WW2 Europe, no US involvement, post fall of France.

[delta180]

You heavily underestimate how Nazis built up self-sufficient sources for most of such materials.
They synthesized fuel, in so huge numbers that it carried them through war (not Romanian oil or anything like that).
They secured Norway to not get winter shipments of metals from Sweden (delivered across Norway shores in winter) disrupted or worse, get Sweden occupied/swayed to Allies.
They relied on Spain and other 3rd countries whenever possible to get resources.
They made rubber too.
They even heavily increased local food production, severely decreasing needed food imports and significantly optimizing food situation compared to WWI.

If anything, you underestimate how much German military economics was prepared to answer such challenges. And if not for 1943-1945 bombings with USA help, it would last much longer.


Except that the regime itself changed because of huge failures of government?
Surely Germany wanted oil, bit it didn't just occupy Romania. It also wasn't in awe from having to occupy Greece and Yugoslavia, but the former's regime changed forced them to do it.

Hello, 2nd battle of Kharkov wants to talk to you. The one where Axis destroyed a whole army and opened a path to the operations in Stalingrad direction. Here is a map which shows how they could advance after eliminating a whole army there:

Sure, resources and Stalingrad's strategic and symbolic meanings also played a role, but main argument was the fact that they could make a resultative offense there with strategic gains.

And more generally, they looted what they occupied indeed, but they didn't count on it that critically.

if Germany was as self sufficient as you say they would not have given only half rations or had famines, they would not have imported more than 1 million tonnes of grain and almost a million tonnes of oil from the soviets in just 6 months, the problems it did have speak for itself and it was unprepared

also, your last sentence contradicts itself as you said "strategic meaning also played a role" but also that the main argument was "strategic gains"
The picture you have comes from a Wikipedia page that advocates "The grand plan was to secure the Don and Volga first and then drive into the Caucasus towards the oil fields", so your missing the point of that picture which was to say they were pushing up to the Volga river, which you can just about see on that map, in order to get the oil in the Caucasus

 

[fr-rein]

also, your last sentence contradicts itself as you said "strategic meaning also played a role" but also that the main argument was "strategic gains"
The picture you have comes from a Wikipedia page that advocates "The grand plan was to secure the Don and Volga first and then drive into the Caucasus towards the oil fields", so your missing the point of that picture which was to say they were pushing up to the Volga river, which you can just about see on that map, in order to get the oil in the Caucasus

It doesn't contradict.
In spring 1942 they stop Soviet Counteroffensive and destroy a whole army in 2nd battle of Kharkov, regaining initiative. They got a part of Front which was significantly weakened due to destruction of whole Army, where they decided to put offensive with strategic gains in mind.
They didn't go for Moscow again which would be most strategic option - because they didn't have an opportunity to launch offensive there like in Stalingrad way.
They opted for cutting oil supplies, securing them and Caucasus and winning a strategical objective they could grab, in process hopefully making good advances and encircling enemy.

 

[Kovax]

The synthetic oil in "so huge numbers" was not even enough for training new pilots, so they had men in the air after less than 50 hours of flying time going up against Allied pilots with hundreds of hours of flight training and combat simulations. Basically, there was barely enough oil to continue operations, and only at a much reduced pace, which was insufficient in the face of steadily growing Allied strength and the mobility afforded by practically complete naval supremacy, other than a few nuisance raids and the annoying subs.

 

[fr-rein]

The synthetic oil in "so huge numbers" was not even enough for training new pilots, so they had men in the air after less than 50 hours of flying time going up against Allied pilots with hundreds of hours of flight training and combat simulations. Basically, there was barely enough oil to continue operations, and only at a much reduced pace, which was insufficient in the face of steadily growing Allied strength and the mobility afforded by practically complete naval supremacy, other than a few nuisance raids and the annoying subs.

However, the synthetic oil amounted to 30% and up to 50% of all oil that was acquired by Germany, with it's amounts growing each year in quantity. It surpassed amounts they managed to import from the start of the war and it was 2-3 times more than production from oil wells in Germany.
Obviously, this was insufficient and to attack major targets they had to stockpile some reserves. But it is indeed a significant amount and it let them carry on this war for more than a year-two. It was enough for oil-deprived country to keep up the war for some time and without it they wouldn't be able to do much at war at all. It was the key to the fuel question in Germany.

