosia to the growing Kushan empire. Their rule continued then in a much reduced area, mainly in Sakastan proper, parts of western Arachosia, and Gedrosia. Their coins became increasingly smaller and debased, and the last known king of the dynasty was a contemporary of Ardaxšir I; he minted coins under the name “Farn-Sāsān”, which bear in the reverse a fire altar very similar to the one that appears in the coinage of Ardaxšir I. The coins of Farn-Sāsān bear the longest lineage of any known coin in Antiquity:

Farn-Sāsān, son of Adūr-Sāsān, grandson of Tiridat, great-grandson of Sanabar, king of kings.

Bronze coin of Farn-Sāsān.

Nothing is known about Adūr-Sāsān and Tiridat, but scholars know coins of Sanabar, and Indo-Parthian king who ruled around 100 CE. It’s not clear if Farn-Sāsān copied the motive of the fire altar from Ardaxšir I’s coins or if it was Ardaxšir who copied Farn-Sāsān; Olbrycht defends the second possibility and Alram the first one. In any case, Ardaxšir I annexed the Indo-Parthian kingdom in 224/225 (the chronology is disputed) and deposed Farn-Sāsān; the next we know, from Šābuhr I’s inscription at the ŠKZ, is that his father had named a certain Ardaxšir (perhaps a member of the Sasanian family) as “King of the Sakas” under the overall suzerainty of the Sasanian šahanšah.

Olbrycht refutes also the traditional etimology for the name Sāsān. Instead, he makes references to studies by D.N.McKenzie and V.Lipshits who derive it from the Old Iranian term sasana, which means “to defeat an enemy”. And he also states that documents (mainly ostraca) found at Old Nisa, Merv and Kosha-depe in Turkmenistan (that is, in the ancient lands of Khwarazm and Parthia proper), the name Sāsān is attested abundantly, especially in compound names like Sasandat and Sasanbuxt. The name is also attested in Soghdiana and Armenia. Thus, Olbryctht believes that Sāsān was a deity worshipped in the local Zoroastrian pantheon in Parthia proper and Chorasmia / Khwarazm, and thus it was a Parthian name. In the ŠKZ, the name is borne by several Parthian grandees, including a Sūrēn.

Olbrycht now comes to the very controversial point of Ardaxšir I’s genealogy and the identity of the “mysterious” Sāsān who was his ancestor. As I explained in my previous post, there’s hardly two ancient sources in agreement in this matter. But Olbycht analyzes them and makes five groups with them:

• The Šāh-nāma states that Sāsān the Elder was a scion of king Dara, the last Kayanid king (in the Šāh-nāma, the mythical Kayanid kings are a distant echo of the Achaemenids, and Dara is a reflex of Darius III), who fled to India and lived in obscurity there, until his descendant Sāsān the Younger came to Pārs and there the ruler of Istakhr called Pābag gave him his daughter in marriage. As we saw in the previous post, the Kārnāmag ī Ardaxšīr ī Pābagān gives a compatible genealogy, and the Bundahišn’s genealogy is also compatible with this.
• Among the western sources, the late Roman / Byzantine authors Agathias and Syncellus present quite convoluted but very similar stories that Olbrycht rationalizes as a statement that Sāsān was Ardaxšir’s biological father, while Pābag was his adoptive one.
• The Armenian authors Agathangelos and Movses Khorenats’i state clearly and without doubts that Ardaxšir was Sasan’s son.
• Tabarī states that Sāsān was a newcomer in Pārs who married a princess named Rambihišt of the Barangizid family (totally unknown outside of Tabarī’s story), and that Pābag was born from this marriage, and that Ardaxšir was his son (this is the genealogy generally most accepted, with variations, as for example in Daryaee’s proposal that I exposed in my previous post). That Sāsān was a newcomer in Pars is implicit in Tabarī’s story, but nothing is said about him coming from India or elsewhere.

Olbrycht points something strange in early Sasanian rock inscriptions. Despite having been made in less than a century, and by two kings who were father and son, there are discrepancies between them. In his great relief at Naqš-e Rustam, Ardaxšir I names “king Pābag” as his father, and “lord Sāsān” as his “ancestor”. But in his genealogy in the ŠKZ, Šābuhr I goes only as far as the “divine king Pābag” and Sāsān is totally absent. But some lines later, when Šābuhr enumerates the members of his father’s court, first amongst them is named a certain “Sāsān the lord”. But Šābuhr I only calls himself son of king Ardaxšir and grandson of king Pābag. The absence of Sāsān from Šābuhr I’s official genealogy is very telling, and I agree with Olbrycht in that it must have been a deliberate omission. Especially if we take into account, as Olbrycht points out, the text inscribed by Šābuhr I’s son, the šahanšah Narseh, in the late III century CE at Paikuli in Iraqi Kurdistan. In it, Narseh is explicit: since the gods gave glory and rulership to the family of Sāsān. And from hence onwards in Sasanian documents, Sāsān is always the main genealogical focal point.

It’s in trying to decipher the reason for this absence that Olbrycht’s narrative steers boldly into uncharted (an unsourced) territory.

One of the "Heir apparent" coins.

Olbrycht begins with a discussion about one of the most puzzling coin types issued by Ardaxšir I, the so-called “Heir apparent” coins. They were issued during the last decade of Ardaxšir I’s rule (229/230 – 239/240 CE) and in them we can see the confronted heads of Ardaxšir I, bearing his ceremonial crown, and a young beardless person bearing the bejewelled tiara (the kolah). Ever since the first specimens of these coins were discovered, they were assumed to represent Ardaxšir I and his heir, prince Šābuhr (the future Šābuhr I). But today this notion has been largely discredited, because Šābuhr had been already depicted previously in the great victory relief at Ardaxšir -Xwarrah as a fully bearded man. In his paper, Michael Alram also analyzes the same coin. Detailed analysis of the chemical composition of these billon and copper coins made by him gave an interesting result: these coins had a chemical composition identical to the last issues of Farn-Sāsān, which implies that they were minted in Sakastan. As for the identity of the beardless person in the coin, Alram offers several possibilities, but he can’t confirm any of them. These possibilities are:

• This person is Ardaxšir, the man that Ardaxšir I installed as king of the Sakas, and was perhaps a member of the Sasanian family, possibly one of Ardaxšir I’s younger sons. Alram also point out an interesting fact: in the victory relief at Ardaxšir-Xwarrah, three people are shown on the “victorious” Sasanian side: first to the right and the largest figure is Ardaxšir I himself, immediately after him, we find his elder son Šābuhr, and after Šābuhr comes a young beardless man, who has usually been assumed to be a page. Could this person and the one in the “Heir apparent” coins be one and the same, and could this person be Ardaxšir king of the Sakas, one of the younger sons of Ardaxšir I?
• It could be a local deity.
• It could be a Zoroastrian priest, an interesting possibility that Alram names because the rock inscription of the famous priest Kirdir at Naqš-e Rajab (carved after Šābuhr I’s reign) depicts him as a beardless man.

Kirdir's relief at Naqš-e Rajab.

Olbrycht shows no doubt, and immediately declares the first possibility to be correct (which is perhaps not so clear). But then he goes further, and assumes (something that in my opinion is even less clear) that the “Heir apparent” coins with the “two Ardaxširs”, father and son, are a sign that Ardaxšir I intended to make the king of the Sakas his heir, instead of his elder son Šābuhr. As we all know, it was Šābuhr who succeeded his father on the throne, and Olbrycht supports here that he did so by displacing his younger brother. It’s interesting to notice that in Šābuhr I’s ŠKZ inscription, Ardaxšir is named as “king of the Sakas” at his father’s court, but when he enumerates the members of his own court, it’s his own son Narseh (the future šahanšah) who holds that title.

Olbrycht goes then (in quite an abrupt way, to resume after it the issue of Ardaxšir I’s succession) to analyze the seizing of power in Iran by Ardaxšir I from his base in Pārs.

The Arsacid empire was divided by the civil war between the brothers Walaxš VI (Mesopotamia and Maishan / Mesene, basically the coastal strip at the mouths of the Euphrates and Tigris) and Ardawān V (Media, Parthia, Kirman, Azerbaijan and Elymais), while in Armenia ruled their cousin Tiridates II (it’s not clear if he took sides in the war). Olbrycht assumes that the eastern Indo-Parthians would have been allies of Ardaxšir I because of their ancient feud against the Younger Arsacids (although I don’t see him as clearly as Olbrycht, given how Ardaxšir I disposed of them after his victory).

According to Tabarī, the first conquest of Ardaxšir I outside Pārs was Kirman, where he defeated its king Walaxš and installed another son of his (confusingly enough, also called Ardaxšir) as king. This conquest was quite significative, because Ardawān II had in his days close ties with Kirman, and it had been since then one of the main bases of the Arsacid family; also the name Walaxš is an Arsacid royal name and it’s possible that this was a member of the Arsacid family, perhaps even a son of Ardawān who Ardaxšir I ousted from Kirman. Strategically it would have made sense because Kirman is the territory that stands between Pars and Sakastan, and if the Indo-Parthians were Ardaxšir I’s allies, this united their territories. Alarmed by this, Ardawān V ordained his vassal the king of Elymais to eliminate Ardaxšir I. But he was himself defeated and Elymais was in turn annexed by Ardaxšir. This left all southern Iran, from the limits with Mesopotamia to Sakastan and the Kushan border, in the hands of Ardaxšir I and his supporters. Now, Ardawān V had to intervene in person.

Rayen castle near Kerman, a fortified town dating back to Sasanian times.

Tabarī wrote about three battles between Ardawān and Ardaxšir; the first two were close affairs with large losses on both sides, but were ultimately won by Ardaxšir. The final battle was fought at Hormozdgan; this battle was a total victory for Ardaxšir, and Ardawān died during the battle. Things are so confused that even now scholars are not sure where this decisive battle took place. Many Internet sites (and some books who should know better) place it “near Bandar Abbas, by the Gulf Coast”, simply because Bandar Abbas lies in the modern Iranian province of Hormozgan. But Tabarī himself stated that the battle took place in Media, and modern scholars place it near the modern city of Shushtar in the Iranian province of Khuzestan (ancient Elymais).

View of the environs of Shushtar.

Following Tabarī’s narrative, Ardaxšir then concentrated in controlling western Iran (Media and Atropatene / Azerbaijan), and in 226 CE he entered Ctesiphon, eliminating Walaxš VI. Some ancient sources state that he took the title of šahanšah at the plain of Hormozdgan immediately after his victory, while others say he did so after entering Ctesiphon.

Tabarī speaks explicitly of the hatred and ferocity that Ardaxšir I deployed in his treatment of the survivors among the Arsacid family. He mercilessly hunted down all of them, killing every one of them who fell in his hands. The survivors amongst the Arsacid family and their supporters took refuge in the only two western territories that stayed loyal to the Arsacids: Armenia, where an Arsacid was still king, and Hatra. And only then did Ardaxšir begin his eastern campaign to bring the eastern parts of the Arsacid empire under his rule, where compared to the west, he found practically no resistance.

The XIV century Arabic Nihayat al-arab though gives a different chronology, stating that Ardaxšir I’s eastern campaign took place before the fall of Ctesiphon. Alram support Tabarī’s account, but Olbrycht puts forward the possibility that perhaps Ardaxšir launched two eastern campaigns: one before taking Ctesiphon, which would have been simply “mopping up” and securing his position amongst the eastern clans who anyways already supported him, thus securing his rearguard and gathering forces for the resistance he anticipated he would find in the west, and another later, perhaps, as Alram suggests, after the fighting with the Roman emperor Alexander Severus was over (after 233 CE), and which would have taken him further than the previous eastern border of the Arsacid empire, perhaps to Chorasmia and Bactria.

Olbrycht points out that the sources don’t speak of any opposition against Ardaxšir I’s rise to the throne in eastern Iran, and how according to the ŠKZ, all the principal dignitaries in the court of Ardaxšir I were of eastern origin:

• Ardaxšir, king of Kirman (according to Tabarī, one of Ardaxšir I’s sons).
• Sadaluf, king of Abrenag (in Khorasan).
• Ardaxšir, king of Merv (also in Khorasan, nothing is known about his lineage or possible relation to the Sasanian family).
• Ardaxšir, king of the Sakas (perhaps another of Ardaxšir I’s sons, as discussed above).

Olbrycht also states (and he might be making an important point here) that in the III century CE, Sakastan was one of the most important provinces / kingdoms in Iran, and one that was given more than once by the ruling šahanšah to the one amongst his sons whom he wanted to succeed him. Thus, later in the century Narseh was king of the Sakas, and also Bahram III.

A fact that has been known for some time and that Olbrycht also point out is the fact that several of the great “Parthian” clans supported the rise of Ardaxšir I, instead of siding with their fellow “Parthians” the Arsacids. According to the ŠKZ, in Ardaxšir I’s court could be find in high-ranking positions member of the great “Parthian” clans of Sūrēn, Kārin and Andegan (the Waraz clan is also named, although its origins are unclear). In his History of the Armenians, Khorenats’i also points out how the Armenian king Khosrov, who was an Arsacid, was informed that “the Parthians” preferred the rule of Ardaxšir I over that of their “own kinsman”. Khorenats’i wrote:

After Artashir, son of Sāsān, had killed Artavan and gained the throne, two branches of the Pahlav family called Aspahapet and Suren Pahlav were jealous that their own kinsman Artashes should rule, and willingly accepted the rule of Artashir, son of Sāsān.

The “Pahlav family” were the Parthians at large, and the “Sūrēn Pahlav” was the Sūrēn clan. As for the “Aspahapet”, it’s not clear. It could be a reference to the Ispahbudhan clan who appears in later Sasanian history in Abaršahr / Khorasan, or to an unnamed general, or generals, or “the army chiefs” in general, for in Parthian and Middle Persian spāhbed meant “general”.

Khorenats’i also wrote that the “House of Karin Pahlav” opposed “Artashir” (Ardaxšir), but according to Olbrycht, this claim must have referred to one of the subsidiary branches of the clan, since it’s known that members of the clan called Peroz Karin and Gog Karin held prominent offices at Ardaxšir’s court, according to the ŠKZ. The Armenian chronicler Agathangelos wrote of a certain “Karinas”, sent along with “Zekas” as Ardaxšir’s envoys to Ardawān V: they are called “the most important clan leaders and generals”. “Karinas” was clearly a member of the Parthian Karin clan. “Zekas” is mentioned in the ŠKZ as Zik, and Olbrycht thinks that he probably represented a Persian family. According to Tacitus, the Sūrēn and Kārin clans had already tried to depose the Arsacid kings Ardawān II and Gōdarz II in the I century CE, and in both cases they’d sent embassies to Rome to ask that the Romans send hem an heir of the Sinatrucid line to put on the throne, and always making abundantly clear that only a member of the Arsacid royal line could be allowed to rule; the merely wanted to exchange an “unjust” Arsacid for a “just” one.

According to Movses Khorenats’i the Armenian king Khosrov was frustrated because his “relatives” had submitted to Ardaxšir. Khosrov sent messengers asking his Parthian relatives “in the lands of the Kushans” (in eastern Iran) to come to his aid against the Persians. But the Sūrēn and Aspahapet clans did not agree. Khosrov was informed that his “kinsman Vehsachan with his branch of the Karen Pahlav had not given obeisance to Artashir”. Ardaxšir is said to have slaughtered all this branch of the Karen Pahlav. One child was rescued, who according to Khorenats’i became the ancestor of the Armenian family Kamsarakan.

NOTE: I should make an aside here. Khorenats’i got his chronology wrong. The Armenian king who ruled at the time of Ardaxšir I’s rise and waged war against him was Tiridates II (c. 194/195 – 252 CE). Khosrov II the Great was his son, who would later be murdered by a “Parthian” nobleman, “Anak the Parthian”, whom Khorenats’i states was a member of the Suren clan. Khorenats’i’s confusion can probably be explained because Tiridates II’s father was also called Khosrov (Khosrov I of Armenia, brother of the Arsacid šahanšah Walaxš V).

For Olbrycht, all this represents that Ardaxšir was helped in his uprising against Ardawān V by a coalition of several great “Parthian” houses which included the Sūrēn and at least part of the Kārin, and possibly also the Indo-Parthian kingdom. Alram and Gazerani see no distinction between the Indo-Parthians and the Suren, but perhaps Olbrycht’s hypothesis fits better with the fact that the members of the Sūrēn clan held important offices in Ardaxšir I’s court, while the Indo-Parthian dynasty of Farn-Sāsān was dispossesed of its lands and titles by Ardaxšir I.

And finally Olbrycht presents his conclusions. For him, Sāsān had been an Indo-Parthian prince, with Arsacid blood (thus agreeing with the tradition preserved in the Sāh-nāma) that settled in Pārs and married the daughter of Pābag, who was perhaps the custodian of the temple of Anahid at Istakhr; Ardaxšir was born from this union. Olbrycht believes that Ardaxšir I, for political reasons (to gain the support of the local Persian nobility and avoid being seen as a “foreign” king) hid his real biological relationship with Sāsān, and could perhaps have reinforced this by having his father-in-law Pābag adopt him (another assumption by Olbrycht, although adoption existed in ancient Iran, and its proceedings and formalities are described in a surviving Middle Persian law treatise). Later, Šābuhr I would have had additional reasons to hide Sāsān from public view, because of his supposed relation with Sakastan, whose king would’ve supposedly been his younger brother and rival heir.

I agree with Olbrycht that this would explain the strange fact of the clear manipulation of his lineage by Šābuhr I, but I’m not so sure about Ardaxšir I. It would have been beneficial during his early rise in Pārs, but once he became šahanšah and had won the allegiance of many clans outside Pārs, there would have been no real political reason to keep on with this fiction. On the contrary, one of the main points of Olbrycht’s reasoning (and one which actually gives some strength to them) is that Ardaxšir was actually related to the Arsacids, and that it was because of this that he gathered supports outside Pars. Then again, why hiding them after Hormozdgan? Later Sasanian kings proudly displayed Sāsān as their ancestor and forgot completely about Pābag.

In short, Olbrycht aligns himself with the genealogy given in the Sāh-nāma and the Armenian tradition, and which appears in a very distorted way in the western accounts of Agathias and Syncellos. In his support, Olbrycht also quotes the work of one who was perhaps the greatest expert in ancient Iran in the Graeco-Roman tradition, the IV century author Ammianus Marcellinus. Ammianus had been for many years an officer in the Roman army in the east, and had been a member of an elite unit charged with intelligence activities, amongst them spying. In his Res Gestae, Ammianus shows an impressive familiarity and knowledge of Iranian governance, geography, religion, traditions, history ... almost everything, and thus he’s perhaps the most trusty amongst western sources, probably because he was the only one who’d actually lived inside the Sasanian empire and who could probably speak fluentPersian, apart from Latin, Greek and Aramaic. Ammianus, in his Res Gestae, makes no difference at all between Arsacids and Sasanians:

Hence to this very day the over–boastful kings of that race suffer themselves to be called brothers of the Sun and Moon, and just as for our emperors the title of Augustus is beloved and coveted, so to the Parthian kings, who were formerly low and obscure, there fell the very greatest increase in distinction, won by the happy auspices of Arsaces. Hence they venerate and worship Arsaces as a god, and their regard for him has been carried so far, that even down to the memory of our time only a man who is of the stock of Arsaces (if there is one anywhere) is preferred to all in mounting the throne. Even in any civil strife, which constantly arises among them, everyone avoids as sacrilege the lifting of his hand against an Arsacid, whether he is bearing arms or is a private citizen.

Thus, Ammianus implies that Aršak was an ancestor of Šābuhr II (309–379 CE). In the extant fragments of his Res Gestae there are no references to Sāsān and the early Sasanians. Ammianus was well informed and must have heard of Ardaxšir’s rebellion, but evidently he considered him an Arsacid de facto.

 

[Semper Victor]

9.0 THE CONSOLIDATION OF ARDAXŠIR I’S RULE.

As I wrote in my previous post, the available sources contradict themselves in what were the immediate steps taken by Ardaxšir I after defeating and killing Ardawān V at the battle of Hormozdgan. I will follow here mainly the account by Tabarī, which is the most detailed and complete source for the events that followed.

Modern scholars have been able to determine the exact date of the battle: April 28, 224. Tabarī states that Šābuhr, Ardaxšir’s son, took part in the battle (as the great relief at Ardaxšir-Xwarrah seems to show) and that he killed Dāḏbondād, who was apparently Ardawān’s secretary (again, as shown in the aforementioned relief), while Ardaxšir himself killed Ardawān, and later he dismounted and trampled the head of Ardawān’s corpse with his feet. Again, according to Tabarī Ardaxšir assumed the title of šahanšah then and there, and some modern scholars have suggested that in this date was also lit the fire of Ardaxšir (each Sasanian šahanšah would have a regnal fire henceforth).

The relief of Ardaxšir I's investiture as šahanšah of the Iranians at Naqsh-e Rostam, near Istakhr. Ardaxšir I is receiving the ring from the supreme Zoroastrian god Ohrmazd, and both are represented as equals in size and attire. The defeated Ardawān V is being trampled under the hooves of Ardaxšir's horse, while Ahriman, the supremen malign demon of Zoroastrianism, is being trampled under the hooves of Ohrmazd's horse. The symbolism is obvious.

Tabarī states that after his victory at Hormozdgan, Ardaxšir and his army travelled north to Media and entered its capital, Hamadan (ancient Ecbatana), and from there to Ādurbādagān (Azerbaijan), Armenia and from here he turned south and entered Asōristān (corresponding to the ancient satrapy of Babylonia, central and southern Mesopotamia) where he took the city of Ctesiphon. And from here he returned to his homeland in Pārs.

Modern historians have analyzed Tabarī’s accounts, comparing with the numismatic evidence and other sources, and have been able to provide some details to the skeleton provided by Tabarī. The fall of Ctesiphon (and the deposition and death of Walaxš VI) must have taken place in 226/227 CE, judging by the dating in the last coins minted by Walaxš IV and the first Sasanian coins minted in the city.

The chronology of events after the fall of Ctesiphon is less clear. According to Tabarī, Ardaxšir returned to Istakhr and from there launched an eastern campaign, marching first into Sakastan, then to Gorgān and Abaršahr, Marv (the furthest point under Arsacid control in the east) and that then he crossed the formed Arsacid eastern border and went as far as Balkh (in Tokharistan, ancient Bactria, then part of the Kushan empire) and Khwārazm (ancient Chorasmia).

Silver drachm of Ardaxšir I minted in Hamadan.

The main basis of operations for these far-reaching campaigns seems to have been the great fortified stronghold of Marv, and according to Tabarī “he killed a great number of people there and sent their heads to the temple of Anahid in Istakhr”. Following Tabarī’s account, then he returned to Pārs and settled for a time at Ardaxšir-Xwarrah, where he received envoys and embassies “from the kings of the Kūshān, and of Tūrān, and of Makrān”. After that, he crossed the Persian Gulf and conquered Bahrayn and perhaps parts of the Arabian coast.

Modern scholars have some problems with this account of events. By 230 CE, Ardaxšir began his attacks against Roman Mesopotamia, so he must’ve turned his attention back to the west, so his great eastern campaign must’ve taken place between 227 and 230 CE, which seems quite a short space of time if he attained so much. It could be explained, as I explained in my previous post, by the fact that he faced practically no resistance in eastern Iran, hence his only serious fighting must’ve been done in his expeditions from Marv. These expeditions, ignored by classical Graeco-Roman authors, would be important for the Iranian empire, for they extended the control of Ardaxšir I over a longer stretch of the lucrative Silk Road, and by attacking Balkh (one of the largest cities in Bactria) he inflicted a serious blow to the Kushan empire, which had already passed its glory days.

Map of ancient Central Asia, showing itst regions and cities.

Still, modern scholars dispute about the time of the first inroads of Ardaxšir I against Rome’s eastern territories, as well as his first attacks against Armenia and Hatra. As I’ve already written in previous posts, Armenia was ruled by the Arsacid Tiridates II, cousin of the two Arsacid brothers deposed and killed by Ardaxšir I. And, if the accounts by Islamic authors about Ardaxšir I’s bloodthirsty annihilation of all members of the Arsacid family (and, generally speaking, of anybody who opposed him), it’s not strange that Armenia became a refuge for all those Iranians who were opposed to Ardaxšir. Also, king Sanatruq II of Hatra (207/08 - 229/230 CE), who had been until then an Arsacid vassal and the most reliable Arsacid ally against Rome, refused to acknowledge Ardaxšir I.

Cassius Dio talks in his last book about the rise of Ardaxšir I, and his sequence of events does not match well with Tabarī´s. According to Dio, Ardaxšir I tried first to take Hatra unsuccessfully, then marched “into Media and Parthia”, and then he attacked Armenia, where he was refused by its king Tiridates with the help of “some Medes” opposed to Ardaxšir.

What seems clear is that Tiridates II did not stand meekly waiting for Ardaxšir to appear in his doorstep, but that he accepted refugees from Iran and encouraged revolts in Media and Ādurbādagān against the rule of Ardaxšir. And one should consider also that Armenia had a sizeable army, trained and armed in the Iranian way, and that it had been one of the strongest vassal kingdoms of the Arsacid empire. Also, it’s quite possible that its king Tiridates may have sought to restore Arsacid rule in Iran with himself on the throne. Coins bearing the name of Artavasdes, one of Ardawān V’s sons, have been found at Khorramabad, Nehāvand and in other parts of Media and Azerbaijan near to ancient Armenia. These coins ceased to be minted in 227 CE, but point towards open resistance against Ardaxšir’s rule.

The Šāh-nāma also offers a sequence of events broadly in accordance with Tabarī, but with some details absent from Tabarī`s accounts: after his victory at Hormozdgan, Ardaxšir returned briefly to Pārs and then marched to Rayy (near modern Tehran, by then one of the most important cities in Media) and then launched a campaign “against the Kurds”, which could point to a campaign against Artavasdes (whose coins have been found mostly precisely in the environs of what is now Iranian Kurdistan). Also, as discussed in the previous post, the XIV century Arabic encyclopedia, the Nihayat al-Arab, states that Ardaxšir launched first his eastern campaign and then went to Rayy, after which its sequence of events closely matches the one by Ferdowsī.

Another ancient source is the late Roman anonymous Acta Martyrum, which deals mainly with the Christians who were persecuted under Decius. This source states that:

The war began in the spring, the Parthian ruler [Ardawān] was forever annihilated, they [the Sasanians] thereupon attacked Mesopotamia, Zabdicene [modern Colemerik in south-east Turkey, located on the route from Armenia to Mosul] and Arzanene [a province in the ancient kingdom of Armenia] and in one year they conquered those countries … and finally all the Parthians fled to the high mountains and abandoned all their cities and countreis to the Persians.

Then there’re the Armenian sources, which point towards an even more aggressive stance of Tiridates II against Ardaxšir I. In his History of Saint Gregory and the Conversion of Armenia, the V century author Agathangelos, Tiridates II launched a campaign to assert his own claims to the throne of Iran. Accordingly, Accordingly, he would’ve opened the Caucasus passes to a large army of “Huns” (a clear anachronism) allowing them free pass to ravage Mesopotamia while he himself assembled a large army of Armenians, Iranian refugees, Georgians (Iberians) and Albanians and launched repeated raids into Media and Ādurbādagān, hoping to incite its nobility to revolt against Ardaxšir. Although he would’ve been able to ravage the country at will, he failed in his goal to arise a general revolt against the new ruler, and retreated to Armenia.

The only solid dates that we have for all this mess are:

• April 28, 224: Battle of Hormizdgan.
• 226/227: First Sasanian coins minted in Ctesiphon.
• 227: End of the coinage of Artavasdes.
• 233/234: First Sasanian coins minted in Sakastan and Marv.

Which seem to confirm, on very broad traces, the sequence of events given by Tabarī. In his book Emperor Alexander Severus: Rome’s Age of Insurrection, AD 222-235, John S. McHugh offers this chronological reconstruction of events (which I find quite plausible): Ardaxšir would have spent the years 224-227 campaigning against a coalition of minor Mesopotamian kings (according to the Nihayat al-Arab) and besieging unsuccessfully the city of Hatra. By this time, Ardaxšir had already conquered Mayshan / Mesene with its commercial ports on the Gulf coast, so an attack on Hatra made sense in order to control the trade routes in their entirety up to the Roman border. Such a campaign would have also threatened the interests of another great commercial city, Palmyra, with its commercial outposts in lower and central Mesopotamia. According to McHugh, the campaign mentioned by Dio “into Media and Parthia” would have been launched by Ardaxšir in 228 CE in response to the invasion by Tiridates II of Armenia, and immediately after repulsing it, Ardaxšir would have invaded Armenian territory in the same year. The Sasanian king failed in his attempt to destroy Tigranes II, and would have then exited Armenia through the southwestern province of Arzanene, and would have entered the Roman province of Cappadocia and raided it, turning then east into Zabdicene (which had for capital the fortified city of Bezabde), and was part of the Roman province of Mesopotamia. As Ardaxšir´s army had entered the heavily defended province from the rear, the Roman garrison would’ve been unable to react, and this action spread panic in the province and caused a great impact across the empire, as the Roman coinage of the second half of the year 228 CE reflects. The raiding of Roman territory would have served Ardaxšir to cover up his failure against Tiridates II (his first real defeat), and would also have given his troops plenty of easy loot.

Location of Arzanene within the ancient kingdom of Armenia.

Eastern Roman provinces in the early III century CE.

Another factor to consider is the possible involvement of the Romans in helping both Hatra and Armenia. Latin inscriptions found inside Hatra and dated to 235 CE state clearly that by then there was a Roman garrison in the city, and that Hatra, which had resisted sieges by Trajan and Septimius Severus, had changed sides and had become a Roman vassal. It’s possible that, in face of Ardaxšir I`s attack, Tiridates of Armenia also asked for Roman help; after all, since Nero’s times Armenia had been a kind of “joint protectorate” under Rome and the Arsacids, even if after the battle of Nisibis Roman influence had waned a bit there. If this was the case, then Ardaxšir would have felt perfectly justified to attack Roman territory (looking back to his career, this was not a man who did things half-heartedly), and we should also remember that neither the Arsacids nor the Sasanians acknowledged the Roman annexation of northern Mesopotamia.

This first invasion of Roman Mesopotamia by Ardaxšir is attested by Herodian, and it’s also him who talks about a second invasion by Ardaxšir the following year 229 CE. And this time it was a full-scale invasion oriented towards conquering Roman Mesopotamia.

 

[Semper Victor]

10.0 THE ROMAN EMPIRE BETWEEN 217 AND 228 CE.

Just like had happened in the Iranian empire, the decade that followed the battle of Nisibis was a time of considerable political upheaval in the empire of the Romans. As I wrote in my post about the battle of Nisibis, Macrinus had refrained from slaughtering Caracalla’s relatives for fear of this emperor`s popularity among the troops, and this was to prove a fatal mistake for him. We know that Caracalla’s mother Iulia Domna had accompanied her son to the east, and while Caracalla reenacted the role of Alexander the Great, she stayed in Antiochia and took charge of the daily administration of the empire.

Out of fear, Macrinus even maintained her bodyguard of Praetorians, but Iulia Domna was already terminally ill with breast cancer, and died shortly afterwards. Her extended family had also travelled with her to the East: her sister Iulia Maesa, and the two daughters of Maesa; Iulia Soaemias and Iulia Mamaea. After Domna’s death, Macrinus took away their bodyguard and sent them packing from the palace at Antiochia towards the Syrian city of Emesa, which was the ancestral seat of the family. This was a second fatal blunder by Macrinus; the family was immensely rich and very influential in this part of Syria, and Maesa immediately began plotting and scheming to install her 14-year-old grandson Elagabalus (son of Iulia Soaemias), who was hereditary supreme priest of the god El Gabal in Emesa, as emperor. Given the great concentration of troops in the area, it was easy for her to find officers sympathetics to her cause. She spread the rumor that Elagabalus was really Caracalla’s natural son (thus implying an incest with her daughter Soaemias), and together with the bribing of some high officers and the distribution of some juicy donativa among the rank and file, Legio III Gallica revolted against Macrinus, and other units soon followed (including even part of the Praetorian Guard and the elite Legio II Parthica). Macrinus gathered the units that remained loyal to him, and both armies clashed near Antioch on 8 June 218. Macrinus was defeated and fled the battlefield; both him and his son were promptly apprehended and executed.

Denarius of Iulia Maesa. On the obverse, IVLIA MAESA AVG.

But Elagabalus was to prove a disappointment for Maesa and for the army. He was an inexperienced and headstrong teenager obsessed with the cult of El Gabal, and his four years as emperor were to be a constant scandal for the inhabitants of Rome, especially for the conservative-minded Senate, and most dangerously for the army, who thought Elagabalus` behavior most unbecoming for an Augustus. Poor Cassius Dio, who at his ripe old age, already embittered by the reigns of Caracalla and Macrinus, thought who had seen everything, was up for four more years of silent rage and disappointment; Elagabalus is only second to Caracalla in the treatment that Dio gave him in his poisonous last book of the Roman History (he consistently calls him “Sardanapalus”, after the legendary Assyrian king).

Denarius of Iulia Soaemias. On the obverse, IVLIA SOAEMIAS AVG.

Aureus minted by Elagabalus. On the reverse, the rock that was venerated as El Gabal in a triumphal chariot.

Always the astute politician, Maesa realized that Elagabalus had become a liability and began plotting again to have him removed, putting in his place her other grandson Severus Alexander, the 13-year-old son of Iulia Mamaea. She outmaneuvered both Elagabalus and Soaemias, and both were killed by the Praetorians at the Castra Praetoria in Rome on March 11, 222 CE.

Severus Alexander was immediately and without trouble acclaimed as Augustus by the garrison of Rome and by the border legions, and was recognized as such by the Senate. Maesa and Mamaea, who were conscious of how much the last emperors had rocked the boat of the Roman state, tried to present the new reign as a “return to normality”, and made a great show of treating the Senate with respect and return to conservative policies. Although they tried, this proved impossible. For starters, the supposed devolution of attributions to the Senate (to the good old ways of the Antonine era) was a mere façade, because the rise of equestrians in the administration and the army was not stopped or reversed. But the wort problem was the imperial Treasury. The increase of army numbers by Septimius Severus and Caracalla and their repeated pay rises had clearly left the budget unbalanced.

