Midway was out of range when it came to fighters, hence Lexington carrying fighters to the island while the attack on Pearl Harbour happened. Long-ragne bombers would have been doable though.
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The racist element cuts both way: Japan was and still is an ethnocentric society with strong racial ideas about the world. Japan's racialised view of Westerners is extremely obvious when you look at their wartime PR propaganda, where both white and especially black soldiers and civilians are depicted as horribly racist caricatures. This racism into their policy making, just like in Nazi Germany.
Anyways, Japan's industry was a fraction of America's. It is exceptionally difficult to see how Japan beats the US, and that isn't even taking into account America's allies. There are some wars that could have gone either way depending on how a few small factors play out, but this was not one of them.
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Especially that Japan cannot even use the initiative, since a.) in the naval domain the US had a quantitative advantage* from the start (5:5:3 in the Washington Treaty, plus the Two Ocean Navy Act) and nothing of importance was in the reach of Japan. Even Pearl Harbor was nothing but a glorified forward base, while convenient could be replaced with something else.
*the ships particapeted in the Coral Sea, Midway, or Guadalcanal battles were already in service or a near completion at 7/12/1941.
"Fly aircraft in' means a one-way transport leg. I do believe the US could pack enough bombers onto the Hawaiian bases to keep Midway airfields knocked out. That would require time and resources, but could be done - the Hawaiian airfields were extensive and numerous, and could be expanded at will.
If Japan took Midway they would have to know they could never keep it. The garrison would be sacrificed as a delaying tactic - successfully, if delay is all that you want. But that only means the massive US Navy of 1943-44 hits perhaps-better-prepared defenses in the Central and Southern Pacific and maybe extends the war into 1946.
I am sure I have misunderstood. The entirety of Japan's entry into WW2 was based on securing the rubber of Malaya, the minerals of Siam and Burma, the oil and resources of the Dutch East Indies, the population and resources of China - all needed to pacify and colonize China and produce economic self-sufficiency for Japan.
Since Japanese armies did reach those places w must say that they are in reach of Japan, yes?
The problem with questions like this is history is always written by the winners. The winners are for the most part never going to make themselves look bad by saying that if they done something a little differently they would of lost. Winners always rewrite history to make themselves look better than they really were. The Romans were masters of this. I don't know the answer to your question but I will say to the people saying Japan could never win, nothing is impossible. If you could go back in time and change the smallest of things it would change history in ways we could not imagine today. Like stopping a butterfly flying can change history in massive ways. Its called the butterfly effect I think.
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Nothing of importance in the (mainland) USA of course. Japan had zero chance to hinder the mobilization of the USA (which was stronger without it anyway). Unlike to Barbarossa where while unlikely a theoretical possibility of KO was there.
Japan of course used its initiative advantage and the pre-occupation of the European powers with something else (like fighting the Germans / needing to feed the German occupation troops) to a great effect.
History is not written by the winners: it is written by the literate. The history of the Crusades, the fall of Rome, and the Viking and Mongolian Invasions were all written primarily by the losers, not the winners. There are countless other examples.
Japanese historians have contributed a great deal to the Historiography of the Asian Front in WW2, even if some of it remains inaccessible in English.
And the idea that history is easily changeable is also likely false, though impossible to disprove. The differences between the US and Japan were stark, and it would have taken more than a few small changes to make a difference.
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American and Commonwealth historians would have written the history of the Pacific War even if they had lost since Japan is less accessible language. Combined with political antagonism with the Soviets a similar thing happened with the Germans, they wrote the history of the Eastern Front for the West even though they lost. Only from '90s onward did Soviet sources start to enter the scene, and coincidentally from '90s onwards there has been increasing use of Japanese language sources in histories pertaining to the Pacific War. For example the definitive institutional history of the IJN in English was written by a scholar literate in Japanese and who largely worked off Japanese sources.
I suspect many of us here are somewhat familiar with alternate history or more formally counterfactuals, I at least spent good deal of time on the Alternate History Forum back in noughties and to a degree early ´10s. Lot of discussion on counterfactual actually tends to gravitate to question of plausibility. Widely implausible alternate history tends to be, at least on these internet discussion circles, quipped off as "ASB" (Alien Space Bats, referring to scenario that is so implausible for given point of departure that it would need intervention by extraterrestrial beings to succeed, originally referred to successful Operation Sealion) or "wank" (referring to implausible alternate history where an exceptionally good outcomes are heaped upon exceptionally good outcomes for particular nation).