 

[delta180]

It doesn't contradict.
In spring 1942 they stop Soviet Counteroffensive and destroy a whole army in 2nd battle of Kharkov, regaining initiative. They got a part of Front which was significantly weakened due to destruction of whole Army, where they decided to put offensive with strategic gains in mind.
They didn't go for Moscow again which would be most strategic option - because they didn't have an opportunity to launch offensive there like in Stalingrad way.
They opted for cutting oil supplies, securing them and Caucasus and winning a strategical objective they could grab, in process hopefully making good advances and encircling enemy.

it does contradict, you cited strategy as both the main and another reason they went for Stalingrad within the same sentence, if I have misunderstood what you meant please correct me
but at this point we are arguing the same thing, both of us agree they were after the oil supplies and that is why they invaded Stalingrad which is what I said and since nether of us can find out what the Germans were thinking at the time I do not think we need to take this any more off-topic, after all this discussion is about America role in the war (and if it was the difference between victory or defeat)

 

[Radbod]

how about the dutch famine? It is one thing to have people starving in a war zone on the front line, it is another to have fully occupied countries starve

That’s a really bad argument to make. The famine in the Netherlands didn’t start because the German occupation. It started because the Dutch government in exile issued a general strike of the Dutch railways. Because of this strike the western part of the Netherlands didn’t get food out of the others parts of the Netherlands. The so-called ‘Hongerwinter’ (winter of hunger) didn’t affect the other parts of the Netherlands.
Funny fact: the general practitioners where really pleased during the war because the Dutch were eating healthier than before the war. They would probably start to cry if they would know what we are eating now….

 

[delta180]

That’s a really bad argument to make. The famine in the Netherlands didn’t start because the German occupation. It started because the Dutch government in exile issued a general strike of the Dutch railways. Because of this strike the western part of the Netherlands didn’t get food out of the others parts of the Netherlands. The so-called ‘Hongerwinter’ (winter of hunger) didn’t affect the other parts of the Netherlands.
Funny fact: the general practitioners where really pleased during the war because the Dutch were eating healthier than before the war. They would probably start to cry if they would know what we are eating now….

I am fairly sure the famine started because the Germans stopped food from entering the Netherlands after the railways began the strike, I am also fairly sure the general practitioners where not pleased and it was not healthier to eat less considering the 20,000 deaths that occurred

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

'Fairly sure' is an assumption designed to promote your own point, it is not a historical argument. Unless it is linked with a very, very concrete fact it loses its punch. 'I am fairly sure the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7th.'

Names, dates, facts and figures are historical arguments, showing the exact chain of events upon which your assumption is based to explain your logic to the reader.

Let me give you another hint going forward based on long experience here:

If you look at Radbod's sig - leaver dea as slaef! - you will notice it is a motto from Friesland meaning 'Better dead than enslaved'.

Which means he is from the exact area you are referencing, is telling you what actually happened, and was making an excellent point.

That is the truly interesting thing about this forum, you have a wide variety of individuals with a wide variety of specialized knowledge. Sometimes it is better to listen and/or go do your research before replying because you are 'fairly sure' you are correct.

And, as Dr. EZ-Kill likes to remind us; half the value of this forum is the fact it challenges you to be very careful what you say and encourages you to do your research and share what you learned with people who can put your ideas into perspective.

 

[Lord Tim]

I tend to discount any statement like "The Germans could not win the war". By 1944, the Soviets ran totally out of manpower and are calling 16 yo boys to the front (a situation later alleviated as they recruit in "liberated" territories). With less of, well, everything, they have way worse human losses over the war ; especially since the German industries does not take as much as a pounding from strategic bombardement, so it is possible that it ends up with a German victory.

Running out of manpower would imply the country stopped having children 18 years earlier. In practice, 1925/26/27 saw rather a lot more births than the previous decade - not fighting world war one and a civil war, and a general improvement in living standards will do that. The number of 18-year olds went from 1.2 million newly available in 1939 to 2.4 million in 1945, and a higher proportion of the latter were in good health after the Soviet investment in rural medical care. Shortages of manpower were an early-war problem.

 

[fr-rein]

I wonder, would UK send expedition corpses to relieve USSR if USA wasn't involved and no Normandy would happen?
For example, an expedition to repel Finland and relieve Leningrad. Or go to Crimea and fight Germans there with a help of navy. Would it be possible in theory?

