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To be fair, Romania is actually a very viable nation in HoI 4. It has a generic focus tree but I've played it several times and it's a very enjoyable nation when you go communist and have the soviets at your back. Starts with a good military and a relatively decent industrial capacity, plus a weak neighbour to the south. I hope they get a specific focus tree in the future. Potentially in some other games too. But yes, I'd also like to see Romania represented properly in more games. I actually voted for Romania in the Red Dragon DLC poll, but alas, it came close to last. :c

Could be viable in both Wargame RD and Steel Division.

The later, even if is build around units, Romania could field some very capable units such as:

- 1st Armored Division who fought in most important engagements of Romanian Royal Army on Eastern Front, from Basarabia and Odessa to Stalingrad and later to Khisinev-Jassy offensive: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jassy–Kishinev_Offensive

- 8th Cavalry Division which also fought in all major engagements, was motorised and supposed to be converted in armored division in 1944

- about any Mountain Division as elite/shock infantry

I am in process of making a research for Romania in WW2 (posters from Eugen forums probably know me for Romanian research during Cold War) and will post it here as well.

Also Romania can field some interesting local designs such as IAR-80/81 fighter bombers, TACAM tank, individual weapons (Orita) destroyers or this beautiful AT guns:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=3750
 
Battle of Clervaux maybe? 2. Pz. Divs spear tip attacked the 707th Tank Battailon plus remainders of the 110th RCT backed by the 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion.
Outcome: Germans lost neglible personel and 4 AFV, US losses 30 of 36 ATGs, B Coy 103rd Engineer Combat Battailon 100% losses, 109 Field Artillery Battailon ca 100 men, 110 Inf Reg losses are hard to establish but it lost in the opening days of the offensive a total of 2750 men. 707th Tank Battalion lost 45 tanks, 5 made it out all of them damaged.

Oh wow this is fun. It's been a while since I've had stat-sheets attempting to be history that was this inaccurate. You're showing me I still have the touch.

Wikipedia article for fun:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Clervaux

"German forces of the Fifth Panzer Army under Hasso von Manteuffel's command, primarily from the 2nd Panzer Division, 116th Panzer Division and the 126th Infantry Division (another account suggests the 2nd Panzer, Panzer Lehr Division and the 26th Volksgrenadier Division)[6] attacked the American 110th Regiment from the 28th Division on December 16.[2][15] "

The German records were so inaccurate they couldn't even agree which Divisions attacked the Americans.

So what was the battle really like?

"The 110th's regimental headquarters, and most of its strength, were in the town of Clervaux.[14][16] The unit also received support from a tank company from the 9th Armored Division[16] as well from the 103rd Engineer Battalion under Captain Parrett, and 109th Field Artillery Battalion under Lt. Col. Robert E. Ewing.[2] Despite this support, German forces had significant superiority in the region, and the engagement was described as a "couple of infantry companies and one company of light tanks versus substantial elements of an entire panzer corps."[16] Fuller described the opposing forces as "two Panzer divisions and one infantry division."

There was no tank battalion on the US side at the outset (those got involved later) They had - "a couple of infantry companies and one company of light tanks".

Against an entire Panzer Corps.

On the other hand, the Germans really were so incompetent and awful at this point that they really needed 10-1 odds in their favor plus the element of surprise to make any dent on the Americans.

But yeah, sure, these are awesome examples of how German tactical prowess. Namely how they needed entire Corps to kill a few battalions.
 
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You really like to lie about what books other people have actually read.



He makes the claim in Normandy 1944. Not "all" Panzer Divisions of all time. End of story.

Yeah because he refers purely to Pz Divs in the Normandy he has in his table from MAY 1943 to AUGUST 1944 all deliveries to ALL units including such deliveries to the Hermann Göring Division who also was in the Normandy...oh wait. Further he clearly refers to quote page 21: "The situation is pretty clear for the Panthers. During the period, 736 vehicles went to SS-Panzer-Divisionen and 3104 to army Panzer-Divisionen. There existed seven SS-Panzer-Divisionen and, on average, about 25 army Panzer Divisionen. This means that 124 Panthers were delivered per army Panzer-Division and 106 per SS-Panzer-Division. This hardly indicates that the SS divisions had priority. The main reason for this is that only a few of the SS-Panzer-Divisionen had a Panther battalion in action. Before 1944 only the 1. and the 2. SS-Panzer-Divisionen had any Panthers in action.
So much for the priority.
Also no one spoke from all times, the list ends in August because then its usless to go further since there is still one SS Division waiting for its Panthers while the new Panzer Brigaden get full deliveries adding even more weight on the Wehrmacht side. Here you can look up for the rest of the war the deliveries, still no priority.
http://www.panther1944.de/index.php...zuweisungslisten/panther-zuweisungsliste-1944



What does this have to do with SS Panzer Corps having actual large-scale deployments of Tigers in 1943? You keep blabbing about unrelated details to cover up the fact that the SS had priority in 1943. I already know of the Tiger deployments in 1942 in the Eastern Front. They were embarrassing failures around Leningrad.
Ok, seems i have it to make it more simple for you: Now for 1st graders: No SS large scale deployment of the SS but three single companies in three single SS Divisions to build up cores for later Abteilungen, Wehrmacht has more Panzer units where they can draw personel from so they could build whole Abteilungen from August42 on, in Kursk if the deployed 146 Tigers 42 are from the SS, the rest from the Wehrmacht, this doesnt include at that time ALL Wehrmacht Tiger units. NO priority, no large-scale deployment.
Simple enough?
Also what has Leningrad to do with the topic? Context is not your friend.




Again, you apparently don't understand that "offensives" consist of multiple battles and that attributing all Allied tank losses to Panzer action is faulty to begin with. By late 1944 it's already known that 30%+ of Allied tank losses were to Panzerfaust.
Apparently you dont know that the writen cases where mostly tank engagements or are you trying to imply that the german tank commanders shot Panzerfausts from their turrets. Funny guy.



yawn* Ok, so let's take your first example and look at it.

You just say "2nd Panzer Division wiped out Task Force Booth and 9th AD". German tanks awesome! RAR!

