Baltics were a mix, Estonia had broad and narrow gauge lines, in Latvia and Lithuania they had those and also some standard gauge lines left in place after WW I.
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5000 miles was ca. length of railway network in the lands Poland had from former Russian partition. But some of them in Congress Poland had standard gauge, for instance the first one - Vienna line.
Anyway it was rather Polish authorities about to ajust all lines to standard gauge, by 1929.
However, you may be kinda right, because AFAIK, the Soviets changed again the gauge in occupied territories of Eastern Poland after 1939, but it was surely less then 5000 miles.
No German-Soviet war in January of '41. But in January of '42, in the Moscow direction, the German situation only altered for the worse daily, due to the Soviet Winter Counter-Offensive of '41-'42.
Soviet railway hubs/held by the Germans/in the Moscow direction/after the Soviet counter-offensive - Bryansk-Smolensk-Orsha-Vitebsk.
As far as I can recall, and I haven't been able to find the source I read it in, the railhead supplying Typhoon was Smolensk. That's about a 400km distance to ship supplies by truck (or wagon) over Russia's 'roads'. Even under ideal conditions that would lead to something like a 75% reduction in supply throughput, and the conditions were anything but ideal.
The German quartermasters managed to keep the units supplied with a minimal level of ammunition most of the time and the soldiers were able to feed themselves by looting the countryside (to an extent) but fuel was a huge issue let alone minor details like winter uniforms, spare parts, replacement drafts and replacement vehicles.
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The trucks were operating out of Smolensk and they kept an offensive rolling to the shadows of Moscow?
Salud.
Also explains what happened when a bunch of screaming Siberians lead an URRA! charge to send you flailing back without a net to catch you. Oh, and your general is as good as dead. Bad day to be German.
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It also explains why the Germans were able to solidify their defenses at Rzhev. By retreating 250km the German forces were able to reach a position that could be effectively supplied. At that point the dire lack of support weapons and training in the Red Army meant that they couldn't take positions held by a well equipped and adequately supplied opponent.
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It's actually a tad longer than the distance the Red Ball Express traveled . . . only with Mules. In Winter.
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You seem to misunderstand auftragstaktik.
Autragstaktik means you get an objective to fulfill and reason why and then youre free to figure out how to do it. It doesnt mean you can just not do it.
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The issue on the eastern front in WW2 is that there were a lot of 'crucial' objectives, but not a single one that would materially shift the balance of the war.
Changing gauge of a railroad isn't particularly hard, it just requires a lot of manpower. If you want to be able to run both gauges, then you need to lay a third rail, which requires rails and transport for the materials. In one example, US railroads changed 11,500 miles of track in less than two days.
(http://southern.railfan.net/ties/1966/66-8/gauge.html)
Or, with planning and preparation, you can operate over multiple gauges (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Variable_gauge).
As to requiring more water and fueling stops - that requires more material, construction time and workers, and those facilities are vulnerable to sabotage and guerilla action. Locomotives and cars are also fairly expensive to produce and easy to damage.
But, as has been said, the real challenge for Germany was to get the stuff forward over a limited rail network and then disperse it with limited trucks, little fuel and limited carrying capacity of horse-drawn wagons. If Russia (or the Soviet Union) had built a European-style road and rail network it is possible that both Napoleon and Hitler could have made their plans work.
In 1812, Napoleon expected the Russian armies to be caught and destroyed near the frontier, causing the Tsar to make peace and adopt the Continental system. When the Russians retreated, he made the mistake of following in hope of still bringing them to a decision. He lacked crucial insight into what the Russians 'could' do as opposed to what he thought they 'would' do - a classic failure of intelligence and planning in confusing capabilities with intentions. His army was not destroyed by winter, it was destroyed by his mistake in placing it far outside its supply in hostile territory in winter.
In 1941, Germany was failing for lack of energy. There was coal, but not enough coal to run the factories and to make synthetic fuel. There was some hydropower, but no oil. Germany's only sources of oil were Romania - which could not provide enough - and the Soviet Union, and that trade deal looked about to fail. So the idea was to smash the communist armies on the border, advance at will into an unprotected country and take the resources that Germany needed. And it worked - except the Soviets were able to raise and equip a new army as big or bigger than the one they had lost. Germany had not planned on supporting combat operations in winter; it lacked crucial insight into what the Russians 'could' do as opposed to what it was thought they 'would' do. Again, it was not the winter that wrecked the German army - it was almost as strong in 1942 and certainly capable of one more great offensive (though on one front rather than three). What caused the German army such grief in the winter of 1941 was that they had advanced past their logistical means and made little or no effective plans for coping with an extended war.