Denarius of Iulia Mamaea. On the obverse, IVLIA MAMAEA AVG.

The initial responsibility for this policies lays with Maesa and Mamaea, for the 13-year-old Severus Alexander was clearly not fit to rule; shortly after 222 CE, Maesa disappears from the historical record (probably died of natural causes), and Iulia Mamaea became the real ruler of the empire, assuming the title Augusta alongside her son (not an unprecedented step, other empresses had enjoyed the rank before) and also assuming a high profile in government (appearing in coins, assuming the title Mater Castrorum, etc.). Although the senatorial ordo supported the new regime enthusiastically (Cassius Dio enjoyed even a revival of his political career when he was already an old man, and painted Severus Alexander in the most positive way possible in the last pages of his work), the army began soon to show signs of discontent.

Silver denarius of Alexander Severus. On the obverse, IMP.CAESAR.SEV.ALEXAND.AVG.

Macrinus had already tried to limit military expenses (yet another fatal error), by reducing the pay of new recruits to pre-Caracalla levels; this allowed him to pay the war indemnity to Ardawān V, and to increase the silver content of the denarius back to a 57,85% (which was not bad given that his reign lasted only from 11 April 217 to 8 June 218).

It’s possible that Mamaea and Alexander tried to limit expenses in another, “softer” way, by keeping military units understrength, which would have displeased army officers (especially the more “hawkish” ones) and by other cuts. The new regime also displeased the army because it took an eminently civilian profile, and what the army wanted was another soldier-emperor like Septimius Severus and Caracalla. Instead, what they got was an empire ruled by a woman and by a boy that even as he grew into a man showed no inclination for military affairs, and stayed always in Rome and never went to the borders and did not start any “preemptive” wars like had become de rigueur by then.

But in parallel to this, archaeology has also shown that the Mamaea / Alexander government also embarked on a lavish program of construction and restoration public buildings in Rome and across the empire, which would have only served to anger the soldiers even more. The extension of the public dole that Alexander did for the poor in the city of Rome would not had helped in this respect either.

Remains of the Aqua Alexandrina, the last great aqueduct built in ancient Rome, built by Severus Alexander to provide water for the Baths of Caracalla, which were finished during his reign.

All this is reflected in Herodian, who clearly disliked Mamaea and accused her of “avarice” and of being “too controlling” with her son, while portraying Alexander himself as a humane and sympathetic character (although Herodian contradicts himself, because in all decisions taken after 224 CE, he shows them as being taken by Alexander alone). The HA’s portrait of Severus Alexander’s is completely distorted, and is little more than a homily on good government, with little relation to real history. The portrait in Dio (who knew him personally, and had enjoyed the ultimate honor of a shared consulship with him) is also that of a just and honorable man, but powerless (or too “soft”) in the face of the “unruly” soldiery.

As a matter of fact, one anecdote from Dio is quite telling about the situation in Rome during the second half of the 220s. Cassius Dio had been appointed as governor of Upper Pannonia, which is quite puzzling in itself. This was one of the most exposed and heavily garrisoned provinces in the empire, and the choice of an elderly senator with no previous military experience as governor is quite a bizarre one. Once in Pannonia, Dio became a martinet, decided to “impose discipline” amongst the troops, which “had grown soft” under Caracalla and Septimius Severus. As can be imagined, by the end of his tenure, all the soldiers in Pannonia hated his guts. Since the reign of Septimius Severus, the Praetorian Guard in Rome was drawn from the soldiers in the border legions, and especially soldiers from the Danube provinces, like the two Pannonias. Obviously, they had been informed about Dio’s deeds in their homeland (perhaps against their own relatives or close friends), and were expecting Dio with sharpened blades. When Dio arrived in Rome, Severus Alexander appointed him consul for a second time (a rare honor) and then announced that he himself would share the consulship with Dio (an even rarer honor) …. And then told him that he should better spend his consular year outside the city of Rome, because not even him, the emperor, could guarantee his safety in face of the anger of the Praetorians. This doesn’t offer a very flattering picture of Alexander, unable to even control the Praetorians in Rome. Another example of the utterly lack of control over the Praetorians is the murder of one of their Prefects, the renowned jurist Ulpianus, also in front of the emperor, and a three-day battle with the Roman plebs, in which the Praetorians inflicted (and apparently also suffered) heavy losses, and set fire to a large area of the city.

Reconstruction of the "civilian" city of Carnuntum, capital of Upper Pannonia; in the background, the encampment of Legio XIV Gemina and the cannabae that surrounded it.

Expenditure on the army is estimated to have been between 286–370 million denarii a year, excluding funds spent on the fleet, pensions, donativa and the purchasing of resources and food for the upkeep of the troops. Herodian accuses Mamaea of greed in her insatiable desire to raise revenue. The emperor supposedly criticized his mother for this (Herodian had to keep his idealized image of the emperor), but he must have been as concerned as her about the financial situation. The late Roman historian Zosimus, probably basing his account on a lost source, explicitly states that the emperor himself was responsible for the careful husbanding of limited resources; beset as he was by “so many difficulties”, Zosimus wrote that:

he was infected with an insatiable avarice, amassing riches with the utmost solicitude, which he confided to the care of his mother.

There is a common topos of senatorial history: the ‘bad’ emperors such as Commodus, Caracalla and Maximinus Thrax are routinely accused of avarice as they looked to impose additional taxes on the rich. ‘Good’ emperors found the necessary money from cutbacks in imperial spending on ostentatious displays of wealth, characterized in our sources as “moderate dignified government”. Consequently, Mamaea was blamed for the financial measures introduced; otherwise, the idealized image of Alexander Severus in all senatorial sources would have been tarnished.

Herodian refers to the “confiscation of some people’s inherited property”. The historian also alludes to a significant number of treason trials for maiestas (a common way for emperors deprived of funds to raise money) which resulted in the guilty being spared the death penalty. However, conviction would have led to exile and the confiscation of their estates, which were added to the imperial fiscus. Dio’s fictional account of the speech of Maecenas to Augustus is the part of his history which reveals the most about the senatorial attitudes of his time. Dio attempted here to offer solutions to the problems facing the empire in the time of Alexander Severus. He recognized the importance of achieving a sustainable and secure revenue in order to provide the resources for the army, who secured the safety of the empire. However, this should be done without drawing on the assets of the elite. Instead, the senatorial historian, himself the owner of vast estates in Italy and in his native Bithynia, urged the emperor to rely purely on the resources of the state itself, through income raised from state owned mines and imperial estates. He also advocated the sale of all properties acquired by the state during the civil wars, with the profits used to provide cheap loans to encourage the cultivation of deserted land, thus increasing revenue. He suggested that any shortfall between income and expenditure could be met through indirect taxation on produce. Wealth was primarily based on land, yet the elite resented any attempt by the state to draw upon their assets in supporting the costs of empire. Emperors that threatened their privileges and wealth were systematically characterized as greedy and avaricious, labels that were now applied to Mamaea, while Alexander Severus was held up as a paragon of imperial virtue and good government.

The supply of gold and silver was finite. Supply did not match demand, especially silver, which was used to pay the soldiers, and this had led to a steady debasement of the silver coinage. As we’ve already seen, Caracalla had introduced the antoninianus, which was meant to be equivalent to two denarii but contained barely 50 per cent silver, the same precious metal content as a single denarius. The gold content of the aureus (the Roman gold coin) had also been reduced slightly by Septimius Severus, with fifty being struck to a pound of gold rather than forty-five. An increasing lack of confidence in the intrinsic value of the coinage is reflected in the jurist Paul’s (another of the great jurists who worked for Severus Alexander) definition of coins as a “price” (petrium) rather than a “commodity” (merx). Severe penalties were imposed on those who failed to accept the theoretical value of the coin. A probable lack of confidence in the antoninianus had led to it being discontinued by Elagabalus. Alexander Severus appears to have attempted to halt this decline in confidence by refusing to debase the coinage any further, retaining an exchange rate of one aureus to twenty-five denarii despite the need to balance imperial income and expenditure. It is perhaps for this reason that a series of coins were issued carrying the legend IMP.SEV.ALEXANDER. AUG. RESTITVTOR. MONETAE and IMP. SEV.ALEXANDER.AUG.RESTITVTA.MONITA (“restorer of the coinage”). However, the purity of the coins was not restored to levels seen before Septimius Severus, suggesting this assertion was merely an attempt to restore trust in the precious metal content.

The urgent necessity to raise bullion is reflected also in the sale of imperial estates. Amphora stamps indicate imperial property acquired in Baetica, Spain, by Septimius Severus during the civil wars was sold to private owners at this time. Excavations on the massive mountain of discarded amphorae at Monte Testaccio in Rome show no private names from 198–230 CE, when they reappear. Alexander Severus appears to have relinquished state control of the trade in oil to the capital and returned it to private ownership, so reducing costs and raising revenue. Furthermore, spending on the upkeep of fortifications was reduced to a minimum and units not kept at full strength. This would lead to accusations of “rapacity and miserliness” by the soldiers.

There’s also evidence for an increased effort to raise tax revenues, with Alexander Severus continuing the policy of previous emperors to appoint curatores and imperial procuratores to supervise the finances of cities, which meant an increased centralization of the fiscal apparatus in the hands of the imperial government. There is a large body of evidence from this period for tax avoidance. This may be a reflection of an increased tax burden or the preservation of a large number of imperial rescripts from the reign of Alexander Severus in the late Roman legal compendiums.

This was the troubled empire that would have to meet the new enemy who’d risen in the East.

 

[Semper Victor]

11.1 THE WAR OF SEVERUS ALEXANDER AGAINST ARDAXŠIR I. FIRST ROMAN REACTIONS.

Severus Alexander had unwittingly been the short-term beneficiary of a protracted period of peace, a consequence of the aggressive campaigns of Septimius Severus and Caracalla against the Caledonians and Maetae in northern Britannia, the Arsacids in the East and the Alamanni on the Rhine. This was, however, a mixed blessing. On the one hand it allowed the new regime the opportunity to build secure foundations to his rule, but it also deprived the emperor of the opportunity to display the martial virtues considered essential by the soldiers. These men were willing to risk their lives serving an emperor, who was their ultimate commander-in-chief, if they felt confident in his virtus and military abilities.

Map of the war theater in northern Mesopotamia.

Caracalla had pursued an aggressive war against a weakened Arsacid Empire to establish this reputation, and he was loved by his men. Even Elagabalus had led men in war, rallying fleeing soldiers to turn the tide of battle at Antioch against Macrinus’ army. Alexander Severus failed to use the peaceful interlude from his accession in 222 to 228 CE to build up these martial credentials. Rome had never been averse to launching an unprovoked military campaign against some weak and surprised foe. The wars of Alexander Severus would, however, be entirely reactive, with the army led by an emperor lacking any military experience. In this respect, the contrast with the aggressive, experienced and battle-hardened Ardaxšir I couldn’t be starker.

The best Graeco-Roman source for this era, Cassius Dio, stops precisely at 229 CE (the year of Dio’s second consulship), and apart from a brief description of unrest in the Roman east, he tells nothing about this war. This means that the only contemporary source available is Herodian, who kept writing up to 238 CE. Any other Graeco-Roman documentary sources date to the IV century (including the HA) or later (Zonaras, Syncellus, etc.).

Let’s then see the extract from Herodian 6.2.1-6.2.2 where Herodian deals with Ardaxšir’s first incursion into Rome’s eastern provinces:

In the fourteenth year, however, unexpected dispatches from the governors of Syria and Mesopotamia revealed that Artaxerxes, the Persian king, had conquered the Parthians and seized their Eastern empire, killing Artabanus, who was formerly called the Great King and wore the double diadem. Artaxerxes then subdued all the barbarians on his borders and forced them to pay tribute. He did not remain quiet, however, nor stay on his side of the Tigris River, but, after scaling its banks and crossing the borders of the Roman empire, he overran Mesopotamia and threatened Syria.

The entire continent opposite Europe, separated from it by the Aegean Sea and the Propontic Gulf, and the region called Asia he wished to recover for the Persian empire. Believing these regions to be his by inheritance, he declared that all the countries in that area, including Ionia and Caria, had been ruled by Persian governors, beginning with Cyrus, who first made the Median empire Persian, and ending with Darius, the last of the Persian monarchs, whose kingdom was seized by Alexander the Great. He asserted that it was therefore proper for him to recover for the Persians the kingdom which they had formerly possessed.

Here Herodian attributes to Ardaxšir a desire to rebuild the Achaemenid empire, when this first incursion had been little more than a collateral effect of his Armenian campaign. According to McHugh’s chronology, this first incursion would have happened in 228 CE. Let’s see nowthe following passage from Herodian 6.2.3-6.2.4 stating which was Alexander’s reaction:

When the Eastern governors revealed these developments in their dispatches, Alexander was greatly disturbed by these unanticipated tidings, particularly since, raised from childhood in an age of peace, he had spent his entire life in urban ease and comfort. Before doing anything else, he thought it best, after consulting his advisers, to send an embassy to the king and by his letters halt the invasion and disappoint the barbarian's hopes.

In these letters he told Artaxerxes that he must remain within his own borders and not initiate any action; let him not, deluded by vain hopes, stir up a great war, but rather let each of them be content with what was already his. Artaxerxes would find fighting against the Romans not the same thing as fighting with his barbarian kinsmen and neighbors. Alexander further reminded the Persian king of the victories won over them by Augustus, Trajan, Verus, and Severus. By writing letters of this kind, Alexander thought that he would persuade the barbarian to remain quiet or frighten him to the same course.

And according to Herodian 6.2.5, this was Ardaxsir’s response:

But Artaxerxes ignored Alexander's efforts; believing that the matter would be settled by arms, not by words, he took the field, pillaging and looting all the Roman provinces. He overran and plundered Mesopotamia, trampling it under the hoofs of his horses. He laid siege to the Roman garrison camps on the banks of the rivers, the camps which defended the empire. Rash by nature and elated by successes beyond his expectations, Artaxerxes was convinced that he could surmount every obstacle in his path.

By now, having seen his previous career, it’s quite clear that strongly worded letters were not going to stop Ardaxšir. But it’s quite clear that the Roman eastern defenses floundered completely in front of Ardaxsir’s attack. According to Dio’s Epitome of Book LXXX, this was due to the soldier’s lack of discipline:

But the situation in Mesopotamia became still more alarming and inspired a more genuine fear in all, not merely the people in Rome, but the rest of mankind as well. For Artaxerxes, a Persian, after conquering the Parthians in three battles and killing their king, Artabanus, made a campaign against Hatra, in the endeavor to capture it as a base for attacking the Romans. He actually did make a breach in the wall, but when he lost a good many soldiers through an ambuscade, he moved against Media. Of this country, as also of Parthia, he acquired no small portion, partly by force and partly by intimidation, and then marched against Armenia. Here he suffered a reverse at the hands of the natives, some Medes, and the sons of Artabanus, number either fled, as some say, or, as others assert, retired to prepare a larger expedition. He accordingly became a source of fear to us; for he was encamped with a large army so as to threaten not only Mesopotamia but also Syria, and he boasted that he would win back everything that the ancient Persians had once held, as far as the Grecian Sea, claiming that all this was his rightful inheritance from his forefathers. The danger lies not in the fact that he seems to be of any particular consequence in himself, but rather in the fact that our armies are in such a state that some of the troops are actually joining him and others are refusing to defend themselves. They indulge in such wantonness, license, and lack of discipline, that those in Mesopotamia even dared to kill their commander, Flavius Heracleo (…).

The entire Roman garrison in the East (including Egypt) amounted to 12 legions, plus auxiliaries. Even if we account for the poor state of discipline in the army (I will later address this issue) and the possibility that due to budgetary difficulties the units could’ve been kept understrength, on paper this war a potent force, more than enough to repeal any attack from Iran.

The real problem though, was not there (although these were also real problems, too). The same initial floundering had also happened when Walaxš IV had attacked at the start of the joint reign of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. And when Walaxš V had attacked taking advantage of Septimius Severus’ problems with Albinus in the west, and in those two cases there were no references to lack of funds or indiscipline. Due to this, some historians have come to believe that the fault lay in the eastern legions themselves, and that they would’ve been “second rate” legions, unable to hold their own without the help of reinforcements from the “hardened” western legions. This is quite an unfounded assertion.

In my opinion, the problem lay in the Roman command system. Rome had 12 legions with their attached auxiliaries in the East, that’s right, but those legions were under the separate control of 7 separate provincial governors, none of whom had control over more than two legions. This was deliberate; it was a system designed to disperse authority and avoid large concentrations of troops under a single commander, which was always politically dangerous for the ruling emperor. The result of course, was a total lack of coordination in any Roman response; each governor had to fight a battle on his own, relying only on his own forces, while the Arsacids or Sasanians enjoyed total unity of command under their šahanšah, and could concentrate at will against any Roman force.

This was an intrinsic weakness of the Roman military system, and one which until the late II and early III century had only showed itself in the East against the Iranians, which were the only enemy able to put in the field large enough armies to overwhelm any provincial garrison. In Europe and Africa until then this had been no problem either (except for the isolated case of the Dacians), because the Germanic and Sarmatian tribes due to their political divisions were unable to put large enough armies in the field as to be really a menace. But already under Marcus Aurelius the Marcomanni and Quadi had been able to launch large scale attacks, and the apparition of the Alamanni under Caracalla pointed in the same direction. Also under Severus Alexander, a large tribal kingdom or confederacy under the overall rulership of the Gothic people was coalescing in southern Ukraine (until the second half of the III century, Graeco-Roman authors would refer to them as “Scythians” which would become a formidable foe for Rome, able to put large cavalry armies on the field.

In the victorious counterattacks of the II century against Arsacid invasions, more than the reinforcements from the West, what had really helped was the displacement of the ruling Augustus to the East, thus establishing unity of command and enabling the dispersed Roman forces to act as a single army. Another alternative was to nominate a generalissimo, a ruling commander over all the forces in the theater, but this was a very risky move. Nero had been lucky with Corbulo, and perhaps would have been lucky too with Vespasian, who nevertheless ended up taking the purple thanks to his control of the army mobilized against the Jewish rebellion. The counterattack against Walaxš IV was under the nominal control of Lucius Verus, who was Marcus Aurelius’ co-Augustus. But the real control of the campaign was under a series of experienced commanders; after the Roman victory the two Augusti left the more successful amongst them, Avidius Cassius, as overall commander in the east … and Cassius ended up rebelling against Marcus Aurelius, who had to stop the war against the Marcomanni to deal with him.

The memory of Avidius Cassius’ rebellion seems to have remained, and Septimius Severus avoided carefully having any comparable commander. He even divided or modified the borders of the three most heavily garrisoned provinces in the empire (Britannia, Upper Pannonia and Syria, with three legions each) so that no governor had command over more than two legions. He also reinforced the central reserve in Rome, and he personally attended to each border crisis by going there himself with reinforcements. In the long time, as menaces multiplied, this would become an impossibility as the ruling Augustus could not be in more than one place at any given time.

Then we have the issue of military indiscipline so bemoaned by Dio; his account sounds very alarming, because he implies issues of desertion to the enemy (not specifically to Ardaxšir’s army, though) and open mutiny. To this day, scholars have been unable to identify the “Flavius Heracleo” of Dio’s account. Some believe he was the prefect of one of the two legions that garrisoned the province (I and III Parthicae), but he could also have been the commander of some sort of auxiliary unit. Most authors seem to discard the possibility that he’d been the equestrian governor (praeses) of the province, though. Also, inscriptions from Lambaesis in Numidia attest to the temporary transfer of two veterans and a certain Virilis from Legio III Augusta to III Parthica, perhaps this could be related with the issue of restoring discipline in the Mesopotamian legions. Also, if Flavius Heracleo was a legionary commander, this was a major offense, and in these cases the legionaries would’ve hurried to proclaim an Augustus of their own choosing to avoid retribution.

Dio, Herodian, the Epitome De Caesaribus, the HA and Zosimus all refer to several revolts in the eastern provinces between the first Sasanian invasion in 228 CE and the arrival of Severus Alexander with a huge army in Antioch in the summer of 231 CE, which means that due to the protracted absence of the emperor from the east. The situation there degenerated into utter chaos (which was a grave mistake by Severus Alexander and his council, even if they had reasons for acting in this way, as we will see).

According to the Epitome De Caesaribus:

Under his rule [that of Alexander Severus], Taurinius, who had been made Augustus, on account of fear, threw himself into the Euphrates.

There are no other epigraphic or literary references to this Taurinius (which implies that this passage of this IV century CE work must be treated with some caution), but the fact that he ended his life by throwing himself into the Euphrates suggests that he led a revolt in Mesopotamia and that he may have killed himself whilst attempting to escape to Sassanid territory, perhaps due to the arrival of the forces of the legitimate emperor to the East.

Zosimus (late V century – early VI century CE), writes about a separate revolt:

The soldiers after this event [the murder of the Praetorian Prefect Ulpian], forgetting by degrees their former regard for Alexander, appeared unwilling to put his commands in execution, and in order to avoid being punished for their negligence, excited public commotions, in which they promoted a person, named Antoninus, to the empire. But he, being incapable of sustaining so weighty a charge, declined, it. They chose in his stead Uranius, a man of low and servile condition, whom they immediately placed before Alexander, dressed in purple, by which they intended to express more strongly their contempt for the emperor.

Uranius appears to have been connected to the city Edessa. In 252/253 CE, a certain Uranius Antoninus defended Edessa and parts of Syria after the total defeat of Roman forces at the Battle of Barbalissos and the capture of all legionary bases in the area by Ardaxšir’s son and successor, Šābuhr I. Some scholars suggest he could have been a claimant to the throne of Oshroene, which had been absorbed by Caracalla into the empire in 214 CE, and the two were close relatives, perhaps father and son. Some coins issued by Emesa around 252 CE carry the name of L. or C. Julius Aurelius Sulpicius Uranius Antoninus. On the reverse, some issues depict the star of Emesa, symbolizing the sun god Elagabal, whilst others show the image of the black stone in the temple. The usurper clearly wished to associate himself with Caracalla, and may have been a distant relative of Iulia Maesa and Iulia Domna.

The assertion of a familial link to an imperial house made it easier for soldiers to switch loyalty having previously made a solemn oath (the sacramentum) to protect the emperor and his family. Uranius may also have been a priest of Elagabal, as the reverse side of the coins show the image of the god. Zosimus described Uranius as “a man of low and servile condition”, which apparently excludes a connection to the Severans. However, Dio himself called Iulia Domna “plebeian”. The fact that Uranius appears to have been brought before the emperor by Roman soldiers clad in the imperial purple suggests his revolt only ended in the late summer of 231 CE when Severus Alexander arrived in the East. Uranius may even have presented himself as a relative of the legitimate emperor defending the empire in the face of Sasanian aggression, hence his decision not to engage Alexander Severus in battle but attempt to persuade him of his honorable intentions in an imperial audience. This would have been a mistake, as any attempt to assume military or political powers without having them conferred by the legitimate authorities would have to be punished severely to pre-empt further insurrections.

The IX century Byzantine chronicler Syncellus describes the whole affair in a most succinct way:

A certain Uranius was named emperor at Edessa in Osrhoene, and, in taking power in opposition to Alexander, he was killed by him when Alexander drove out the Persians who were raiding Cappadocia and besieging Nisibis.

Another source confirming the usurpation is the V century CE writer Polemius Silvius, in his calendar that chronicles festivals, the birthdays of emperors, consular years and key events and which refers to Uranius with additional nomenclature, as well as an otherwise unknown usurper:

Elagabalus Antoninus was slain. After which Marcellus and Sallust Uranius Seleucus and Taurinius, the tyrants were made Caesars.

As I wrote before, the absence of the emperor for such a protracted period from the East of time is striking. The war on the borders of the empire in Mesopotamia had been waged between the rival claimants for the throne of Iran for a long time. The warning signs were long in evidence before the actual attacks on Roman territory in late 228 CE. Yet Severus Alexander didn’t arrive in the East until the late summer of 232 CE. This was clearly an error of judgement on the part of the emperor, Iulia Mamaea and their advisors. By the reign of Severus Alexander, the emperor was virtually obliged to lead the army in person, especially during periods of crisis. The emperor was titled imperator and “fellow soldier”. Septimius Severus, Caracalla and even Elagabalus had all led armies into battle. Furthermore, Severus Alexander had increased his personal identification with the army by adding his name to all the legions, as had Commodus and Caracalla before him. For example, Legio I Minervia Antoniniana became Legio I Minervia Severiana Alexandriana at the start of his reign. However, in times of stress an absent emperor became an increasingly abstract concept for the soldiers.

When news of Ardaxšir I’s aggression reached Rome, the emperor assembled his concilium and listened to their advice. Caution prevailed and an embassy was sent to Ardaxšir demanding that he cease his aggression and remain within the established territories of the Arsacid empire. And we’ve also seen how did Ardaxšir respond to this letter. The governors of Rome’s eastern provinces demanded the presence of the emperor, beset as they were by external invasion and internal insurrection, but the emperor took four years before arriving in Antioch; this had disastrous consequences, but Severus Alexander was not, as Herodian implied, simply “lingering” in Rome. Herodian, 6.3.1:

When the bold actions of this Eastern barbarian were disclosed to Alexander while he was passing the time in Rome, he found these affronts unendurable. Though the undertaking distressed him and was contrary to his inclinations, since his governors there were calling for him, he made preparations for departure.

Given that probably many army units were understrength due to the financial difficulties of the fiscus, and that the emperor lacked any military credentials, the imperial concilium’s first reaction, trying to negotiate with Ardaxšir, was probably a reasonable one … only if the enemy hadn’t been Ardaxšir, and if the emperor’s credibility hadn’t been already low amongst the soldiery. In the worst case, lengthy negotiations would have bought time for the Romans to prepare for war. Instead, they had to prepare themselves in haste, leaving the eastern governors to fend for themselves against Ardaxšir’s onslaught.

From 229 CE onwards, the coinage of Severus Alexander showed martial themes in an increasing way. Denarius of Severus Alexander; on the reverse, MARS VLTOR (Mars the Avenger).

Coin of Severus Alexander. On the reverse, VIRTVS AVGUSTI, exalting the military virtues of the emperor, shown in military attire.

From 230 CE onwards, there is evidence of extensive preparations for war, and one that is specifically remarked in several sources is the large recruiting campaign across the whole empire led by Severus Alexander, which points once more towards understrength units. And for this, Severus Alexander and Mamaea needed time; time to recruit and train troops to meet the challenge of an aggressive and experienced enemy. This is reflected in Herodian 6.3.1-6.3.2:

He assembled for army service picked men from Italy and from all the Roman provinces, enrolling those whose age and physical condition qualified them for military service.

The gathering of an army equal in size to the reported strength of the attacking barbarians caused the greatest upheaval throughout the Roman world.

Amongst the epigraphic remains, a badly damaged inscription found in Capua appears to record the appointment of a certain L. Fulvius Gavius Numisius Petronius Aemilianus, who was tasked with the raising of soldiers in Transpadanum (northern Italy) during Severus Alexander’s reign; this could be related with the refence in the HA that Severus Alexander raised a new legion, Legio IV Italica, for the eastern campaign, although this piece of information by the HA is treated as spurious by most scholars.

The Armenian chronicler Agathangelos also recorded “troops being raised from Egypt to the Black Sea and even the desert”. This is supported again by archaeological and epigraphic evidence recording levies raised in Mauretania, Palmyra, Osrhoene and probably in Arabia. The Roman fort at Ain Sinu in northern Iraq provides further evidence of Severus Alexander’ extensive recruitment. The fort itself commands a pass controlling the road to Nisibis from Hatra across the strategic Jebel Sinjar mountain range that rises above the vast plain of northern Mesopotamia. The fort itself held detachments from Legio III Parthica, but next to the fort an extensive castellum was built without the usual administrative buildings, covering 11,5 hectares. By comparison, the legionary fortress of Legio II Parthica at Alba near Rome covered 10,5 hectares. The open area inside the castellum suggests that it was used as a cavalry training area; these auxiliary forces, probably light cavalry, would have been drawn from the area between the Tigris and Euphrates, the old Parthian province of Arabaya which was now controlled by Ardaxšir’s enemy and Rome’s new ally, Hatra. Unsurprisingly, Severus Alexander’s preparations seem to have been concerned with countering the Sasanian cavalry advantage.

Denarius of Severus Alexander. On the reverse, the legend FIDES MILITVM ("Loyalty of the soldiers"), with the personification of Loyalty holding two legionary standards. It was usually a bad sign when an emperor started issuing such coins; they were almost invariably a sign of discontent in the army. From 228 CE onwards, these legends become also increasingly common in the coinage of Severus Alexander.

According to Herodian, Ardaxšir I’s army entered Roman Mesopotamia and besieged the main military bases there. This means that the main Sasanian force besieged the main Roman fortresses of Nisibis, Singara, Carrhae and Edessa, but the sources say nothing about any of them falling into Ardaxšir’s hands. What seems clear is that the Romans took refuge in their fortified cities and left the countryside to Ardaxšir’s cavalry, who was able to pillage them at leisure, probably crossing the Euphrates and raiding also into Syria and Cappadocia. Herodian does not give numbers for the Sasanian army, but his assertion that “The gathering of an army equal in size to the reported strength of the attacking barbarians caused the greatest upheaval throughout the Roman world” implies a huge army. The highly unreliable HA gives a number of 150,000 men, with 700 elephants and 1,500 war chariots, which is completely fanciful, and anachronistic (there’s no evidence whatsoever for chariots being ever used by the Sasanians, and elephants would be used only after Ardaxšir I’s reign). The fact that, despite having three whole years to campaign practically unopposed, Ardaxšir I did not manage to conquer any of the great Roman fortresses implies that the Sasanians were not still as proficient in siege warfare as they would become later, and that the army probably only took the field in spring and summer, returning home every autumn, which was too short a time if they were trying to force the Roman garrisons to surrender by hunger.

Then there’s the affair of chronology and Ardaxšir’s eastern campaign, as attested in eastern sources. If by 233/234 CE, Ardaxšir’s first coins area attested in Sakastan and Marv, and Severus Alexander’s great counterattack was launched in the summer and spring of 232 CE and the emperor returned to Europe in early 233 CE, then Ardaxšir’s eastern campaign must’ve been launched immediately after the pause in hostilities in the West.

 

[Semper Victor]

11.2 THE WAR OF SEVERUS ALEXANDER AGAINST ARDAXŠIR I. THE ROMAN ARMY MOVES TO THE EAST.

In the late spring of 232 CE, emperor Severus Alexander left Rome to travel East by land, taking with him most of the central reserve quartered at Rome, with only a minimal garrison left to ensure order in the capital. Only those Praetorians who were nearing the end of their sixteen years of service and awaiting discharge remained behind. However, the discipline and loyalty of the Praetorians remained an issue, having only recently threatened the life of the consul Cassius Dio, angered by his severe imposition of discipline on the Pannonian legions. Apart from the Praetorians, Equites Singulares Augusti and other special contingents (Speculatores, Aulici, Osrhoenian Archers, etc.), the presence of Cohors XIV Urbana is also attested in the East.

As well as the central reserve in Rome, detachments from the Rhenish, Danubian and African legions were also sent to the East, which meant a weakening of the European borders of the empire (the estimates have been taken from the same source as in my previous posts, Julio Rodríguez González’s Historia de las legiones romanas):

• Legio I Adiutrix (based at Brigetio, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
• Legio I Minervia (based at Bonna, Lower Germany): a vexillatio. According to the epigraphic evidence, the legate of this legion was M. Marius Tittius Rufinus.
• Legio I Italica (based at Novae, Lower Moesia): a vexillatio.
• Legio II Adiutrix (based at Aquincum, Lower Pannonia): a vexillatio.
• Legio II Italica (based at Lauriacum, Noricum): a vexillatio.
• Legio II Traiana Fortis (based at Nicopolis, near Alexandria in Egypt): a vexillatio.
• Legio III Augusta (based at Lambaesis, Numidia): a vexillatio. Probably under its legate, Cn. Petronius Probatius Iunius Iustus.
• Legio III Italica (based at Castra Regina, Raetia): a vexillatio.
• Legio IV Flavia Felix (based at Singidunum, Upper Moesia): a vexillatio.
• Legio VII Claudia (based at Viminacium, Upper Moesia): a vexillatio.
• Legio VII Gemina (based at Legio, Tarraconensis): a vexillatio.
• Legio VIII Augusta (based at Argentorate, Upper Germany): a vexillatio.
• Legio X Gemina (based at Vindobona, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
• Legio XIV Gemina (based at Carnuntum, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
• Legio XXII Primigenia (based at Mogontiacum, Upper Germany): a vexillatio.
• Legio XXX Ulpia Traiana Victrix (based at Vetera, Lower Germany): a vexillatio.

As you can see, the number of vexillationes from the western legions moved to the East was higher than in previous campaigns, which hints both towards the size of the enemy forces, to the discipline problems and revolts in the East, or to both.

As for the eastern legions, there’s a problem with respect to previous campaigns. The epigraphic habit that keeps historians so well informed about the whereabouts of Roman legions began to wane in the early III century, and the first area of the empire where this phenomenon is attested is precisely the East. Due to this scarcity of epigraphic sources, the estimate is especially precarious, but I will provide it anyway (by the same source used above):

• Legio I Parthica (based at Singara, Mesopotamia): the whole legion.
• Legio III Cyrenaica (based at Bostra, Arabia): the whole legion.
• Legio III Gallica (based at Danaba, Syria Phoenicia): the whole legion.
• Legio III Parthica (based at Nisibis, Mesopotamia): the whole legion.
• Legio IV Scythica (based at Zeugma, Syria Coele): a vexillatio.
• Legio VI Ferrata (based at Caparcotna, Syria Palaestina): the whole legion (probably).
• Legio X Fretensis (based at Aelia Capitolina, Syria Palaestina): the whole legion (probably).
• Legio XII Fulminata (based at Melitene, Cappadocia): the whole legion (unconfirmed, but quite probable).
• Legio XV Apollinaris (based at Satala, Cappadocia): the whole legion (unconfirmed, but quite probable).
• Legio XVI Flavia Firma (based at Samosata, Syria Coele): the whole legion (unconfirmed).