Running out of manpower would imply the country stopped having children 18 years earlier. In practice, 1925/26/27 saw rather a lot more births than the previous decade - not fighting world war one and a civil war, and a general improvement in living standards will do that. The number of 18-year olds went from 1.2 million newly available in 1939 to 2.4 million in 1945, and a higher proportion of the latter were in good health after the Soviet investment in rural medical care. Shortages of manpower were an early-war problem.

How does it contradict statement that mobilization pool was quite exhausted?
You get new generation available each year, but it's very little compared to the way wider mobilization range that was summoned already. The main way to draw new manpower is to mobilize females as nurses, take some workers from factories to Front, to expand age of mobilization, to mobilize people from occupy territories.
New generations would offer some relief, but not enough to cover the lack of soldiers and workforce.

Which pretty much means that USSR could run out of manpower if it failed to liberate pre-war territories as in real life. It doesn't cancel out German exhaustion of course or guarantee Soviet defeat, but it makes USSR more vulnerable to chances of such outcome.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Actually, I have heard both sides of this argument before.

One camp states Mother Russia has inexhaustible manpower.

The other states Russia had almost depleted the Russian nationals and were scraping the barrel picking up volunteers from the hinterlands of its empire. They still had a vast army moving into Germany, but there was a bottleneck of manpower after that. There was a statistic, which I can neither confirm nor deny, quoted on this forum a while back that 99/100 Russian males age 18 in 1941 would be dead by 1945.

This is a good question to resolve, I would love to know which it was.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

This was quoted by @Matt714 a few years back:

WWII annual casualty rates:

U.S: 17.8 %
U.K: 17.5 %
France: 16.3 %
USSR: 88.2 %
Germany: 44.9 %
Italy: 19.8 %
Japan: 25.1 %
China: 12.2 %

Compare with WWI:

U.S: 52.9 %
British Empire: 42.8 %
France: 46.8 %
Russia: 63.3 %
Germany: 47.2 %
Italy: 46.6 %

Source: Trevor N. Dupuy, Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties And Equipment Losses In Modern War, Virginia, 1990: p. 40

 

[Narwhal]

Actually, I have heard both sides of this argument before.

One camp states Mother Russia has inexhaustible manpower.

The other states Russia had almost depleted the Russian nationals and were scraping the barrel picking up volunteers from the hinterlands of its empire. They still had a vast army moving into Germany, but there was a bottleneck of manpower after that. There was a statistic, which I can neither confirm nor deny, quoted on this forum a while back that 99/100 Russian males age 18 in 1941 would be dead by 1945.

This is a good question to resolve, I would love to know which it was.

That the class called to arms in 1940 would be 99% dead or captured in 1944 I can believe it, given the massive losses of 1941.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

That the class called to arms in 1940 would be 99% dead or captured in 1944 I can believe it, given the massive losses of 1941.

Not to mention Stalins policy that it is better to be dead than captured by the enemy. Soviet pows are traitors to the Communist Party and subject to re-education before reentrring society.

 

[Yakman]

Actually, I have heard both sides of this argument before.

One camp states Mother Russia has inexhaustible manpower.

The other states Russia had almost depleted the Russian nationals and were scraping the barrel picking up volunteers from the hinterlands of its empire. They still had a vast army moving into Germany, but there was a bottleneck of manpower after that. There was a statistic, which I can neither confirm nor deny, quoted on this forum a while back that 99/100 Russian males age 18 in 1941 would be dead by 1945.

This is a good question to resolve, I would love to know which it was.

Draft of central Asia ssrs was really high. They were typically put into units which were on the front line, and took disproportionate casualties.

The Soviets were indeed at their limits in 1945. Most Soviet citizens had been on starvation rations for years. That being said, they had kept going for years.

 

[Henry IX]

Britain and the Soviets against Germany? Absolutely zero, and I mean zero, US involvement? Anything they sell to one side they sell to both. God help the side that interdicts US shipping first, and shipments to Germany can handled by the proliferation of shell companies located in 'neutral' countries such as Spain. Once France falls, the border is no longer an issue and German shipments can reach Berlin by rail in a matter of days.

No Former Navy Person? No SOE using America as a base? No Lend Lease? No under the table arms shipments? No Destroyers for Bases? No US Merchant Marine and their Liberty Ships? No jeep carriers forming hunter/killer ASW teams?

Even if you leave Japan out of the mix to prevent confusion . . . I think I'm taking Germany.