Allied forces faced an equally bitter winter in 1944 but had the logistical support for just about everything they needed (not enough fuel, but everything else). The reason was that they had adjusted their expectations, realized the war was not going to be over in 1944 and made plans for coping with it. The Allied advance from Normandy to Germany was criticized for being slower and more methodical than it could have been, but that cautious advance and thorough logistical planning let them turn back the German winter offensive of 1944 and continue forward in the spring.
Napoleon failed, I think, because he did not think he could fail - hubris led directly to catastrophe. Hitler failed because he underestimated his enemy. He realized he didn't have the resources to prevail in a long war and, like Japan, refused to see the difference between what he wanted to be true, and what was.
Changing gauge of a railroad isn't particularly hard, it just requires a lot of manpower. If you want to be able to run both gauges, then you need to lay a third rail, which requires rails and transport for the materials. In one example, US railroads changed 11,500 miles of track in less than two days.
(http://southern.railfan.net/ties/1966/66-8/gauge.html)
Or, with planning and preparation, you can operate over multiple gauges (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Variable_gauge).
As to requiring more water and fueling stops - that requires more material, construction time and workers, and those facilities are vulnerable to sabotage and guerilla action. Locomotives and cars are also fairly expensive to produce and easy to damage.
But, as has been said, the real challenge for Germany was to get the stuff forward over a limited rail network and then disperse it with limited trucks, little fuel and limited carrying capacity of horse-drawn wagons. If Russia (or the Soviet Union) had built a European-style road and rail network it is possible that both Napoleon and Hitler could have made their plans work.
In 1812, Napoleon expected the Russian armies to be caught and destroyed near the frontier, causing the Tsar to make peace and adopt the Continental system. When the Russians retreated, he made the mistake of following in hope of still bringing them to a decision. He lacked crucial insight into what the Russians 'could' do as opposed to what he thought they 'would' do - a classic failure of intelligence and planning in confusing capabilities with intentions. His army was not destroyed by winter, it was destroyed by his mistake in placing it far outside its supply in hostile territory in winter.
In 1941, Germany was failing for lack of energy. There was coal, but not enough coal to run the factories and to make synthetic fuel. There was some hydropower, but no oil. Germany's only sources of oil were Romania - which could not provide enough - and the Soviet Union, and that trade deal looked about to fail. So the idea was to smash the communist armies on the border, advance at will into an unprotected country and take the resources that Germany needed. And it worked - except the Soviets were able to raise and equip a new army as big or bigger than the one they had lost. Germany had not planned on supporting combat operations in winter; it lacked crucial insight into what the Russians 'could' do as opposed to what it was thought they 'would' do. Again, it was not the winter that wrecked the German army - it was almost as strong in 1942 and certainly capable of one more great offensive (though on one front rather than three). What caused the German army such grief in the winter of 1941 was that they had advanced past their logistical means and made little or no effective plans for coping with an extended war.
Allied forces faced an equally bitter winter in 1944 but had the logistical support for just about everything they needed (not enough fuel, but everything else). The reason was that they had adjusted their expectations, realized the war was not going to be over in 1944 and made plans for coping with it. The Allied advance from Normandy to Germany was criticized for being slower and more methodical than it could have been, but that cautious advance and thorough logistical planning let them turn back the German winter offensive of 1944 and continue forward in the spring.
Napoleon failed, I think, because he did not think he could fail - hubris led directly to catastrophe. Hitler failed because he underestimated his enemy. He realized he didn't have the resources to prevail in a long war and, like Japan, refused to see the difference between what he wanted to be true, and what was.
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I think it wasn't "Auftragstaktik" that failed the German army in urban warfare, I think the problem was a level higher, the "operational" level. Correct me if I am wrong, but campaigns like Barbarossa succeeded so well for the German because they did NOT throw their units at enemy strongpoints but instead focussed on weak points, broke through there and forced the enemy to abandon his strongpoints or be cut off and encircled, which meant no means to replace supplies and casualties and attacks from a probably not fortified rear or sides.