Given the state of unrest in the East (with some legions in open rebelllion or on the verge of rebelling), and the fact that these legions (at least the Mesopotamian and probably the Syrian ones) had been fighting against Ardaxšir’s army for three years, it’s probable that some amongst them were not at full strength; that would be especially true of Legiones I and III Parthicae, which were the garrison of Mesopotamia and who must’ve been besieged by Ardaxšir’s army every campaign season.

We don’t know if the emperor would have moved with his core forces collecting the detachments from the European garrisons along the way, or if every sub-unit took its own separate route. The first option simplified control over the troops, which given the situation of unrest amongst the army would’ve been politically important, but that would’ve also worsened the foraging situation. Until the reign of Caracalla, soldiers had to pay for their rations and equipment out of their own pay. However, as part of his attempts to curry favor with his troops after the murder of Geta, Caracalla had removed this obligation. Provincials were increasingly expected to provide this in kind in time of emergency, which after 230 CE became the normal state of affairs. The payment of soldiers through the annona militaris (the name that received this tax in kind) was not introduced by Alexander Severus, but became established practice through the necessity of adapting to the crisis caused by repeated barbarian incursions. From the compilations of imperial law rescripts of the late Roman era, we have quite a lot of complaints and appeals to the emperor made by peasant communities along the great military axis of the empire (the Upper Rhine-Upper and Middle Danube-Thrace-Bithynia-Galatia-Cappadocia-Cilicia axis), where the repeated movements of large army contingents probably reduced these communities to utter destitution.

There’s also traces of unrest amongst the European troops mobilized to go to the East. Many of their men would have resented leaving behind their families for a campaign that many could expect never to return from. A number of these legions lost their honorary epithets of Alexandriana, Severiana or Severiana Alexandriana; three from Upper Germany, and one each from Upper and Lower Pannonia. Legio VIII Augusta from Upper Germany lost its title in 231 CE, as did XXII Primigenia based at Moguntiacum, which had not been restored by 232 CE. Legio II Adiutrix in Lower Pannonia, suffered a similar fate in AD 230, whilst Legio X Gemina from Upper Pannonia had it removed in 232 CE but restored in 234 CE. This can only have been in response to unrest caused by the resentment of men who were to march far from home to fight against the Sasanians.

This does not mean that the Roman state did not provide for the troops; the annona militaris could not have covered the needs of such large armies over protracted periods of time, and it was necessary to transport large quantities of foodstuffs over large distances between provinces. Contributions raised for the eastern campaign are also attested for example in provinces like Pamphylia, which lay outside the main military routes. In times of war, the a rationibus (one of the main imperial secretaries, charged with control of the Treasury) was responsible for ensuring that the necessary finances were available to oil the wheels of war, whilst the Prefect of the Annona planned, organised and supervised the collection, transportation and storage of grain. The a vehiculis, or praefecti vehiculorum, was tasked with its transport along the roads. Demands for supplies and resources were sent out by the ab epistulis (there were two of them, one for the Latin correspondence of the emperor, and another one for the letters written in Greek) to the provinces.

Roman road between Antioch and Chalcis in northern Syria.

To facilitate the movement of grain and soldiers across the empire, a huge road repair program was initiated, focused on Pannonia, the Balkan provinces, Asia Minor, Syria and Mesopotamia, which is attested in epigraphy. Supplies and reinforcements by sea were guaranteed by the appointment of P. Sallustius Sempronius Victor, initially with responsibility for ridding the seas around Sardinia of pirates. The island must have been used as a base for their raids along the coast of Italy and Gaul. Once this had been achieved, his ships were to patrol the sea lanes, ensuring the provisions sent to the army in the East reached their destination. He must have carried out his instructions well, as he was later appointed to the post of Procurator of Bithynia and Pontus, and at the end of the reign was made Procurator of Mauretania Caesariensis.

Epigraphy allows us to know the names of some of the key commanders in the East. Rutilius Pudens Crispinus could have been the legate of Syria Phoenice; he was a senator was a close amicus of the emperor and a man of his utter confidence; an inscription from Palmyra attests to his presence in the city in 232 CE, alongside the emperor and his army:

The Senate and people have placed this in honour of Julius Aurelius Zenobius and Zabdilas, the son of Dichmalchus, the son of Nassumus, leader of the army on the arrival of the divine Alexander, perpetual deputy of Rutilius Crispinus, the leader of the cavalry bands; overseer also of the distribution of the corn, a liberal man, not sparing even his own private property, most creditably, administering the affairs of state, and on that account approved of by the divine Jaribolus and Julius [Philippus], the most illustrious prefect and sacred praetor, and also a great lover of his country, in the year 554 [Palmyrene dating].

Another man implied in the eastern expedition was the equestrian C. Furius Sabinius Aquila Timesitheus (who would raise to be the de facto ruler of the empire under Gordian III). For this campaign. he was made Procurator provinciae Syriae Palaestinae ibi Exactor Reliquorum Annonae Sacrae Expeditionis. This over-arching commission gave him responsibility for collecting the annona and resources in the eastern province necessary for the logistical requirements of the campaign against the Sasanian king.

For the key post of governor of Mesopotamia (Praeses Mesopotamiae), there’s no epigraphic evidence. The governor of this province created by Septimius Severus was always an equestrian, and John S. McHugh, following some lines from Herodian, proposes for this post the future emperor Maximinus Thrax, a man of proved military experience. The court also accompanied the emperor, as well as his mother Iulia Mamaea. During this time, the imperial authorities also kept minting coinage infused with propagandistic messages directed to infuse confidence to the inhabitants of the empire about the sure victory that would come.

As I said, the emperor left Rome probably in the late spring of 232 CE. The journey would take about five months and cover 2,000 miles, suggesting he arrived at Antioch in the late summer, perhaps September, of that year. This was at the very end of the campaigning season. Herodian is frustratingly vague on the exact route of the emperor and his vast army, merely stating that it:

was completed with all speed, first to the garrisons of the Illyrian provinces, where he collected a large force; then on to Antioch

Upon reaching Antioch, Alexander Severus again offered a diplomatic settlement to Ardaxšir. It is likely that this move was highly unpopular with the soldiery, who had just undertaken an arduous march and seen Rome’s Eastern provinces looted and soldiers killed. They would have wanted a satisfactory restoration of Roman honor that could only have been achieved at the point of a sword. However, the emperor and his advisors well understood the risks of war. Defeat would undermine the credentials of the emperor to rule and no doubt lead to further revolts. The loyalty of the Praetorians and soldiers from Pannonia remained problematic, whilst the situation in Mesopotamia itself had not been restored, with several claimants to the imperial throne still at large.

Plan of the Roman city of Antioch-on-the-Orontes, largest Roman city in the Levant.

Modern reconstruction of Antioch. The island in the Orontes river lodged the imperial palace (the ancient royal palace of the Seleucid kings).

An embassy was sent to Ardaxšir, suggesting a little optimistically a "friendly alliance". The emperor hoped that the size of the army he had brought to the East would intimidate his foe. In Herodian’s words (Herodian 6.4.4):

He thought it best to send another embassy to the Persian king to discuss the possibility of peace and friendship, hoping to persuade him or to intimidate him by his presence. The barbarian, however, sent the envoys back to the emperor unsuccessful.

He was sadly mistaken; the Roman embassy returned to Antioch empty-handed. And Ardaxsir sent promptly an embassy to Severus Alexander in Antioch. According to Herodian 6.4.4-6.4.6:

Then Artaxerxes chose four hundred very tall Persians, outfitted them with fine clothes and gold ornaments, and equipped them with horses and bows; he sent these men to Alexander as envoys, thinking that their appearance would dazzle the Romans.

The envoys said that the great king Artaxerxes ordered the Romans and their emperor to withdraw from all Syria and from that part of Asia opposite Europe; they were to permit the Persians to rule as far as Ionia and Caria and to govern all the nations separated by the Aegean Sea and the Propontic Gulf, inasmuch as these were the Persians' by right of inheritance.

When the Persian envoys delivered these demands, Alexander ordered the entire four hundred to be arrested; stripping off their finery, he sent the group to Phrygia, where villages and farm land were assigned to them, but he gave orders that they were not to be allowed to return to their native country. He treated them in this fashion because he thought it dishonorable and cowardly to put them to death, since they were not fighting but simply carrying out their master's orders.

This was a plain-out public insult to Severus Alexander’s face. Only the sacred and sacrosanct rules of ancient diplomacy prevented the emperor from executing the ambassadors; instead they were arrested and forcibly settled on land in Phrygia. Despite all his efforts, war could no longer be avoided.

The emperor advanced into Mesopotamia and relieved Nisibis. This city must’ve been the subject of several sieges, as it could not have survived a prolonged siege lasting several years. Probably, the fortress city was besieged from the start to end of each campaigning season, with Sasanian forces withdrawing each fall. The approach of the emperor’s considerable army forced Taurinius to throw himself in the Euphrates, whilst Uranius, attempting to defend his actions in a cloak of legitimacy, was brought before the emperor, who passed a sentence of death. Enemy forces either withdrew or were ejected from Rome’s provinces.

Despite the lateness of the year, the emperor planned an offensive into Sasanian territory beyond the Tigris. Not much could have been achieved at this stage, but it would help to raise morale in the army. However, his plans were thrown into disarray by a rebellion, quoted in Herodian 6.4.7:

This is the way the affair turned out. While Alexander was preparing to cross the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and lead his army into barbarian territory, several mutinies broke out among his troops, especially among the soldiers from Egypt; but revolts occurred also in Syria, where the soldiers attempted to proclaim a new emperor. These defections were quickly discovered and suppressed. At this time Alexander transferred to other stations those field armies which seemed better able to check the barbarian invasions.

Legio II Traiana was the only Egyptian unit we are aware of as taking part in the campaign. The enigmatic Syrians who joined the revolt were probably legionaries from the Legio III Gallica from Syria Phoenice. A significant number of inscriptions have been found with the legion’s name chiselled out. Removal from the historical records was the usual response to betrayal. Legio IV Scythica was transferred from Syria Palaestina to Alexandria by the emperor. It is highly unlikely that Alexander Severus would transfer a rebellious legion to such a vital province; Legio IV Scythica was moved to Egypt to take the place of Legio II Traiana. This coincides with the appointment of a dux to the province, no doubt with instructions to suppress any signs of revolt amongst the Egyptian soldiers left behind, veterans of Legio II Traiana or their families.

The number of edicts passed by the emperor’s jurists Modestinus and Paul suggest disciplinary issues continued to concern him. The laws they reaffirmed or laid down to counter ill-discipline are draconian and clearly meant to act as a deterrent rather than serve the ideals of justice. Desertion was severely punished: those caught were to be punished with death, and those caught with the intention of joining the enemy were to be tortured before being fed to the beasts in the arena. Loss of weapons was confirmed as another capital offence, as was insubordination, the failure to follow commands, the striking of an officer or vacating of a post. The penalty for insubordination by whole units was in theory its dishonorable discharge. Soldiers caught stealing from the baths were also to be dishonorably discharged. These laws stipulated that such men lost the privileges that usually accrued to veterans, including their entitlement to land at the end of their period of service. It appears that upon his arrival in the East, the emperor was met by an army in the process of disintegration. There can be little surprise that rebellious units would have attempted to raise a pretender to the throne to escape punishment.

All in all, this did not bode well for the Romans if they had to fight Ardaxšir I.

 

[Semper Victor]

11.2 THE WAR OF SEVERUS ALEXANDER AGAINST ARDAXŠIR I. THE CAMPAIGN OF 233 CE.

The autumn and winter months of 232-233 CE were spent planning for the coming campaign and building diplomatic ties. The caravan city of Palmyra was Rome’s long-standing ally, especially since Ardaxšir had captured the port city of Spasinou Charax in Mesene at the head of the Persian Gulf, depriving the city of vital trade routes and cutting its commercial links with India. The ruling family had added Iulii Aurelii Septimii to their name, reflecting not only their close alliance with Rome, but also with its imperial houses.

Armenia had even more pressing reasons to side with Rome. Its ruling family, who were Arsacids, had made common cause with the Arsacid royal family of Iran to overthrow Ardaxšir. Their aggressive invasion of Sassanid territory resulted in an equivalent invasion of their own lands by Ardaxšir I’s army. A Roman army would march unhindered through their territory, suggesting this had been agreed in negotiations over the preceding months. Herodian refers to:

Armenian archers, some of whom were there as subjects and others under terms of a friendly alliance

that served in the Roman army on the Rhine in 234 CE. They were joined by exiled Parthians, whose influence would be extremely useful in winning over local support in Media.

However, the jewel in these diplomatic operations was the addition of the great fortress city of Hatra into Rome’s alliance. Both Trajan and Septimius Severus had attempted to capture the city but failed, situated as it was in the middle of an arid desert and surrounded by imponent double walls 4 miles in length. It lay 60 miles from the Roman frontier that ran along the Jebel Sinjar. This great trading metropolis and religious center controlled the caravan routes through central Mesopotamia to Singara, Zeugma and the Euphrates, but it was now threatened by the rise of the centralizing Sasanian dynasty. Its Arabic ruling house rejected Ardaxšir and looked to its old enemy Rome for help, especially after the Sasanian attempt to capture the city. Severus Alexander looked to integrate Hatra into the Roman defensive system and extend his control from northern to central Mesopotamia, threatening Ctesiphon itself. The emperor needed to secure this position and establish Roman control over this strategically important city.

King Sanatruq II of Hatra.

Apart from raising local troops from these territories, as evidenced by the massive open fort built at Ayn Sinu, the Romans extended their road repair program to Mesopotamia, now free of Sassanid forces. Milestones dated to 232 CE show repairs to communication routes around Singara and the Tigris. Significantly, another repair to the road from Singara to the Khabur river is dated to 233 CE, at the height of the war between Severus Alexander and Ardaxšir. These repairs suggest that the road was a vital communication route, as a significant body of soldiers would have had to be deployed for this construction in the war zone. The road also linked Hatra to Roman territory. The road was clearly reconstructed to facilitate the movement of Roman forces to support their new ally. Some of the statues of Sanatruk II, the last king of Hatra, portray him wearing a breastplate decorated with Hercules, the divine protector of the imperial families. His coins also bear the legend SC (Senatus Consulta) surrounded by an eagle with its wings outstretched.

The territory under Sanatruk II’s control stretched over vast areas of land between the Tigris and Euphrates, and appears to have encompassed some areas within the Roman province of Mesopotamia. His alliance with Rome probably granted him a degree of suzerainty over the nomadic Arab communities in these areas rather than control of the cities, towns and forts in the province and along the Euphrates. However, through him, Roman power was now exerted into central Mesopotamia. Diplomacy and a common foe had now attached both Armenia and Hatra to Rome, kingdoms that previous, more illustrious emperors had attempted to subdue but had now been acquired without the loss of a single drop of Roman blood.

The main aim of the campaign of 233 CE appears to have been to add further allies to Rome and feed the fires of revolt against Ardaxšir, strangling the newly born Sasanian dynasty in its cradle (to borrow one of Churchill’s quotes). It was a bold and ambitious plan which, according to Herodian, was drawn up with the advice of the emperor’s council. This council was probably the concilium principis, formed by the emperor’s most trusted military advisors. Counsel from men with military skill and experience was imperative. The most influential amicus travelling with the court was Rutilius Crispinus. Another laudatory inscription from Palmyra honoring a leading citizen declares (the underlining is mine):

Statue of Julius Zabdilah, son of Malko, son of Malko, son of Nassum, who was strategos [general] of [Palmyra] at the time of the coming of the divine emperor Alexander, who assisted Rutilius Crispinus, the general in chief, during his stay here, and when he brought his legions here on numerous occasions.

The absence of any reference to Mamaea in these inscriptions or in these discussions is significant. The presence of the Augusta would have been mentioned by Herodian if she had made any significant contribution to a campaign that would go spectacularly wrong in the end.

For this campaign, the essential source is Herodian, who in his account of the war, quite unusually discards his customary generalizations and describes the campaign in some detail (Herodian, 6.5.1-6.5.2):

After thus setting matters in order, Alexander, considering that the huge army he had assembled was now nearly equal in power and numbers to the barbarians, consulted his advisers and then divided his force into three separate armies. One army he ordered to overrun the land of the Medes after marching north and passing through Armenia, which seemed to favor the Roman cause.

He sent the second army to the eastern sector of the barbarian territory, where, it is said, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers at their confluence empty into very dense marshes [NOTE: Herodian’s geographic descriptions are always a bit garbled]; these are the only rivers whose mouths cannot be clearly determined. The third and most powerful army he kept himself, promising to lead it against the barbarians in the central sector. He thought that in this way he would attack them from different directions when they were unprepared and not anticipating such strategy, and he believed that the Persian horde, constantly split up to face their attackers on several fronts, would be weaker and less unified for battle.

So, Rome’s forces were divided into three separate armies. On its western border, Armenia was accessible by way of the upper Euphrates; from the head-waters of the Euphrates a relatively low pass leads into the valley of the Araxes (modern Arak) which was the heart of Armenia, and this valley also gave good communication with Media Atropatene, (Azerbaijan), and Media proper. The first army, probably beginning its march well before the second and third, headed north towards Armenia, travelling probably along the Amaseia to Melitene road, entering the territory of Rome’s ally from Cappadocia. Herodian gives few clues as to the route taken by the invading army, although the existing topography severely limits the options. Possibly the northern mustering point for Rome and her allies was the Armenian old capital of capital Artaxata (by the III century, the capital had been moved to Valarshapat). The most detailed information we have for a Roman army traversing Armenia is the campaign of Mark Antony in 36 BCE, which we can take as a model. The march to Artaxata was a hard slog across very rough country: Herodian describes it as an almost impossibly difficult crossing. The northern army probably crossed the Euphrates near Melitene (Cappadocia) before ascending into the mountains straddling their path. On the evidence of milestones, it’s also been proposed that it marched along the road linking Zela to Sebastopolis. Road repair is also attested in the environs of Melitene itself.

The Araxes rives (modern Arak).

This was perhaps a mixed force of infantry drawn from the Danubian legions as well as the two Cappadocian legions and a large body of cavalry. If Armenian chronicles are to be trusted, they were joined in Armenia by significant numbers of allied troops; according to Movses Khorenats’i:

There quickly arrived in support great numbers of brave and strong cavalry detachments. Nevertheless Khosrov [NOTE: Tiridates II] took the vast numbers of his army, plus whatever lancers had arrived to support him in the war.

It is likely that Arsacid exiles also joined the invasion force, their target being the Iranian heartland of Media. The staggered start would draw Sasanian forces away from the target areas of the second and third columns. Iulius Palmatus was possibly the commander of this northern army.

There can be little doubt then that this was the route followed by the northern column. The distance from Melitene to Artaxata (located in the Araxes valley) is almost 1,000 km. The mountains were only passable because it was spring, but even at this time of year the climate can be tough, with temperatures exceeding 40 ºC in daytime and approaching freezing at night. If the army covered 24 km/day then it would have taken about six weeks just to reach Artaxata. Even then the marching was only half complete, because the soldiers would have been ordered south to cross another stretch of dry and inhospitable terrain. The target would be Azerbaijan (Media Atropatene, the Sasanian province of Ādurbādagān), and perhaps southwards into Media proper. The army could not of course count on surprise (there were too many spies and informers for that) but the area included important objectives which probably were not strongly defended. The Romans knew that if Ardaxšir sent a strong force to counter the incursion he must simultaneously weaken the south.

Landscape in eastern Turkey near the Iranian border, in the highlands of the ancient Armenian kingdom.

Clearly, it was hoped that the attack on Media through Armenia would result in a Parthian uprising in support of the Arsacid dynasty. As we saw in a previous post, Movses Khorenats’i wrote about the “disobedience” of a part of the Karen clan (which was based at Nehāvand in Media, and also in Khorasan), which is contrasted to the loyalty demonstrated by the Aspahbed and Sūrēn to Ardaxšir. Perhaps Tiridates II and Severus Alexander hoped that the presence of a large force in Media would persuade the Karen to join them. If so, they were to be disappointed, as the Karen appear at the top of the list of court officials under Ardaxšir’s son and successor, Šābuhr.

There may have been a second reason for targeting this province. As we have seen, Ardaxšir had closely associated his rule with the Zoroastrian religion, in particular its religious leaders or Magi (as the Greeks and Romans called them). The late Roman author Agathias wrote:

This man [Ardaxšir] was bound by the rights of the Magi and a practitioner of secrets. So it was that the tribe of the Magi also grew powerful and lordly as a result of him. It had never been so honored or enjoyed so much freedom … and public affairs are conducted at their wish and instigation.

All Sasanian rulers dated the beginning of their reign in ‘fires’ rather than years, referring to the fire temples founded by each ruler at their accession or coronation; and these “regnal fires” were displayed in the reverse of their coins. It’s possible that one of the objectives of this northern column was the destruction of the sacred fire of Media, Ādur Gušhnasp. At this time, the old Arsacid capital of Azerbaijan, Phraaspa, was abandoned and moved to Ganzak, near to the place where the great fire temple of Ādur Gušhnasp would be built by the Sasanian kings after 400 CE. A later rock relief at Salmās has been interpreted as showing governors of Ādurbādagān standing before Ardaxšir I and Šābuhr I in acknowledgment of their loyalty. This suggests some sort of acknowledgement that their loyalty may have come under pressure. However, if the fire temple was destroyed at this time by the Romans, and Phraaspa sacked or rebelled, the Roman sources fail to refer to it and Sasanian ones would have little reason to do so.

The Sasanian relief at Salmās in Iranian Azerbaijan.

Meanwhile, the central and southern columns were concentrated at Antioch. Given the staggered nature of the (in hindsight, overly complicated) Roman campaign plan, the southern column would begin moving in second place, and finally the main Roman body, the central column under Severus Alexander himself.

As for the routes available to the southern and central columns, there were several:

• The Euphrates route once taken by Xenophon.
• Alexander’s route, which avoided the desert by skirting the northern fringe of Mesopotamia, crossing the Tigris at Bezabde, and then following the old Achaemenid royal road well to the east of the Tigris through the fertile plains of Arbela and Apolloniatis.
• The Hatra route, the most direct route from Nisibis, which could be varied by crossing the Tigris near Libba and then joining Alexander’s route in its last stages.

The lack of reference to a fleet of any kind indicates that the Roman strategy strove for victory on the plains of Assyria. Surety of supply was essential. Whatever the plan, the Euphrates and Tigris would, by necessity, feature prominently. The Euphrates is an alpine river course as far downstream as Zeugma, where it becomes navigable. Its major tributaries, the Khabur and Balikh Rivers, are dry during summer. The Tigris, like the Euphrates, is alpine in Armenia, and navigable only from Mosul. Unlike its sister river, the Tigris meets tributaries downstream, such as the Great and Lesser Zab, and the Diyala, all of which originate from the Iranian plateau. Thus, given their importance, it is surprising that not one of the ancent sources refers to them in the mechanics of the offensive. Such a silence may not be incidental; Herodian, after all, was aware that Septimius Severus had used a fleet. The Euphrates and Tigris, according to the archetypal Roman invasion of Mesopotamia, should have figured conspicuously in any plans to advance into Babylonia. The silence, especially in Herodian, is significant, according to Bernard Michael O’Hanlon’s analysis of this campaign in his book The Army of Severus Alexander, AD 222-235, which I will follow from now on.

The Euphrates route was the shortest in mileage and, moreover, offered the prospect of ongoing supply from a river flotilla. Since the Tigris lay further to the east, one was forced to shadow the Jebel Sinjar until the river itself was attained, after which one followed its course downstream into Babylonia and Ctesiphon. This path, while considerably longer, had the advantage of bordering the most bounteous farmland of the region. Even with such forage, supplies would still need to be ferried down the Tigris. Alexander the Great had elected for the Tigris over the Euphrates in his approach to Babylonia. Trajan used both. Dura Europos was the key to the Euphrates march. Singara, legionary base of Legio I Parthica, exerted a similar importance for the northern route skirting the Jebel Sinjar. Hatra, of course, now stood with Rome. Thus in 232 CE, the Empire controlled all three possible avenues of attack.

The Euphrates near Dura Europos, where it left Roman territory.

The route of the southern column is probably suggested by the creation of the new post of Dux Ripae at Dura Europos (whose first holder was, according to most scholars, Gaius Iulius Verus Maximinus, the future emperor Maximinus Thrax); namely, a route downriver into the heart of the Sasanian realm. So, the southern column headed south-east (towards “Babylonia”) along the Euphrates river-valley. Many scholars also accept Herodian’s interpretation of this column as performing an essentially diversionary role, speculating that its objective was not so much to overrun the heartland of the Sasanian Empire but to lay waste the regions around Mēšān/Mesene (the area of territory bounded by both the Tigris and the Euphrates as they approach the Persian Gulf), and Khuzestan/Elymais.

As presented by Herodian, the southern column’s route bears some resemblance to the campaigns of Lucius Verus and Septimius Severus, whereby a Roman army marched into Babylonia with the intention of bringing the enemy into battle, and upon victory, ravaging Ctesiphon. The elaborate nature of Severus Alexander’s plan (according to O’Hanlon), however, meant that the Roman strategy diverged markedly from this template. O’Hanlon suggests that the plan was one that resisted the attraction of the cities of Ctesiphon and Veh-Ardaxšir (founded by Ardaxšir I near Ctesiphon), and so, it did not envisage sending a sizeable force (beyond this column) into central and southern Mesopotamia at the onset of the campaign.

And finally, after leaving Antioch, the central Roman column marched to Zeugma on the Euphrates, and from there to Edessa, Resaina, Nisibis and finally Singara. Evidence for this route can be seen in the reconstruction of the roads running between Singara and Carrhae. The dating of these repairs to the months immediately before the Roman advance is an indication that Ardaxšir left Roman Mesopotamia upon the arrival of Severus Alexander. Also, the string of forts which stretch from Hatra to the eastern Singara-Nisibis road were probably built at the time. (NOTE: contrary to other authors, O’Hanlon believes that Ardaxšir managed to take Nisibis and Carrhae before the arrival of Severus Alexander, only to abandon both cities when the emperor reached Antioch).

According to Herodian (6.5.4-6.5.6), the northern column was the first one to reach its destination:

Alexander therefore devised what he believed to be the best possible plan of action, only to have Fortune defeat his design.

The army sent through Armenia had an agonizing passage over the high, steep mountains of that country. (As it was still summer, however, they were able to complete the crossing.) Then, plunging down into the land of the Medes, the Roman soldiers devastated the countryside, burning many villages and carrying off much loot. Informed of this, the Persian king led his army to the aid of the Medes, but met with little success in his efforts to halt the Roman advance.

This is rough country; while it provided firm footing and easy passage for the infantry, the rugged mountain terrain hampered the movements of the barbarian cavalry and prevented their riding down the Romans or even making contact with them.

O’Hanlon assumes then that this was deliberate. A further assumption is that the Romans were hoping that Ardaxšir’s cavalry army, riding north in response, would be unable to inflict serious damage on this force given the nature of the terrain. As Herodian tells us, this was indeed the outcome. This expedient would have had the effect of concentrating the cream of the Iranian forces in the north, a useful development from Rome’s perspective. O’Hanlon also presumes that the Romans expected that this force would not detain the Sasanian army forever: through intelligence, Ardaxšir would ascertain that a Roman thrust (the southern column, the next to invade), was marching towards his heartland. Accordingly, he would disengage in the north and redirect his efforts (or so the complex Roman plan, as envisaged by O’Hanlon, hoped).

According to Herodian’s retelling of the events, the next Roman force to make itself known to the Sasanian king was the southern column (Herodian, 6.5.6-6.5.7):

Then men came and reported to the Persian king that another Roman army had appeared in eastern Parthia [NOTE: meaning southern Mesopotamia and Khuzestan, geography was not Herodian’s strong point] and was overrunning the plains there.

Fearing that the Romans, after ravaging Parthia unopposed, might advance into Persia, Artaxerxes left behind a force which he thought strong enough to defend Media, and hurried with his entire army into the eastern sector. The Romans were advancing much too carelessly because they had met no opposition and, in addition, they believed that Alexander and his army, the largest and most formidable of the three, had already attacked the barbarians in the central sector. They thought, too, that their own advance would be easier and less hazardous when the barbarians were constantly being drawn off elsewhere to meet the threat of the emperor's army.

This passage implies that the southern force was not expecting to engage in extensive hostilities during its march; the developments in Media and Assyria would draw off the greater portion of the Persian strength. What reasons, then, can we construe for its formation? Given the staggered nature of the offensive, it could be argued the Romans were hoping that the news of its advance would compel Ardaxšir to disengage in the north. In his haste to return south lay the Roman hope of a decisive victory.

And now, the whole key to the Roman plan (as envisaged by O’Hanlon): meanwhile the main Roman column, having invaded by the central route (having marched across the northern Mesopotamian plains to Singara), would attempt to intercept and annihilate Ardaxšir’s army as it raced southwards. The effort expended on the roads leading to Singara in the precious hours of the invasion’s eve is critical; there’s also Herodian’s information that the main weight of the Roman invasion was assigned to the central army group. If Severus Alexander hoped for victory, his hope lay in the strength of this main column being brought to bear.

The Jebel Sinjar, which together with the Khabur river marked the border of Roman Mesopotamia.

It might also be suggested that the Romans created the southern army group to attempt a hit-and-run raid on Ctesiphon via the Euphrates river-valley. This was not beyond the capacity of a small cavalry force, especially in the absence of substantial resistance. If Ardaxšir’s main army group was not overwhelmed by the might of the central army group, the destruction of Ctesiphon and/or Veh-Ardaxšir would still serve Roman ends. Probably, if Severus Alexander’s strategy had succeeded, the central army column could have marched down the Tigris river valley to join them in Babylonia after defeating Ardaxšir in Assyria (northern Mesopotamia), akin to what a decade later Timesitheus would do at Resaina, thus sealing the fate of Ardaxšir’s cities.

The plan failed in a most evident way. According to Herodian (6.5.8-6.5.9):

All three Roman armies had been ordered to invade the enemy's territory, and a final rendezvous had been selected to which they were to bring their booty and prisoners. But Alexander failed them: he did not bring his army or come himself into barbarian territory, either because he was afraid to risk his life for the Roman empire or because his mother's feminine fears or excessive mother love restrained him.

She blocked his efforts at courage by persuading him that he should let others risk their lives for him, but that he should not personally fight in battle. It was this reluctance of his which led to the destruction of the advancing Roman army.

Of course, for Herodian it was all Mamaea’s fault (even if there’s no proof that she followed her son beyond Antioch), so that his admired Severus Alexander could remain blameless. The result: the southern column, which was advancing “carelessly”, met a bloody defeat at the hands of the Sasanian army (Herodian 6.5.9-6.5.10):

The king attacked it unexpectedly with his entire force and trapped the Romans like fish in a net; firing their arrows from all sides at the encircled soldiers, the Persians massacred the whole army. The outnumbered Romans were unable to stem the attack of the Persian horde; they used their shields to protect those parts of their bodies exposed to the Persian arrows.

Content merely to protect themselves, they offered no resistance. As a result, all the Romans were driven into one spot, where they made a wall of their shields and fought like an army under siege. Hit and wounded from every side, they held out bravely as long as they could, but in the end all were killed. The Romans suffered a staggering disaster; it is not easy to recall another like it, one in which a great army was destroyed, an army inferior in strength and determination to none of the armies of old. The successful outcome of these important events encouraged the Persian king to anticipate better things in the future.

Herodian’s account is probably an exaggeration. Cohors XX Palmyrenorum, based at Dura and which with almost total certainty marched with this army group survived after the campaign, even if reduced to 50% of its force. What the southern Roman column suffered was a clear defeat with many casualties, but it was able to retreat. Plus, the description of the battle by Herodian is clearly borrowed from Plutarch’s depiction of Carrhae.

To make matters worse, an epidemy seems to have been partially responsible for paralyzing the Roman central column (Herodian, 6.6.1-6.6.2):

When the disaster was reported to Alexander, who was seriously ill either from despondency or the unfamiliar air, he fell into despair. The rest of the army angrily denounced the emperor because the invading army had been destroyed as a result of his failure to carry out the plans faithfully agreed upon.

And now Alexander refused to endure his indisposition and the stifling air any longer. The entire army was sick and the troops from Illyricum especially were seriously ill and dying, being accustomed to moist, cool air and to more food than they were being issued. Eager to set out for Antioch, Alexander ordered the army in Media to proceed to that city.

And then the northern column had to endure the ordeal of a retreat through the now snowed and desolate northern Zagros and the highlands of Armenia, suffering grievously in the process (Herodian, 6.6.3):

This army, in its advance, was almost totally destroyed in the mountains [of Armenia]; a great many soldiers suffered mutilation in the frigid country, and only a handful of the large number of troops who started the march managed to reach Antioch. The emperor led his own large force to that city, and many of them perished too; so the affair brought the greatest discontent to the army and the greatest dishonor to Alexander, who was betrayed by bad luck and bad judgment. Of the three armies into which he had divided his total force, the greater part was lost by various misfortunes - disease, war, and cold.