So when and where did this happen?

Oh? You don't know?

http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/da...ored-at-bastogne-and-the-battle-of-the-bulge/

Let's explain what really happened.

"Task Force Booth" - which you list separately from CCR of 9th AD - were in fact the same unit. Task Force Booth was a component of CCR 9th Armored Division. As noted in the dispositions here:



Note that put all of the stuff together, and CCR is no more than one battalion of armor and armored infantry.

They fought an entire Panzer Division around Dec 17-19. Three days against 4-1 odds!

And yet what did they accomplish?

Not only lacking in context but also reading problems, it gets difficult.

Firstly the main battle took part on the 18th, the final destruction on the 19th since the 2. Panzer Divison threw back the Force Harper and then on the 19th the Task Force Booth together with the rest was annhilated.
Also there where only the 2. Pz Div because in Lehr was crossing in the morning the river Clerve at Drauffelt, as was the 26. VG Div, en route to Bastonge, while the 116. Pz Div. drove the 28th Infantry Divisions 112th Infantry Regiment back, otherwise the 112th would have run from an invisible foe, scarry.

Oh look, one German AFV destroyed (I thought they had zero losses?) and two forced to turn back!
oh look reading problems incease since disabled =/= and since the Germans where in possesion of the Battlefield they could have easily repaired it.




Oh look, the Germans reporting timeline delays. More on this later.

But let's focus more on the action:



Hey, hey, I thought the Germans had no AFV losses. Now they've lost three Mark IVs for one destroyed Sherman and two damaged! Are the numerically superior Germans actually just trading tank-for-tank with the US Army?



More German tanks blowing up! I thought they were supposed to have a 180-1 kill ratio?



Now the Germans are mad and throw a second Panzer Division into the mix. Again, let's remember: One US armor battalion and another of armored infantry, now up against two German Panzer Divisions!

But really, was the tank fight that mattered?
Ah yes, because kill claims > loss data from both sides, plus tanks again wrong unit disposition since the 116. Pz Div never fought that fight. 180-1 ratio, we are getting mad arent we? Cool source you got. Keep it up, stands in the internet must be true, why not including some wiki article?



Nope, because here's the secret:

The tank losses? The infantry losses? They were meaningless. The Germans in fact completely lost the entire Ardennes Offensive during the operations where they supposed "wiped out" a US tank battalion for "no losses" (which, as noted above, is a complete lie - there are at least five enemy tanks confirmed to have been knocked out, with many more not recorded in greater detail).
Ah a seamingless raise from Show me engagements where the Germans prevailed to b-b-b-b-b-b-but they lost the war. Best argument ever, you are really desperate grapping from strawmans arent you?

The reality is instead this:

We had two US battalions - a tank battalion and an armored infantry one - fighting a delaying action against two Panzer Divisions.

That means the Americans were outnumbered by a factor of something like 9-1, and yet successfully stopped the Germans from occupying Bastogne until the 101st arrived to secure the town! And in the meantime, they were in some instances trading tanks evenly with the Germans despite being outnumbered!

This again is a stark demonstration of why people who blindly quote loss figures (the German ones in this case being a complete lie - as attested by the US accounts) and pretend it's proof of German tank superiority are not experts on the subject in any way or form.
Firstly, a combat command is more than that plus there where parts of other units like the TD Bataillon with 36 ATGs, Field Artillery Bataillon, parts from the 110th RCT etc.
Secondly, there is not a single german Pz Div who had its authorized strength, they were lacking infantry as well as tanks: 28 Pz IV, 56 of the oh so bad Panther against according to "real experts" the Sherman enjoyed a 8,6 times effectivity and 40 StuGs and TDs, makes 124 AFVs all manned with crappy crews as you say. Still they win the engagements against 8,6 effectivity....strange.


War is not a bloody spreadsheet. They are not just numbers on a loss tally.

Battles are a sequence of events. And more importantly, they are a sequence of events to achieve specific ends.

It didn't matter than those two battalions couldn't beat two Panzer Divisions. It didn't matter if the final "score" favored the Germans. Two battalions winning against two Divisions is an unrealistic expectation to begin with.

The best they could do therefore was to delay the Panzers and lay the groundwork for future victory.

In this case, we had an outnumbered US force trading tank for tank with the enemy and delayed them long enough to secure Bastogne - at the time the most important piece of real estate in the area because without it the Germans couldn't really supply further advances.

And as a result, 2nd Panzer Division ran out of gas before it reached its objectives. Task Force Peiper also ran out of gas and had to abandon its tanks:

http://www.battleofthebulgememories...-the-trap-that-doomed-kampfgruppe-peiper.html



In short, the Americans in fact won this engagement regardless of the score sheet - they achieved their objectives in the face of daunting odds and secured a bigger overall victory for the rest of the army. Meanwhile you're still trying to pretend 60 years later that the Germans won because they had a higher "score", when in reality the Germans were clearly flubbing their loss reports - they lost multiple tanks and didn't report them.
Nice summarize on wrong assumptions, context failures and some outdated memes. Thats all you got?
We talked about combat efficiency and in that the Germans prevailed no matter how hard your butthurt is and the memes, all long ago debunked like "muh germans flubbing loss reports so they look better 70 years later", thats not how an army works but your understanding of that is anyway minimal.
As a hint: if the losses of Army A lay in line with kill claims of B then the kill claims are +- a small percentage true, otherwise the Army blew its eqippment for fun.
Another hint: the US loss numbers are from the US Army itself, but they surely faked the numbers too to let the Germans look better 70 years later, at least according to you. Thats how desperate you are, but again not surprising.


But yeah, sure, Panzers win because you and a bunch of long-dead Nazis just invent charts out of thin air and then try to posture your way to winning an argument. It's really sad.
Awww the nazi card, cute. Since all of your rubbish is for the trash (again), im asking me how you attempt to lecture others on the internet while knowing literally zero. But keep it up, would not the first time i trash you the whole time with facts while you come up with opinions, wishfull thinking and baseless assumptions.
And hey make a patreon account to buy yourself finally Zetterlings Normandy 44 so you dont have to pretend you have any knowledge what he wrote, i might even spend something for the good cause.
Otherwise write a book and prove Historians like Zetterling, Dupuy, Szamveber and Bergstrom wrong, i will buy it, i value a good laugh like everyone else.
 