Choosing the right point of departure (i.e. the specific instance in which the butterfly flaps it's wings and history takes a difference course from our own) is important for plausibility of scenario, however. If you push it far enough (say, a pre WW1 point of departure) you could end up with a vastly different war between United States and Japan and a one which Japan could perhaps win. But the war they actually ended up with after their attack on Pearl Harbor was all but impossible for them to even "not lose".
Midway is about 2100 kilometers from Oahu. It's within ferry range of most medium bombers on both sides and within attack range of B-24s. It seems to be in very extreme Betty range, but it's so extreme I wonder if it's a functional one even for recon particularly with radar directed interceptors on Hawaii (which historically intercepted a flying boat doing recon on Pearl) as those would necessitate high speed flight near the islands to reduce interception chances. Johnston atoll is somewhat closer than Oahu and was extensively used to ferry US aircraft during the war.
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This is particularly true for the Pacific War.
The Japanese lost at Midway primarily because the Americans got really, really lucky, and the Japanese had no luck at all. There's compounding factors of course, but that battle could have easily gone the other way. The Coral Sea could have been a devastating defeat for the Allies rather than the strategic victory which it was.
Some small changes and the war looks very different early on.
While I don't think that Japan was going to ultimately win the war what happened was by no means certain.
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I'd say Midway is still fundamentally somewhat stacked against Japanese since Americans are the ones reading their opponent's code, and hence are likely to have the advantage of surprise they historically had. But you are also right that Midway was still closely run battle, particularly the decisive knockout blow and it's superlative magnitude was dependent on good (lucky) timing. The problem is though that while Midway is a battle that can break Japanese carrier force for good it has far more limited ability to do that for US. Even if all three American carriers are somehow lost there (which is not that likely) US fleet carrier force will overgrow the Japanese one within a year. By end of 1943 (when US would possibly be starting an offensive in Central Pacific) US carrier forces would be bringing closer to twice as many planes to battle than their Japanese counterparts, and increasingly technologically superior ones at that.
The immediate effects would be felt in the South West Pacific campaign, which would at least save Japanese navy from some attrition. I doubt that Japanese victory would lead to occupation of Fiji, Samoa or New Caledonia though, as these places were already garrisoned by division scale forces.
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Not only that, but it was
- near the american logistical base (far more likely that they somehow limp home)
- the carrier arm had rough parity in aircraft, however there was the island of Midway itself which made it into a ~40% advantage in numbers
Sure winning it to 4-1 was quite astonishing, but far from ASB.
Note that Sealion was not meant to be a serious plan, but a thought exercise to show that it is impossible. So it is hardly surprising that it would not have worked without ASB intervention. And since not even serious preparation took place the Kriegsmarine achieved what it wanted.
Now as compared to that the Imperial Japanese Navy needed to prove that in order to pacify China they absolutely need to fight a naval war against the USN. Otherwise they might just build tanks and field artillery instead of Yamato-class superbattleships, or even transfer sailors to the Army. You can see that this would be an unacceptable development. Naval war is necessary, and it must be against the USN, because fighting the French light cruiser Lamotte-Picquet can be done without the Yamatos.
I'll take a somewhat contrarian view: the IJN did excellent planning for the Pearl Harbor attack and the expansion into SE Asia and across the Pacific.
But, after that - woof., it went bad quickly The occupation of Attu and Kiska was as smooth as it was pointless. The Midway operation was an over-complicated mess that arrogantly assumed everything would go exactly as expected, with no provision for anything else. Failing to occupy Midway was trivial, losing four fleet carriers and some expert pilots was catastrophic - and avoidable, had less arrogance and more common sense been used.
Guadalcanal saw the Japanese pull out some wonderful tactical wins, fail to capitalize on them, arrogantly under-estimate their opponent and eventually get run out of the area. In the process they lost two valuable capital ships, priceless destroyers, twenty thousand soldiers and took irreplaceable attrition to their air corps. Everything after that was disaster piled upon disaster - the Truk raid, the Marianas Turkey Shoot, the unsuccessful attempt to wreck the Philippine landings, the pointless sacrifice of Yamato.