With the benefit of hindsight, several things can be said about the Roman invasion plan (always according to O’Hanlon’s hypothesis, which as far as I know is the only serious attempt at reconstructing the whole campaign):

• First, it was a plan far too complicated for its time. It involved taking a huge risk, dispersing the Roman forces on a 1,300 km front from the Araxes river valley to the Gulf Coast, at a time when command and control techniques were almost non-existent. Even during IIWW achieving full coordination in so wide a theater with so widely dispersed army groups would’ve been an achievement.
• The main objective of the campaign was sound: bring the Sasanian army to a pitched battle and then destroy it. And only then, advance into southern Mesopotamia, without risking harassing and further surprises on the way (in the IV century, Julian went straight for Ctesiphon and suffered the consequences). The problem though was always the same: how to bring a highly mobile enemy, much more mobile than the Roman army, to a pitched battle in a place chosen by the Romans.
• The plan’s second and perhaps gravest fault though was that it disregarded completely the strengths of the enemy. By 232 CE, Ardaxšir was an old fox, who’d been constantly at war for almost two decades. And who had showed himself a masterful commander and strategist on repeated occasions, much better of course than Severus Alexander (who’d never commanded an army in his life) and probably most of Severus Alexander’s military councilors. Thus, it’s very probable that despite Herodian’s words, Ardaxšir never fell for the Roman plan: he abandoned completely northern Mesopotamia/Assyria, only retained a token force in Media and his main army never left central/southern Mesopotamia, guarding the approaches to Ctesiphon and Pars, and keeping his options and retreat avenues open. In this sense, it’s probable that the Roman plan was going to fail from the start.
• Even if Ardaxšir had bitten the bait, it was very optimistic for the Romans to think that they would be able to intercept in the plains of northern Mesopotamia Ardaxšir’s cavalry army, which was much more mobile than the Roman one.
• The Roman plan as reconstructed by O’Hanlon smells strongly of a plan devised by a clever, cultivated young man who’d read a lot of books about war and history but who’s never experienced the real thing himself (a perfect description for Severus Alexander), mixed with the strategic and military hindsight given by more experienced men (the ones who were part of his concilium, and perhaps field commanders like Cn. Iulius Verus Maximinus). In my opinion, this makes it credible, because probably Severus Alexander, who was in his late twenties by now and wanted to dispel the doubts about his military abilities at once, devised his own plan and imposed it over the army. But for example he did never stop to consider if gathering a force of several thousand men in the middle of the Mesopotamian desert in summer and keeping them static in one point was a safe course of action. That an epidemic would hit the army in such conditions was highly probable, as a seasoned commander would’ve probably known (the same had happened to the armies of Trajan and Septimius Severus when besieging nearby Hatra in similar conditions).

But it backfired spectacularly. Severus Alexander emerged from the campaign utterly discredited amongst the army. While Ardaxšir could now boast of being the first Iranian king in more than a century to have suffered a full-scale Roman offensive without being defeated and having preserved Ctesiphon.

Eastern Anatolian highlands in winter.

On the positive side for the Romans, Herodian writes (Herodian 6.6.4-6.6.6):

In Antioch, Alexander was quickly revived by the cool air and good water of that city after the acrid drought in Mesopotamia, and the soldiers too recovered there. The emperor tried to console them for their sufferings by a lavish distribution of money, in the belief that this was the only way he could regain their good will. He assembled an army and prepared to march against the Persians again if they should give trouble and not remain quiet.

But it was reported that Artaxerxes had disbanded his army and sent each soldier back to his own country. Though the barbarians seemed to have conquered because of their superior strength, they were exhausted by the numerous skirmishes in Media and by the battle in Parthia, where they lost many killed and many wounded. The Romans were not defeated because they were cowards; indeed, they did the enemy much damage and lost only because they were outnumbered.

Since the total number of troops which fell on both sides was virtually identical, the surviving barbarians appeared to have won, but by superior numbers, not by superior power. It is no little proof of how much the barbarians suffered that for three or four years after this they remained quiet and did not take up arms. All this the emperor learned while he was at Antioch. Relieved of anxiety about the war, he grew more cheerful and less apprehensive and devoted himself to enjoying the pleasures which the city offered.

So, in Herodian’s view the “barbarians” had also suffered grave losses, which kept the border safe for some years. This is a view accepted by many historians (including O’Hanlon, to a certain degree). That the campaign was not an absolute disaster is proved by Herodian’s assertion that Severus Alexander was planning for a new offensive for the oncoming campaign season in 234 CE, and that the Roman army was able to retreat without having to pay tribute or ransom and without making territorial concessions (something that neither Macrinus nor Philip the Arab were able to do). But on the other side, we should remember that, as we saw in previous posts, by 233/234 CE, Ardaxšir was minting coins at Marv and turning several Central Asian small states and the once mighty Kushan empire into Sasanian tributaries, which is hardly the sign of a defeat. And the territorial security of Rome's eastern provinces would not last for long.

In Antioch, Severus Alexander received alarming news from Europe: taking advantage of the weakening of the European border garrisons, the Alamanni had broken the limes in Upper Germany and Raetia, and even Italy could be in danger. The emperor was urgently recalled by the governors of the invaded provinces, and he had to leave the East in a hurry in the spring of 234 CE, taking with him the vexillationes of the western legions, which were now seething with hatred and resentment against him: their homes were now endangered while they’d fought a pointless war that they did not even want to join to begin with. When the emperor tried to buy peace with the Alamanni, the legionaries of Legio I Minervia proclaimed the popular commander Cn. Iulius Verus Maximinus as Augustus. Other forces joined them, including the Praetorians and Legio II Parthica, and Severus Alexander, his mother and all of his secretaries and ministers were lynched at the legionary fortress of Mogontiacum in Upper Germany on 19 March 235 CE.

Denarius of Cn. Iulius Verus Maximinus (AKA "Maximinus Thrax) as Augustus. On the reverse, the by now familiar legend FIDES MILITVM.


EDIT: I'll add some more comments about the campaign, and about Severus Alexander`s (hypothetical) plan. This is a map of northern Mesopotamia in Roman times:

The Roman border followed the southern slopes of the Jebel Sinjar (the mountains in the center of the map), and to the west of the Jebel Sinjar it followed the Khabur river until it met the Euphrates near Circesium. The main Roman army was located either at Nisibis or Hatra, south of the Jebel Sinjar. This is an expanse of utter waterless desert, where temperatures in summer can hit 50ºC regularly. Hatra is located 50 km from the Tigris, and Singara 80 km from the Tigris. The distance between Singara and Hatra was 110 km. This was the area where (according to O'Hanlon) the decisive battle had to take place.

In 344 CE. the Roman emperor Constantius II managed to do something similar to what Severus Alexander had probably envisaged. The Sasanian king Šābuhr II wanted to attack the Roman fortress of Singara; he'd aproached it along the eastern bank of the Tigris (logical, as it had fertile farmland, while the western bank was a barren desert and open to Roman attacks). When he was opposite Singara, the large Sasanian army crossed the Tigris on a pontoon bridge, and then suddenly the Roman field army of the East, led by emperor Constantius II, appeared. It was a total surprise for Šābuhr II (and an obvious failing of his scouts), and now his army was trapped with its back to the river, on a narrow plain surrounded by hills, and with only a narrow pontoon bridge at his back for escape route. It was precisely the type of battlefield situation where the Sasanian superiority in cavalry (and its superior mobility) could not be brought to bear, as the battle was to be a frontal encounter without possibility of flanking maneuvers; exactly the kind of battle that favoured the Roman heavy infantry.

But in my opinion it's quite a stretch of the imagination that, of all the places where Ardaxšir I could cross the Tigris he would do so in this part of the river, in Roman controlled territory (as Hatra was a Roman ally) and without sending scouts first; on top of that, had he succeeded then he would've needed to cross a large expanse of open desert with a large army to reach southern Mesopotamia, when he could have done that approach march much more safely along the eastern bank of the Tigris. In 344 CE, Šābuhr II crossed the Tigris there precisely because his objective was Singara, but in 233 CE there was no guarantee at all that Ardaxšir I would've done the same, and I think that it would've been quite illogical of him to do so.

 

[Semper Victor]

12. THE FINAL YEARS OF ARDAXŠIR I’S REIGN.

Optimistically, Herodian attributed the abandonment of the Mesopotamian war theater by Ardaxšir I as a sign of the great losses suffered by his army. But as we’ve seen in previous posts, by 233/234 CE he was minting coins in Marv, in ancient Margiana, in the extreme northeast border of the old Arsacid empire. So, this is the most probable timeframe for Ardaxšir I’s eastern campaign as described by Tabarī. And this eastern campaign, by all accounts, was truly a triumphal march for Ardaxšir I, hardly the type of expedition that can be expected from a defeated king.

The Kushan empire at its maximum extent, under Kanishka I.

It’s not clear who had controlled the oasis-city of Marv before the arrival of Ardaxšir I. The Kushan emperor Kanishka I the Great (127-150 CE) had issued coins in Marv, but scholars are not sure what was the political situation there by the early 230s CE. Some think it was still a Kushan city, while others think that the Arsacids had retaken it. In the ŠKZ, when Šābuhr I listed the members of his father’s court, he named a certain “Ardaxšir king of Marv”. But scholars don’t know if he was enthroned there by Ardaxšir I (and was probably a son of his) or if he was already ruling over Marv under Arsacid or Kushan suzerainty and Ardaxšir I kept him there, or if he was an independent ruler and Ardaxšir I kept him in his throne as a vassal. According to the ŠKZ, Ardaxšir I’s court was full of “Ardaxširs”, implying that it was a common enough name and that one should be careful with making assumptions about it being a specifically Sasanian name.

Gold dinar of the Kushan emperor Vasudeva I.

Gold dinar of the Kushan emperor Kanishka II.

The Kushan emperors at this time were Vasudeva I (c.191-225 CE) and Kanishka II (225-245 CE). Vasudeva I is considered the last of the “Great Kushans”, and he’d had already problems with invasions into his territories north of the Hindu Kush. Kanishka II was the Kushan emperor who had to deal with Ardaxšir I´s occupation of Marv, his annexation of the last remnants of the Indo-Parthian kingdom and his incursions into Khwarazm and Bactria/Tokharistan, which were Kushan possessions. According to Tabari, Ardaxšir I even managed to take Balkh, the capital of Bactria and one of the principal mints of the Kushan empire; this invasion is usually considered the beginning of the decline of the Kushans.

The establishment of Sasanian rule in Tokharistan is more surely attributed to Šābuhr I, but the first Sasanian coins minted in Bactria date from the reign of Ardaxšir I. These coins bear inscriptions in Middle Persian in Pahlavi script, but very soon coins of a certain Ardasharo Koshano, with legends in Bactrian language using the Bactrian script, begin to appear. The gold issues (dinars) were minted in Balkh, while the silver and copper issues (drachms) were minted in Marv and then transported to Tokharistan. There’s still a lot of confusion amongst scholars about who this Ardasharo Koshano might’ve been. He could’ve been the Sasanian šahanšah Ardaxšir I himself, but this would disagree with the regnal years that the coins attribute to him (230-245 CE), as Ardaxšir I died in 242 CE. He could’ve been the “Ardaxšir king of Marv” of the ŠKZ, but there’s no evidence to support this, apart from the numismatic connection between Marv and Tokharistan. And finally, he could’ve been the first of the Kušanšahs, the Sasanian cadet branch that would rule the old Kushan lands until the second half of the IV century CE (and so, a son of Ardaxšir I and a brother of Šābuhr I); most scholars seem to incline towards this possibility, but the problem is that in the ŠKZ Šābuhr I does not name any Ardaxšir Kušanšah in his father’s court. For the lineage of the Kušanšahs, there’s a useful convention that Arabic numerals are used instead of Roman ones, to avoid confusion with the main Sasanian branch, the Kings of Kings of Iran; and so this one would be Ardaxšir 1.

Silver drachm of "Ardasharo Koshano".

According to Tabarī, it’s even possible that the Kushans became tributaries to Ardaxšir I. This was a major revolution in central Asian geopolitics, because until then the Kushan empire had been the second most powerful Asian polity after the Han empire (with which it kept regular diplomatic contacts); Ardaxšir I sure had reached dizzying heights since his first days as the argbed of Dārābgird.

And now the šahanšah turned his eyes again towards the West, where he had unfinished business to deal with. While Ardaxšir I expanded his empire in the East, the Roman empire had entered a spiral of political instability and foreign invasions that would last until the advent of Diocletian.

The new emperor Maximinus Thrax was a professional soldier, and an equestrian by rank (the second equestrian to raise to the purple after Macrinus). According to the scandalized Roman senatorial historians, he was of barbarian origins (of Gothic and Alan stock), and what’s true is that he was a man who cared little for the usual decorum of Roman high society (in other words, to the cultivated elite’s eyes, he was an uneducated brute). He did not even deign himself to pay a visit to Rome to keep appearances up, he immediately organized the Rhine legions for a counterattack against the Alemanni across the Rhine, and then very deep into Germany (his punitive campaign reached as far as the Harzfeld in northern Germany, and possibly further). He would spend all his reign in a permanent campaign, because once the campaign against the Alemanni was finished, he set up his new headquarters at Sirmium in Pannonia and launched a new campaign against the free Dacians and Sarmatians.

Maximinus followed Septimius Severus and Caracalla’s policies: he cared for the army and nothing else. He abandoned all attempts at restoring the fiscal balance, began minting devaluated antoniniani again, and ramped up fiscal pressure to keep his European campaigns going.

The increased fiscal pressure also fell on the shoulders of the privileged senatorial elite, who already hated Maximinus. And to make matters worse, taking advantage of Maximinus’ European campaigns, Ardaxšir I attacked Roman Mesopotamia again in 237-238 CE; the defenses floundered once more and this time Zonaras and Syncellus agree that the Sasanian army took the key fortresses of Nisibis and Carrhae (contrary to Herodian, who says nothing about it). To follow this success, in 238-239 CE, a large Sasanian army besieged and took the Roman fortress of Dura Europos on the Euphrates.

The Senate had had enough of Maximinus. A tax revolt began at Thysdrus in the rich province of Africa, led by its main landowners, who then proceeded to proclaim its legate, the aged senator Marcus Antonius Gordianus Sempronianus (known as Gordian I) as Augustus on 22 March 238 CE. The elderly Gordian I quickly associated his adult son Marcus Antonius Gordianus Sempronianus Romanus Africanus (known as Gordian II) to the throne as joint Augustus.

Denarius of Gordian I.

Denarius of Gordian II.

Both Gordiani were immediately recognized as legitimate Augusti by the Senate in Rome, who proceeded then to declare Maximinus an hostis publicus (public enemy) and to burn and destroy all his images and persecute all his known supporters in Rome and Italy; which being under direct control of the Senate also recognized the two Gordiani as legitimate emperors.

Things took a turn for the worse though when Capelianus, the legate of nearby Numidia and legate of Legio III Augusta, the only legion based in Africa west of Egypt declared his loyalty to Maximinus and marched on Carthage. Gordian II died fighting against Capelianus’s professional soldiers and Gordian I commited suicide on 12 April 238 CE. Their reign had lasted less than a month.

The revolt was now leaderless, but the Senate showed considerable sang froide in this situation. It proclaimed joint Augusti two of its members, Marcus Clodius Pupienus Maximus and Decimus Caelius Calvinus Balbinus. The Senate also appointed a commission of 20 senators to aid them in the task (the awkwardly named XX VIRI EX S.C. REI PVBLICAE CVRANDAE, “Vigintiviri for the care of the res publica appointed by the Senate”). Of the two emperors, Pupienus was the one with extensive military experience and left for Ravenna, where he installed his command post. The Senate controlled only the Urbaniciani of Rome and the Vigiles, but it also controlled what would prove to be a decisive factor: the two Praetorian fleets based at Ravenna and Misenum. Two senators also with military experience (and probably members of the vigintiviri), Rutilius Pudens Crispinus (the old right-hand man of Severus Alexander) and Tullius Menophilus were dispatched by Pupienus to defend the strategically vital city of Aquileia from Maximinus’s army, which was marching hurriedly from Pannonia to Italy. Amongst the emasure taken by these two senators, two would prove crucial: a policy of scorched earth on the road from Emona to Aquileia and most of the Veneto, and the rebuilding and strengthening of the walls of Aquileia.

Denarius of Pupienus. On the reverse, AMOR MVTVVS AVGG, a hopeful legend, because according to ancient authors Pupienus and Balbinus hated each other's guts.

Denarius of Balbinus. On the reverse, VICTORIA AVGG.

Once his army arrived at the doors of Aquileia, Maximinus settled down to besiege the city, in which most historians have considered to be his great mistake, instead of merely blocking it and keep his march south towards Rome. But what’s often ignored in this judgement is the supply situation of Maximinus’ army. The legions on the Rhine and Danube borders were not fed from their hinterland, but from far away rearguard provinces, usually by sea and river transportation. For feeding an army situated in the Upper Danube, the usual supply route was for African grain to be shipped to Aquileia and from here by road to Emona (modern Ljubljana), where it could be loaded on boats on the Save river, and from the Save to the Danube for its distribution to the troops. Now the Senate controlled Aquileia, and although Africa was controlled by Capellianus, who was loyal to Maximinus, the Ravenna fleet, controlled by the Senate, blocked also any shipments to Maximinus’ army through the Adriatic. It’s quite possible that large quantities of grain had been stored in Aquileia awaiting transportation to the Danube, and Maximinus could’ve considered absolutely essential to seize it before continuing his march southwards. In any event, Menophilus and Crispinus put up a very competent and tough defense of the city, and Maximinus failed to take it by force; the siege stretched on, and while the defenders had plenty of supplies, Maximinus’ army became ever hungrier.

Antoninianus of Gordian III. On the reverse, PIETAS AVGVSTI.

Meanwhile in Rome where Balbinus had remained (and had to put down an attempted revolt by the senators Gallicanus and Maecenatus, as well as by part of the Praetorians that still remained in Rome), the people of the city was dissatisfied with the senatorial government, and demanded that the 13-year-old nephew of the late Gordian I, Marcus Antonius Gordianus Pius (known as Gordian III) be associated to the throne; the Senate agreed and appointed the boy as Caesar. And arrived at this point, the Senate played a winning hand: it sent secret emissaries to Maximinus’ army, to the soldiers of Legio II Parthica and the Praetorians. The Senate coldly told these men that their women and children resided in Rome and Alba under senatorial control, and that if they did not desist in their support for Maximinus, they would be put to the sword. Hungry and desperate for the fate of their families, the soldiers of Legio II Parthica murdered Maximinus and his son on 10 May 238 CE.

The severed heads of Maximinus and his son were sent to the Senate who ordered the damnatio memoriae for the deceased emperor, although the new co-Augusti Pupienus and Balbinus could not enjoy their new posts for long: Balbinus was murdered by the Praetorian Guard at Rome on 11 May 238 CE and Pupienus on 29 July 238 CE. The Senate then proclaimed the young Gordian III as sole Augustus of the Roman empire. Finally, the state was able to have some stability, and the new regime could begin to plan a counteroffensive in the East against Ardaxšir I to regain the lost Roman provinces of Mesopotamia and Osrhoene.

While the new regime in Rome organized itself, Ardaxšir I kept his offensive against the Roman East. And in 240 CE the Romans received the shocking news that finally a Sasanian army led by the crown prince Šābuhr had managed to take and destroy the previously unassailable city of Hatra. Rome’s most reliable ally in the East had been destroyed, and with the fall of Hatra now the Sasanians controlled all of Mesopotamia.

Remains of the main sanctuary at Hatra.

By this time, Ardaxšir was already an old man, and he associated his son Šābuhr to the throne, the both of them acting as co-rulers of the empire. As Tabari wrote, Šābuhr had already taken part in his father’s campaign against the Arsacids, which is confirmed by the great “Hormizdgan relief” at Ardaxšir-Xwarrah, which shows him as an already grown man. According to the medieval Arab historian and geographer Al-Mas’udi in his Muruj adh-Dhahab:

[Ardaxšir] judged him the gentlest, wisest, bravest and ablest of all his children

and nominated him as his successor in an assembly of the magnates. Šābuhr also appears in Ardaxšir’s investiture reliefs at Naqš-e Rajab and Ardaxšir-Xwarrah as the heir apparent, standing behind his father.

The medieval Persian author Muhammad Bal'ami also stated that:

Ardaxšir placed with his own hand his own crown upon Šābuhr’s head

Which is also confirmed by Mas’udi, who adds that Ardaxšir then retired to serve God and lived for a year or longer. Further confirmation is given by the Cologne Mani Codex, which informs us that in Mani’s twenty-fourth year, (that is, in 24+ 216=240 CE), Ardaxšir:

subjugated the city of Hatra and King Šābuhr, his son, placed on his head the great [royal] diadem

Then there are the already discussed “Heir Apparent” coins, which for the scholar Shapur Shahbazi show Ardaxšir I facing his son Šābuhr, who would be represented symbolically as a young beardless man; Olbrycht would not agree with this, but according to Shahbazi the legends on the coin state:

Divine Šābuhr King of Iran whose seed is from the gods

Although it should be pointed that in Middle Persian Šābuhr means “son of the king”, and it was originally a title, there’s no remaining evidence of its use as a proper name until after Ardaxšir I’s reign.

Further proof for this period of synarchy in the Sasanian empire between father and son is given by two Sasanian rock reliefs. The already mentioned rock relief at Salmās in Azerbaijan depicts two horsemen both wearing Ardaxšir’s lower-type crown, must also date from the period of synarchy. Another, at Dārābgird in Pārs, represents a victory of Šābuhr I over the Romans but the king wears Ardaxšir’s crown, thus symbolizing the shared victory of the father and the son. Later in his reign after his father’s death, Šābuhr I would be depicted almost always wearing his typical “mural” crown.

Šābuhr I's rock relief at Dārābgird in Pārs.

The Cologne Mani Codex has allowed scholars to reconstruct the exact date of Šābuhr I’s coronation: Sunday 12 April 240. Ardaxšir I is still mentioned in a letter of Gordian III to the Senate in 242 CE, but as there are no more mentions of him, he must’ve died soon thereafter.

 

[Semper Victor]

13. ARDAXŠIR I’S INTERNAL POLICIES. IDEOLOGY OF KINGSHIP, RELIGION, ART AND ECONOMY.

As usual when there’s a change of dynasty in an ancient preindustrial society, there are two ways to address this change: one underlining the basic permanency of social and economic structures typical of preindustrial societies, and another underlining the political, social cultural changes brought by the change of regime.

In the long term, during the four centuries of Sasanian rule in Iran, archaeology has revealed very substantial structural changes in the economy and society, but it’s also true that one of the main reasons for the final fall of the Sasanian dynasty was the infighting between the great “Parthian” clans and the House of Sāsān, as well as between themselves, which shows that despite everything the basic sociopolitical structure had seen little change during the Sasanian period. Both approaches are equally valid and underline different parts of the same historical reality.

In the case of the reign of the first Sasanian king Ardaxšir I, on one side it’s quite clear that he did not enact any sort of social or political revolution in Iran. He had risen to the throne thanks to the support of many of the great clans, and this means that he had to accommodate them. In the ŠKZ, Šābuhr I listed the main members of his father’s court, and there were members of old “Parthian” clans like the Sūrēn, Kārin, Varāz and Andēgān in it, as well as new ones like the Zik (who were perhaps a Persian clan) (NOTE: I will make frequent cotes from the ŠKZ from now onwards; I’ll be used the translation provided here; the underlined passages are mine):

Those who lived under the rule of Ardašēr the king of kings: Sadārub, king of Abarēnag; Ardašēr, king of Marv; Ardašēr, king of Kirmān; Ardašēr, king of Sakestān; Dēnag, mother of Pābag the king; Rōdag, mother of Ardašēr the king of kings; Dēnag, queen of queens, daughter of Pābag; Ardašēr the bidaxš (‘second after the king’,viceroy); Pābag the hazāruft (‘chief of a thousand men’, chiliarch); Dēhēn of the family Varāz; Sāsān of the family Sūrēn; Sāsān, lord of Andēgān; Pērōz of the family Kārin; Gōk of the family Kārin; Abursām of the family Ardašērfarr; Gēlmān from Dumbāvand; Raxš, the army chief; Mard, chief of scribes; Pābag, master of ceremonies; Pākcihr, son of Visfarr(ag); Vēfarr son of Farrag; Mihrxvāst son of Barēsag; Hōmfrād, the māyagānbed (‘chief of the royal guard’?); Dirām, chief of the armory; Cīrīg, the (chief) judge; Vardān, chief of (royal) stables; Mihrag son of Tōsar; Zīg son of Zabr(ag); Sagbus, in charge of hunt; Hudōg, the chief steward; Jāhēn,the (chief) wine-keeper.

Andēgān is a town in Khorasan, and perhaps the “Sāsān lord of Andēgān” was a member of the “Aspahapet family” quoted in Armenian sources as staunch supporters of Ardaxšir, and the forebears of the Ispabudhan clan, which hold extensive estates there and in Azerbaijan. During the four centuries of Sasanian rule, these and other families reappear once and again and meddle constantly in state affairs, intermarrying between them and with the Sasanian royal house.

It’s also worth noticing the rigid hierarchy that this passage suggests; the ones named first are the šahryār (kings with the right of hereditary transmission of their title), then the wispuhr or princes of the royal house, then the wuzurgān (literally “the great ones”, the magnates or grandees), then the spāhbedān (generals, sometimes in other inscriptions they are placed before the wuzurgān), then the āzādagān (nobles) and finally the wāspuhragān (special courtiers). We don’t know how the Arsacid court was organized, but quite clearly the Sasanian one was quite an elaborate affair from the very beginning.

Until what point the old “Parthian” clans retained their own identity under the new dynasty was not evident until the early 2000s, when the numismatist Ryka Gyselen published a groundbreaking study of late Sasanian clay seals (bullae) dating from the VI and early VII centuries CE, under the Sasanian kings Xusrō I, Hormizd IV and Xusrō II. These bullae bore the personal seals of some of the main generals and military governors of the empire, and almost all of them bore the surname of one of the great “Parthian” clans, and what’s more important still, they identified as such in the bullae: for example, “X, son of Y, the Pahlav (Parthian) spāhbed (general)”. And those who did not identify themselves as Pahlav, identified themselves as Parsīg (Persian).

Clay bullae of a Sasanian spāhbed of the VI century CE.

So, if after four centuries the situation was still like this, it’s to be expected that little (if anything) changed in the deep sociopolitical structure of Iran under Ardaxšir I.

What changed substantially was the royal ideology, both in itself and in how it was transmitted to the king’s subjects. Ardaxšir I, in his coinage and rock reliefs, raised himself to levels reached never before by any Iranian king, Arsacid or Achaemenid. The standard formula found in the obverse of Ardaxšir I’s coins which he had minted as šahanšah is:

The Mazdayasnian (Mazda-worshipping) lord Ardaxšir, king of kings of Iran, whose seed is from the gods.

This clearly raised Ardaxšir I and his family well above the rest of his subjects (including the great clans) at least in official royal ideology. Also, in his coins and rock inscriptions Ardaxšir I closely linked himself with the rituals, gods and external apparatus of the Zoroastrian religion, in a way that no Arsacid king had ever done. It’s significative that only Ardaxšir I and his heir Šābuhr I used this expression, the following Sasanian kings dropped it from their titles, probably under pressure from the increasingly powerful and organized Zoroastrian priesthood. The reverse usually shows an elaborate fire altar with the legend:

Fire of Ardaxšir.

Fire of Ardaxšir (reverse).

This also began another custom that lasted until the Muslim conquest: all Sasanian šahanšahs counted their regnal years as “year X of the Fire of Y”. Ardaxšir I also inaugurated a Sasanian era (counted as I wrote in a previous post from the year of Pābāg’s uprising), which was to be the official Iranian era until the Muslim conquest. It should be noted though that although Ardaxšir I and Šābuhr I favored greatly the Zoroastrian religion and its priests (the mowbedān, known in the Graeco-Roman world as magi), they never made Zoroastrianism the official religion of their empire. Other religious communities were allowed to keep their religion, but some of them experienced a curtailing in their political autonomy, especially the Mesopotamian Jews, who had enjoyed almost total autonomy under the Arsacids; Ardaxšir I sought to abolish the official validity of Jewish Law within their communities (a policy that was later reversed by Šābuhr I and later kings). The association of Zoroastrianism with the royal house became closer than ever since the days of Darius the Great.

In his official propaganda, Ardaxšir I derived his right to kingship from the fact that he’d been invested by the supreme Zoroastrian god Ohrmazd with the Xwarrah (“royal glory”, Middle Persian equivalent to the Parthian farr). No other Iranian king had dared until then to claim having received his right to rule from Ohrmazd himself, but Ardaxšir I showed no hesitation about it.

It’s unclear if during his reign Ardaxšir I began the creation of an official “Zoroastrian church” like it existed under later Sasanian kings, with an official hierarchy led by the mowbedān mowbed that would define a rigid Zoroastrian orthodoxy to unify the very disparate cult practices and beliefs that had evolved during centuries under the common label of “Zoroastrianism”; in this sense, the first hint of such an attitude appears in the rock inscriptions of the mowded-e mowbedān Kirtir in the late III century; Kirtir began his rise under Šābuhr I, but probably he only attained his exalted position and great influence under Šābuhr I’s short-lived successors.

Under Ardaxšir I, it also becomes evident a desire to associate himself and his family with Iran’s glorious past, especially the past of Pars; hence the choice of the dramatic cliff at Naqš-e Rostam for his great rock-reliefs, beside the tombs of the Achaemenid kings, even if probably the Achaemenids themselves were barely remembered in Pārs or Iran (ironically, the ones who remembered them better and raised the specter of Ardaxšir wanting to restore Darius I’s empire were the Greeks and Romans, who thanks to their written history guarded a much better memory of that dynasty). Also, in his coins Ardaxšir I employs for the first time the Middle Persian word Ērān. Grammatically, ērān is the plural of ēr, which is Middle Persian for “aryan”. Thus, in his coins he proclaimed himself as “king of kings of the Aryans/Iranians”. His son and heir Šābuhr I would carry this title much further, as we will see in future posts.

Middle Persian displaced Parthian as the official language in coins and court documents, although royal rock inscriptions were also written in Parthian until the reign of Šābuhr I’s son Narseh in the late III century CE. The usage of Greek is attested for the last time in the ŠKZ. Although at first the new dynasty kept partially the old Arsacid system of vassal kingdoms, the tendency over time was towards an increased centralization, and the conversion of these kingdoms into provinces. As seen above in the quoted fragment from the ŠKZ, there were four sub-kings under Ardaxšir I, and at least two of them were sons of Ardaxšir I (the kings of Kirmān and Sakastan). But other territories that had been traditionally autonomous kingdoms under the Arsacids disappear from the very beginning: Atropatene, Adiabene (probably already annexed as a royal province by Walaxš V), Elymais and Mesene. Of these, Mesene would become again a sub-kingdom under Šābuhr I, but the rest would never again exist. Instead, from the start the new dynasty seems to have reorganized the administrative divisions of the empire; new names appeared; these are the ones attested in the ŠKZ, some of which survived until the Muslim conquest and beyond:

• Āsōristān was the name given to the ancient satrapy of Babylonia, the rich agricultural province of central and lower Mesopotamia.
• Arbāyistān was the name given to northern Mesopotamia, including the conquered kingdom of Hatra and the Roman provinces of Mesopotamia and Osrhoene, when they were under Sasanian control.
• Nōdšīragān was the name given to the ancient kingdom of Adiabene.
• Xūzestān (Khuzestan) was the name given to the old kingdom of Elymais and the satrapy of Susiana.
• Mēšān was the name given to the old kingdom of Mesene, at the mouths of the Tigris and Euphrates on the Gulf coast.
• Ādurbādagān was the name given to the ancient kingdom of Atropatene.
• Pārs was of course the ancient kingdom of Persis.
• Pahlaw was the ancient satrapy of Parthia/Parthava.
• Spāhān; the province of Isfahan in western Media.
• Ray; roughly corresponding to northern Media.
• Kirmān in south-central Iran, under the rule of the Kirmānšah.
• Sagestān/Sakastan, under the rule of the Sakanšah.
• Gurgān was the name given to ancient Hyrcania.
• Marw was the name given to ancient Margiana.
• Harēw was the name given to the ancient satrapy of Aryana (in northwestern Afghanistan, around Herat).
• Abaršahr was the name given to the northern portion of the ancient satrapy of Parthia, now converted into a new province which would act as a border march against Central Asian nomads.
• Tūrestān in modern Pakistan (only under intermittent Sasanian control); it bordered the Indus river and limited with Sakastan; it was usually ruled by the Sakanšah.
• Makurān (Makran).
• Kūšānšahr, the territories annexed by Ardaxšir I and Šābuhr I from the Kushan empire in Afghanistan and Pakistan (basically Bactria, Kabulistan and Gandhara); these territories were ruled by the Kūšānšah.

Approximate extent of the Sasanian empire under Šābuhr I.

Another activity of Ardaxšir I that marks a sharp departure from tradition is his activity as a builder of new cities. Arsacid kings had also built of rebuilt cities (Ctesiphon itself for example, or Vologesias near Seleucia under Walaxš I); these cities were almost always built following a circular plan borrowed from the steppe traditions with an eminent defensive intention (the circle allows the maximum area to be enclosed with the minimum wall length), but Ardaxšir I probably built or rebuilt more cities during his reign than any Arsacid king:

• Ardaxšir-Xwarrah: his first foundation and first capital, in his Pārs homeland.
• Rēv-Ardaxšir (Rīšahr) in Pārs.
• Hormozd-Ardaxšir (Sūq al-Ahwāz) in Khuzestan.
• Vēh-Ardaxšir opposite Ctesiphon.
• Vēh-Ardaxšir in Kīrman.
• Astarābād-Ardaxšir (Karḵ-e Meyšān) in Lower Mesopotamia
• Psʾ? (unsecure reading) Ardaxšir on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf.
• Nūḏ-Ardaxšir near Mosul.

Further foundations are mentioned by the medieval Islamic historians Ḥamza Esfahani and Dīnavarī among other authors. The foundation or rebuilding of cities remained an important activity for all Sasanian kings. Notice that most of these cities were built in Mesopotamia, Khuzestan and Fars. The new cities were built in royal estates, and two of them were ports (Rēv-Ardaxšir and probably the one founded in Arabia). This inaugurates also two policies that were to be pursued by all Sasanian kings: to raise their revenues by developing royal lands and by developing long-distance trade, especially the one that had to cross royal estates. Iran was already crossed by the major Eurasian trade route (the Silk Road), but it crossed the Iranian plateau on its northern part, which was mostly controlled by the great clans. The Sasanian kings instead chose to concentrate on developing sea trade with India through the ports in Meyšān and Pārs. This was probably the reason why Ardaxšir I conquered Bahrain and the coastal strip on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf, according to Tabarī. The ŠKZ also proves Sasanian control over Oman, and archaeological evidence (including fire temples) attests to a continued Sasanian presence in Bahrain and the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf.

This policy of royal close control over the Indian ocean trade clashed directly with the interests of the two great Arabian trading cities of Hatra and Palmyra, which until then had controlled this trade thanks to their trading colonies in Lower Mesopotamia and the old kingdom of Mesene (which was annexed by Ardaxšir I); Palmyra had been always a Roman ally, but these policies were probably (more than any loyalist feeling towards the Arsacid dynasty) which caused the hostility of Hatra towards the Sasanians and its alliance with Rome. The other injured party by these new trading policies inaugurated by Ardaxšir I were Roman traders from Egypt, who until then had kept an active maritime trade with India undisturbed; from then on, they had to compete with Sasanian traders in the Indian ports.