Yeah because he refers purely to Pz Divs in the Normandy he has in his table from MAY 1943 to AUGUST 1944 all deliveries to ALL units including such deliveries to the Hermann Göring Division who also was in the Normandy...oh wait.

Have you actually ever even seen Zetterling's list of published books?

https://www.amazon.com/Niklas-Zetterling/e/B0028F28T6

For reference, he only has six books. Two are on ships - a Bismarck and a Tirpitz book. He has two operational history books - one on Moscow 1941 and another on the Korsun Pocket.

His two statistical analysis books - the ones which detail Panzer deliveries and losses - are on Kursk and Normandy. And if you've read the Kursk book you'd realize that he wasn't quite as comprehensive as the Normandy one (which was the real ground-breaking book).

That you're pretending that he has a "table" from May 1943 to August 1944 is pretty much fabricated. He hasn't formally published any such table in one of his books. It seems you are just pretending that his Kursk and Normandy books can be bridged together as one when in reality they are two very different books.

Moreover, you're ignoring two important things:

Third Kharkov happened in February 1943 - which was again the first ever major deployment of the Tiger tank and this was with the SS Panzer Corps - which is before the period you say he supposedly studied.

Secondly you seem to be completely ignorant of the fact that his two statistical analysis books were published in 2000 and 2004. There is a reason why he hasn't published new books since then. And it has to do with how people realized that Zetterling's "loss figures" were in fact not terribly reliable because again quartermasters are not 100% accurate when there's a war going on.

Indeed, there is in fact quite a bit of disdain toward's Zetterling's conclusions in the Kursk book among real tank historians, because based on his "war by spreadsheet" the Germans won Kursk and that the subsequent campaign in 1943 which threw the Germans out of the Ukraine should not have been possible - the Soviets shouldn't have had any tanks left to conduct the offensive to retake Ukraine based on Zetterling's numbers!

For reference, here are some of the earliest criticisms on the Kursk book:

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum4/HTML/000065.html

And anyone looking at the exchange can easily see that a big problem of Zetterling's approach is that it's "War by Spreadsheet". He tries to reduce war into loss figures and tries to math conclusions out of them.

The problem here is that war is not a spreadsheet. It's a series of events. Battles are not just about troops and losses. They require time to fight and sometime delaying a much larger force is all you need to win.

Which is also why _Sev's_ analysis completely ignores the time / delay aspect of the 9th CCR vs 2nd/116th Panzer engagements, but let's review that again a bit later.

No SS large scale deployment of the SS but three single companies in three single SS Divisions to build up cores for later Abteilungen

You say you have tables from May 1943 and yet you're commenting about Tiger incorporation into the SS Panzer Corps which occurred in 1942 and were put into combat in February 1943. It's very clear at this point that you are not even internally consistent with your arguments. You claim Zetterling has a table from May 1943-August 1944 (even though he has no single book on the subject) and yet you claim the same figures show the Tigers being added to the SS Panzer Corps which happened in the period before that.

Also what has Leningrad to do with the topic? Context is not your friend.

That's where the Tigers were deployed in 1942, where they were defeated by Russian 45mm guns. But this seems to not be dwelled on by people who want to present German armor as more capable than it actually was.

Apparently you dont know that the writen cases where mostly tank engagements or are you trying to imply that the german tank commanders shot Panzerfausts from their turrets. Funny guy.

I never said panzerfaust were fired by Panzer crewmen. I said that 30% of Allied tank losses were caused by panzerfaust - which were obviously carried by German infantry. That you assumed I meant they were fired by Panzer crewmen demonstrates how your "analysis" is colored by the very wrong idea that it was the German Panzer forces which did all of the anti-tank work; and that the Panzerjaeger arm (one battalion in each infantry Division) didn't do anything.

Firstly the main battle took part on the 18th, the final destruction on the 19th since the 2. Panzer Divison threw back the Force Harper and then on the 19th the Task Force Booth together with the rest was annhilated.

Again, read the actual battle record instead of cherry-picking the portions of the battle you like. I have already demonstrated that your "example" has blatant inaccuracies about the forces involved.

You tried to pretend that there was only one Panzer Division involved, when there were two (2nd and 116th).

You are still trying to pretend that the US force was more than CCR 9th Armored Division - when in reality Task Force Harper and Booth were just elements of the CCR.

Indeed, that you keep mixing up the Task Forces with the CCRs tells me you don't even understand how US Armored Divisions operate. US Armored Divisions don't suddenly generate new tanks out of thin air. They are instead easily reorganized into Task-focused units - which is why each Task Force had a mix of tanks and infantry - but all of them nonetheless were drawn from the same pool of just two battalions.

And again - It was not an even battle. It was two US battalions against a Panzer Division which was then reinforced by a second Panzer Division. The US were outnumbered by as much as 9-1.

That is why their mission - which you completely ignore - is to delay the Panzer forces. A mission that they succeeded at because the 101st was able to deploy in Bastogne before the Panzers got there. And thanks to this delay the entire German offensive was doomed.

War is not an excel spreadsheet. Running up your score by picking specific battles and ignoring their context isn't how wars are fought are won. It's just stat-padding.

Also, it would be good if you stopped repeating terms that I have said and completely butchering their meaning. "Context" means showing the broader picture to show where the individual battles fit in the larger campaign. I actually read the battle report. I am very familiar with the overall Ardennes Campaign. That's why I can summarize the whole series of engagements into just a few sentences and explain its real impact on the war.

By contrast you use the word "context" to basically say "It does not support my historically inaccurate views of German tank superiority". What you're doing is not providing context. You're engaging in "alternative facts", which is no surprise when your favorite author on the subject is basically a Neo-Nazi writer whose "analysis" consists of wrongly copying statistics from real historians like Buckley to perpetuate the myth of Panzertruppen supermen.
 
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I miss Warpact/NATO debates...

No!