The reality is what you are suggesting now allows Henry Ford to sell Herr Hitler (who keeps a picture of Henry Ford on his desk) all the trucks he wants at reasonable prices paid in gold through shell companies and third-party intermediaries in Switzerland. You take all those Ford Trucks used to fuel the Russian offensives, and give half of them to the Germans, what comes next? Not to mention Ford selling knock off B-24's, one an hour, to Goering at quite reasonable prices.

For offloading US shipments to Germany, I highly recommend the top-secret U-boat base at Vigo with its massive infrastructure of hidden tunnels and strong rail lines connected directly to the Ruhr. If you can just pull into Brest and thumb your noses at the British, so much the better.

And our old friends at Standard Oil are more than happy to make a profit in time of war selling to the highest bidder. Bye-bye German Oil problem.

Trains? American Locomotive Company has quite the inventory to pick from; using steam and disel-electric configurations of the finest quality imaginable. And they can make cheap single use locomotives like those that ran up and down the Persian supply lines as well. What do you need today?

I'd hit up Alfred Sloan over at GM real quick if I'm Britain and see what kind of deals they can cut. And I'd make a stop at North American Aviation, Boeing, Consolidated, Vought, Republic, and US Steel while I'm over here. Prices are about to go up. The shipyards, btw, are reserved for our own use.

Good luck.

An option where the US actually sells war materials to Germany is unlikely in the extreme for a couple of reasons unrelated to US politics or government positions:

1. Gold reserves - the Germans didn't have any. The plunder from Western Europe was just barely adequate to maintain their economy, certainly not enough to buy anything from the US

2. Poor credit - the economic policies of the Reich were an anathema to US capital and the German reneging on debts ensured that NOTHING would be sold to Germany on credit. Their word, diplomatically and financially was worth nothing and everybody knew it.

3. British determination - the British were going to continue to blockade Germany regardless of the US wishes in this regard. They recognised that blockade was their only chance of victory and were prepared to enforce it. Unless the US was willing to wage war to trade with the cashless, poor credit Germans, then the blockade would stand. In addition, the British policy was to direct all shipping to their ports. They did generally pay for goods impounded, so most traders were not too angry about it.

That being said, hostile neutrality from the US would cause all sorts of issues and problems for both Britain and the Soviet Union, particularly in the Battle of the Atlantic.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

An option where the US actually sells war materials to Germany is unlikely in the extreme for a couple of reasons unrelated to US politics or government positions:

Roosevelt is convinced about Hitler's intentions and places the government in opposition to him. From the moment BSC, the British Security Co-ordination, opens its offices in New York City in May of 1940, the US is unofficially at war with Germany.

I don't think the US is actively interested in selling to Hitler after that point. And George HW Bush's father, who was brought up on charges of treason by the US Senate for helping finance their war industry shows what the public wanted done with war profiteers.

I hate breaking things down into paragraphs, but to mirror your question.

1. Gold reserves - the Germans didn't have any. The plunder from Western Europe was just barely adequate to maintain their economy, certainly not enough to buy anything from the US

The raison d'etre for Heydrich's RHSA was to generate a steady stream of cash and gold for the Party, and by all accounts he was very good at his job, and the extreme measures he used to extract wealth is well documented. Production goes up, under the table payments through third parties using Switzerland to trade Nazi gold for clean gold keeps critical assets flowing until further resistance was futile. Then, when it is time to begin the long retreat, German industry tied to the Party infrastructure on Bormann's express orders starts shoving money up that same pipeline into third world countries using a policy of Flight Capital; which will be brought back into Germany when the dust settles. Vatican Bank is created in 1943, the IOR, who has one of the blackest banking records in Europe for corruption; all this excess wealth came from somewhere, perhaps prepayment for them stealing the get away car. Cash is not their problem; before, during or after the war.

2. Poor credit - the economic policies of the Reich were an anathema to US capital and the German reneging on debts ensured that NOTHING would be sold to Germany on credit. Their word, diplomatically and financially was worth nothing and everybody knew it.

If free trade is allowed, which it was not, there are plenty of American businesses actively willing to deal with Hitler's government. Henry Ford stands at the top of that list.

3. British determination - the British were going to continue to blockade Germany regardless of the US wishes in this regard. They recognised that blockade was their only chance of victory and were prepared to enforce it. Unless the US was willing to wage war to trade with the cashless, poor credit Germans, then the blockade would stand. In addition, the British policy was to direct all shipping to their ports. They did generally pay for goods impounded, so most traders were not too angry about it.