Ardaxšir I kept high the silver content of the Iranian silver coin (the drachm, an inheritance from Hellenistic times), and so did all the Sasanian kings, at a time when the Roman silver currency kept on devaluating until Diocletian abolished it and replaced it with a new monetary system based on gold. This was the result of a strong economy (archaeology shows an increase in population, irrigation works and cultivated land in the Sasanian empire across its four centuries of existence), the control exerted by Sasanian kings over the major Eurasian trade routes and the control of major silver mines in Armenia and Bactria (in the Panjšir valley).

And finally, apart from all his other achievements Ardaxšir I was also a great builder, who built the most important and original buildings in Iran since the building of Persepolis. All his remaining major buildings projects were located in his homeland in Pārs, and I will write here about three of them, the round city of Ardaxšir-Xwarrah, his two palaces near this city, Qalʿa-ye Doķtar and the Ataskadeh.

Ardaxšir-Xwarrah (literally, “Glory of Ardaxšir”, renamed later as Gōr or Jūr, and since the X century known as Firuzabad) was founded by Ardaxšir I before his war against Ardawān V, and but it’s not sure if planning and construction began before or after he became king of Pārs. According to Tabarī, the founding of a city would have been a usurpation of the prerogatives of the King of kings and would have precipitated the war between Ardaxšir and Ardawān, although he’s the only author to claim so. Round cities were nothing new in Iran (their design originated in the steppes), but Ardaxšir-Xwarrah was unique in that not only was it circular, but also laid out following a concentric plan, with circular secondary streets parallel to the outer wall, and main radial streets (four of them, one to each cardinal point) which led exactly to the center of the city, where Ardaxšir I built three great buildings. One was a palace for himself, the other a fire temple (ātaxš-kadag) where after Hormizdgan he lit his regnal fire and the other a “mysterious” tower about which scholars are still in disagreement in what purpose did it serve. The city impressed greatly the Arab conquerors in the VII century, so much that it was chosen by the first Abbasid caliph as the model for the planning of Baghdad. The city was an impressive propaganda statement of the “absolute” character of Ardaxšir I’s rule, with the king (and the Zoroastrian religion) being the center of all things.

Plan of the city of Ardaxšir-Xwarrah.

Qalʿa-ye Doķtar (“The Maiden’s Castle”, in New Persian) was a vast barrier fortress with a royal palace inside built by Ardaxšir I before his victory over Ardawān V. It was a fortress built at a time when Ardaxšir’s rule over Iran was still not established, and so it had mainly a defensive military role. The important part of the complex though is Ardaxšir’s palace, which already shows an impressive ambition. For the construction of the residence, the highest ridge of the rocky spur on which the fortress was built, running in an almost east-west direction, was artificially enlarged by three steps of terraces. The access to the residence was done through the lower level, which gave access to a courtyard which served as an entry hall; the second level was also built around a courtyard that housed the servants, kitchens, etc, and finally on the third and higher terrace which lay open to the landscape stood open a deep, barrel vaulted ayvān (Middle Persian for iwān, a large vaulted hall typical of Iranian architecture since Antiquity) with lateral halls which led to the square domed main room (the transition from the circular dome to the square plan of the room was made with squinches, the first example found of this construction device in Iranian architecture) where stood Ardaxšir’s throne. This upper part of the palace, which contained the representation rooms, stood spectacularly high over the landscape, and was surrounded and supported by massively high and thick walls, which gave it a truly imposing image. This building was so innovative that it had to pay the price for its bold design, as the horizontal push of the main dome and the surrounding vaults soon caused damage to the under-dimensioned walls that supported them; dangerous cracks appeared early on and buttresses had to be added almost from the start.

Reconstruction of Ardaxšir I's residence at Qalʿa-ye Doķtar.

Remains of Qalʿa-ye Doķtar seen from the valley.

After his victory over the last Arsacid king, Ardaxšir I built a new palace on the plain near Ardaxšir-Xwarrah. This is no longer a defensive structure, but purely a residential and representative residence, built on a grander and more luxurious scale. Today it’s popularly (and incorrectly) known as Ataškadah. This palace was divided in two halves of equal surface, the lower half housed the representation state rooms, and the upper half, built around an inner courtyard, housed the private rooms of the royal family. The same man scheme of Qalʿa-ye Doķtar is followed here, with a grand ayvān leading into a massive domed room where stood Ardaxšir’s throne; the novelty here is a change in scale: everything is bigger, the main domed room is flanked by two other domed rooms, and this time the builder got the proportions right and the walls were strong enough to withstand the push of the domes and vaults.

Plans and 3D reconstruction of Ardaxšir I's palace near Ardaxšir-Xwarrah.

These buildings set the ground for all later royal Sasanian buildings, and their use of domes, vaults and iwāns would also laid the foundations for later Perso-Islamic architecture, followed in all the great palaces and mosques of the medieval and modern era.

 

[Semper Victor]

14. THE EARLY SASANIAN ARMY.

Historical evidence for the early Sasanian army is scarce, but much evidence has survived from the late Sasanian era, either in original Middle Persian texts or in medieval Arabic or New Persian translations and quotations. By the late Sasanian era, there was in circulation in the Sasanian empire a truly imposing amount of war manuals, treatises and the like, and from what’s remained of them, added to epigraphic sources of the III century (like the ŠKZ) and texts from ancient Graeco-Roman authors, modern scholars have been able to draw a rough sketch of the early Sasanian military.

Ardaxšir I was first and mainly a warlord who tanks to his military abilities rose first to the throne of Pārs and then to the throne of Iran, and who spend practically all his life in campaign on a horse, expanding constantly his territories in every possible direction.

The Middle Persian word for “army” is spah. The C-i-C of the army was of course the Sasanian šahanšah himself, and both Ardaxšir I and his son and heir Šābuhr I commanded their armies in the field. Immediately under him, the second highest echelon was that of Ērān spāhbed, literally “general of the Iranians”, a post which was always held by a member of the wuzurgān; scholars believe that the Ērān spāhbed was not actually a commanding officer, but rather a sort of “minister for war” in charge for the overall supervision of the army and with the key responsibility of conducting peace negotiations in the name of the šahanšah. The commander officer of an army assembled for a campaign received the title of spāhbed (general). In the ŠKZ the old Parthian title of aspbed (“Master of Horse”, chief of the cavalry) is still attested, although under the Sasanians it did not have the same importance as under the Arsacids, when the aspbed was the second highest ranking commander after the king himself. In later Sasanian texts, instead of this title a new title appears, that of savārān sardār (Chief of the Cavalry). Another title attested is that of paygān sālār (Chief of the Infantry); these two titles were probably the Iranian equivalents of the late Roman posts of magister equitum and magister peditum respectively; and thus must’ve been mostly administrative posts.

A detail of Šābuhr I’s rock relief of Bishapur III in Fārs, showing infantry.

A very high-ranking post in the ŠKZ inscription is that of hazārbed, which under both Ardaxšir I and Šābuhr I was held by a certain Pābag. His rank was high enough to be listed immediately after the princes of the royal family, and before the wuzurgān. Scholars believe that his responsibility was mainly to ensure the king’s personal safety; and that thus he commanded the royal guard and the forces raised in the royal estates; he had to be a person who enjoyed the king’s trust, and thus the hazārbed appears sometimes in sources as leading armies in campaign. In the ŠKZ, the Ērān spāhbed is listed among the members of Ardaxsir I’s court, but not among the members of Šābuhr I’s court, while in the latter’s court we find an aspbed, which does not appear amongst Ardaxsir’s courtiers; according to the scholar Shapur Shahbazi, it’s probable that under Šābuhr I, the hazārbed took over the responsibilities of the Ērān spāhbed, although this title reappears again in the inscription of Narseh at Paikuli, dated to the last decade of the III century CE.

British reenactor Nadeem Ahmad in the full garb of a Sasanian spāhbed.

The chief minister of the Sasanian šahanšah was the wuzurg framādār (although this title is not attested under the first two Sasanian monarchs), which would often also fulfill military command posts under later Sasanian kings. This sort of “prime minister” was usually a member of the wuzurgān, and in Islamic times the Abbasid caliphs would revive the office under the Arabic name of wazīr (from whence the English word “vizier”). This title though is not attested in any surviving source from the III century CE.

Another post in the central organization of the army was the Ērān ambāragbed, the “chief of army depots”, in charge of supplying the army, while the pushtigbān sālār was probably the commander of the royal guard (a substantial force of elite heavy cavalry, and thus an army on its own); although again the office must’ve not existed before Šābuhr II’s reign at the earliest (when the very word pushtigbān is first attested). According to the Zoroastrian Denkard, the Sasanian military had even a corps of veterinaries (the stōr bizešk) charged with caring after the health of the horses of the cavalry.

There were also territorial commands, of which the one that is already attested since Arsacid times and was kept by the Sasanians was that of marzbān. Again, there’s some controversy about this post. It was mainly of a military nature, although marzbānān also held civilian attributions. Most scholars believe that the marzbān was the military governor of a border province (a “march”), and thus the commander of the military forces stationed there as garrisons and with the faculty of mobilizing its non-permanent forces (militias, allied tribes, noble levies, etc.) in case of foreign attack. The problem (in my opinion) is that then most scholars list the provinces ruled by a marzbān and include interior provinces like Spāhān, Pārs and Kirmān which were not under any foreign menace (well, Pars was attacked across the Persian Gulf by Arab tribes in the early IV century CE). To me, it seems that a marzbān was just a military governor and that it existed in all provinces, but that in border provinces its post was more relevant, because the in case of foreign attack the marzbān was responsible for defending the province until the king sent reinforcements. Apart from being military governors, the marzbānān also acted as civilian governors, but in the ranks under him the civilian and military administrations became divided into separate branches.

A particularity of the Sasanian military, inherited from the Arsacids and which was totally absent from the Roman army was that most of these posts were the patrimonial property of the wuzurgān. This was the inevitable consequence of the structure of the Iranian society. For example, it was very problematic to appoint a marzbān to a province if its nobility did not like him, so the post of marzbān to any given province was usually inherited within the most powerful clan in that province, like in the case of the province of Abaršahr, where the title of kanārang (local equivalent to marzbān) became hereditary within the ruling family of Tūs, which became known as the Kanarangiyan. Some scholars also believe that at one given time the post of aspbed also became hereditary within the Ispahbudhan clan.

The above passages already suggest that from the start the Sasanian army, although it retained most of the core Arsacid tactics and doctrines, was organized in a very different way than its predecessor. It had a central command structure, with even its own logistical branch, something completely unattested for the Arsacid period. Over time, the tendency was to increase the number of men in the royal forces, allowing the šahanšah to have less dependence of the forces of the great clans. But according to modern scholars, in the VI century CE after the reforms of Xusrō I the royal army still amounted to less than half of the total armed force available to the Sasanian kings. Under the first two kings of the dynasty, the situation can’t have been much different than it was under the last Arsacids, with the overwhelming majority of the army coming from the levies among the great clans.

Sasanian cavalry depicted in Šābuhr I’s rock relief at Bishapur III.

Cavalry remained the core of any Iranian army under the Sasanians, but its composition varied with respect to that of the Arsacid era. Scholars believe that little (if any) light cavalry archers were raised in the Iranian plateau, and that now most of the light horse archers of the Iranian armies were provided by allies, vassals and mercenaries (Albanians, Kushans, Kidarites, Hephtalites, Turks, etc), especially from nomadic Central Asian peoples. According to late Sasanian sources from the Vi century CE, Ardaxšir I divided the population into four states: priests, warriors (artēštārān), husbandmen and peasants, and finally artisans and traders. Only the artēštārān (the nobility) could belong to the cavalry, some of it was provided by the king himself, some of it by the wuzurgān and their retinues and the rest by the āzādān, the lesser nobility. This noble cavalry was the flower of Sasanian cavalry, and it was formed by armored horsemen equipped at first in a way lighter that under the Arsacids; the great battle relief of Ardaxšir I against Ardawān V at Ardaxšir-Xwarrah shows Sasanian horsemen equipped with Roman-style mail armor while their Arsacid foes were equipped with an older and heavier lamellar armor. These horsemen were equipped (under Xusrō I) with a kontos, sword, war axe or mace, a bow an quiver with 30 arrows, a lasso and even a sling. The idea was obviously that this “universal” cavalry could be used to fulfill the roles that in Arsacid times had fulfilled the light and heavy cavalry. In the same relief, horses also appear to be armored not with iron armor, but with a leather or thick cloth mantlet.

Detail of Ardaxšir I’s armor in his victory relief at Ardaxšir-Xwarrah.

Under Šābuhr II in the IV century CE, the trend turned again to favor more heavily protected cavalrymen, as attested by Ammianus Marcellinus in his Res Gestae.The Sasanian army also differed from its Arsacid predecessor by its increased use of infantry. There were three main types of infantry: light infantry, infantry archers and heavy infantry.

Light infantrymen were called paygān, and according to Classical authors, they were “pitiable peasants”, poorly armed and with no training, who were only fitted to serve the cavalrymen and to be used as labour forces in sieges and to build fortifications. They were raised by levy from amongst the peasant populations of the estates of the king and the nobility, and they were regarded as mere “cannon fodder” by their leaders. Obviously, they were no match for Roman heavy infantry.

The archers were the elite of the Sasanian infantry. They were masters in area shooting, and their training was geared towards delivering rapid and overwhelming archery fired against selected areas in the battlefield. They usually shot their arrows protected behind large wickerwork and oxhide shields, and they acted in coordination with the cavalry. Battles were usually opened by them by showering the enemy ranks with their arrows, to “soften” them for a cavalry charge. According to Islamic medieval authors, Ardaxšir I was himself an accomplished bowman, and invented a new type of draw which enhanced the speed and strength of an archer’s shots.

Finally, the IV century Roman author Ammianus Marcellinus also wrote about heavy infantry in the armies of Šābuhr II “armed like mirmillones”, which was a type of Roman gladiator. This means that in Sasanian armies served infantry provided with heavy shields, metal helmets and swords, with some body armor. This heavy infantry came probably (as in late Sasanian times) from the semi-independent Iranian northern mountain tribes of Daylam and Gilan near the Caspian sea which served as mercenaries in the armies of the šahanšah. There’s also the possibility that under Ardaxšir I these forces included Roman deserters, as implied by Dio and other sources.

The region of Daylam, on the Alborz mountains south of the Caspian sea.

Possibly already under Šābuhr I, the Sasanians began using war elephants, probably as a consequence of the impact they made in their war against the Kushans in Afghanistan and the Indus valley. Against undisciplined or demoralized enemies, they could work miracles. Against the disciplined Roman army, their effectiveness was dubious, although the Sasanians kept using them until the very end.

Like under the Arsacids, the army was organized into divisions (gund) which were in turn subdivided in “banners” (drafš), each one identified by their own standard).

Another important difference with the army of the Arsacids that became very obvious since the very early days of the new dynasty was that the Sasanians finally mastered the siege techniques employed by the Romans, which was a very bad development for the Romans. During its first Mesopotamian campaign, the Sasanian army behaved like the Arsacid armies of old, they were only able to surround Roman fortified cities and try to force them into surrendering through hunger; as the Sasanian army had to return to Iran each autumn, these sieges were short and unable to force the well supplied Roman defenders into submission. But in the 238-239 campaign, Ardaxšir I’s army achieved the surrender of Nisibis and Carrhae, heavily garrisoned and protected cities, and in 239-40, Hatra and Dura-Europus also fell into Sasanian hands; this marks a 180 degree turn in the situation; for the first time Iranian armies seemed able to take fortified cities like the Romans did. It’s not sure what happened, but it’s probable that Roman deserters (as implied by Dio, and the imperial legislation passed by Severus Alexander) trained the Sasanians in Roman siege tactics; from this moment on, the Sasanians became as skilled in sieges (both in offense and defense) as the Romans were. A dramatic testimony of this proficiency can be found in the ruins of Dura Europus, the “Pompey of the East”, which was besieged and finally destroyed by a Sasanian army in 256 CE in which almost all siege techniques (including poisonous gas) were used both by the Roman defenders and the Sasanian besiegers.

The Sasanian army also differed from its Arsacid predecessor in that it was much more willing to fight pitched battles than the old Arsacid armies were. If necessary, they could also resort to the old tactics of guerrilla warfare, harassing and scorched earth, but unlike under the Arsacid kings, now the Romans were able to fight many more pitched battles against their Iranian foes.

The IV century Roman soldier and author Ammianus Marcellinus hated the “Persians”, but he admired their “patriotism”. According to him, this was taken to the extreme in Šābuhr II’s army: if a man was found to have deserted to the enemy, his entire family was put to the sword. Ammianus and other late Roman authors also extolled the tenacity of Sasanian armies in sieges; they were fearsome when besieging, but really formidable when besieged. This proficiency of the Sasanian army in sieges becomes already evident under Ardaxšir I and especially under his son Šābuhr I. The propaganda value of Zoroastrian religion was also exploited by the Sasanian kings, who usually carried mowbedān with them into battle, and sometimes even the mowbedān mowbed, to help raise the morale of their men.

 

[Semper Victor]

15.1. THE CAMPAIGN OF GORDIAN III AGAINST ŠĀBUHR I. THE SITUATION IN ROME AT THE START OF GORDIAN III’S REIGN.

The murder of Severus Alexander and the accession of Maximinus Thrax is usually considered the start of the so-called III century crisis in the Roman Empire, a period marked by the combined onslaught of foreign invasions, civil wars, epidemies and a fiscal and economic crisis that almost caused the fall of the empire. By contrast, the nascent Sasanian empire enjoyed a long period of political stability and territorial and economic expansion under the combined reigns of Ardaxšir I (224-240 CE) and his son and heir Šābuhr I (240-270 CE).

It’s in this period that scholars must also confront a problem with available sources. Cassius Dio’s History of the Romans stops in 229 CE, and Herodian’s narrative stops in 238 CE with the murder of Maximinus Thrax. There are no surviving Graeco-Roman sources for the rest of the III century. Thus, scholars must resort to alternate sources:

• Epigraphy (which grew increasingly scarce as the century advanced).
• Numismatics.
• Isolated references and fragments, like Egyptian papyri, texts by III century Graeco-Roman Christian writers (like Tertullian, Cyprian of Carthage) that were copied by later Christians, the Acts of the Christian Martyrs and strange and difficult sources like the so-called Thirteenth Sybilline Oracle, a “prophetic” text written somewhere in the Roman East in the 260s.
• Roman and Greek writers from the IV century CE and later.

Most of these authors had access to sources now lost, especially the chronicle written in Greek by the Athenian Publius Herennius Dexippus, which would’ve been the essential source for this period. Recently, a fragment of Dexippus’ original work (the so-called Scythica Vindobonensia) resurfaced in a palimpsest preserved in the Austrian National Library in Vienna, so maybe someday new discoveries may be made. The principal IV century and later sources are:

• The so-called Historia Augusta, a very problematic Latin source (see previous posts) written by one or several authors known collectively as Scriptores Historiae Augustae (SHA).
• Sextus Aurelius Victor (c.320 – c.390 CE) was a high-ranking Roman official who wrote a Latin short history of imperial Rome, entitled De Caesaribus and covering the period from Augustus to Constantius II. His work is an example of the historical genre known as epitome, re-using material by older authors in a highly condensed and shortened form (which has allowed its survival until modern times).
• The Res Gestae of Ammianus Marcellinus (c.325-330 – c.391-400 CE). Ammianus was a native of the Roman east who although having Greek as his first language, chose to write in Latin (a very, very rare decision). He was for many years a soldier of the Roman army under Constantius II and Julian. A staunch adherent of paganism and traditional “Roman virtues”, his work is full of criticism against Christians. Originally, the Res Gestae was written in 31 books, of which the first 13 are now lost, and covered the period from the accession of Nerva (94 CE) until the death of emperor Valens at the battle of Adrianople (378 CE). The surviving books cover the period from 353 to 378 CE.
• Flavius Eutropius (IV century CE) was another high-ranking member of the imperial Roman government who wrote a Latin epitome in ten books entitled Breviarium historiae Romanae, from the foundation of Rome to the reign of the eastern emperor Valens (to whom the book is dedicated).
• Festus (later IV century CE) was yet another high-ranking Roman official who wrote another epitome, the Breviarium rerum gestarum populi Romani, commissioned by the eastern emperor Valens. It covers the period from the foundation of Rome until 364 CE.
• The anonymous Epitome de Caesaribus (late IV century CE) is a Latin compendium of biographies of Roman emperors, from Augustus to Theodosius I.
• Zosimus (active in Constantinople between 490 and 510 CE) was an imperial functionary who wrote in Greek a work titled New History in six books, covering from Augustus to the year 410 CE. For events between 238 to 270 CE, he drew on the lost work of Dexippus. Zosimus was a pagan, and the objective of his work was to “demonstrate” how the decadence of the Roman empire was due to the rejection of the old gods by the Christian emperors.
• Peter the Patrician was magister officiorum under Justinian I, and wrote in Greek a history of the first four centuries of the Roman Empire, from the death of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE to the death of Emperor Constantius II in 361 CE, of which about twenty fragments are extant.
• George Syncellus (? – after 810 CE) was a Byzantine monk who wrote a universal chronicle entitled Extract of Chronography. In it he reused much material from Dexippus for events of the III century.
• John Zonaras (Constantinople, XI-XII centuries CE) was a Byzantine monk who wrote a universal history from Adam to the death of emperor Alexios I (1118 CE), entitled Extracts of History. For events of the III century he’s one of the most important sources available, as he makes abundant use of sources now lost.

All this hodgepodge of western sources must be compared and complemented with eastern sources, which are the same already described in previous posts, and especially with the unique document that is Šābuhr I’s inscription at Naqš-e Rostam (the ŠKZ), which gives the official version of events by Šābuhr I of the events that happened in his wars against Rome. This inscription was made on the lower part of the walls of an ancient Achaemenid building, and was inscribed in Middle Persian, Parthian and Greek. It was not discovered until 1940, and although the Middle Persian version is badly damaged, the Parthian and Greek versions are perfectly preserved.

The first act by the Senate after the acclamation of the young Gordian III as sole augustus was to condemn the late Pupienus and Balbinus to the ultimate punishment of damnatio memoriae (same as Maximinus). What did they do to deserve this fate is unknown, but this should make people think twice before blaming solely the Praetorians for their deaths. Herodian though puts the blame solely on the Praetorians, who had been humiliated by the Roman populace led by Balbinus and who resented the fact that the army at large (not the Praetorian Guard itself) had been deprived of what it saw as its privilege since the accesion of Septimius Severus, the right to appoint the new Augustus. Thus according to Herodian, it was the Praetorians who, following the murder of Pupienus and Balbinus acclaimed Gordian III as augustus, excusing their actions by stating publicly that they were merely carrying on the people's will. Although this still does not explain why did the Senate go as far as it went with the damnatio memoriae of their late colleagues.

The first three years of the new reign were years of total inactivity on the eastern border, with the Romans failing to retaliate against the Sasanian advances. Given that it’s quite improbable that the teenaged emperor governed by himself, it’s possible that the government was assumed by a regency council drawn from the ranks of the Senate, and that this council was dominated by western senators who did not care much about eastern affairs. By 240 CE, the situation in the East was a total disaster for Rome. The new Sasanian dynasty had brought the Roman border back to the Euphrates, like in the times before Lucius Verus’ conquests, and the only ally of Rome that still resisted the apparently unstoppable Sasanian tide was Armenia, led by its Arsacid king Tiridates II. During his three- year reign Maximinus Thrax had left aside completely the defense of the Roman East and had concentrated only in Rome’s northern borders, and this had been one of the main causes for the wave of discontentment that led to his fall.

According to Syncellus and Zonaras, Sasanian armies had taken Nisibis and Carrhae, although they say nothing about the other main fortified Roman cities and encampments like Singara, Edessa or Resaina. The situation was probably even worse than the list of fallen cities might suggest; Nisibis had been the base of Legio III Parthica, and if the city had been lost, this legion must’ve been destroyed or at the very least badly mauled. Carrhae lies near the Euphrates, Hatra had also fallen and the city had been razed to the ground, and the advanced Roman fortified city of Dura-Europos had also been lost. So, while it’s possible that Edessa and Resaina had not been lost (as they were both located near the Euphrates), it’s very probable that Singara, located much more to the east and south than any of these cities, had also been lost, which raises again the question about the sort suffered by the legion based there (Legio I Parthica). The same applies to the roughly 10,000 auxiliaries that had been stationed in the province, especially in the forts along the Singara-Khabur road; which archeological evidence shows that were either destroyed or abandoned at the time. Further proof for the loss of Mesopotamia is the fact that the Nisibis mint stopped its issues completely after 240 CE. Scholars David S. Potter and Yann Le bohed state that Singara and Resaina fell into Sasanian hands in 241 CE, although I've been unable to find the ancient sorces that provide this bit of information.

Map of Roman Mesopotamia with the main fortified cities and fortified bases qu.oted in the text

A much more alarming hint is that the imperial mint at Antioch (the main Roman mint in the East) also stopped minting in 240-241 CE, which has led some scholars to suggest that the Sasanian armies had managed to either besiege or perhaps even take the city for a time, but the sources do not mention it (except the always unreliable SHA), so this must be treated just like a (very, very unlikely) hypothesis.

To make matters worse, the Sasanian empire was led by a vigorous new king, who was an adult man with plenty of military experience, while the emperor in Rome was a thirteen-year-old boy. It took the Romans two years to react after the accession of Gordian III to the purple. His first years were difficult. Gordian III came from a respected and wealthy senatorial family, and was well liked by the Senate and the Roman plebs (who for some reason had been very fond of the ephemeral two first Gordiani). Even though, as due to his age he couldn’t have been able to fulfill his duties as augustus, and although the sources don’t tell us anything, it’s quite possible that the old senatorial families of the Severan era took advantage of the situation to govern in his name (as I wrote above). But, apart from the situation in the East, there were other troubles. One of the first measures of Gordian III’s government was to dismiss Legio III Augusta for its role in killing his kinsmen. It was not a very enlightened decision, for it left the rich North African provinces of Africa and Numidia practically defenseless, and in 240 CE the senatorial proconsul of Africa Sabinianus proclaimed himself augustus. The revolt had to be quashed by the governor of Mauretania Caesariensis, who had to go to Carthage with the auxiliary units garrisoned in his province to deal with the revolt (Philip the Arab would re-form Legio III Augusta after Gordian III’s death).

And apart from the situation in Mesopotamia there were also problems in the lower Danube. Maximinus Thrax seems to have dealt with the immediate menaces against the Rhine and upper Danube borders, but 238 marks the first official appearance of the Goths in Roman history. This year, the ancient Greek city of Olbia in the estuary of the Bug river (which was part of the Roman province of Moesia Inferior) was sacked by them, and soon after the city of Histropolis, in the mouth of the Danube, suffered the same fate (although the source is the SHA, scholars agree that the information is reliable). Meanwhile, the Dacian tribe of the Carpi also crossed the Danube further to the west, invading Lower Moesia proper. Before their deaths, Pupienus and Balbinus sent the senator Tullius Menophilus (one of the defenders of Aquileia against Maximinus Thrax) to deal with the new menace; it’s possible that he was the first man to be entrusted with a general command encompassing several provinces, in this case Lower Moesia and the Dacian provinces. Menophilus reinforced the defenses of Marcianopolis near the mouths of the Danube and repaired the roads in the area (and probably turned it into an important military base, as a mint was established there under his rule). Then he opened separate negotiations with the Goths and Carpi, and agreed to pay a substantial yearly “subsidy” to the Goths, while in comparison the Carpi were offered a pittance. This satisfied the Goths, who quit the war, and the Carpi, angry but unable to put up a serious menace without the Goths, had to accept the deal, and retired back to the north of the Danube. This was the first attested encounter between Goths and Romans, and things did not end well for the Romans, who had to buy the Goths’ retreat. After this episode, he continued for a while in the Lower Danube, which implies that the new government of Gordianus III confirmed him in his post.

Silver Pentassarion of Gordian III with the god Serapis. Minted at Marcianopolis by the consular legate Tullius Menophilus.

In 241 CE, the young Gordian III married Furia Sabina Tranquillina, a step that according to those amongst the ancient sources which give a more extensive treatment of his reign would give a complete turnaround to his hitherto lackluster reign, for the girl was the daughter of a rising star in the Roman administration, the equestrian C. Furius Sabinius Aquila Timesitheus. For the following passages about this character, I’ll by drawing data from the paper written about him by Professor Tommaso Gnoli from the University of Bologna.

Sestertius of Gordian III and his wife Tranquillina, with Greek inscription.

Timesitheus must’ve been a man of remarkable administrative abilities. Whatever scholars have been able to put together regarding his career seems to confirm this: his rise began under Caracalla and continued uninterrupted under Macrinus, Elagabalus, Severus Alexander, Maximinus Thrax and Gordian III, slowly but steadily and always holding administrative posts. Luckily, his complete equestrian cursus honorum is detailed in an epigraphic inscription from Gallia Lugdunensis and dated to 238 CE. The full cursus honorum (in chronological order) is as follows:

• Praefectus of Cohors I Gallica in Hispania Tarraconensis, the only military post listed.
• Procurator rationis privatae per Belgicam et duas Germanias, i.e. administrator of the imperial estates in these provinces.
• Procurator provinciae Arabiae ibi vice praesidis bis, i.e. imperial supervisor of the province of Arabia, and vice-governor, twice. (under the joint government of Elagabalus and Severus Alexander).
• Procurator in urbe magister XX, ibi logistae thymelae, i.e. supervisor in Rome for the collection of the 5% inheritance tax, and supervisor of the imperial theaters and circuses (under Severus Alexander).
• Procurator provinciae Syriae Palaestinae ibi exactori reliquorum annonae sacrae expeditionis; i.e. imperial officer in charge for fiscal affairs and for the collection of the extraordinary taxes in kind raised from the province of Syria Palaestina for the eastern expedition of Severus Alexander. This is his first truly important post, because that means he was one of the main functionaries responsible for the supply of the huge army that Severus Alexander gathered in the East.
• Procuratori provinciarum Bithyniae Ponti Paphlagoniae tam patrimoni quam rationis privatae ibi vice procuratoris XXXX item vice procuratoris patrimoni provinciarum Belgicae et duarum Germaniarum ibi vice praesidis provinciae Germaniae inferioris; i.e. imperial officer in charge of fiscal affairs and administrator of the imperial estates in the provinces of Bythinia, Pontus and Paphlagonia, imperial officer in charge for the collection of the 2,5% customs tax and administrator of imperial estates in Belgica, Lower and Upper Germany and provisional governor of Lower Germany. This is an unusual accumulation of posts, quite rare in other known equestrian or senatorial careers. Timesitheus must’ve been a very competent administrator to have so many posts heaped upon his person (and in widely dispersed areas of the empire). Gnoli proposes an interpretation for this wide array of posts as follows: Timesitheus ad developed his functions in Palestine brilliantly, and while Severus Alexander was in Antioch in the winter of 233-34 CE planning his second (and never carried out) campaign against Ardaxšir I, he appointed Timesitheus as supervisor for the administration of imperial states and fiscal supervisor over territories that straddled two whole Asian provinces and part of another (Paphlagonia was part of the province of Galatia). When the emperor had to leave in a hurry for the Rhine in the spring of 234 CE, he took Timesitheus with him and appointed him with similar responsibilities for the two Germanies and Gallia Belgica, which were essential for the supply of the Rhine army. In early 235 CE, Severus Alexander, his mother and his ministers met their end at the hands of mutinied soldiers of the Lower Germany legions at Mogontiacum, Gnoli thinks that it’s possible that the senatorial governor of Lower Germany was amongst those murdered at Mogontiacum, and that the new emperor Maximinus Thrax then appointed Timesitheus as provisional governor for the province while a new senatorial governor was chosen; on top of all his other appointments.
• Procurator provinciae Asiae ibique vice XX et XXXX itemque vice proconsulis; i.e. imperial officer for the supervision of fiscal affairs in the province of Asia and for the collection of the 5% inheritance tax and the 2,5% customs tax, and provisional governor for the province. Maximinus Thrax sent Timesitheus back to Asia, to one of the richest provinces in the empire, where he also acted as provisional governor (an uncommon honor for an equestrian in a senatorial province of proconsular rank like Asia).
• Procurator provinciarum Lugdunensis et Aquitaniae; i.e. imperial officer for the supervision of fiscal affairs in the provinces of Gallia Lugdunensis and Gallia Aquitania. This is the last line in the inscription, and as it is dated to 238 CE, according to Gnoli this must’ve been Timesitheus’ post at the time of Maximinus Thrax’s death.

As Gnoli states, by this stage in his career Timesitheus had held in succession five posts of ducenarius rank, which qualified him for being raised to a prefecture (of which there were several, the highest of them being that of Praetorian Prefect, the culmination of an equestrian’s cursus honorum). This is a successful career for an equestrian, but not a spectacular one.

The inscription preserved at the Roman Museum in Lyons with Timesitheus' cursus honorum.

And then we’re left with the key hiatus 238-241 CE, for which we have no evidence for Timesitheus’ post. Gnoli hypothesizes (and it seems quite probable to me) that he occupied the post of Prefect for the annona in Rome, i.e. the imperial officer in charge for the supply of foodstuffs to the city of Rome and the distribution of the imperial dole. It’s a possible appointment for two reasons:

• First, because as we’ve seen when recalling his career, he was a man very experienced with logistics and supplies.
• Second, because he must’ve been residing in Rome when he got lucky and Gordian III married his daughter Tranquillina.

Immediately after the marriage, the young Gordian III raised his father-in-law to the post of Praetorian Prefect, the highest rank in the equestrian cursus honorum. The ancient sources which deal with the reign of Gordian III with a minimum of detail are the SHA, Zosimus, Syncellus and Zonaras. All three coincide in attributing to Timesitheus extraordinary personal, military, political and administrative qualities (the SHA are almost sycophantic towards the man). This is quite puzzling when we compare it to the epigraphic inscription from Lugdunensis, which depicts a quite common equestrian career, specialized in administrative tasks and totally lacking in military experience. How is this possible?