There are thousands of these people. Millions maybe. They'll keep our new game flush with cash for years. No more waiting in lobbies for an hour or more just to get some chumps DC'ing after 10 minutes.

These are great days we're living bros! We're Jolly Green Giants walking the earth... with guns! These boos we will waste in the future are the finest monetary contributors to Eugen we will ever know.
 
Have you actually ever even seen Zetterling's list of published books?

https://www.amazon.com/Niklas-Zetterling/e/B0028F28T6

For reference, he only has six books.

Six books isn't too shabby. It's six more than I and a lot of people will ever publish! How many articles and reports has he published? If Sweden is anything like UK academia, peer-reviewed articles may be considered much more valuable than books when it comes to audits.

For reference, here are some of the earliest criticisms on the Kursk book:

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum4/HTML/000065.html

And anyone looking at the exchange can easily see that a big problem of Zetterling's approach is that it's "War by Spreadsheet". He tries to reduce war into loss figures and tries to math conclusions out of them.

The problem here is that war is not a spreadsheet. It's a series of events. Battles are not just about troops and losses. They require time to fight and sometime delaying a much larger force is all you need to win.

I agree with you that "Battles are not just about troops and losses", and that the tactics, actions and consequences need to be taken into consideration. However dismissing logistics and analyses of logistics out of hand simply because they tend to result in quantitative data is equally narrrow and limited. You have to consider a vast array of variables to gain a holistic understanding of a singular battle, an offensive, a campaign, a theatre; the combat, the logistics, the technologies, and so forth.

I admit that I haven't read Zetterling's book, but from that discussion you linked (and the original link within that discussion), people were not necessarily criticising the use of statistics but the scope of the study, the accuracy of the data, and the eventual conclusions. Debating methodologies does not immediately correspond to rejecting those methodologies.

Finally, I'm not sure calling people Nazis and neo-Nazis just because you disagree with their conclusions or methodologies is particularly mature.
 
That you're pretending that he has a "table" from May 1943 to August 1944 is pretty much fabricated.

And this BS peddler even gets agreed with.

lX2uEhb.png

HOsh0XS.png


The fabricated charts may 43/august 44 from Zetterlings book on Normandy.

By contrast you use the word "context" to basically say "It does not support my historically inaccurate views of German tank superiority". What you're doing is not providing context. You're engaging in "alternative facts", which is no surprise when your favorite author on the subject is basically a Neo-Nazi writer whose "analysis" consists of wrongly copying statistics from real historians like Buckley to perpetuate the myth of Panzertruppen supermen.

He is "wrongly" copying statistics out of archival documents he has scanned into his book, which is just another book you probably went Tl:dr on.

You say you have tables from May 1943 and yet you're commenting about Tiger incorporation into the SS Panzer Corps which occurred in 1942 and were put into combat in February 1943. It's very clear at this point that you are not even internally consistent with your arguments. You claim Zetterling has a table from May 1943-August 1944 (even though he has no single book on the subject) and yet you claim the same figures show the Tigers being added to the SS Panzer Corps which happened in the period before that.

They were not prioritised in anything, not Marder IIIs, not Panthers, not Panzerwerfers, not Tigers, not anything.

First three Tiger battalions were heer. Panthers went to heer at a 4:1 ratio compared to SS.


I never said panzerfaust were fired by Panzer crewmen. I said that 30% of Allied tank losses were caused by panzerfaust - which were obviously carried by German infantry. That you assumed I meant they were fired by Panzer crewmen demonstrates how your "analysis" is colored by the very wrong idea that it was the German Panzer forces which did all of the anti-tank work; and that the Panzerjaeger arm (one battalion in each infantry Division) didn't do anything.


" Although Americans lost more tanks than the British and Canadians, the British and Canadians did it with more style. Few defeats could equal the grandeur of 500 burning hulks at Goodwood or the destruction ofthe BCRs during Totalize. The Americans were bled slowly and methodically by Stugs, Paks and panzerfausts. Bocage engagements were at point blank distance. Although the American tank battalion samples total 2579, half were victims of gunfire and only about 30% oft his was tank fire. The British and Canadian losses to gun flre were 60% of which 55% were kills by tanks."

The Quest for operational manuever in the Normandy Campaign, Roman Johan Jarymowycz.

Buckley also assumes similar numbers.

And german kill claims are slanted in much the same direction, majority to tanks.

MBfJDCj.png
 
Have you actually ever even seen Zetterling's list of published books?

https://www.amazon.com/Niklas-Zetterling/e/B0028F28T6

For reference, he only has six books. Two are on ships - a Bismarck and a Tirpitz book. He has two operational history books - one on Moscow 1941 and another on the Korsun Pocket.
https://www.goodreads.com/author/list/765015.Niklas_Zetterling
Right, only 5 books, there are doubles for being in swedish and in english but still. Just for the lulz how many books has someone to write until he is good in your eyes, or isnt it more what suits your agenda since real facts arent your thing as it seems.

His two statistical analysis books - the ones which detail Panzer deliveries and losses - are on Kursk and Normandy. And if you've read the Kursk book you'd realize that he wasn't quite as comprehensive as the Normandy one (which was the real ground-breaking book).
As if you had read the Kursk book but more about that later.

That you're pretending that he has a "table" from May 1943 to August 1944 is pretty much fabricated. He hasn't formally published any such table in one of his books. It seems you are just pretending that his Kursk and Normandy books can be bridged together as one when in reality they are two very different books.
Ah yes the fabricated table, which is shown in Ulatersk posts screenshots who beat me to it, so you are outright lying and as always let it look like you have read both books. I dare to say you havent even touched them. There is no bridging if i quote the deployment numbers of Tiger I in Kursk but you can keep pretending.

Moreover, you're ignoring two important things:

Third Kharkov happened in February 1943 - which was again the first ever major deployment of the Tiger tank and this was with the SS Panzer Corps - which is before the period you say he supposedly studied.
Wrong the fist major deployment happened with the 501. Schwere Panzer Abteilung on 25 November 1942 with Kampfgruppe Lueder in Tunesia, the first major deployment in the east happened on the 1 January 1943 with the 503. Schwere Panzer Abteilung securing bridges over the Mantschy river. The 502. Schwere Panzer Abteilung was already in the east but got only reinforced piecemeal. Read it up in Wolfgang Schneiders Tigers in Combat volume I. According to the units war diaries.