At Stalingrad and Kursk though, the Wehrmacht bashed its head against enemy strongpoints and suffered accordingly. The attacker has the advantage of choosing time and place of the battle, the defender has the advantage of having the enemy come to him. When you attack at a place where the enemy awaits you, you are bound to suffer for it.
At Stalingrad and Kursk though, the Wehrmacht bashed its head against enemy strongpoints and suffered accordingly. The attacker has the advantage of choosing time and place of the battle, the defender has the advantage of having the enemy come to him. When you attack at a place where the enemy awaits you, you are bound to suffer for it.
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I have checked my sources and the main force used for Typhoon, Panzergruppe 4, was supplied from Roslavl not Somlensk, although the distance to Moscow is about the same (400km).
By the second phase of Typhoon, which began on the 15th of November the railways had been re-gauged to Volokolamsk at the closest, which was still over 120km from Moscow and the German panzer divisions had only has about 1VS of fuel on hand, enough to drive around 100km on good roads with no combat. The railhead was over 60km behind the German front lines at this point and their was only just enough supply coming in to maintain the formations in their current positions with no excess to accumulate stockpiles of ammunition, food or fuel let alone additional tanks, replacement parts, replacement soldiers or winter uniforms. The main unit spearheading the attack was the 6th Panzer division with mostly obsolete Pz.35 (t) tanks, for which no spare parts were available and who's engines had already done over 12000km. During this critical phase the Luftwaffe transport fleet was engaged in moving paratroops to the Leningrad area and was unavailable for emergency fuel drops, a further clear example of poor operational planning.
So the Germans attacked, then blamed the weather for their defeat.
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If it had rained fuel, ammunition and provisions, it might have worked! Like Yahweh rained down Mana on the Israelites. So we could also blame the Jews.
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I love it when I ask a question and get a studied answer a week or two later, one of the very best parts of this forum. Salud!
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Many very intelligent posts in this threads... and I am joining a bit late.
The question of this thread "About General Winter" rightfully bloomed into a much wider discussion.
Be it Napoleon or the Germans in 1941, the reason for the Russian or Soviet victory, well, it is folly to seek it in only one single reason, as usual there are a multitude with several standing out more than others. One of them: the ability and willingness of the Russians/Soviets to fight and not to give up...
Everybody likes to discuss the Russian winter, I'd like to add only a snippet of further information. Here are imagines from the German Federal Archive. They are NOT from the winter but from the season the Russians call Rasputiza. Rasputiza happens during a time in spring and autumn and due to this often the Russian year has been considered to have 6 and not only 4 seasons.
The images do speak for themselves:
The question of this thread "About General Winter" rightfully bloomed into a much wider discussion.
Be it Napoleon or the Germans in 1941, the reason for the Russian or Soviet victory, well, it is folly to seek it in only one single reason, as usual there are a multitude with several standing out more than others. One of them: the ability and willingness of the Russians/Soviets to fight and not to give up...
Everybody likes to discuss the Russian winter, I'd like to add only a snippet of further information. Here are imagines from the German Federal Archive. They are NOT from the winter but from the season the Russians call Rasputiza. Rasputiza happens during a time in spring and autumn and due to this often the Russian year has been considered to have 6 and not only 4 seasons.
The images do speak for themselves:
Might one say that both the French and the Germans went to war planning quick, decisive campaigns and were completely unprepared when these did not work as well as they had in western and central Europe?
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Yes. Every military campaign planned by Germany before Russia was based on deception aiming to get the quick kill. They banked EVERYTHING on a six week gambit referred to as ‘The Greatest Deception in History’ and lost because a quick deception is not enough to kill Russia.
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Well, the opening stages of Barbarossa went extremely well, no? Maybe they shouldn't have gone for Moscow but instead planned for shorter advances, sort enough not to collapse their supply lines and keep the Wehrmacht sharp enough to deal with the Red Army?
What I wonder, how important was Lend-Lease?
What I wonder, how important was Lend-Lease?
If Russia didn't have severe winters, Russia would be a lot more populated and the likes of Napoleon or Hitler wouldn't have invaded them the first place
The French certainly expected a decisive battle against the Russian First and Second Armies, but I wouldn't say they would have been certain the war as a whole would be quick. They'd spent years already fighting in Spain, without any sign that particular campaign was coming to an end. What Napoleon would have done in the event of defeating the Russian armies but facing popular resistance and without the Czar asking for terms is something only Napoleon would have known, and he rarely shared his long-term plans with subordinates.
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