Gnoli points out something that has been known to scholars for quite some time: all these authors drew their basic data for Gordian III’s reign from the lost work of Dexippus. None of them lived under Gordian III (the closest one/s, the SHA, must’ve written towards the end of the IV century CE), so they were completely dependent on the Athenian’s work, who was a contemporary of the facts. And Dexippus, like all humans, had his favoritisms. He was a champion of Greek virtues, and Timesitheus was probably of Greek or Syrian Greek origins (lots of imperial bureaucrats from this provenance entered the imperial service under the Severans, due to the Syrian background of the empresses of this dynasty). Dexippus thus showed a parochial attitude towards Timesitheus for the simple fact that he was a fellow Greek, although judging from the comparison between the authors that used his work, the original assessment by Dexippus was far more nuanced that the one that appears in the SHA. Another factor that probably raised Timesitheus’ value in Dexippus’ eyes was his alleged conservatism, which was shared by the Athenian. That Timesitheus was a conservative character is implicit in the fact that the senatorial circle that ruled affairs in Gordian III’s name allowed the marriage of the young augustus with Timesitheus’ daughter, an in other alleged actions which took place shortly after it.

Gnoli hypothesizes (an opinion that I find very interesting) that the period between 238 CE and 260 CE (the capture of Valerian at Edessa) was marked by a newfound predominance by the Senate, and repeated bouts of conservative politics that this body, which thought of itself as the guardian of Roman essences, tried to impose on a society and a state that was changing at a rapid pace. In this sense, if Timesitheus really had a fraction of the influence that ancient authors give him over the teenage emperor, he must’ve enjoyed the full support of the Senate and must’ve taken care to avoid going against its wishes. To Gnoli, the real novelty that Timesitheus brought to Roman politics was a renewed interest in the east; after all he was probably a Syrian, and it’s possible that his rise had been engineered by the eastern faction within the Senate, to end the lack of reaction by the Roman state to Sasanian advances in the East.

And in this sense, the entry of Timesitheus into the imperial family and his rise to the Praetorian prefecture truly made a change, for in 242 CE a new expeditio orientalis was launched. The new campaign was launched with a full propaganda campaign and with all due pomp and ceremony in the Urbs, which according to the SHA included archaic gestures like having Gordian III open the gates to Janus’ temple (the latest time that such an action is attested in Roman history), sacrifices to the main Roman gods, and the like. Probably in early spring, the emperor, and the two Praetorian prefects (Timesitheus and Gaius Iulius Priscus, who was also an easterner born in Damascus) left Rome towards the northern border, to follow the now familiar main military road along the Danube and Thrace towards the Bosphorus and Hellespont, gathering legionary vexillationes, auxiliary units and “barbarian” numeri in their wake.

 

[Semper Victor]

15.2. THE CAMPAIGN OF GORDIAN III AGAINST ŠĀBUHR I. THE ROMAN ARMY MOVES TO THE EAST.

I forgot to add some further precisions to the previous post, so I’m going to write them in here. Although I find Gnoli’s assertion about a renewed supremacy by the Senate intriguing, this opinion is not the mainstream one among scholars. The mainstream opinion is aptly expressed in David S. Potter’s book The Roman Empire at Bay, AD 180-395. For Potter, the first years of Gordian III’ reign were marked by the inability of the Roman elite to put together a unified government around the figure of the emperor, as the Roman elite was becoming increasingly divided in different groups of interest and losing the cohesion and unity of sights that had characterized it during the first two centuries of the empire.

To Potter, the marriage of Gordian III and Tranquillina and the rise of Timesitheus to the Praetorian Prefecture signaled the triumph of one of the groups within the elite, a group of equestrian officials with a common background in administering the res privata, the private property of the emperors, which was increasing in importance as a source of income to the emperors, and in the fiscal service at large.

Potter identifies Timesitheus as the most prominent member of this lobby, together with figures like C.Attius Altimus Felicianus, who in 239 CE was head officer in charge of the res privata and would be left as the virtual man in charge in the capital when the emperor and the two Praetorian prefects went east, as prefect of the Vigiles and prefect of the anonna; Valerius Valens, prefect of the fleet of Misenum who succeded Felicianus as prefect of the Vigiles and Fultonius Restitutianus, who succeeded Valens in the same post.

To Potter, the brothers Gaius Iulius Priscus and Marcus Iulius Philippus (the future emperor) were also members of this group; nothing is known about Philippus’ career before 243 CE, but Priscus had also held some posts as procurator in his career before becoming Praetorian Prefect.

Potter leaves it unsaid, but the reason for this sudden “empire of the accountants” was probably the ongoing fiscal crisis that had begun under Septimius Severus and Caracalla. Severus Alexander had managed to stop the devaluation of Roman currency and Elagabalus had already stopped the minting of antoniniani. But Pupienus began minting them again. Maximinus Thrax had also experienced financial difficulties. According to Herodian, he had promised in a speech to the soldiers that had risen him to the purple that he would double their pay (again!) and give them a sizeable donativum. Potter doubts that he really intended to raise their pay, but he believes that the promise of a large donativum was true, and that Maximinus was then unable to fulfill his promise, which undermined quickly his popularity among the troops.

The notion that he promised a large donative, which he could not pay immediately, could also serve to explain why, despite his military virtues, Maximinus was not particularly popular in the army. Furthermore, the honorific title Maximiniana appears to have been restricted to units on the Rhine and Danube borders before 238 CE. This would suggest that he showed a preference to the troops under his immediate command, and it might explain why some among the eastern legions supported the rebellion of 238 CE (together with the fact that they had been abandoned to their fate by Maximinus). The slow and uneven distribution of largess might even explain why he was not uniformly popular with the troops under his direct command. There were two serious plots against his life, the conspiracies of Magnus and Quartinus, even before the uprising in 238 CE. The problem of uniting the army behind him may also explain why Maximinus could do nothing about the Sasanian invasion of Mesopotamia that took place in the year of his accession and resulted in the loss of the province.

The same had happened to Macrinus, who according to Dio had promised the soldiers when he became augustus a donativum of 20,000 sesterces for every man (=200 aurei, =5,000 denarii), but the money he had at hand only allowed him to distribute a donativum of 4,000 sesterces. For a comparison, the indemnity that (according to Dio) Macrinus had to pay Ardawān V after Nisibis amounted to 200 million sesterces (=2 million aurei, =50 million denarii). According to Augustus’ reform of the currency, 1 gold aureus = 25 silver denarii = 100 bronze sertertii.

For further comparison, I’ll post here some tables extracted from Yann Le Bohec’s L’armée romaine dans la tourmente, showing the pay levels of the Roman army under successive emperors, and the total amount of the military budget. Contrary to Potter, Le Bohec believes that Maximinus really raised the soldiers’ pay.

These numbers allow us to see several things. The military budget had multiplied by a factor of 3 since Augustus’ time, while the army had not increased threefold. The empire had seen some economic and demographic growth in this period of time, but not by a factor of three, and actually since the Antonine Plague, the demography had taken a serious hit. It’s very probable that since the reign of Septimius Severus the regular revenues of the Roman state did not suffice to cover the military budget; and this forced the emperors to seek additional income sources:

• Massive convictions and confiscations among the moneyed classes in Rome, as done by both Septimius Severus and Caracalla.
• Military expeditions to the East with the hope to win abundant booty in the rich lands of Mesopotamia (a risky affair, which grew riskier as time went by).
• Debasement of the silver coinage which with the troops were paid. This process became unstoppable under the successors of Severus Alexander, hitting rock bottom under Aurelian. But there’s evidence that for a while the debasement of the silver coinage did not cause widespread inflation (at least judging by the Egyptian evidence) and so the emperor kept applying it. This also means that there was a serious scarcity of silver within the empire, probably caused by the exhaustion of the Iberian silver mines, which was not covered by imports of precious metals through foreign trade. The emperors of the III century also ramped up the minting of new coins to keep up with the spending, as archaeology demonstrates. Debasement of the gold and bronze coinage is also attested, becoming painfully obvious under Gallienus.
• The payment of the troops’ salaries in goods instead of currency, through the mechanism of the anonna militaris established by Septimius Severus. Over time, this payment method became increasingly important, and under Diocletian it became the main for of payment for the Roman armies.

The tables also allow us to judge the impact of the financial commitments that the different emperors took with the troops or with foreign powers. Macrinus had to pay Ardawān V 50 million denarii, when the yearly total spending in the army was of 195 million denarii; this was a huge sum. Also, his compromise of paying 5,000 denarii to each soldier was the equivalent to more than a year of regular pay, which was another huge commitment. It was plainly impossible that the Roman state could pay such sums of money (the regular spending, plus the war indemnities, plus the extraordinary donativum) in a short space of time. It should also be stated that the troops (and officers) expected to receive donativa at the elevation to the purple of each new augustus, and in occasion of special days, like his decennalia (the ten-year anniversary of his acclamation), his marriage, etc.

Gordian III issued the last two regular issued of denarii, after them, only antoniniani were minted regularly; at the start of his reign their silver content stood at 42%.

For the 242-244 CE eastern campaign of Gordian III, there’s far less available information from ancient sources, and the epigraphic evidence is also very scarce (as I noted in previous posts, this loss of the epigraphic habit by the inhabitants of the empire began during the late II century CE and happened in a much faster way in the East, so much of what I’ll write in this post will be based on hypothesis or attempts at reconstructing the events by modern scholars. This means that the degree of incertitude will be quite higher than with the eastern campaigns of Septimius Severus, Caracalla and Severus Alexander.

To embroil things further, there are also very relevant discrepancies between the ancient sources. The most marked ones happen between our only surviving Iranian source (the ŠKZ of Šābuhr I) and the Graeco-Roman sources at large, and then amongst these sources in important details.

The emperor probably left Rome with all the Roman “central reserve”, leaving only the Urbaniciani, Vigiles and the oldest soldiers of Legio II Parthica and the Praetorian Guard. If all the army accompanied the emperor along the land route, then it probably travelled from Rome to Aquileia, crossed the Julian Alps and entered Pannonia passing through Emona. If the army was to travel as a single unit (something that is not so clear, as perhaps it would be easy to supply it if it marched divided into smaller units), the detachments of the legions from the two Germanias, Raetia, Noricum and the two Pannonias would have joined the emperor now (the legions from further west having begun their marches earlier). According to the SHA (the only source that states so), the army stopped its march in the eastern Balkans for a while, “and dispersed all the enemies that were in Thrace”. The SHA also state that in his funerary monument Gordian III received the titles Sarmaticus and Gothicus, titles that he could only have gained in the lower Danube if there’d been yet more trouble with the Goths.

The departure of Gordian III to the East is paralleled by an increase in military themes in his coinage. From top to bottom:

• Silver antoninianus of Gordian III, on the back, FIDES MILITVM (Loyalty of the soldiers)
• Silver antoninianus of Gordian III, on the back, VIRTVS AVG

In 241 CE, Tullius Menophilus had been executed. The reasons for this execution are unknown, but perhaps are related to the displacement in Rome of the equatrian/senatorial faction which had governed until then in Gordian III’s name for the one represented by Timesitheus. Some scholars have hypothesized that the death of Menophilus could have led to further trouble with the peoples which dwelled north of the Danube and who had recently concluded a treaty with him. If that was the case, then the peoples who caused trouble must’ve been the Carpi and the Goths.

If a new peace treaty was established with these peoples, or perhaps in fulfillment of the clauses of the treaty signed by Menophilus, it was customary that the Romans demanded from the “barbarian” peoples that they defeated or to whom they paid subsidies the provision of warriors to the Roman army, to serve as dediticii (in the first case) or numeri (in the second). This kind of forces were not included as auxiliaries within the regular structure of the Roman army, but rather they were allowed to keep their own weapons, and usually also to fight under their own leaders (although in some cases they were put under the orders of Roman officers). The advantages of this practice in the III century after the fiscal crisis caused by the financial profligacy of Septimius Severus and Caracalla towards the army were evident: these “barbarian” forces were much cheaper, because they were only kept under arms when needed, and being outside the structure of the Roman army they were not entitled to the high pay levels of the regular Roman troops. Also, the Goths would have been able to provide heavy cavalry which fought in the manner of steppe warriors (with bows and kontoi), which would’ve been very useful against the Sasanian army.

A further confirmation of the use of Germanic and Gothic numeri by the army of Gordian III is provided by the ŠKZ:

And, when at first we were established over the kingdom, Gordian Caesar assembled from all of the Roman, Goth and German lands a military force and marched on Āsūrestān against Ērānšahr and against us.

The text of the ŠKZ is quite credible because it differentiates between “Germans” and “Goths”, just like the Greeks and Romans of the III century did.

After this possible stop relayed by the SHA, the army, after having gathered the detachments from the Danubian armies and the Germanic and Gothic numeri, crossed the Bosphorus and proceeded via the main military road to Ancyra, Tyana, Tarsus and Antioch, arriving to the main Roman city in the East in late 242 CE or early 243 CE. According to the SHA, Gordian III delivered the city from Sasanian occupation, by this is unconfirmed by the other sources or by archaeology, so most scholars treat is as yet another mistake or plain invention by the SHA.

As usual, Antioch was to be the main base for the Roman offensive against Mesopotamia. As for the actual command of the army, ancient sources insist that the army was led by Timesitheus. To some scholars like Gnoli, this seems highly implausible, because as the epigraphic text from Lugdunensis states, the man had zero experience in commanding a military unit above a cohort of auxiliaries, and in my opinion Gnoli is right in his doubts. A personal leadership by Gordian III is also quite dubious for in 243 CE he must’ve been 17-18 years old, and without any military experience (unless he was the second coming of Alexander the Great). Most probably the army must’ve been led by a military council made up by senators and equestrians with military experience. A factor often ignored by most scholars is that Timesitheus was not sole Praetorian Prefect; the other prefect was Gaius Iulius Priscus. And that the Roman custom was to have one praetorian prefect as the effective military commander of the guard, and the other as a legal and administrative assistant to the emperor. Priscus could’ve been the “military” prefect was Priscus, but as Potter states, his career before becoming Praetorian Prefect seems to have been also a largely administrative one, similar to Timesitheus’.

This incertitude about the command arrangements of the army only adds to the difficulties in reconstructing the very confusing and contradictory accounts of the campaign.

As already stated, as well as the central reserve in Rome (Praetorian Guard, Legio II Parthica, Equites Singulares Augusti, Speculatores, etc.), detachments from the Rhenish, Danubian and African legions were also sent to the East. The following estimates have been taken from my usual source, Julio Rodríguez González’s Historia de las legiones romanas. But I must stress again, that with each new expedition the reliability of these estimates goes down, due to the increasing scarcity of epigraphic data:

• Legio I Adiutrix (based at Brigetio, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
• Legio I Minervia (based at Bonna, Lower Germany): a vexillatio.
• Legio I Italica (based at Novae, Lower Moesia): a vexillatio.
• Legio II Adiutrix (based at Aquincum, Lower Pannonia): a vexillatio.
• Legio II Italica (based at Lauriacum, Noricum): a vexillatio.
• Legio III Italica (based at Castra Regina, Raetia): a vexillatio.
• Legio IV Flavia Felix (based at Singidunum, Upper Moesia): a vexillatio.
• Legio V Macedonica (based at Potaissa, Dacia): a vexillatio.
• Legio VII Claudia (based at Viminacium, Upper Moesia): a vexillatio.
• Legio VIII Augusta (based at Argentorate, Upper Germany): a vexillatio.
• Legio X Gemina (based at Vindobona, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
• Legio XI Claudia (based at Durostorum, Lower Moesia): a vexillatio.
• Legio XIV Gemina (based at Carnuntum, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
• Legio XXII Primigenia (based at Mogontiacum, Upper Germany): a vexillatio.
• Legio XXX Ulpia Traiana Victrix (based at Vetera, Lower Germany): a vexillatio.

More vexillationes from the Danubian and Dacian legions moved to the East than in previous campaigns, this could be a hint that the “settling up” of matters in the Balkans stated by the SHA could be right. If this is the case, then this force must’ve had also sizeable numbers of Carpi, Goths and other Germanic and non-Germanic peoples subjected to the Goths (Heruli, Gepids, Iazyges, etc,) with it.

As for the eastern legions, the problem with epigraphy is at its most acute here. Due to this scarcity of epigraphic sources, these estimate is especially precarious, but I will provide them anyway (by the same source used above):

• Legio I Parthica (based at Singara, Mesopotamia): the whole legion or whatever remained of it.
• Legio III Cyrenaica (based at Bostra, Arabia): the whole legion.
• Legio III Gallica (based at Danaba, Syria Phoenicia): unattested, but probable.
• Legio III Parthica (based at Nisibis, Mesopotamia): the whole legion, or whatever remained of it (unconfirmed).
• Legio IV Scythica (based at Zeugma, Syria Coele): unattested, but probable.
• Legio VI Ferrata (based at Caparcotna, Syria Palaestina): unattested, but probable.
• Legio X Fretensis (based at Aelia Capitolina, Syria Palaestina): unattested, but probable.
• Legio XV Apollinaris (based at Satala, Cappadocia): unattested, but probable.
• Legio XVI Flavia Firma (based at Samosata, Syria Coele): unattested, but probable.

It’s worth noticing that despite the utter neglect of the eastern front since 235 CE and the repeated Sasanian conquests, there are no reports of unrest, rebellions or indiscipline amongst the eastern armies. But it’s quite probable that their morale was quite low, and that at least two legions, with all their attached auxiliary units, had been almost wiped out by the Sasanians. Another bit of information that makes me think about Gnoli’s hint about a renewed supremacy of the Senate after the decease of Maximinus Thrax is that Legio II Parthica, which had been led by an equestrian prefect since its founding by Septimius Severus, was led in this campaign by a senatorial legate, Iulius Pomponius.

As usual, the amount of propaganda themes in Gordian III's coinage was ramped up after the emperor arrived to the war theater. From top to bottom:

• Silver antoninianus of Gordian III, on the back, VICTORIA AVG; eastern mint (probably Antioch).
• Silver antoninianus of Gordian III, on the back, ORIENS AVG, with the image of the god Sol (Hellenized version of El Gabal). Mint of Antioch.

Either due to lack of epigraphic material, or because fewer forces were mobilized, the totals for this campaign are lower than in previous Roman offensives, although there are two variables to be considered:

• One thing is to have 150,000 men available in the East for operations against the Arsacids or Sasanians, and another is to deploy them all in the field, especially in a single army. As showed by the epidemics suffered by the armies of Lucius Verus, Septimius Severus and Severus Alexander’s, large concentrations of men in Mesopotamia in the summer had inherent risks.
• This time, large numbers of “barbarian” contingents were deployed to compensate for the possible Roman relative “weakness” in numbers, especially in cavalry. It’s impossible to assess how many men from these people the Romans took with them. On one side, they were cheap but effective soldiers, but large concentrations of unruly “barbarians” inside the empire also posed a risk on their own: undisciplined behavior, mistreatment of Roman provincials (although in this case, it was probably not worse than in the case of Roman troops) and more dangerously, the risk of angering the Roman troops if they felt that the “barbarians” got preferential treatment.

A couple of legal rescripts by Gordian III survive in late Roman / Byzantine compilations of Roman law which deal with abuses by Roman troops on rural communities, one a village called Skaptokara somewhere in the Balkans, and the other in Phrygia. Both communities were placed near the main military road that linked the Rhin, the Danube and Antioch and along which troops were constantly on the move from one front to another. In neither case did Gordian III offer any positive solution to the villagers above expressing his good feelings and sympathy towards their case, and directing them to bring their cases to their respective provincial governors. Although some scholars have seen in this a decrease in military discipline, similar cases are attested for the I and II CE, and appear for example in the case of Batavian revolt. The reputation of soldiers in this respect was such that the Jewish Talmud stated that if a woman had been kidnapped by brigands, it could not be automatically assumed that she’d been raped, but if she’s been kidnapped by soldiers, that rape had happened should be automatically assumed.

 

[Semper Victor]

15.3. THE CAMPAIGN OF GORDIAN III AGAINST ŠĀBUHR I. THE 243-244 CE MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN.

In 243 CE, probably in the early spring, the Romans launched their offensive crossing the Euphrates and invading northern Mesopotamia. All the Graeco-Roman sources state that this attack was a resounding Roman victory (thanks to the military genius of Timesitheus, of course) and that Gordian III’s army retook with little difficulty all the main cities and fortified posts in the province. Further evidence supports this account: the mint at Nisibis began issuing Roman coins immediately, and the ŠKZ stays suspiciously quiet about the whole affair; according to it, the Roman army attacked Āsūrestān and then was stopped not far from Ctesiphon without any further ado. Of course, the ŠKZ is a piece of propaganda by Šābuhr I, so that anything that would cast a bad light on the šahanšah was to be omitted from it, but there’s also the added factor that Zoroastrian religion holds the Lie as the evil principle in the universe, and so lying openly in a public inscription when any informed reader could identify it easily as a blatant lie would be a PR disaster for Šābuhr I. It was much better to omit embarrassing facts altogether (which was not a lie, after all), a custom that was otherwise seen as normal in eastern official or courtly chronicles before, during and after the Sasanian dynasty.

There’s also the possibility that the ŠKZ does not omit any Sasanian defeat, or to put it in other words, that Šābuhr I reacted just like his father Ardaxšir I had done in similar circumstances and abandoned the cities of northern Mesopotamia without fighting, retreating towards Āsūrestān and Ctesiphon with the bulk of his forces while enacting a policy of scorched earth behind him. Other than writing about generic “victories”, the only Graeco-Roman source that names a specific battle is Ammianus Marcellinus. During his tale of Julian’s invasion in 363 CE, Ammianus’ hero issues a speech to the troops in which he refers to a defeat suffered by the “Persians” at the hands of Gordian III at Resaina (modern Ras al-Ayn, in Syria). This is the only extant reference to this battle, but all the scholarly texts that I’ve read take it at face value: Šābuhr I suffered a “great defeat” (Potter though is more skeptical) at the hands of Gordian III’s army at Resaina.

Personally, I incline towards the possibility that Šābuhr I simply abandoned Roman Mesopotamia. He probably found himself in the same circumstances as his father ten years before. He had an army which most probably still had few numbers of professional infantrymen with which to garrison the main cities of the province and leaving dismounted cavalry in there would have meant throwing away the Iranian army’s main strategic and tactical superiority (its superior mobility) while turning his high-quality horsemen into sitting ducks and perfect targets for the Roman army, to be defeated piecemeal. That was one of the principal weaknesses of the Arsacid and early Sasanian armies: due to their being formed almost exclusively by cavalry, they were mainly offensive tools, and they were very badly suited for defensive tasks like defending fortified cities, especially in cases like northern Mesopotamia, where fortified cities were abundant and they faced an enemy very competent in siege warfare.

It’s of course also possible that the battle of Resaina took place. Looking at the map of northern Mesopotamia, you’ll notice that Resaina stands further to the east than Edessa and Carrhae and is located on the road that leads from Carrhae to Singara. If the army of Šābuhr I clashed with the Romans there, this means that Edessa and Carrhae had already been lost or at least left to be besieged by the Roman army. But what’s clear is that, if the battle happened and was a Roman victory, it was far from being decisive, as latter events will show. Resaina stood in the middle of the north Mesopotamian plain, and just like the environs of Carrhae and Edessa, its surroundings are perfect cavalry country. In such a battlefield, an army with cavalry superiority would have been able to break off contact and retreat easily, and the enemy would’ve been unable to pursue. Arsacid and Sasanian armies showed no prejudice in refusing battle or in breaking contact and retreating if circumstances were not favorable, without fearing “loss of face”, while the Romans were more reluctant to do so. This arose endless complaints among Graeco-Roman writers about the “cowardice”, “effeminacy” and “unmanliness” of their eastern foes.

Map showing the position of Resaina and the main cities of Roman Mesopotamia.

But Iranians were more practical in this respect and showed little scruple in waging war through guerrilla tactics, harassment and scorched earth policies against an enemy who was superior in pitched battles.

Whatever happened at Resaina, it’s clear that the Roman army retook quickly and easily northern Mesopotamia, and then it turned its attention to the south, with the goal of crowning its success with the taking of Ctesiphon. The SHA, a highly unreliable source, even quotes a supposed letter from Gordian III to the Senate sent to Rome after the early triumphs in the campaign:

After those deeds, Conscript Fathers, which were done while on our march and done everywhere in a manner worthy of as many separate triumphs, we (to compress much into little) removed from the necks of the people of Antioch, which were bent under the Persian yoke, the Persians, the kings of the Persians, and the Persians’ law. After this we restored Carrhae and other cities also to the Roman sway. We have penetrated as far as Nisibis, and if it be pleasing to the gods, we shall even get to Ctesiphon.

Although such “letters” in ancient chronicles are almost always rhetorical inventions by their authors, there’s a detail in this text that could lend some authenticity into it: it mentions “the Persian kings”, and as we’ve seen before by 242-243 CE Ardaxšir I was still probably alive and was co-ruler with his son. Probably, this means that the SHA copied this “letter” verbatim from a III century source closer in time to the facts (possibly Dexippus).

And after this point, what really happened is shrouded in utter confusion by the sources. Quoting here every one of them would turn this post into something quite ungrateful for readers, so I’ll try to resume them and keep quotations to the minimum.

The Iranian source for the events that followed is the ŠKZ, which is lapidary in its tale of what happened:

And, when at first we were established over the kingdom, Gordian Caesar assembled from all of the Roman, Goth and German lands a military force and marched on Āsūrestān against Ērānšahr and against us. And on the border of Āsūrestān at Mešīk (Note: Mesikhe or Misikhe in Greek sources), a great frontal battle took place. Gordian Caesar was killed. We destroyed the Roman military force. And the Romans made Philip Caesar. And Philip Caesar came to terms to us, and, as ransom for the life, he gave us 500,000 denars, and became tributary to us. And for this reason we gave the name Pērōz-šābuhr (“victorious Šābuhr”) to Mešīk.

Among the Graeco-Roman sources, none of them admits to even the existence of a battle at Mesikhe, or to even a defeat of the Roman army (in a mirror image of the ŠKZ’s dismissal of the battle of Resaina). But there’re significant differences between them.

According to the IV century CE Breviaria of Aurelius Victor and Festus, Gordian III “triumphed over the Persians” and was murdered in his return trip north to Roman lands by his “treacherous” Praetorian Prefect Philip, who reigned after him. According to Aurelius Victor, Gordian III’s death happened in February/March 244 CE.

The Breviarium of Eutropius tells the same tale, but with the added detail that “his soldiers” raised a funerary monument to him 20 miles from Circesium, very near to the Roman border. The Chronicon of Jerome and the Res Gestae of Ammianus Marcellinus also agree with Eutropius. Ammianus gives the name of the village where the monument stood: Zaitha.

As it couldn’t be otherwise, the SHA have left us quite a more novel-like version of events. According to it, the treacherous Philip (younger brother of the Praetorian Prefect Priscus) poisoned Timesitheus, and then through intrigues by both brothers Philip became Timesitheus’s substitute. And then, the cunning Philip managed to block the flow of supplies to the army stranded in Mesopotamia, which caused the soldiers to riot, murder Gordian III and acclaim Philip as augustus. The tale of Gordian III’s cenotaph at Circesium is also present in this version. In a very abridged way, the anonymous Epitome de Caesaribus agrees with this version, as also does Zosimus (with the helpful addendum that Philip was an Arab, “a nation in bad repute”). Orosius, Jordanes, John of Antioch and George Syncellus also blame Philip (although in a much more succinct manner).

And then there’s another group of chroniclers who state that Gordian III fell from his horse while fighting the Sasanian army, and died later of his wounds, this group includes Georgius Monachus, George Cedrenus and John Zonaras, although Zonaras makes a mess with the three Gordiani, and says that it’s Gordian II who waged war against the “Persians” and broke his thigh after falling from his horse, while Gordian III was murdered by Philip.

Hypothetical situation of Mesikhe in central Mesopotamia.

And as if this mess was not enough, there’s also disagreement about the terms of the peace treaty between Philip the Arab and Šābuhr I. The VI century CE Antiochene author Evagrius stated that Philip abandoned Armenia to the Sasanians. Zosimus wrote that Philip “entered into a most dishonorable peace with the Persians”, while John Zonaras wrote that Philip “made a peace with Shapur, then the king of the Persians, to end the war by ceding Mesopotamia and Armenia”.

Modern scholars also disagree about what to do with all these contradictory tales. Personally, I align with the conclusions drawn by David S. Potter, which are more or less followed by most scholars today. Potter gives general credibility to the account of the ŠKZ, except in details.

The Roman army would have marched south towards Ctesiphon in the spring and summer of 243 CE, following the Euphrates. In front of them, Šābuhr I must’ve ordered a scorched earth policy like the one that Šābuhr II would apply against Julian a century later. As the Romans got further to the south, the advance would’ve gotten increasingly difficult, due to the heat, the lack of supplies and the use of fortified posts and irrigation channels by the Sasanian army to delay their advance. Potter qualifies the accounts of the SHA and Zosimus as “nonsense”, and indeed they sound like that, with Philip the Arab playing the part of the cartoonish villain, Gordian III that of the hapless young hero and Timesitheus that of the sage old fatherly figure. But there are some details in their accounts that could hint at what really happened. The SHA accuse Philip of slipping into Timesitheus’ drink a poison that “loosened his bowels”, which could hint at that perennial problem of armies in hot summer weather without access to reliable sources of fresh water: dysentery. Timesitheus would’ve died of it, and then there would’ve been the need to elect another Praetorian Prefect in his place. Priscus, with remarkable political ability, managed then to have his own brother elected, something without precedent in Roman history, as the point in having two Praetorian Prefects was precisely to have one control the other; having two brothers as joint prefects defeated this purpose.

The tale of Philip blocking the arrival of supplies to the army could also be a hint that the army indeed grew hungry and found itself without proper supplies; and Philip again played the part of the villain here; both Zosimus and the SHA go to pains to describe how wonderful the logistic arrangements by Timesitheus had been, and how Philip sabotaged them. This sounds like an excuse to blame Philip for a situation that probably was not of his making.

Aurelius Victor wrote that the death of Gordian III happened in February / March 244 CE, which is a weird time of the year to campaign in Mesopotamia, as it’s the rainy season and the rivers are prone to violent inundations. It’s more probable that the Sasanians managed to slow down the Roman advance as they approached Ctesiphon, and that this delay caused the supplies of the army to run low, as the Romans probably expected (as in Septimius Severus’ second campaign) that for the return journey they would be able to live off the rich farmlands along the Tigris valley.

Scholars are not sure about the exact location of the town of Mešīk / Mesikhe, but all locate it in the environs of Ctesiphon, near modern Fallujah. Some scholars identify it with the Arab town of Anbar, and with the “Pirisabora” that Julian besieged in his 363 CE march towards Ctesiphon.

The battle would’ve ended in a Sasanian victory, with Gordian III being badly wounded and incapacitated (as the indirect cause of his death would've been his defeat and wound, Šābuhr I’s claim to have slain him in battle would’ve been yet another half-truth). The Roman army would’ve been now in a desperate situation: deep in enemy territory, and with the only retreat path open being the Euphrates valley, which had been already devastated, and probably surrounded and/or harassed by the army of Šābuhr I. It’s probably because of this desperate situation and the disappointment of the troops in Gordian III’s leadership that the troops mutinied, murdered their young emperor, and acclaimed Philip as augustus, which is in itself quite a surprising choice. He was not by any means the most senior leader present there, his own older brother Priscus outranked him. The fact that he was elected means probably that nobody wanted to take responsibility for the desperate situation, and that Philip was either ambitious enough to accept the post or was coerced into accepting it due to his junior status (later in his reign he apparently tried to abdicate, which would lend support to this possibility). This is again a very similar case to the election of Jovian as augustus after Julian’s death.

Philip’s first task would’ve been to negotiate with Šābuhr I the safe retreat of the Roman army, and the šahanšah agreed to it, but under humiliating conditions. Graeco-Roman writers toed over the details (only two sources even acknowledge them), but the ŠKZ states clearly that Philip had to accept that Armenia belonged to the Sasanian sphere of influence, and to pay a large indemnity. The ŠKZ also states that Philip became Šābuhr I’s tributary, which is accepted by some scholars (a minority) and dismissed by others as Sasanian propaganda (a majority); although I must say that in my opinon Philip was probably not in any position to argue about the terms offered. Scholars have also disagreed about the exact amount of the indemnity. Some take the expression “dinar” in the ŠKZ to be the equivalent of the Roman denarius, which is probably mistaken for two reasons:

• First, because stating the value of the ransom in Roman currency would be meaningless for a Persian reading the inscription in Pārs.
• Second, because 500,000 denarii would’ve been a very modest amount.

The sum that Šābuhr I demanded was probably 500,000 Iranian gold dinars, a goild coin which weighted around 7-7.4 grams. This was a close equivalent of the Roman aureus. So, the real amount of the ransom was 12,500,500 denarii, still a modest sum compared to what Macrinus had to pay after Nisibis. But more important is the fact that the Romans would not be able to pay this ransom in debased coinage, and that they had also accepted territorial losses (unlike Macrinus).

As for territorial concessions in Mesopotamia, the only author that mentions them is Zonaras, which leaves open the doubt about what happened with this province. In following wars between the Romans and Šābuhr I, the latter had to besiege again Carrhae and Edessa, but Nisibis, Resaina and Singara disappear from the accounts. So, it’s possible that Philip only had to cede the eastern half of the province, or that he agreed to cede all the province at first to save the army, but once safely away from Šābuhr I’s grasp, he or his successors broke this promise (which is somewhat implied in the following lines of the ŠKZ). Or that Philip ceded all the province, but in the forthcoming wars the Romans managed to recapture Carrhae and Edessa, the two cities closest to the Euphrates.

It’s also possible that Philip led the negotiations with Šābuhr I in central Mesopotamia while Gordian III was still alive but incapacitated by his wound, and that the troops murdered him later during their march northwards and elected Philip as augustus as their “savior”; this later hypothesis would allow for Philip’s intriguing in inciting the troops to mutiny. According to most Graeco-Roman sources, the death of Gordian III took place in late winter apparently very near the Roman border, and in 363 CE it took to Julian’s army three weeks to reach Pirisabora from a point near to where Gordian III’s funerary monument stood, so that means that in February / March 244 CE the Roman army had been marching for at least three weeks without supplies along a devastated country in winter, and it was probably at the end of its tether.