Secondly you seem to be completely ignorant of the fact that his two statistical analysis books were published in 2000 and 2004. There is a reason why he hasn't published new books since then. And it has to do with how people realized that Zetterling's "loss figures" were in fact not terribly reliable because again quartermasters are not 100% accurate when there's a war going on.
Have you even a single proof for this assumption? I guess no as always fabricated since you can use the link above and look at the puplished dates, his newest book in english will arrive around april-may this year. The quartermaster argument is also a made up i guess so i will save my time to ask for a proof that his books who are regarded by historians as standart books or as Glantz writes in the foreword of the Kursk study:
"Withing the context of a sound chronological narrative of the battle, Zetterling and Frankson offer an imposing statistical analysis of the Battle of Kursk. By exploiting all available German archival sources, they offer a definite view of the strength , losses, and loss rates of German forces, particularly panzer, during the Battle of Kursk. They juxtapose this against a fair represnentation of like fugures on the Red Army side. In doing so, the authors put to rest many of the myths concerning the battle and offer a work that superbly complements the best of new literature now appearing about the battle. One can only hope that the Russians will respond to this volumes`s candor by releasing appropriate data on the Red Army; but until they do, this book will justifiably remain the last word on the subject."
And its still today because since then there is no new study in this size about the battle.

Indeed, there is in fact quite a bit of disdain toward's Zetterling's conclusions in the Kursk book among real tank historians, because based on his "war by spreadsheet" the Germans won Kursk and that the subsequent campaign in 1943 which threw the Germans out of the Ukraine should not have been possible - the Soviets shouldn't have had any tanks left to conduct the offensive to retake Ukraine based on Zetterling's numbers!
Gotcha! Again like like about the Normandy book you are lying. Why? Because nowhere in the study is any statement of the Germans winning at Kursk nor does the numbers/tables even suggest that.

For reference, here are some of the earliest criticisms on the Kursk book:

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum4/HTML/000065.html

And anyone looking at the exchange can easily see that a big problem of Zetterling's approach is that it's "War by Spreadsheet". He tries to reduce war into loss figures and tries to math conclusions out of them.
And if you had read the thread or even understood what it is about you would know that the guy who tries to "proof" Zetterlings bias goes home soundly defeated...just like you.

The problem here is that war is not a spreadsheet. It's a series of events. Battles are not just about troops and losses. They require time to fight and sometime delaying a much larger force is all you need to win.

Which is also why _Sev's_ analysis completely ignores the time / delay aspect of the 9th CCR vs 2nd/116th Panzer engagements, but let's review that again a bit later.
It was never about the time or anything your statement was: show me a Regiment sized engagement after D-Day were the Germans win. I showed you some, now you are shifting goalposts, as to be expected, but as i said you can read Ardennes by Bergstrom who uses the data of both sides and you will find many many more engagements who end in a German victory.


You say you have tables from May 1943 and yet you're commenting about Tiger incorporation into the SS Panzer Corps which occurred in 1942 and were put into combat in February 1943. It's very clear at this point that you are not even internally consistent with your arguments. You claim Zetterling has a table from May 1943-August 1944 (even though he has no single book on the subject) and yet you claim the same figures show the Tigers being added to the SS Panzer Corps which happened in the period before that.
God, seems you fail in context...again. Good i dumb it down once more. Zetterlings table ( you know the one that according to you and book owner of Normandy 44 doesnt exist) in Normandy 44 shows the tank deliveries of Pz IV and Pz V and they show NO priority in deliveries of equipment for the SS, as i already put down above the Tiger companies in the three SS Divisions were also no priority, the Heer got Tigers sooner and more and it stayed like that the whole war. Period. No priority for Waffen SS. Period.
Simple enough this time?

That's where the Tigers were deployed in 1942, where they were defeated by Russian 45mm guns. But this seems to not be dwelled on by people who want to present German armor as more capable than it actually was.
Cool story bro, it has to do with your "opinion" that SS had a priority in equipment? Right.


I never said panzerfaust were fired by Panzer crewmen. I said that 30% of Allied tank losses were caused by panzerfaust - which were obviously carried by German infantry. That you assumed I meant they were fired by Panzer crewmen demonstrates how your "analysis" is colored by the very wrong idea that it was the German Panzer forces which did all of the anti-tank work; and that the Panzerjaeger arm (one battalion in each infantry Division) didn't do anything.
Ah yes the 30% meme, also assumingly made up since:
GUNFIRE: Allied Tank Casualties Sampling: ETO 1944"
June July August September October November December
CON 71% 50% 68% 38% 33% 2% 25%
OK 85% 70% 64% 40% 68% 10% 12%
USA 50% 28% 60% 64% 48% 47% 53%
huuuui a lot of losses by gunfire....hmmm lays in line with the conclusions of Buckley, Zetterling, Szamveber and Bergstrom. This includes ofc. also ATGs but as we saw in buckleys book the german tanks outnumbered the ATGs 3:1 and the kill claims represent that too.
But wait there is more, you will like it:
HOLLOW CHARGE: AIlied Tank Casualties Sampling: ETO 1944"
June July August September October November December
CDN 1% 4% 9% 12% 10% 1% 25%
UK 3% 4% 12% 5% 6% 1% 11%
USA 3% 22% 9% 8% 13% 9% 13%
WOW hollow charged weapons like the Panzerfaust or the Panzerschreck made up 13% on the US troops losses, seems you have to subtract 17% from your 30%.
The source is: ORO T 117 So what is this document you may ask well its a sampling study of 10388 allied tank casualties in all theaters, in case you have again context problems you see in the headline this is for the European Theater.
Seems your list of nazi/fraud authors is rising.

Again, read the actual battle record instead of cherry-picking the portions of the battle you like. I have already demonstrated that your "example" has blatant inaccuracies about the forces involved.

You tried to pretend that there was only one Panzer Division involved, when there were two (2nd and 116th).

You are still trying to pretend that the US force was more than CCR 9th Armored Division - when in reality Task Force Harper and Booth were just elements of the CCR.