I agree this is where this problem gets interesting in an HOI IV sandbox world 'what if' way. If the US is shipping war materials to Spain for resell to Nazi Germany through intermediaries and shell companies, and the British start interdicting US ships . . . . fortunately this is a hypothetical and pure speculation. But the US could do to Britain what it did to Japan if the need arose.

 

[Henry IX]

The raison d'etre for Heydrich's RHSA was to generate a steady stream of cash and gold for the Party, and by all accounts he was very good at his job, and the extreme measures he used to extract wealth is well documented. Production goes up, under the table payments through third parties using Switzerland to trade Nazi gold for clean gold keeps critical assets flowing until further resistance was futile. Then, when it is time to begin the long retreat, German industry tied to the Party infrastructure on Bormann's express orders starts shoving money up that same pipeline into third world countries using a policy of Flight Capital; which will be brought back into Germany when the dust settles. Vatican Bank is created in 1943, the IOR, who has one of the blackest banking records in Europe for corruption; all this excess wealth came from somewhere, perhaps prepayment for them stealing the get away car. Cash is not their problem; before, during or after the war.

The sums of gold stolen by the Nazis and funnelled out of Germany are staggering by an individual's measure, but are insignificant by the standards of an economy. Particularly given the cost of buying war materials is astronomical in ordinary economic terms. As an economy, the Nazis had already had to put extraordinary currency controls on Germany prior to the war even starting to eke out their meagre gold reserves. As a result of these restrictive trade practices the US had already functionally ceased to trade with Germany before the war.

The Germans had a gold backed currency without the gold to support the value. As such it was not accepted by the Americans as they could not equivalise it to their floating currency. American imports had to be paid for upfront and in advance in $US as the actions of the Nazis in the '30s had already burnt the American exporters. American dollars could only be earned by exporting goods, particularly consumer goods, production of which had already been severely curtailed by Nazi economic policy (in favour of war materials). Germany in the late '30s had no money with which to purchase goods and no way to raise capital without reducing military expenditure and increasing production in the civilian sectors of the economy, which is kind of crazy if you are looking to purchase military hardware with the money thus raised.

It is worth noting that even the British, with their massive currency reserves, access to the world economy, empire to exploit and sophisticated and effective banking system were functionally out of cash by 1941, which is when the US switched from Cash and Carry to Lend Lease.

 

[Easy-Kill]

It is worth noting that even the British, with their massive currency reserves, access to the world economy, empire to exploit and sophisticated and effective banking system were functionally out of cash by 1941, which is when the US switched from Cash and Carry to Lend Lease.

I am sorry but this isn't remotely true. British imports of cash purchased goods in 1944 (approx £900M) was higher than in 1938 and only 90% of the 1940 level (£1000M)*. What remains most impressive is that UK reciprocal aid under lend lease (i.e. aid provided by Britain to other allied nations including the USA) was approximately £800M in the same year.

So no, the narrative that the UK was financially bankrupt by the end of the war does not match with the reality of the situation. Yes, the UK received substantial volumes of aid in warfighting material but even in 1944, after years of warfighting and a wartime economy, it was still in a position to 'gift' substantial volumes of aid to its overseas allies.

* Cited from Britain's War Machine: Weapons, Resources, and Experts in the Second World War by David Edgerton, who in turn cites National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom 1855-1965 (Studies in the National Income and Expenditure of the UK) by C. H. Feinstein.

 

[Henry IX]

I am sorry but this isn't remotely true. British imports of cash purchased goods in 1944 (approx £900M) was higher than in 1938 and only 90% of the 1940 level (£1000M)*. What remains most impressive is that UK reciprocal aid under lend lease (i.e. aid provided by Britain to other allied nations including the USA) was approximately £800M in the same year.

So no, the narrative that the UK was financially bankrupt by the end of the war does not match with the reality of the situation. Yes, the UK received substantial volumes of aid in warfighting material but even in 1944, after years of warfighting and a wartime economy, it was still in a position to 'gift' substantial volumes of aid to its overseas allies.

* Cited from Britain's War Machine: Weapons, Resources, and Experts in the Second World War by David Edgerton, who in turn cites National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom 1855-1965 (Studies in the National Income and Expenditure of the UK) by C. H. Feinstein.

You are correct. I should have specified that I meant cash reserves. They came up with a range of financial instruments to extract additional credit, with which they then were able to purchase goods. If the international money markets were to treat the British like they did the Germans, then they would have had real difficulties in continuing to raise finance.