Situation of Circesium; the last Roman outpost on the Euphrates was Dura Europos (Doura in the map), so Circesium was just across the border.

According to Zosimus and the SHA, Philip sent an official message to the Senate telling it that Gordian had died of disease and asking it to ratify its rise to the purple; the Senate accepted his version of events and duly ratified Philip as augustus. Later, Philip had the body of Gordian III carried to Rome with full honors and instructed the Senate to deify him; either Philip had not murdered the late Gordian or he avoided carefully the stain of regicide that had made so much harm to Maximinus Thrax’s reputation.

As for the exultant Iranians, Šābuhr I’s propaganda exploited his victory to the fullest; and he had great rock reliefs carved at Dārābgird and Bīšāpūr in Pārs to commemorate his victory over Gordian III. The ŠKZ is dated towards the end of Šābuhr I’s long reign, but these reliefs are dated to shortly after the events and agree fully with the version of events of the ŠKZ; in them, a dead Gordian appears prostrated in the ground, under the hooves of Šābuhr I’s horse, while a frightened Philip begs for Šābuhr’s clemency.

The badly damaged Bīšāpūr I relief; it closely follows the model of Ardaxšir I's investiture relief at Naqš-e Rostam. Šābuhr I is standing on horse to the right, and he receives the diadem of power from Ohrmazd, who is standing on horse as his mirror image to the left. A dead Roman, presumably Gordian III, is being trampled under the hooves of Šābuhr I's horse, while Ahriman suffers the same fate under the hooves of Ohrmazd's horse. In the middle, Philip the Arab begs on his knees for Šābuhr I's clemency, with outstretched arms.

Šābuhr I’s rock relief at Dārābgird (already showed in a previous post). Šābuhr I is still wearing his father's crown, as a symbol of the shared nature of his victory. Again, a dead Gordian lies on the ground while Šābuhr I extends his hand towards Philip the Arab's head in a sign of mercy.

 

[Semper Victor]

16. THE AFTERMATH OF GORDIAN III’S EASTERN EXPEDITION.

The fate of northern Mesopotamia, as I wrote in the previous post, is unclear. What's clear is that when the full extent of Philip’s concessions was known in Rome, there was an uproar against them, and it’s quite possible that Philip tried to break the terms of the treaty with Šābuhr I as soon as possible. In fact, the XII century Byzantine chronicler John Zonaras seems to suggest just that in this passage:

However, once he (i.e. Philip) learned that the Romans were distressed by the loss of these regions (i.e. Mesopotamia and Armenia), he, a little while later, broke the peace and gained possession of Mesopotamia and Armenia.

Which is echoed in the ŠKZ, where Šābuhr I wrote:

And Caesar lied again and did wrong to Armenia.

In Šābuhr I’s version, it’s only Armenia that seems to be the object of dispute, nothing is said about northern Mesopotamia. Notice also the attribution of lying to the Roman emperor, which according to the Zoroastrian religion, is the basest of all evils. Notice also that the ŠKZ only names “Caesar”, as in “the Roman emperor”, and does not state if that Roman emperor was Philip or any of his immediate successors.

But according to the Armenian tradition, this time Šābuhr I managed to take control of Armenia, and did so by quite unethical means. It's surely known by scholars that in 251-252 CE Šābuhr I annexed Armenia and installed his eldest son Hormizd-Ardaxšir as “Great King of Armenia”, a title probably created specifically to placate the proud Armenian nobility over the annexation of their country to the Sasanian domains.

Coin of Hormizd-Ardaxšir as šahanšah Hormizd I.

The “official” Armenian version of the events (in the work of Agathangelos and Movses Khorenats’i) tells us a slightly different story though, and states that Khosrov II of Armenia (who had resisted successfully for seventy years the Sasanian attacks -a remarkable feat-) was murdered by a traitor called in these Armenian sources “Anak the Parthian”, a Parthian noble refugee related to the Arsacid house of Armenia, who would’ve been promised by Šābuhr I the return of his lands in Iran if he carried out the murder. And they place these events in the improbable late date of 287 CE.

But as the scholar Cyril Toumanoff first noticed in 1969, this version is quite unlikely, because of its novel-like flair and because the main villain’s name, “Anak” means “evil” in Parthian, a very improbable name. According to the chronicler Elishe Vardapet, Khosrov II was murdered by “fratricidal uncles” and does not name Anak, implying that if the conspiration was indeed engineered by Šābuhr I, he managed to convince a group of close relatives of the king into taking part in it.

Whatever happened, all versions agree that some loyalist noblemen managed to flee the country into Roman territory with the young crown prince Tiridates (Tirdat), the son of Khosrov II, who in time would rule in Armenia as Tirdat the Great. It’s probable that the sanctuary given to Tirdat in the Roman empire was considered by Šābuhr I as a break of the treaty of 244 CE and ignited the next wave of Sasanian attacks against Rome. The chronology and events reconstructed by modern scholars, as ancient Armenian sources are very unreliable here is that Tirdat II of Armenia, who had fought successfully against the Sasanians for twenty-eight years died in 252 CE and was succeeded by his son Khosrov II who was murdered that same year, perhaps by instigation of Šābuhr I. Notice though that in the case that the Romans had refrained from helping the Armenians, it still took Šābuhr I five or six years to subdue an Armenian kingdom deprived of Roman help. It sounds unlikely (which would suggest that Philip indeed broke the treaty as soon as he could); after all the Armenians had showed themselves to be very tough adversaries for Ardaxšir I and his son before, but they’d always had Roman help available.

The chronological discrepancy in the Armenian sources is quite surprising, because the Armenian tradition is in general very reliable. It also coincides with the confusion by Movses Khorenats’i and Agathangelos with the names of the Armenian kings of this era. The succession of Armenian kings in the III century CE according to modern scholars is (regnal years in brackets):

• Khosrov I (brother of Ardawān V and Walaxš VI, 198-217 CE).
• Tirdat (Tiridates) II, (217-252 CE).
• Khosrov II (252 CE).
• Hormizd-Ardaxšir (252-270 CE), son of Šābuhr I, with Armenia as a Sasanian sub-kingdom. He became later šahanšah of the Sasanian empire as Hormizd I.
• Narseh (270-287 CE), son of Šābuhr I, with Armenia as a Sasanian sub-kingdom. He too became later šahanšah of the Sasanian empire.
• Tirdat III the Great (287-330 CE); restoration of the Arsacid royal house in Armenia and reestablishment of Armenian independence and its alliance with the Roman empire.

According to Khorenats’i and Agathangelos, a single king named Khosrov ruled between 217 and 287 CE, the murder of Khosrov engineered by Šābuhr I happened in 287 CE and was followed shortly by the triumphal return of Tirdat the Great with Roman help. This chronology is plainly impossible for two main reasons:

• First, because Šābuhr I’s death is dated without doubt to 273 CE.
• Second, because Hormizd-Ardaxšir is attested as Great King of Armenia in Sasanian sources, and the western Graeco-Roman tradition does not contradict this.

Relations between the Sasanian empire and Armenia became extremely hostile after Tirdat III’s restoration, and the conversion of Armenia to the Christian faith worsened them, as it was soon followed by Constantine I’s conversion, which strengthened the ties between the two Christian states. The Sasanians were quite indifferent towards the expansion of Christianity among their “non-Aryan/non-Iranian” subjects but did not look kindly upon the expansion of any religion other than Zoroastrianism among their “Aryan/Iranian” subjects. Armenia appears listed in the inscription of the mowbedān mowbed Kirdir at Naqš-e Rustam as an “Aryan” land, and when the Armenian kingdom was partitioned between Rome and the Sasanian empire in the late IV century CE, the Sasanians tried to reinstate Zoroastrianism by force upon the Armenians (or at least amongst the warrior nobility, which was the part of the population they really cared about), which met with frontal opposition and caused several large scale revolts that were put down by the Sasanians only with extreme difficulty; after them the Sasanians accepted the new religious reality and stopped their attempts to impose Zoroastrianism in Armenia. But this had its consequence on Armenian historical tradition, because all the Christian Armenian historians were unanimously hostile towards the Sasanians. Their messing up of kings and dates in the III century seems like a deliberate attempt at erasing a part of Armenian history that saw the first incorporation of Armenia into the Sasanian sphere of influence, especially if, as the work of Elishe Varshapet seems to hint at, the control of Armenia by Šābuhr I was made possible by a revolt of Armenian nobles.

The annexation of Armenia as a vassal kingdom strengthened considerably the position of the Sasanian empire versus the Roman empire in the East. Firstly, Armenia had a large army formed mainly by heavy cavalry equipped, trained and recruited in the Iranian style (Armenian cavalrymen were always considered as elite forces in Sasanian armies until the end of the empire). It removed the direct threat of invasion of Media and Ādurbādagān and put at risk of invasion the Roman provinces of Pontus and Cappadocia. It also allowed Šābuhr I to extend its influence in the Caucasus, where the kingdoms of Iberia and Albania became also Sasanian protectorates; they were allowed to keep their own ruling houses, but a high-ranking Sasanian official, the bidaxš (translated roughly as “viceroy” or “king’s lieutenant) was sent to the Iberian court to supervise that the country was ruled according to the interests of the šahanšah. Iberia and Albania also fielded numerous armies of a feudal nature (that, as vassal kingdoms, now had to join the royal Sasanian army in campaign) and were sources of mercenaries to be hired into Šābuhr I’s armies. The Sasanians also controlled now the two main passes across the Caucasus, the Caspian Gates and the Alans' Gates, which were garrisoned by Iranian troops and increased the security of northwestern Iran, Ādurbādagān and Mesopotamia against nomadic invasions from the Caspian-Pontic steppes. And, if northern Mesopotamia was still under Roman control, it turned its strategical position untenable, because the northern border of the province was bordered by the Tur Abdin mountains (then Armenian territory, now in Turkey) from which the whole north Mesopotamian plan can be easily kept under surveillance, and attacks against its cities could be organized and launched with the guarantee of total surprise.

The Darial Gorge between Russia and Georgia, known in ancient times as the Alans' Gates.

In short, the Sasanian conquest of Armenia was a strategic disaster for Rome, much worse than the loss of northern Mesopotamia, and this helps us to understand the uproar that Philip faced in Rome when the terms of the treaty were known. Again, the laconic sentence in the ŠKZ “And Caesar lied again and did wrong to Armenia” comes to mind. Did Philip reopen hostilities after a short time once the army had recovered from its defeat? David S. Potter believes so, although the only source stating so is Zonaras, in the passage quoted in the first passage of this post.

There’s also a passage in the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle that seems to suggest that Priscus, the emperor’s brother, was left in the East in charge of operations:

Wretched Antioch, the exacting Ares will not leave you
while the Assyrian War is waging around you.
For a leading man will dwell under your roofs
who will battle against all the arrow-shooting Persians,
he himself coming from the royal house of the Romans.

If this was the case, then probably the sanctuary given by the Romans to the young prince Tirdat of Armenia was the last straw that caused Šābuhr I to launch his first major invasion of the Roman East in 252 CE.

 

[Semper Victor]

17.1. THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE ARAB. INTRODUCTION.

Imperator Caesar Marcus Iulius Philippus Pius Felix Invictus Augustus.

Marcus Iulius Philippus, known as Philip the Arab (Philippus Arabs) was one of the most badly reputed III century Roman emperors already in Antiquity. Greek writers and officials of the eastern part of the empire disliked him for his alleged Arab provenance: Zosimus’ comment about Arabs being “a nation in bad repute” was probably taken from his main III century source Dexippus, and it seems to have been a generalized prejudice (Potter saw hints of it in the Thirteenth Sybilline Oracle). He had to deal with criticism for many events, some of which were not his fault:

• He’d abandoned Armenia and perhaps Mesopotamia to Šābuhr I.
• He had accepted to pay a huge indemnity to Šābuhr I, and some modern scholars believe that the claim in the ŠKZ that Philip had become Šābuhr’s tributary was not mere propaganda. Which meant that Rome was now in the humiliating position of paying regular tribute to both the Goths and the Sasanians.
• He was suspected of regicide.
• He had obscure (and to some, unsavory) origins.

Looking back, it was during his reign that the generalized crisis of the empire became evident to all, and fear about its very future began to spread. This tainted his reign forever in the eyes of Graeco-Roman historians. If Augustus had raised from the ashes and visited Rome in 248 CE during the celebrations of the Roman millennium under Philip the Arab, he would have still recognized the city and the empire as the same he’d ruled over. But if he’d done the same in 268 CE just after the murder of Gallienus, both Rome and the empire would have been unrecognizable to him. These twenty years are the ones that really make “the” crisis of the III century. What had happened before them had been a slowly evolving fiscal, military and social crisis (limited exclusively to a very reduced elite).

Until Philip’s reign, its effects in the economy and everyday life of the vast majority of the empire’s inhabitants was slight or nonexistent; it was limited to the growing fiscal pressure by the central government; as a result of the crisis of imperial finances, the emperors tried to tighten control over the tax system, which until them had been largely decentralized and left to the network of cities that were the administrative basis of the empire. Already in the II century some emperors had started sending specially appointed equestrian officials to supervise tax collection in certain provinces; with their activities being independent from the control of provincial governors, they were only answerable to the central government. With Septimius Severus, these ad hoc officials became regularly appointed ones: known as procuratores, they were always equestrians and they were sent systematically to every province; some were only in charge of imperial properties in the province (which Septimius Severus had reorganized as the res privata), while others were in charge of public finances, which were thus wrestled from the hands of senatorial legates. Timesitheus’ career had been mostly a succession of such procuratorial posts.

Modern scholars believe that this increased supervision of municipal finances by imperial officials had the effect of diverting large resources that until then had been spent by provincial elites in prestige projects (baths, aqueducts, theaters, etc.) into the starved coffers of the imperial government, and that this was one (if not the main) cause for the retreat of provincial elites from urban life in the western provinces. This does not mean that profligate spending in lavish public buildings stopped everywhere: the African city of Thysdrus, which already had two amphitheaters, built a third one in the early decades of the III century, which was the third largest in the whole empire. Another lavish amphitheater was started but never finished in Nicaea, and other African and Anatolian cities saw significant buiding projects, like the enormous temple complex of Jupiter Heliopolitanus built at Heliopolis in the Beka’a valley in Syria (modern Baalbek).

Aerial view of Thysdrus around 238 CE, drawn by the French archaeologist Jean Claude Golvin.

Aerial view of the temple complex of Iupiter Heliopolitanus at Heliopolis in Syria (modern Baalbek, Lebanon) built within the first four decades of the III century CE, drawn by the French archaeologist Jean Claude Golvin.

A slow trend of urban decadence and the beginnings of the ruralization are visible only in the western provinces of Gaul and Hispania, but in other parts of the empire this was still a time for prosperity and urban growth, especially in North Africa, Anatolia, the Levant and the Illyrian provinces. But the last two years of Philip’s five-year reign (244-249 CE) were the moment when the empire plunged into chaos. And this time, the effects of the crisis pervaded all the empire, including the provinces located the furthest from invasion routes. Because of this, although his short reign proably did not see significant military conflicts with Iran, I think that it deserves a detailed overview, because if there was a turning point for Rome in the III century, this was it.

 

[Semper Victor]

17.2. THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE ARAB. POLITICAL OVERVIEW.

When his politics are analyzed in detail, Philip the Arab can be seen as an emperor who tried hard to return to the Antonine and Severan traditions of government. This was in tune with the old pre-industrial tradition of the “mirror of princes”, in which the path of the state could always be straightened by a righteous, courageous ruler who ruled according to sound moral principles. The Dutch scholar Lukas de Blois suggested in an old article published in the late 1970s (The Reign of the Emperor Philip the Arabian) that Philip took as the model for his reign the late Severus Alexander, and tried to emulate many of his policies, while also trying to follow the examples set by other Severan and Antonine emperors. It was this very conservatism of his regime that caused his ultimate fall, because the crisis had reached a point when urgent reforms were needed, and this urgent need was not acknowledged by the Roman elite, and much less by the emperor; all of them were united around the idea of turning the clock back to “the good old times”. But it was to be under Philip the Arab that the floodgates of the crisis opened, and that a rapid descent into chaos began; the fortunes of the empire would not begin to improve until the reigns of the first two Illyrian emperors, Claudius Gothicus and Aurelian.

Although Philip began taking steps immediately to improve his position, he was not one of the Soldatenkaiser; he was an equestrian official, probably with a mainly bureaucratic background (although he possessed some military talent) that showed little imagination in his policies and a penchant for traditionalism. The first step taken while he was still in the East was to launch a new wave of coins from the mint of Antioch, with legends as Pax fundata cum Persis, Aeternitati augusti, Aeternitati imperii, Fecunditas temporis, etc. As I wrote in a previous post, he also had arrangements made to deal honorably with the corpse of Gordian III, and upon his arrival in Rome he ordered an amnesty and a remission of debts to the fiscus or a remission of tax arrears. This was a traditional measure for an emperor who wanted to start his reign with a popular measure (applied for example by Hadrian) but which the imperial fiscus could hardly afford in the increasingly dire circumstances of Philip’s rule. Upon reaching Rome, he also shamelessly took the titles Persicus Maximus and Parthicus Maximus and displayed them in coins and public inscriptions to try to erase as much as possible the controversy about his treaty with Šābuhr I.

Antoninianus of Philip the Arab. On its reverse, PAX FVNDATA CVM PERSIS.

He also filled the most important posts of the imperial government with close relatives or friends whom he could trust. According to Zosimus:

When he (i.e. Philip) arrived at Rome, he won over the senatorial order with his fine oratory. However, he believed that the most important offices of the realm should be vested with his closest relatives. He therefore placed Priscus, his brother, in command of the Syrian forces and entrusted the armies in Moesia and Macedonia to Severianus, his brother-in-law.

This was nepotism, but it follows a time -honored Roman precedent in that emperors needed people of trust in key posts, given the nature of Roman politics (the Romans, as most ancient or modern cultures, cared very little about “meritocracy”). In this sense, he introduced an important innovation, for his brother Priscus (who was of equestrian rank) held the post of praeses (equestrian governor) of Mesopotamia (suggesting that the province had not been lost) and legatus Augusti pro praetore of Syria Coele, a senatorial post, and most important of all, according to an inscription found in Philippopolis in Arabia, he received the unprecedented title of Rector Orientis, which actually made him deputy emperor at the very least in the provinces of Syria Coele, Syria Phoenicia, Syria Palaestina, Mesopotamia and Arabia. Little is known about Severianus and his role under Philip, but De Blois thinks that he played in the Danube the same role that Priscus did in the East.

He also elevated his son Philip the Younger (Marcus Iulius Philippus Severus, who was 7 years old in 244 CE) to the rank of caesar (heir apparent), with evident dynastic ambitions, and elevated his wife Marcia Otacilia Severa to the rank of augusta, giving her the same cartload of titles that had been held time ago by Iulia Mamaea. Probably at this moment of his reign, Philip also began the grandiose project of rebuilding his native Arabian village of Chahba in the Hauran as a great metropolis in a lavish imperial Graeco-Roman style and renamed it Philippopolis. And finally, he also had the Senate deify his father Marinus, although he’d not been an emperor.

Antoninianus with the effigy of the augusta Otacilia Severa, wife of Philip the Arab. On the obverse, CONCORDIA AVGG.

Bust of Marcus Iulius Philippus Severus (Philip the Younger), son of Philip the Arab.

He cultivated good relations with the Senate, and his reign was marked by good harmony between it and the emperor, even if there was some snobbishness from old senatorial families towards Philip’s obscure origins (which can be detected in later sources which drew from III century authors). As soon as the situation in Rome seemed secure, he left the capital and headed towards the Danube to lead personally the army, where there was trouble with the Carpi and Quadi and perhaps his brother-in-law Severianus was not up to the task. This was a courageous decision on Philip’s part, because probably the Danubian army mistrusted him as yet another oriental with a civilian background (like the despised Severus Alexander). In the Danube in 246/247 CE, Philip apparently won victories against the Quadi and Sarmatians in Pannonia, and later against the Carpi in Dacia, and he took the titles of Germanicus Maximus and Carpicus Maximus. After this short martial parenthesis, Philip returned to Rome in 247 CE where he raised his son Philip the Younger to the rank of joint augustus.

The following year 248 CE was marked by lavish celebrations in the Urbs, to mark the 1,000-year anniversary of the legendary foundation of the city of Rome. Philip ensured that no expense was spared to turn this into an unforgettable event. The Ludi Saeculares were held, along with many other athletic events, theater performances, solemn religious ceremonies and all sorts of spectacles. Great races took place in the circuses of the capital, and the Colosseum saw spectacular games in which more than 1,000 gladiators were killed along with hundreds of exotic beasts. The emperor also commissioned special literary works for the occasion, like Gaius Asinius Quadratus’ Chilieteris (Millenium) and large numbers of new coins celebrating the millennium of Rome were issued, especially in gold, with legends as Saeculares Augusti, Millenium Augusti, Romae Aeternae, Laetitia fundata and Liberalitas III Augusti.

Antoninianus of Philip the Arab commemorating the celebrations of the Roman millenium. On the reverse, the image of a lion with the legend SEACVLARES AVGG.

Antoninianus of Philip the Arab commemorating the celebrations of the Roman millenium. On the reverse, the image of an elephant with the legend AETERNITAS AVGG.

Some scholars see these extravagant festivities as the swansong of an old, outdated way of governing the Roman empire, a grand masquerade organized by an elite which refused to accept the realities of the new era they lived in. The festivities had been inaugurated on April 1, 248 CE. By September 249 CE, Philip and his 12-year-old son had been killed and the empire was in dire straits.

 

[Semper Victor]

17.3. THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE ARAB. FINANCIAL POLICIES.

Although he came from a family of equestrian officials who had advanced through the ranks under the experienced administrator Timesitheus, Philip the Arab seems to have done very little to stabilize the disastrous state of the imperial finances. Instead, he spent huge sums on prestige projects and tried to economize in the two areas where he could least afford it: the army and foreign policy. This does not mean that he was particularly profligate with money, but he tried to rule according to the mores of a bygone era that just had no place in the III century. Philip in this sense behaved as if the state of the imperial fiscus was still the same as under Vespasian, Trajan or Hadrian, to name but a few of the augusti who financed splendid festivities for the Roman people and lavish public buildings. This would’ve been successful politics two hundred or one hundred years earlier.

Philippopolis in Arabia (in the Hauran or Hawran region in modern Syria). Remains of the Philippeion, the temple dedicated to the deified Phiip and his family.

Early in his reign, Philip minted some emissions with military legends, especially in eastern mints. These antoniniani were probably destined to paying his (by now de rigueur) donativum to the troops who had risen him to the purple. This means that since the very start of his reign, Philip found himself having to provide financially for:

• The regular pay of the army (a monumental expense, as exposed in a previous sum).
• The donativum to the soldiers that had acclaimed him as augustus.
• The subsidies to the Goths and Carpi.
• The indemnity to Šābuhr I, and perhaps also a regular tribute payment to the Sasanians.

These expenses were probably already more than the Roman state could afford to pay, and two of them were also politically very damaging for his regime (the payments to “barbarians”), both among ruling circles in Rome and especially in the army. But Philip worsened it by his expensive prestige projects: the rebuilding of his native village of Chahba in the style of a Roman metropolis (which he renamed modestly as Philippopolis), and the spectacularly lavish celebrations of the millennium of Rome in 248 CE.

The extant documentary sources unanimously censure Philip’s brother Priscus for his “rapacity”; scholars believe that, apart from acting as Philip’s deputy in the East and commanding the eastern armies, Priscus was also entrusted with the mission of squeezing these rich provinces to the bone to provide funds for Philip’s fiscal needs. And Priscus seems to have been brutally efficient in the task, which means that he and his brother soon became unanimously hated across the entire East. Priscus’ authority probably extended to Egypt, as extant papyri from Philip’s reign also state a deep fiscal reorganization in this province: every village would have to elect two men who would be answerable before the imperial fiscus for collecting the taxes demanded from their villages (and I imagine that the text lacked the addendum “or else”). Tax collection was subtracted from the responsibilities of the equestrian Prefect of Egypt and a new official with the title of rationalis was put in charge of tax collection in the province (until then as the province of Egypt had been ruled by an equestrian prefect, the emperors had not sent procuratores there to supervise its finances). Also, in Zosimus and in Justinian’s Digest, there’s evidence that Priscus even allowed the return of exiles to enlarge his fiscal base (which had been mostly convicted on criminal charges) .

Gold philippeum of Philip the Arab, minted to commemorate the Roman millenium. On the reverse, SAECVLARES AVGG.

At first, Philip seemed to be able to avoid further devaluation of the silver coinage. The issues of antoniniani by the six emperors of 238 CE suffered a sharp devaluation, but the first two years of Gordian III, the coinage recovered somewhat from it, only to suffer another severe drop in 240-244 CE, probably due to the costs of the subsidies to the Goths and Carpi and the campaign against Šābuhr I. In 244-246/47 CE there was another light recovery, and another sharp drop in 247-249 CE, which can only be attributed to the expenses of the Roman millennium’s celebrations, after the failure in the regime’s attempts at raising fiscal revenues. Another alarming signal is that Philip began minting a new gold coin, the philippeus, valued at 40 denarii. The coin still maintained the high gold content of the original aureus, but it weighted only a 62% of an aureus’ weight. This could be due to two reasons, which are not mutually exclusive:

• The large amount of gold spent in new coins (“prestige” issues) minted with legends celebrating the millennium of Rome.
• The difficulty in keeping the theoretical exchange rate of 1 aureus = 25 denarii (or 12.5 antoniniani) according to the old standard of Augustus. By now, the silver content of the antoninianus was 40% or lower, and probably it became increasingly difficult to support this artificial exchange rate; the new philippeus was probably an attempt to keep the rate at 1 philippeus = 25 (devalued) denarii = 12.5 (devalued) antoniniani, although at 62% of an aureus’ weight and with a gold content over 92%, its value was still too high for that exchange rate to be sustainable, and anyway the continued debasement of the antoninianus soon sent this measure into the trash bin.

This second reason was particularly worrying, because it would have been the first sign of discontent among the soldiers and the populace at large with the continued devaluation of the silver coinage, or in other words, the first hint that the continued devaluation of the silver coinage was beginning to have social and economic consequences.

 

[Semper Victor]

17.4. THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE ARAB. THE MILITARY AND THE ROMAN ELITE.

For the Dutch scholar Lukas de Blois, the second great failure of Philip’s reign, or rather double failure, was his failure to deal properly with the army and its inability to reform how the posts in the Roman administration and military were filled. Both problems would have been closely linked, and it’s difficult to analyze one without the other.

After his initial issues of antoniniani to pay the donative to the troops who had raised him to the purple, Philip minted practically no more issues with military legends, not even during the overabundant issues minted in 248 CE for the millennium of Rome. Instead, he spent most of his time in Rome (except for his Danubian campaign) and cultivated his ties with the Senate, which became very amiable, fostering an image of himself as a civilian princeps in the tradition of the Antonines, and sidestepping the army. The study of the careers of equestrians and senators who occupied high administrative and military posts under Philip shows that he maintained (perhaps even more strictly than previous emperors) the traditional cursus honorum for both orders, which combined administrative, legal and military posts. This system ensured that these two orders controlled all the key posts of the Roman state, whatever their nature.

Since the middle II century, there had been a growing tendency towards specialization, which was pronounced among the equestrians than among the senators, who thus experienced great advances within the Roman government under the Antonines and Severans. But still, some things did not change: most legions were led by senatorial legates, and most equestrians who led auxiliary units (or legions, like in Egypt and Mesopotamia) were only part-time soldiers. In this sense, the “experienced general” Timesitheus is a good example. Before his accession to the Praetorian Prefecture, his only military experience was the command of a 500-men auxiliary cohort in the military backwater that was Hispania Tarraconensis. And he was then expected to command an elite force of 10,000 men and a whole Roman army in the eastern campaign.

This had been the normal state of things all along Roman history (let’s just recall for example the amateurism of Crassus at Carrhae, and how many Roman military disasters were cased by poor leadership). But according to De Blois’ thesis, after the empowerment of the army by Septimius Severus and Caracalla, the troops began to grow ever more hostile to this situation. They began to trust only men who had either risen from the rank and file, or who came from military families (usually centurions) established in the border provinces and who maintained close ties with the army. The Roman army was a parallel society, strictly divided from the civilian milieu by physical (everywhere where there were permanent barracks, the troops were billeted in closed precincts either physically separated from the civilian city (like at Carnuntum or Alba) or in walled citadels that became true “cities within the city”, like at Rome or Dura Europos. The military had their own amphitheaters, baths and basilicas, special laws were applied to them, and even followed particular religious cults that were rare among the civilian population (in the III century, Mithras and Jupiter Dolichenus).

Bronze statuette of Iupiter Dolichenus, a divinity of Syrian origin venerated especially by Roman soldiers.

The brutal behavior of the troops towards civilians was an old story, but it’s clear that from the reign of Septimius Severus onwards this situation worsened at least in legal terms (with things like Caracalla’s authorization to the soldiers to collect the annona themselves). In the first half of the III century and only in Rome there were several brutal clashes between the Roman plebs and the Praetorian Guard, with the Praetorians setting fire to large parts of the Urbs, and the Roman plebs (helped by gladiators, the Urbaniciani and other assorted groups of people) besieging the Castra Praetoria, cutting the aqueduct that carried water to it and forcing the Praetorians to surrender. The continued pay raises enjoyed by the army were also (correctly) perceived by the civilian population as further plundering by the soldiers, and the raising of the fiscal pressure by the Roman state to cope with its financial obligations with the troops was seen with increasing hatred and bitterness by the civilians.

Plaster model with an hypothetical reconstruction of the Castra Praetoria. Museo della civiltà romana, Rome.

De Blois’ vison implies that the Senate and the equestrians that filled the highest ranks in the government were mostly opposed to these developments and wished fervently to return to the good old days when the troops were treated with due severitas and disciplina, to force them to bow to their betters and keep to their station. This vision is summarized better than anywhere else in Cassius Dio’s historical work, whose last book is marked by his bitter and life-threatening confrontations with the soldiery. The soldiers and career officers to the rank of primus pilus, (from tribune upwards the officers were either of senatorial or equestrian rank except in rare cases where the system allowed talented men to raise higher, like in the case of Maximinus Thrax) despised especially senatorial commanders, whom they saw increasingly as effeminate dilettantes who dwelled in luxury in Rome and knew nothing about the office of the arms. This is what Dio bemoaned as the loss of discipline among the troops: their increasing reluctance to be led by commanders who were not career soldiers whom they perceived as close to their realities; the viri militares who were so despised by the senatorial historiography. Maximinus Thrax was their earlier example, and he fell because, as it was to be expected, he was completely inept in political and administrative matters. But after Gallienus, they would seize the control of the Roman state.

This approach to the problem though is somewhat outdated today (De Blois’s paper is thirty-something years old), and it’s redolent of the thesis of the Russian-born scholar Michael Rostovzeff, who following his experiences during the Russian Revolution, descibed the crisis of the Roman empire in social terms, under a clear influence of Marxist ideas of class struggle (although Rostovzeff was no Marxist). The main support for this approach is of course the work of Cassius Dio and his bitter portrait about the “indiscipline” and “insolence” of “the soldiers”.

But later scholars have pointed to the fact that despite this supposed antagonism between the privileged classes and the army, almost all usurpers until the reign of Gallienus were senators, who were acclaimed as augustus by the troops under their command, so that there was little (if anything) about class struggle and subversion of the social order amongst the soldiers and lower officers (rather the contrary, because as shown by the example of the Illyrian emperors, they were often more conservatively Roman than the Romans themselves).

The problem of the army meddling into politics was nothing new in the Roman world as I wrote in a previous post, and the great problem of the III century was that, after the reigns of Septimius Severus and Caracalla the army had become used to exploiting its political power in order to obtain legal and financial benefits … and that unscrupulous senators and equestrians showed little remorse in taking advantage of this situation. Some scholars have described the usurpations of the III century as the soldiers forcing their will over their commander and proclaiming him augustus against his will; once a general had been hailed as augustus, there was no way back, because the only open path for the ruling emperor in Rome was to punish the rebels and execute their leaders. Perhaps there were a few situations like this one, but given the propensity showed by ambitious members of the elite in previous times of Roman history towards rebellion, this can’t have been too generalized.

Another factor that ironically contributed to the growing carousel of usurpations was, as pointed by Potter, the very success of imperial propaganda during the first centuries of the empire. Most common people, including the soldiers, had come to see the emperor as an almost omnipotent being, and his presence in a threatened border as an almost assured guarantee of victory. The soldiers wanted their augustus close to them and leading them personally, as Caracalla or Maximinus Thrax had done, and not in far away Rome or elsewhere in the empire. But as the ruling emperor could not be everywhere at once, this aura of omnipotence of the imperial figure propelled the armies in menaced areas to proclaim their own augustus.

Tommaso Gnoli also made an interesting consideration about the situation of Roman politics after 238 CE. As I wrote in a previous post, for Gnoli, the period between the victory of the Senate over Maximinus Thrax in 238 CE and the chaos that followed the capture of Valerian were times of undisputed senatorial supremacy, when the senatorial aristocracy finally achieved victory in its long struggle against the rising equestrian bureaucracy that had risen steadily under the Antonines and the Severans. In these twenty-something years, despite the chaos and usurpations, almost all emperors and usurpers were senators (Philip was the only exception), there were no purges amongst the senators, and the surviving legislation shows a clear pro-senatorial bias. But according to Gnoli the Senate paid a price for its victory. The membership of the Senate had been restricted to 600 senators under Augustus, and it was precisely the fact that it was a tightly-knotted group (almost like a Victorian gentlemen’s club) that allowed the Senate to function and to become one of the main pillars (if not the main pillar) of the Principate. This coherence was at first reinforced by the fact that most senators were Italians, but during the I century, an increasing number of Gaulish and Hispanic senators began to appear, and the II century it was the turn for Africans and easterners. This began to diffuse the unity of interests and intent that had characterized the Senate and allowed it to function, but still, its small size allowed most senators to know personally their colleagues and kept the spirit of a closed club.