Indeed, that you keep mixing up the Task Forces with the CCRs tells me you don't even understand how US Armored Divisions operate. US Armored Divisions don't suddenly generate new tanks out of thin air. They are instead easily reorganized into Task-focused units - which is why each Task Force had a mix of tanks and infantry - but all of them nonetheless were drawn from the same pool of just two battalions.
Still dont getting that a Combt Command consists out of more than two Batallions? God get a grip and read some books, like really.
Again you can pick on this battles i quoted because they follow up each other as you will since as you dont even get components of a CC right doesnt change the fact that there are tons of tank engagements who are won by the Germans and the data from both sides SHOW as already written down that the germans outperformed the US troops in tank engagements.

And again - It was not an even battle. It was two US battalions against a Panzer Division which was then reinforced by a second Panzer Division. The US were outnumbered by as much as 9-1.
Proof? Or made up number like the 30% above? Why am i asking, especialy since the germans outnumbered the US forces with a factor 2,5:1 on the first day of the offensive, afterwards steadily getting lower. Source: Zetterling Normandy 44 Chapter 8 German Combat Efficiency

That is why their mission - which you completely ignore - is to delay the Panzer forces. A mission that they succeeded at because the 101st was able to deploy in Bastogne before the Panzers got there. And thanks to this delay the entire German offensive was doomed.
Since the 2.Pz. Div. was not moving towards Bastonge but the Pz Lehr and the 26. VG Div this is an 100% wrong statement, as a nice tidbit: the Germans moved with 80 km in several days in the Ardennes over icy, snowcovered roads while conducting battles faster as the US troops in Operation Cobra in the summer with air supremacy who only had came on 60 km. Source: same as above, same chapter

War is not an excel spreadsheet. Running up your score by picking specific battles and ignoring their context isn't how wars are fought are won. It's just stat-padding.
The horse isnt already dead yet? Well we didnt talk about winning wars but tank engagements, still trying to shift goalpost i see, desperation rises hm?

Also, it would be good if you stopped repeating terms that I have said and completely butchering their meaning. "Context" means showing the broader picture to show where the individual battles fit in the larger campaign. I actually read the battle report. I am very familiar with the overall Ardennes Campaign. That's why I can summarize the whole series of engagements into just a few sentences and explain its real impact on the war.
You are not even in the slightest familiar with anything you write here as i just proofed especially not with: Mechanized Warfare, TO&Es, doctrins, tactics, Studies, the Ardennes campaign, the Normandy campaign. All i see here is slandering historians and fabricating outright lies as seen above.

By contrast you use the word "context" to basically say "It does not support my historically inaccurate views of German tank superiority". What you're doing is not providing context. You're engaging in "alternative facts", which is no surprise when your favorite author on the subject is basically a Neo-Nazi writer whose "analysis" consists of wrongly copying statistics from real historians like Buckley to perpetuate the myth of Panzertruppen supermen.
Too sad that just Buckley supports the theory that most of the losses came from tanks, which supports also Jentz and his data, Szamvebers data, Zetterlings data and Bergstroms data who all use data from both sides. Intriguing isnt it.
The fabricated neo nazi slandering just reinforces my point above.
I think we can close the case. Bye and have a good time with your applause clowns.
 
https://www.goodreads.com/author/list/765015.Niklas_Zetterling
Right, only 5 books, there are doubles for being in swedish and in english but still. Just for the lulz how many books has someone to write until he is good in your eyes, or isnt it more what suits your agenda since real facts arent your thing as it seems.

The list has 20 books but adds only three additional campaign books - Barbarossa, Blitzkrieg, and Norway/Danish. Again, none of those cover the period of 1943 of Third Kharkov.

Again, the only book he ever addresses the SS issue is Normandy 1944.

It's rather obvious at this point that you yourself have not read any of Zetterling's actual books or even their cover summaries given that you provide lists but can't even detail their contents. Meanwhile I took a look at your link and again found nothing to support the idea that he has some magical chart from May 1943 - Aug 1944 aside from the bit where he talks about the SS in Normandy 1944. He doesn't have any book that's a general history of German tank warfare in that period.

Ah yes the fabricated table, which is shown in Ulatersk posts screenshots who beat me to it, so you are outright lying and as always let it look like you have read both books. I dare to say you havent even touched them. There is no bridging if i quote the deployment numbers of Tiger I in Kursk but you can keep pretending.

Sorry, I must've missed the dates in the Normandy '44 book because I really don't waste time trying to play "War by Spreadsheet" and don't bother to memorize grossly inaccurate delivery figures (with Zetterling pointing out the inaccuracies himself in the tables - which is why he's a historian and you're not).

And as usual, any time someone makes a minor error you completely forget about the rest of the arguments like:

Third Kharkov happened in February 1943 - which was again the first ever major deployment of the Tiger tank and this was with the SS Panzer Corps - which is before the period you say he supposedly studied.

Secondly you seem to be completely ignorant of the fact that his two statistical analysis books were published in 2000 and 2004. There is a reason why he hasn't published new books since then. And it has to do with how people realized that Zetterling's "loss figures" were in fact not terribly reliable because again quartermasters are not 100% accurate when there's a war going on.

Now, since you're too busy gloating to admit it - but that table is from Normandy '44 - like I had been insisting all along and where the focus of his work was on the units in France at the time. And again, you're clinging to a book published more than a decade ago where he himself is pointing out the problems with his methodology? Really?

Wrong the fist major deployment happened with the 501. Schwere Panzer Abteilung on 25 November 1942 with Kampfgruppe Lueder in Tunesia, the first major deployment in the east happened on the 1 January 1943 with the 503. Schwere Panzer Abteilung securing bridges over the Mantschy river. The 502. Schwere Panzer Abteilung was already in the east but got only reinforced piecemeal. Read it up in Wolfgang Schneiders Tigers in Combat volume I. According to the units war diaries.

Lol, cherry-picking your German Panzer fanboy stories again? Even wikipedia is more accurate than you now!

The first combat deployment anywhere was around Leningrad in September 1942.