The United States had a cushion - it could afford to lose men, ships and even territory, for so long as public sentiment favored prosecuting the war the fleet would recover and grow. Japan did not have that cushion - they had to be smart, win big and win on the cheap by forcing the enemy to take losses. Instead, the Japanese failed to learn, failed to adapt, failed to win.
Over and over we see Japanese operational and strategic plans go wrong. We see wasteful dispersion of resources, faulty intelligence, ruinous assumptions. We see bad commanders retained and good ones sidelined. On the American side we see prudence, from the Japanese we see detachment from reality.
So I say that Japan lost because they lost: they simply were not as good at running a war as their opponents. Like the armies of the Confederacy, they got in some hard early licks and then suffered defeat after defeat as their opponent learned how to fight. Whether or not Japan could have won enough battles and cost the Allies enough to make them accept a peace, the fact is that the Japanese Army and Navy were not strong enough, not good enough, to do it.
The victors do not always write the histories: I give you the Lost Cause myth of the American Civil War as one example.
But, after that - woof., it went bad quickly The occupation of Attu and Kiska was as smooth as it was pointless. The Midway operation was an over-complicated mess that arrogantly assumed everything would go exactly as expected, with no provision for anything else. Failing to occupy Midway was trivial, losing four fleet carriers and some expert pilots was catastrophic - and avoidable, had less arrogance and more common sense been used.
Guadalcanal saw the Japanese pull out some wonderful tactical wins, fail to capitalize on them, arrogantly under-estimate their opponent and eventually get run out of the area. In the process they lost two valuable capital ships, priceless destroyers, twenty thousand soldiers and took irreplaceable attrition to their air corps. Everything after that was disaster piled upon disaster - the Truk raid, the Marianas Turkey Shoot, the unsuccessful attempt to wreck the Philippine landings, the pointless sacrifice of Yamato.
The United States had a cushion - it could afford to lose men, ships and even territory, for so long as public sentiment favored prosecuting the war the fleet would recover and grow. Japan did not have that cushion - they had to be smart, win big and win on the cheap by forcing the enemy to take losses. Instead, the Japanese failed to learn, failed to adapt, failed to win.
Over and over we see Japanese operational and strategic plans go wrong. We see wasteful dispersion of resources, faulty intelligence, ruinous assumptions. We see bad commanders retained and good ones sidelined. On the American side we see prudence, from the Japanese we see detachment from reality.
So I say that Japan lost because they lost: they simply were not as good at running a war as their opponents. Like the armies of the Confederacy, they got in some hard early licks and then suffered defeat after defeat as their opponent learned how to fight. Whether or not Japan could have won enough battles and cost the Allies enough to make them accept a peace, the fact is that the Japanese Army and Navy were not strong enough, not good enough, to do it.
The victors do not always write the histories: I give you the Lost Cause myth of the American Civil War as one example.
"on the American side, we see prudence; on the Japanese side we see detachment from reality"
That's one hell of a "victors write history" moment right there
Firstly, I refuse to believe that prudence vs detachment from reality is an apt summary of the Pacific war. I'm no expert on that theater of war but if the western European land theater is anything to go by, the American approach to war is hardly one of 'prudence'. Rather, a slow walking effort that prides itself on finding as many walls to bash their heads against, as possible, and calling that 'generalship'.
Secondly, I think in your dismissal of the Japanese strategic and operational planning, you confuse the political and the military sides of the war. The japanese refusal to accept that the war was unwinnable, and that there were no good opportunities to give battle to the USN, was not a military failure but a political one. You could argue over whether the fault was with the admirals who didn't use strong enough words to explain to the political leaders (the political generals) how bad the situation was, or with the political leaders not asking the right questions / deluding themselves in spite of clear evidence that the situation was hopeless. But you can't blame admirals for planning battles against poor odds when it's a political choice that they must continue to give battle against poor odds, instead of refusing battle against poor odds and hoping that political negotiations can find an end to the war. When faced with terrible odds, and lacking permission to lay down arms, no military will really look good. The only operations that you can plan under such conditions, are forlorn hope type attacks. That the Japanese navy continued to do so speaks volumes about their discipline and their exemplary soldierly spirit. It doesn't say a whole lot about their planning and strategizing abilities.