Gnoli points out that this changed after 238 CE, as epigraphy shows an increased number of senators who had been adlected into the Senate from the equestrian order. The Roman state simply could not work without the specialized skills of equestrians like Timesitheus, and the Senate began increasing its ranks by allowing ever more equestrians to join their ranks. On one side, this diffused the barriers between the two elite groups, but at the same time it killed precisely what had kept the Senate a viable institution. With its enlarged membership, the Senate became ever more divided into interest groups that represented the interests of different imperial bureaucracies or different territories within the empire, while it became impossible for a single senator to get to know personally a significant part of his colleagues, because with so many new senators who were increasingly dispersed across the empire (filling posts that had been until then occupied only by equestrians), the small group who resided in Rome and assisted to the meetings of the Senate grew ever more irrelevant. The Senate became a dysfunctional institution, and this time there was no new Augustus to reform it again. If Gnoli’s hint (because it’s scarcely more than that) is right, then the crisis of the Roman state was double: a crisis of the imperial office and a crisis of the Senate, with one feeding the other. This would also help to explain the frequency of usurpations by senators, which would not have been only initiatives by the soldiers, but also conspirations by their senatorial commanders and their groups of supporters within the enlarged senatorial ranks. And this would also explain why, in the deepest point of the crisis the emperor Gallienus (himself of old Italian senatorial stock) decided to liquidate the cursus honorum and cut senators off from military posts altogether, a step which ended the functions of the Senate as a governing body and was perhaps the most radical reform in Roman history until the adoption of Christianity by Constantine.

Also, the insistence in scholarly works about the infighting between senators and equestrians needs to be explained according to the rules and organization of Roman society, not according to modern or medieval analogies. One of the main pillars of Roman society was the institution of patronage, as the French scholar Paul Veyne has described masterfully. Without a patron more powerful than himself, a Roman individual was nobody and at mercy of every kind of crime and abuse, as the only “criminal justice” that was enacted and financed by the Roman state was in cases of “crimes against the state”. In cases like murder, rape, robbery, etc. it was up to the offended part to physically bring the offender to the court, which would then rule the case according to law, and then applying the sentence was left again in the hands of the offended part. As can be easily summoned, in such a system one needed to be part of a network of patronage if one hoped to survive and prosper. In case of suffering an offence, one had to seek help from one’s immediate patronus, which would then evaluate the situation, and if he deemed it necessary, he would then in turn call for his own more powerful patronus’ help, etc.

The most powerful patronus was the emperor himself, but immediately under him, it was the 600 members of the Senate who were the leaders of all these clientele networks. And they were essential for them if they wanted to maintain their status; being a senator meant enjoying legal privileges and exemptions and also having access to very well remunerated posts, in which senators also engaged regularly in corruption (in one of Cicero’s letters, he wrote about the corruption and greed of Verres as governor of Sicily, compared with his own virtuous behavior as governor of Cilicia, where he only embezzled with moderation and only left the province (after a single year term as governor) two million sesterces richer. This kind of behavior was publicly acknowleged and it arose no scandal (only when the embezzlement became too much, as in Verres’ case, or when one wanted to attack a political adversary and then every single penny mattered).

Recontructed view of the Roman Forum; the building to the left is the Curia, where Senate meetings were held.

As a senator’s cursus honorum was long (it began at the age of eighteen, and a senator was only eligible for the highest post in the cursus, that of consul, if he was at least forty years old) and covered posts in the army, in the courts of justice and in the administration, senators had the ability to start building their own clientele networks from a young age and extend them upon all three branches of the Roman res publica (and of course, they also inherited them from their deceased predecessors, like a Sicilian Don). Thus, a middle-aged senator would be no only a rich and privileged individual, but also a man with lots of important connections within the army, the administration and the courts of justice, from which he could pull favors and reclaim unpaid debts at any time.

By the III century, most senators were not Italian anymore, although by law they were forced to own land in Italy and reside in the peninsula for long periods of time. Also, if they wanted to play a political role, they needed to spend long stretches of time in Rome. Cassius Dio for example was a Greek-speaking senator born in Nicomedia, who also owned estates in Italy and Sicily. When he was not in his native Nicomedia, he spent his time either in his urban villa in Rome or in the villas he owned in Syracuse or across Italy. Of course, senatorial dynasties were tied to their birthplace, because it was usually there where their clientele networks were the strongest. But as time went by, due to intermarriage between senatorial families, most of them came to own vast estates distributed all across the empire. And a senator during his career would visit many different provinces, which would allow him to win clients in several places and in different branches of the Roman state’s structure.

For a city or a province, having a powerful senator in Rome linked to it was extremely important if they wanted to further their interests in front of the ruling emperor. For example, after defeating Clodius Albinus, Septimius Severus took steps to punish all who had helped him. The senatorial legate rich province of Baetica had sided with Albinus, and apparently most of the rich landowners of the province (many of them senators) had done the same. Apart from executing the governor and ordering punishments for the most important supporters of Albinus, Severus also took a very serious reprisal against the province of Baetica as a whole. Until then, the imperial dole of olive oil to the Roman plebs had been purchased by the emperors from Baetican landowners. Severus cut these commercial ties, and instead contracted the supply of olive oil for the Roman Annona with African landowners and merchants. This province of Africa benefited spectacularly from this measure, and the first 40 years of the III century were a time of growth and abundance for the province; one of the most benefitted cities was Leptis Magna, which was specialized in the production and export of olive oil, and which saw its business grow exponentially thanks to Severus’ decision. And naturally, Severus was born in Leptis in a senatorial family which descended from the old Punic oligarchy of the city.

Aerial view of Leptis Magna after all the embellishments bestowed on the city by Septimius Severus. Drawing by the French archaeologist Jean Claude Golvin.

Syria as a whole also benefitted from the rule of the Severan emperors because, despite the initial reprisals by Severus against the main cities of the province for their support of Pescennius Niger, his wife’s family was Syrian. The women of the Severan family and probably its emperors probably contributed funds to grand public works in the province like the large temple complex of Iupiter Heliopolitanus.

Macrinus' failing in liquidating the women of the Severan family, allowing them to return to their power base of Emesa, was a catastrophic mistake for him, because from there they began managing the many long threads of their networks of clients which were particularly strong in Syria and managed to turn part of the army stationed in Syria against Macrinus (which also means that yet another great mistake by Macrinus was to keep the army gathered for too long in a province with such strong ties to the Severan dynasty). This is an example unusually well known and attested because we have Cassius Dio’s and Herodian’s chronicles of the events.

There’s reason to believe that the murder of Severus Alexander and the end of the Severan dynasty was met with dismay by the “African lobby” in Rome, and that this played a part in the African uprising of 238 CE. Also, the clientele ties that linked the late Severus Alexander with some eastern units in the army that had moved to the West with him were behind the two plots against Maximinus Thrax that developed immediately after his usurpation: the first of them was led by a senator, but it was organized and was to be carried on by the auxiliar force of Osrhoenian archers in the army and its leader, a certain Macedon.

Aerial view of Roman Carthage, capital of the province of Africa and one of the largest cities in the Roman empire where the two Gordiani rebelled against Maximinus Thrax in 238 CE. Drawing by the French archaeologist Jean Claude Golvin.

It’s probable that the senatorial clique who carried out the 238 CE successful coup was led by African and Italian senators: the Gordianii, although of Anatolian origin, resided in Italy by then, Pupienus and Balbinus were Italian, Rutilius Crispinus was also Italian, and Publius Licinus Valerian (the future emperor) is quoted by some chroniclers as having been involved in the revolt too, and he belonged also to an old family from Etruria). This would explain their lack of care for the events in the East, and some scholars have suggested a direct link between the uprising of the senatorial proconsul Sabinianus against Gordian III in 240 CE and the fall of this faction. This revolt would have fractured the until then leading faction of Italian and African senators and would have allowed the “eastern faction” of senators with interests in the east to grasp the reigns of power and consolidate the new situation with the marriage of Timesitheus’ daughter (Timesitheus was an easterner with links to the old Severan elite, and so a man with ties to the new clique in power) with the young Gordian III. The debacle of Gordian III in Mesopotamia did not cause the fall of this group from power; probably just sacrificed Gordian to the soldiers’ wrath and then put Philip in charge as the new figurehead of their regime, and then it was business as usual. It’s probable that the rest of the Senate in Rome with their ties in the Danube army resented this, and that Philip’s lack of popularity with said army was not only due to his eastern origins, but that it was fostered by a certain lobby or lobbies within the Roman governing elite which were not happy with how things were being done.

This is what made senators so dangerous if an emperor alienated the Senate; because they, as a whole, were the ones who were in control of all the state’s institutions and the Roman plebs thanks to their clientele networks. And the emperors knew this and let things as they were because until Macrinus all of them were of senatorial extraction and came from the same milieu and had followed the same methods. Bear also in mind that even between the reigns of Macrinus and Gallienus, only Maximinus Thrax and Philip the Arab were not senators.

Partly a way to circumvent this state of things and partly as because the small senatorial elite was plainly insufficient in numbers to cover all the posts in the expanding imperial bureaucracy, from the I century CE onwards, the emperors began appointing ever more equestrian officials, which was seen with increasing displeasure by the Senate. The reason was quite simple: high ranking equestrian officials with direct and regular access to the emperor (especially the two Praetorian prefects, but also the prefect of the annona) rivalled the clientele networks possessed by the members of the Senate, and senators did not like this in the slightest.

Aerial view of Hierapolis in Phrygia (modern Pamukkale, in southwestern Turkey), which saw its golden era between 200 and 250 CE; the city was especially linked to the emperors of the Severan dynasty and to Severus Alexander in particular. Drawing by the French archaeologist Jean Claude Golvin.

If Gnoli’s hint is right, the year 238 CE marked the victory of the Senate over this tendency of the emperors (from Augustus to Maximinus Thrax) to use the equestrian order as a counterweight against the Senate, and as a way to centralize more power in their own hands. As the position of an equestrian was less coddled by legal privileges and inheritance rights than that of a senator, equestrians were always more indebted to their own patronus, the emperor, and much less likely to start pursuing their own goals instead of those of his master, emperors correctly saw equestrians as more trustworthy in power positions than the group of 600 rich, powerful and ambitious men who sat in the Senate. By the III century though, powerful equestrians had reached a point where they’d also begun to behave like senators; Septimius Severus executed his praetorian prefect Plautianus under charges of plotting to murder him to seize the throne for himself, and another praetorian prefect Macrinus, murdered Caracalla and seized the purple for himself. Ilkka Syvänne has tried to rebuild the plot led by Macrinus, which according to him included most of the high equestrian hierarchy of the empire: both praetorian prefects, the prefect of the fleet at Misenum, etc.

In this sense, and following Gnoli’s line of thought I’d go further and ask if the short reigns and weakness of third century emperors after Caracalla, and especially after 238 CE, were not due to the fact that the Senate was not willing to repeat the experience of another Caracalla, and if the political infighting within the ranks of the Senate that had destroyed the Roman republic had not been reignited again with the successful “senatorial coup” of 238 CE. And thanks to the actions of Septimius Severus and Caracalla in relation to the army, it was very easy now for ambitious senators to use the army as a tool in a bid for power, which meant a de facto return to the conditions of permanent civil war that had prevailed before Augustus’ seizure of power. The senatorial hierarchy became increasingly large by the adlection of equestrians into the ordo senatorius, and it became too unwieldy and fractured into different interest lobbies to be able to act as a ruling organ for the empire. Instead, it only added to the growing chaos with its infighting.

 

[Semper Victor]

17.5. THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE ARAB. ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND EPIDEMICS.

In the 240s the empire was also hit by a combination of natural disasters of unprecedented magnitude in Roman history. In the past, due to the lack of quantifiable evidence and the ease with which ancient sources resorted to catastrophism, religious apocalypticism and convoluted rhetoric, scholars have been very reluctant to consider seriously their seriousness and the deep (even decisive) effect that these natural factors had in plunging the Roman empire into the depths of the III century crisis. Today, global climate mechanisms are much better understood than just two decades before, and the current debate about climate change and studies of the history of the Earth’s climate has made scholars more aware of the importance of natural factors.

In 2017 the American scholar Kyle Harper published a book that I recommend wholeheartedly: The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease and the Fate of an Empire. In it, Harper explains at length how changes in climate and the diffusion of new epidemic diseases (favored by demographic growth, urbanization and the growth of trade networks within the empire and with lands outside the empire) hit the empire with full force in the III century, adding further destruction to the already going political, military and fiscal crisis. This resulted in catastrophic droughts and epidemics that caused a sharp demographic decline and a reduction of the fiscal and recruiting foundations of the Roman state when it least could afford it. This was the factor that pushed an empire already weakened by the military, political and fiscal crisis into the catastrophic period of 248-268 CE.

The global weather phase known as the Roman Climate Optimum (RCO) came to its end in the late II century, and the early III century saw a progressive process of cooling and increased aridity in the Mediterranean basin. In this sense, the Romans who lived in the times when their empire was built were unknowingly the beneficiaries of a temporary climate situation that was more the exception than the norm in the global climate trend of the Late Holocene. It was in the decade of the 240s CE when the until then slow shift back into normal Holocene conditions intensified abruptly and its effects hit the economy and the demography of the Roman empire with full force. The beryllium isotope record shows a drastic drop in the levels of solar radiation in this decade, and sudden cooling followed. In the Alps, after centuries of melting retreat, the ice of the Great Aletsch glacier started creeping down the mountain. And the same happened with the Mer de Glace glacier in the Mont Blanc basin. Records as far apart as Spain, Austria, and Thrace show a coordinated bout of cooling.

The Great Aletsch glacier in the canton of Valais, Switzerland is the largest glacier in the Alps.

Evolution of the Great Aletsch glacier during the last 3,500 years.

In the southern and southeastern Mediterranean basin, this quickened climate change resulted in catastrophic drought. The surviving letters and works of bishop Cyprian of Carthage dated to the 240s CE are full of references to drought:

if the rains fall from above but rarely, if the land is given over to dust and becomes desolate, if the barren earth sprouts hardly a few pale and thirsty blades of grass (…) if the drought causes the spring to cease.

If the vine fails, the olive tree cheats us, and the burning field withers with crops dying in the drought, what is that to the Christians?

Similar rhetorical images can be found in rabbinical texts from Palestine. Ḥanina bar Ḥama was a major rabbinic figure who played a leading role in the rabbinical school at Sepphoris in Galilee and died around 250 CE. In the stories attached to him, drought is an overbearing problem. In one episode, the rains for a time failed both in Galilee and to the south in Judea. A rabbi in the south made it rain by instituting a public fast, while the drought in Sepphoris endured because “their hearts were hard”. Eventually the rains arrived, but the memories of a brutal drought, and its long-awaited alleviation, clung to the memories attached to this leading rabbi.

But as usual, it’s in Egypt where the clearest evidence can be found. In dire circumstances, the empire could usually rely on Egypt, for the narrow green ribbon of the Nile valley was miraculously fertile, and it was the empire’s great insurance policy. Ninety percent of the water flow that the Nile carries to Egypt comes from the Blue Nile, which gathers the runoff of the highlands in Ethiopia and carries it downstream, where it joins the regular flow of the White Nile at Khartoum. For the period after 641 CE, the phases of the Nile can be followed in the world’s oldest, continuous human record of climate: the Nilometer readings preserved by Arabic chronicles. In earlier periods, the record is patchy and indirect. But the extant evidence argues that the centuries of Roman rule witnessed deep changes in the Nile’s behavior.

Normal flow of the Indian Ocean's monsoon winds.

The Blue Nile originates as the overflow of the waters of lake Tana, in the Ethiopian highlands; these are the Tis Abay falls, which collect the water overflowing from lake Tana that forms the Blue NIle.

Rain levels in the Ethiopian highlands are dependent from the Indian Ocean monsoon, which is in turn dependent on the mode of global climate variability known as the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO). In El Niño years, the waters of the eastern Pacific warm up, and the monsoon rains far to the west are suppressed; a strong El Niño is correlated with weak Nile floods. Today El Niños occur every 3–5 years, but ENSO periodicity has varied over time. Sedimentation records from Ecuador suggest that during the RCO, ENSO events were very rare (once every 20 years or so). This quiescent ENSO meant an active and reliable flood regime in Egypt, and it marks yet another way in which the RCO exhibited exceptional features upon which the prosperity of the late Republic and early Roman empire was built. Then, in the centuries of the Roman Transitional Period (RTP) that followed the RCO, ENSO events became extremely common, every third year or so.

Table extracted from Kyle Harper's book, The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease and the Fate of an Empire, showing the historical frequency of El NIño events. Notice the sharp jump in the middle III century CE.

In precisely the same years that witnessed the start of the phase shift, the 150s CE, for the first time a new kind of document, the “declaration of unflooded land,” appears in Egyptian papyri. Its origins are obscure, but these declarations may well have been a response to the onset of a more erratic regime of Nile flooding. And in the 240s CE, when the Romans could less afford it, the Nile failed them in a spectacular way.

In 244 CE, the Nile failed to rise. In 245 or 246 CE, the floods were weak again. By March of 246 CE, before the harvest, public officials in the town of Oxyrhynchus were taking emergency measures otherwise unparalleled in the historical record of Roman Egypt. There was a command to register all private stocks of grain, within twenty-four hours, under threat of drastic penalties. The state carried out compulsory purchases, at shockingly high prices, 24 drachmai per artaba. Normally the government set prices that were favorable to itself, but 24 drachmai was very high: about twice what we might expect for the period, implying acute desperation to acquire grain even at a high cost. Two years later, in 248 CE, the shortage was still a gripping problem. A papyrus of that year refers to the “present emergency” and a scramble to fill the offices handling the public food supply. In another papyrus of 248 CE, an individual refused to fulfill the obligatory office of food supply, surrendering all his belongings to dodge it. At this same moment, bishop Dionysius of Alexandria claimed that the riverbed of the Nile was as parched as the desert which, if it is not just a rhetorical figure, hints to the simultaneous failure of the White and Blue Niles. In all, this amounts to the most severe environmental crisis known to modern scholars at any point in the seven centuries of Roman Egypt.

Harper makes a helpful comparison to help us understand the economic costs of this failure of Egyptian agriculture. The wheat crop on a plot of land depended on any number of factors, including the quality of the land sown. But the flood was the silent partner in the farming business. On one well-known third-century estate, wheat yields on a series of arable plots within the same region ranged, in the space of a few years, from 7 to 16.6 artabas (the unit of dry measure, equivalent to 38.8 liters) per aroura (the unit of land, equivalent to 0.2756 hectares). Based on an average of approximately 12 artabas per aroura, the annual gross production of Egypt has been estimated at 83 million artabas. If a year with a poor flood reduced yields by only 10%, which seems a conservative estimate, the total economic cost to the province was 8.3 million artabas, which at contemporary prices equaled to 1 million aurei or twice the payment by Philip the Arab to the Persian king Šābuhr I.

The Roman state extracted at least 4–8 million artabas of wheat from Egypt every year; if a drought cost the state only 20% of its annual tax revenue from Egypt, the value would be 96,000 - 192,000 aurei. In fact, the damage could have been multiples of this: when the Nile failed in medieval Egypt, gruesome starvation often followed. A run of consecutive poor floods was exponentially worse, as the margins of resilience wore thin.

But political, fiscal and military crisis, foreign invasions, usurpations and environmental disasters were not all that fell upon the empire during Philip’s short reign, for in 249 CE a terrific and never before seen new epidemic disease entered the empire through Egypt. This is the pandemic known as the Plague of Cyprian, for the Carthaginian bishop described vividly its symptoms and the effects on its victims.

The pestilence came from Ethiopia and migrated north and west across the empire. That’s what the chronicles tell us, and affected literary emulation of the plague account in Thucydides, the model literary description of a plague and familiar to every educated Greek, has been sometimes suspected. But two telling clues corroborate the possibility that again a microbial agent had invaded the empire from the southeast. First, archaeologists have discovered a mass grave adjacent to a body-disposal operation at the site of ancient Thebes, in Upper Egypt. Lime was mixed on site, to be poured over bodies that were then hastily incinerated. The disposal site dates to the middle of the III century, and the utter uniqueness of the corpse-burning and mass disposal enterprise (at a time when inhumation had become the usual funerary practice among pagans and Christians alike) argues that something about the disease had startled the inhabitants of the place into extreme measures. The more decisive evidence for the pandemic’s southern origin is provided by bishop Dionysius of Alexandria, who places the disease in his city by at least 249 CE. The first dateable evidence for the pandemic in the west comes from 251 CE, in the city of Rome. This chronology confirms an eastern point of entry and vindicates the historical record.

The pit at Luxor near ancient Thebes excavated by Italian archaeologists in 2014 and thought to have been used as a mass grave for victims of the Plague of Cyprian. The excavation revealed bodies covered with a thick layer of lime, three kilns where the lime was made, and evidence of a giant bonfire containing human remains.

The Plague of Cyprian raged for years. The chronicles report a plague lasting fifteen years, but it is unclear exactly which fifteen-year span they mean. There may have been a second wave sometime around 260 CE. Emperor Claudius II was supposed to have been killed by a pestilence in 270 CE, but whether his death truly belongs to the same pandemic is entirely obscure. The sources insist upon a prolonged event, as the mortality coiled its way around the empire, with at least two pulses in the city of Rome. One of the later chronicles preserves the significant detail that some cities were struck twice. It is unfortunately impossible to be more precise. The Plague of Cyprian was in the background of imperial history from ca. 249 CE to 262 CE, possibly with even later effects around 270 CE.

The geographic scope of the pestilence was vast. According to the V century writer Orosius:

There was almost no province of Rome, no city, no house, which was not attacked and emptied by this general pestilence.

In his Getica, the VI century author Jordanes wrote that it

blighted the face of the whole earth.

The plague of Cyprian is attested everywhere we have sources. It hit the largest cities like Alexandria, Antioch, Rome, and Carthage. It attacked the “cities of Greece” but also more remote urban places like Neocaesarea in Pontus and Oxyrhynchus in Egypt. According to Zosimus, the Plague of Cyprian raced through town and countryside alike; it

afflicted cities and villages and destroyed whatever was left of mankind: no plague in previous times wrought such destruction of human life.

It was clearly an empire-wide event.

In his sermon De Mortalitate, Cyprian described vividly the symptoms and advance of the illness:

The pain in the eyes, the attack of the fevers, and the ailment of all the limbs are the same among us and among the others, so long as we share the common flesh of this age. (…) These are adduced as proof of faith: that, as the strength of the body is dissolved, the bowels dissipate in a flow; that a fire that begins in the inmost depths burns up into wounds in the throat; that the intestines are shaken with continuous vomiting; that the eyes are set on fire from the force of the blood; that the infection of the deadly putrefaction cuts off the feet or other extremities of some; and that as weakness prevails through the failures and losses of the bodies, the gait is crippled or the hearing is blocked or the vision is blinded.

Thus, according to Cyprian, the pathology included fatigue, bloody stool, fever, esophageal lesions, vomiting, conjunctival hemorrhaging, and severe infection in the extremities; debilitation, loss of hearing, and blindness followed in the aftermath. Cyprian’s report can be compared with other isolated and less clear hints from other witnesses. Amongst them, an anonymous African Christian that probably moved in the same circles as Cyprian and is known today as the Pseudo-Cyprian, who in his work De laude martyrii wrote:

Do we not see the rites of death every day? Are we not witnessing strange forms of dying? Do we not behold disasters from some previously unknown kind of plague brought on by furious and prolonged diseases? And the massacre of wasted cities?

The pestilence, he argued, was a manifest encouragement to martyrdom, since those who died the glorious death were spared the common fate of others amidst the bloody destruction of ravaging diseases.

The death toll was high. We have an intriguingly specific report from bishop Dionysius of Alexandria (preserved in Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History), who claimed that:

this immense city no longer contains as big a number of inhabitants, from infant children to those of extreme age, as it used to support of those described as hale old men. As for those from forty to seventy, they were then so much more numerous that their total is not reached now, though we have counted and registered as entitled to the public food ration all from fourteen to eighty; and those who look the youngest are now reckoned as equal in age to the oldest men of our earlier generation.

The reckoning implies that the city’s population had declined by around 62% (from something like 500,000 to 190,000). Not all of these would have died of plague. Some would have fled in the chaos. And we can always suspect overheated rhetoric. But the number of citizens on the public grain dole is a tantalizingly credible detail, and all other witnesses agreed on the scale of the mortality. The Athenian Dexippus claimed that 5,000 people died every day in Athens (as reported by the SHA). Witness after witness, dramatically if imprecisely, testified that depopulation was invariably the sequel of the pestilence.

To Harper, the Plague of Cyprian was a hemorrhagic fever caused by a filovirus similar to the one that causes Ebola, as the symptoms, the probable and quick human-to-human contagion and the seasonality of the epidemic (it thrived in winter months, in times when people packed more closely together) closely correlate the spread and effects of such a pathology. Even today case fatality rates, with modern treatment, are grotesquely high: 50%-70%. Hemorrhagic fevers like Ebola require direct human-to-human contagion, which occurs through contact with the bodily fluids of the sick person. Thus, this kind of disease is extremely dangerous in environments where people live closely packed in dense settlements: cities and towns would’ve been hit the hardest; once the illness entered a family, it would’ve been impossible to stop it from spreading to all its remaining members, as in those times it was relatives who had to take care of sick family members in their own houses, and traditional funerary practices would have also helped to spread the contagion. A collective which would have been extremely vulnerable to such an epidemic was the army, formed by professional soldiers who lived tightly packed, 10 men in a barracks room or a tent, sharing meals and in constant contact. Thus, the Plague of Cyprian probably delivered its heaviest blows to the two institutions that were the main pillars of the Roman state: the army and its dense network of cities.

These environmental and medical factors can be linked to several elements of political history that we’ve seen in previous posts. Large eastern campaigns were usually supplied mostly with Egyptian grain, and the crop failures in Egypt and the Levant in the 240s CE could have been a (perhaps decisive) factor in the hunger experienced by Gordian III’s army. The diminishing tax yields from Egypt could have also been the reason that caused Priscus to appoint a rationalis to oversee tax collection in this province and why the tax system was reformed and tightened. It’s even possible that Priscus demanded just the “normal” amounts in taxes, but that given the prevailing drought conditions, these demands were impossible to meet, which in turn would’ve led to an increase of coercion by the authorities and made Philip’s regime increasingly hated. But Philip could not, or did not want to, cut spending. And when he finally did start to cut it, the result was a disaster.

The image of an empire suffering either extreme cold or extreme drought sheds also a new light upon the celebrations of the Millenium of Rome; it was a gigantic propaganda act to try to reinforce the confidence in the bright future of Rome and in the abilities of its emperor in an empire where many old certainties were probably starting to shake.

Aerial view of Roman Alexandria, drawn by the French archaeologist and architect Jean Claude Golvin.

In 249 CE, large riots happened in Alexandria, that turned into an attack by the populace against the Christians. If we imagine a city under assault by famine, pestilence, millenarianism (which seems to have thrived in these years around the Roman millennium) and brutal fiscal pressure then these riots are easily understandable. It also hints at scarcity in the city of Rome, which was fed with Egyptian and African grain; this was probably the reason which led Roman officials in Egypt to enforce compulsory grain purchases by the state, even at inflated prices. Another hint at this are some late coin issues by Philip with legends like Annona Augusti or Laetitia Fundata, showing Laetitia on a ship’s prowl (perhaps a grain ship?).

Antoninianus of Philip the Arab. On the reverse, ANNONA AVGG.

 

[Semper Victor]

17.6. THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE ARAB. THE FALL OF PHILIP.

Under the added weight of all these simultaneous crisis and disasters, Philip the Arab’s regime broke down and the foundations of the empire themselves began shaking.

The first hint at trouble happened relatively early, with the war against the Carpi, Sarmatians and Quadi in the Danube. Probably Philip’s brother-in-law Severianus had failed as military commander and Philip had to intervene personally (a risk of having close relatives filling such posts is that their failures immediately reflected on the emperor himself). It’s quite probable that the attack of the Carpi against Dacia (after all, they had been receiving subsidies from Rome) was not a random affair, and some scholars speculate that perhaps Philip had stopped paying them their subsidies, as they were the weakest among the foes who were being paid off by Rome, which made it an affordable risk. After a short campaign, he returned to Rome, and left a certain Tiberius Claudius Marinus Pacatianus in Severianus’ place. This Pacatianus has been identified by some scholars as “Cl(audius) Marinus c(larissimus) p(uer” who is named in an inscription found in Bostra, capital of the Roman province of Arabia,a s the son of Cl(audius) Sollemnius Pac(atianus), senatorial legate of the province and who would be later consular legate of Syria Coele. But according to Potter and De Blois, when Philip left the Danube, the war had not still ended, and Philip’s return to Rome (and his assumption of victory titles) were received with increasing anger by the armies of the Danube, who already despised Philip for his eastern origins and his overtly “civilian” way of ruling. This discontent in the army would’ve been very tempting for ambitious generals.

The overspending of 248 CE had its consequences, and Philip had to stop paying, late that very year or in early 249 CE, the tribute to the Goths and perhaps also to Šābuhr I, if he’d been indeed paying him a regular tribute. Apparently, this had no immediate consequences in the East, but it had immediate consequences in the Danube, where the Carpi and Goths restarted hostilities against the empire. The army of the Danube had had enough of what they saw as Philip’s cowardice and incompetence and acclaimed the regional commander Pacatianus as augustus, who immediately began minting coins at the mint of Viminacium (modern Belgrade). This was the inherent risk in appointing someone, anyone, who was not close family to such high commands in the III century: a rebellion was almost its automatic consequence. Until Gallienus stopped appointing them, all theater commanders in the Danube (incidentally, all of whom were of senatorial stock) rebelled against the legitimate augustus acknowledged by the Senate in Rome. Pacatianus is known to scholars from his coins and from accounts by Zosimus and Zonaras.

Antoninianus minted by Pacatianus. On the reverse, the inscription celebrates the "Aeternitas" of Rome in ocassion of the Millenium.

In the East, the provincials had also had enough of Priscus’ extortions, and a certain Marcus F. Ru. Iotapianus, a member of the local Syrian aristocracy (he was a descendant of the old royal family of Commagene) was proclaimed augustus and was supported by at least part of the eastern army. Priscus disappears from the scene (extant chronicles say anything about his fate), and Iotapianus seized Antioch and began minting coins. Iotapianus is known to scholars from his (rare) coins and from accounts by Aurelius Victor, Zosimus and the Latin V century CE author Polemius Silvius.

Antoninianus minted by Iotapianus.

Another usurper that perhaps also rebelled at the same time is not attested in written sources, but coins minted by him have survived: a certain Mar. Silbannacus who rebelled in Gaul. The name is of Celtic stock, and the coins have been found in eastern Gaul near the Rhine, but it’s unknown if he managed to attract to his cause any of the Rhine army units. A gold coin minted by a certain Sponsianus (whose authenticity is disputed by numismatists) could point to another rebellion around this time, possibly in Pannonia.

Antoninianus minted by Silbannacus. On the reverse, VICTORIA AVG.

In the middle of this ongoing disaster (remember also the draught, epidemics, and fiscal crisis that were developing at the same time) Philip possibly lost heart. There’s a surprising passage preserved in Zosimus’ work. According to him, Philip offered his abdication to the Senate:

Philip, being disturbed by these events, desired the senate either to assist him against such imminent dangers, or, if they were displeased with his government, to suffer him to lay it down and dismiss him quietly.

And then, according to Zosimus, silence followed, until a senator named Decius stood and spoke reassuring words addressed to Philip:

No person making a reply to this, Decius, a person of illustrious birth and rank, and moreover gifted, with every virtue, observed, that he was unwise in being so much concerned at those events, for they would vanish of themselves, and could not possibly long subsist.

In other words, in Decius’ opinion, Pacatianus’ and Iotapianus’ revolts would soon fail by themselves without need to intervene, and so there was no need to worry about them. And Philip responded thus:

yet Philip was still in fear, knowing how obnoxious, the officers in that country were to the army. He therefore desired Decius to assume the command of the legions in Moesia and Pannonia. As he refused this under the plea that it was inconvenient both for Philip and himself, Philip made use of the rhetoric of necessity, as the Thessalians term it, and compelled him to go to Pannonia to punish the accomplices of Marinus (i.e. Pacatianus).

In other words, Philip decided that if Decius was so sure about the insignificance of the revolts, he should go there himself and deal with them; probably Philip invested Decius with the same powers that Severianus and Pacatianus had received.

Other accounts do not give so many details, but all of them agree that Philip sent the aged senator C. Messius Quintus Decius Valerinus to the Balkans to deal with the situation there (the fact that he had to send a sexagenarian in such a mission does not speak well about the pool of talent available to Philip). Sending a man like Decius to the Balkans was dangerous: he was a respected and very well-connected senator, was a native of Illyria and had occupied several command posts in the Danubian army, which respected him. Probably this is a sign of how conscious Philip was of his bad repute among the Danubian army, and so he decided to send a man who clearly held great authority there, but in doing so he took a fatal risk.

It’s unclear how events developed, but most scholars seem to agree that Pacatianus was killed by his own troops upon Decius’ arrival. And then there are two possibilities for what happened later: some ancient authors wrote that Pacatianus’ troops acclaimed immediately Decius as augustus fearing the reprisals that they could suffer at Philip’s hands because of their rebellion, and other sources state that Decius managed to fight off some “barbarian” incursions, possibly by the Carpi or Quadi, and that then his troops raised him to the purple.

In any case, Philip’s act of sending Decius to deal with the situation had ended in another disaster (showing yet again the risks of naming for such posts men who were not direct relatives of the emperor or otherwise individuals of total reliability). Philip could not let such open rebellion go unpunished. Decius gathered detachments of the Danubian army (leaving the border unguarded when the Goths and Carpi were openly hostile) and marched to Italy, while Philip gathered the central reserve in Rome and marched north. Both armies clashed near Verona in August or September of 249 CE. In this battle, Philip was defeated and both him and his son died, probably at the hands of their own troops, and Decius was acknowledged as legitimate emperor by the Senate.

C. Messius Quintus Decius Valerinus