"Eager to make use of the powerful new weapon, Hitler ordered the vehicle be pressed into service months earlier than had planned.[50] A platoon of four Tigers went into action on 23 September 1942 near Leningrad"

The first combat deployment in Tunisia was in December:

In the North African Campaign, the Tiger I first saw action during the Tunisia Campaign on 1 December 1942 east of Tebourba when three Tigers attacked an olive grove 5 km west of Djedeida.[53] The thick olive grove made visibility very limited and enemy tanks were engaged at close range. The Tigers were hit by a number of M3 Lee tanks firing at a range of 80 to 100 metres. Two of the Lees were knocked out in this action. The Tiger tanks proved that it had excellent protection from enemy fire; this greatly increased the crew's trust in the quality of the armour.[53] The first loss to an Allied gun was on 20 January 1943 near Robaa,[54] when a battery of the British 72nd Anti-Tank Regiment knocked out a Tiger with their 6-pounder (57 mm) anti-tank guns. Seven Tigers were immobilised by mines during the failed attack on Béja during Operation Ochsenkopf at the end of February

But again, the Franz Kurowski readers don't want to remember the first deployment because it was an embarrassment.

Have you even a single proof for this assumption? I guess no as always fabricated since you can use the link above and look at the puplished dates, his newest book in english will arrive around april-may this year.

His next book is on 1939-1940. I hardly think it will feature tables from February 1943.

The quartermaster argument is also a made up

Zetterling literally admits that the delivery schedule he presented was wrong by as much as one month in many cases. Again, you don't seem to understand that "War is not a spreadsheet".

"Withing the context of a sound chronological narrative of the battle, Zetterling and Frankson offer an imposing statistical analysis of the Battle of Kursk. By exploiting all available German archival sources, they offer a definite view of the strength , losses, and loss rates of German forces, particularly panzer, during the Battle of Kursk. They juxtapose this against a fair represnentation of like fugures on the Red Army side. In doing so, the authors put to rest many of the myths concerning the battle and offer a work that superbly complements the best of new literature now appearing about the battle. One can only hope that the Russians will respond to this volumes`s candor by releasing appropriate data on the Red Army; but until they do, this book will justifiably remain the last word on the subject."
And its still today because since then there is no new study in this size about the battle.

Yes, but that was back in 2004. We're in 2017 now. And we have very different views from analyzing the same numbers like in the book "Kursk: The German View" but since Zetterling is apparently all you claim to read (but clearly don't) then I'm not particularly inclined to believe your petty posturing.

Gotcha! Again like like about the Normandy book you are lying. Why? Because nowhere in the study is any statement of the Germans winning at Kursk nor does the numbers/tables even suggest that.

Uh, you did read the criticism right? Where Zetterling said that the 25% infantry losses were "not significant" when they in fact were - because unlike fanboy interpretations infantrymen for assault roles are amongst the hardest to replace. Moscow could now be assaulted in 1941 because the German infantry had suffered 25% losses or worse. Why would it be different at Kursk?

Zetterling whole thesis of the Kursk book is that the German losses were not as bad as people make them out to be. But if they weren't... then why was Ukraine liberated in 1943 and why was Germany unable to do any further major counter-attacks?

But really, we can summarize your entire attitude to historical research by your next statement:

And if you had read the thread or even understood what it is about you would know that the guy who tries to "proof" Zetterlings bias goes home soundly defeated...just like you.

No, _Sev_, you aren't going to change the fact that Germany and its crew of drug-addled supermen wannabes lost the real war by pretending you "win" at Internet debates. Indeed a big reason why they lost the war was because they kept tunnel-visioning themselves into believing they were "winning" when they were in reality losing. And very badly at that.

That you "read" that thread and pretended that Zetterling "won" the argument and proved he wasn't "biased" only proves you are biased and have lost all credibility with regards to discussing history even before you quoted yet another (completely meaningless) spreadsheet.

To begin with - how do you determine whether 25% losses represent "major" losses or "low" losses in the first place?

Neither side of that debate (including Zetterling) was actually able to present a good argument of how to treat the 25% losses, because neither side provided a point of comparison to previous campaigns and operations. They were both - by their own admissions - working off their assumptions.

Problem is, Zetterling's assumptions - which is that infantry losses of 25% were easily replaced - were wrong. They've been known to be wrong since the 90s when Ty Bomba did a look at the failed German assault on Moscow in 1941. Back then Zetterling could have been forgiven since that data was relatively new, but we're in 2017 at this point. Other authors have looked at Moscow 1941 and drew the same conclusions. A 25% loss in infantry was a considerable loss.

That you didn't even comment on this - and which really cements how you and your cronies are stuck in a bizarre time-warp from the early 2000s - is a reflection of how your viewpoint is just narrowly focused towards Kurowski "Panzer Aces" fanfiction. In reality most research on Kursk today is looking at the infantry fight - because people have only belatedly realized that this was a battle of millions of men and yet everyone focuses on one skirmish between a couple of hundred guys and their tanks at Prokorvka.

Yet you didn't comment on this because... what, you don't understand how real war works and infantry is really important to winning it?

It's the same problem with how you still can't admit that 2nd Panzer Division with support of the 116th only fought two battalions of 9th Armored CCR, was delayed significantly (by the admission of its own officers) and failed to secure the town that really mattered - which was Bastogne?

Because really, when you say things like this:

Since the 2.Pz. Div. was not moving towards Bastonge but the Pz Lehr and the 26. VG Div this is an 100% wrong statement, as a nice tidbit: the Germans moved with 80 km in several days in the Ardennes over icy, snowcovered roads while conducting battles faster as the US troops in Operation Cobra in the summer with air supremacy who only had came on 60 km. Source: same as above, same chapter

When even publicaly available maps in Wikipedia show that 5th Panzer Army (parent unit of 2nd Panzer) show this:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/50/Wacht_am_Rhein_map_(Opaque).svg

It's really obvious that you're a bit too focused in trying to live in a world of alternate facts created by spreadsheets instead of, I dunno, looking at an actual battle map and understanding how the whole series of events happened for a change.