"on the American side, we see prudence; on the Japanese side we see detachment from reality"
That's one hell of a "victors write history" moment right there
Firstly, I refuse to believe that prudence vs detachment from reality is an apt summary of the Pacific war. I'm no expert on that theater of war but if the western European land theater is anything to go by, the American approach to war is hardly one of 'prudence'. Rather, a slow walking effort that prides itself on finding as many walls to bash their heads against, as possible, and calling that 'generalship'.
Secondly, I think in your dismissal of the Japanese strategic and operational planning, you confuse the political and the military sides of the war. The japanese refusal to accept that the war was unwinnable, and that there were no good opportunities to give battle to the USN, was not a military failure but a political one. You could argue over whether the fault was with the admirals who didn't use strong enough words to explain to the political leaders (the political generals) how bad the situation was, or with the political leaders not asking the right questions / deluding themselves in spite of clear evidence that the situation was hopeless. But you can't blame admirals for planning battles against poor odds when it's a political choice that they must continue to give battle against poor odds, instead of refusing battle against poor odds and hoping that political negotiations can find an end to the war. When faced with terrible odds, and lacking permission to lay down arms, no military will really look good. The only operations that you can plan under such conditions, are forlorn hope type attacks. That the Japanese navy continued to do so speaks volumes about their discipline and their exemplary soldierly spirit. It doesn't say a whole lot about their planning and strategizing abilities.
The problem is that Japanese navy was hardly a bystander in the politics that led to the war. Indeed they had outright pioneered hostility to USA, which then developed to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Well the said admirals had to eat they cake the cook... after Tsushima the Japanese Navy lost it reason to exist due to lack of peer rivals (China: gone; Russia: gone; Germany: insignificant as proven in 1914; France: insignificant as proven in 1940; UK: allied) in their sphere of influence and small/negligible overseas trade to protect. Thus the sane reaction would have been a building holiday and other cost saving measures. Instead the IJN in the 1905-1920 period built 4 pre-dreadnoughts, 6 dreadnoughts and 4 battlecruisers. After that they came up with the 8-8 program.
This was well beyond the needs and capabilities of Japan and the only reason to do this that the admirals just did not want to have less power/prestige. To justify the overinflated navy the IJN of course needed an enemy and the only credibly looking one was the USN.
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Can you comment on the US Navy's carrier building programs since 1990? Isn't that just the same story.
Militaries are like that. As are most large organizations. But it's a political issue. Not one of operational or strategic planning. Coordination between branches of the armed forces, is also a political issue not an operational or strategic issue.
Right, and both branches of Japanese service were political agents. They engaged in political agitation, propaganda and had defined political powers including ability to veto any civilian government (as in collapse the government), and they were theoretically accountable to the Emperor alone. That was the ur-failing of Imperial Japan.
Basically, both the Americans and the Japanese made a great many errors ("Situation Normal, All F'ed Up" is a cliche for a reason), but the Americans were in a position to afford mistakes, whereas the Japanese would have been hard pressed to pull off a victory even with "perfect play".
The framing of this debate implies that, by contrast, the US military was not a political agent, which is, to put it lightly, counterfactual. True, it was less of a political actor and by-and-large obeyed the civilian oversight at the end, but it was political to the hilt.
And to say that the IJN lost it raison d'etre after Tshusima is equally counterfactual. Japan was an up-and-coming imperial/colonial power, and one that had a significantly enlarged empire after 1918, even if only in distance. It had to keep some level of parity with the other two big powers (UK, USA) in order to protect that colonial empire from any other power. By 1922, the USA basically forced the UK to break the anglo-japanese detente, which means that the IJN now has to keep some deterrent against both, rather than being allied with one against the other. That is not an environment in which you cease shipbuilding. That is an environment in which you build up to your treaty limits and pull out all the tricks (just like everyone else) to circumvent it.
Besides, everyone and their dog was building bigger and bigger ships. Might as well say the same thing about <insert Navy here>. To wit, Russia lost its pacific holdings, yet went on an equal building spree (unfinished because of WWI).
The Washington and London treaties came about for a reason. Everyone was building ships well past any reasonable budget.
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