But sure, let's pretend that 2nd Panzer Army was just honorably driving around in circles in some unspecified area in the Ardennes and racking up (fake)high kill ratios to justify that running around in circles and shooting up random people somehow wins wars instead of securing your parent unit's actual primary objective.
 
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And this BS peddler even gets agreed with.

Of course, because I actually read the book. You took the spreadsheet and declared victory. Again, there is an enormous gulf between wannabes trying to pretend they know war by throwing spreadsheets around and people who actually read the book and understood the methodology (and more importantly, the limitations) of the author. But as with much of the War Thunder mafia you're so terribly insecure by how literally every modern tank expert (Zaloga, Showalter, DiNardo, Citino, even Schneider) has major reservations about the bloody nonsense of German tank superiority that you cling to spreadsheets written by long-dead quartermasters dug up by a researcher from a decade ago.

And how do I show that I read the book? Would you mind taking a read at the bit below the chart?


Note the bit where he says that a tank said to be issued in this table may have been issued the next month? So how exactly is this chart terribly accurate when the reality on the ground may be as much as one whole month removed from this chart? (and this is before we get to the fact that SS had higher manpower in their best units - 19,000 men - compared to 16,000 men or less than in other similar units. But again this is what happens when you tunnel vision all analysis to just tank numbers).

Again, there's a reason why people don't take Zetterling's analysis too seriously anymore. His data is too inaccurate to be making wide-sweeping assumptions based on them. To his credit, he admits to them. To your discredit, your keep glossing over it and instead engage in personal attacks on those who simply point out that you're widely exaggerating the quality of your sources which are in any case more than a decade old and like seven books behind current.

" Although Americans lost more tanks than the British and Canadians, the British and Canadians did it with more style. Few defeats could equal the grandeur of 500 burning hulks at Goodwood or the destruction ofthe BCRs during Totalize. The Americans were bled slowly and methodically by Stugs, Paks and panzerfausts. Bocage engagements were at point blank distance. Although the American tank battalion samples total 2579, half were victims of gunfire and only about 30% oft his was tank fire. The British and Canadian losses to gun flre were 60% of which 55% were kills by tanks."

The Quest for operational manuever in the Normandy Campaign, Roman Johan Jarymowycz.

Buckley also assumes similar numbers.

If you understood the subject you'd understand that the British have a very lively back-and-forth with who-is-to-blame for their Normandy tank losses. Albeit I would congratulate you for proving that _Sev_'s earlier assertions - that the German armor inflicted all of the Allied tank losses - is grossly false; and that his 100-1 kill ratio calculations were nonsensical. As you just pointed admited - at most only 55% of 60% of losses were due to enemy tanks. That actually means it's just 33% of British Allied tank losses were due to enemy Panzers according to Roman.

You just didn't point it out because you were too busy trying to back up your fellow War Thunder Panzer Ace myth-makers.

But yeah, sure, keep up with trying to pretend you're "winning" some kind of war.
 
Of course, because I actually read the book.

No, you did not.

But as with much of the War Thunder mafia you're so terribly insecure by how literally every modern tank expert (Zaloga, Showalter, DiNardo, Citino, even Schneider) has major reservations about the bloody nonsense of German tank superiority that you cling to spreadsheets written by long-dead quartermasters dug up by a researcher from a decade ago.


Im not insecure.

Im having a sincere laugh about your peddling of complete, and utter nonsense, through appeals to authority, emotional arguments, and blanket statements.

Its hilarious, really.

Note the bit where he says that a tank said to be issued in this table may have been issued the next month? So how exactly is this chart terribly accurate when the reality on the ground may be as much as one whole month removed from this chart?

And complete strawmen with a side of misrepresentation.

Yes, the fact that tanks might not have been dispatched until next month will cause the reality of 4:1 ratio between Heer and SS and existence of only two Panther battalions in 1943 compared to 6 total, in LSSAH and Das Reich, to equalize to 1:1 or higher ratio, so your wild imagination will be satisfied.

and this is before we get to the fact that SS had higher manpower in their best units - 19,000 men - compared to 16,000 men or less than in other similar units. But again this is what happens when you tunnel vision all analysis to just tank numbers).

Nice shifting of goalpost.

Atleast you got where you wanted to go on the third or fourth try.

Congratulations, SS is still not prioritised in vehicles.


Again, there's a reason why people don't take Zetterling's analysis too seriously anymore. His data is too inaccurate to be making wide-sweeping assumptions based on them. To his credit, he admits to them. To your discredit, your keep glossing over it and instead engage in personal attacks on those who simply point out that you're widely exaggerating the quality of your sources which are in any case more than a decade old and like seven books behind current.

Atleast they arent neonazi fanfiction, we are making progress here.

Yawn.


If you understood the subject you'd understand that the British have a very lively back-and-forth with who-is-to-blame for their Normandy tank losses. Albeit I would congratulate you for proving that _Sev_'s earlier assertions - that the German armor inflicted all of the Allied tank losses - is grossly false; and that his 100-1 kill ratio calculations were nonsensical. As you just pointed admited - at most only 55% of 60% of losses were due to enemy tanks. That actually means it's just 33% of British Allied tank losses were due to enemy Panzers according to Roman.


Excellent strawmaning.


1. British gunfire losses in Normandy were in major part caused by tanks, he is right in that. Im honestly shocked that you manage to strawman and misrepresent arguments on a same page in a thread,
2. Those are no calculations, and that statement was made in a different context. So again, strike.
3. Yes, it lines up moderately well with Buckley and inaccurate Zetterling in a ration of 3:1:1 Tank, SPG,AT-gun, when it comes to share of gunfire losses for Brits in Normandy.

You just didn't point it out because you were too busy trying to back up your fellow War Thunder Panzer Ace myth-makers.

Ive yet to see any facts, just personal attacks.


Maybe, just maybe, you can bring your authors from current year into your next post to finally source any of your statements at all.
 
You're seeing a Warsaw Pact vs NATO argument right now just with different names, it makes me smirk to see some people I recognize as Pact proponents argue strongly in favour American engineering and skill in world war 2.

As Hugh Laurie once famously said :
"Just because we all hate the german does not mean we have to like the Swedes Americans"
 
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