About Moldova & Wallachia's level of development. There is this Youtube channel called Corpus Draculianum. They are a group of professional historians from universities and scientific institutes in Germany and Romania. Their main expertise is Vlad Drăculea but naturally they have a lot of knowledge about the history of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania.
They mostly talk about Vlad Drăculea so 1450s, but given that EU5 will reach 1450s and beyond, this may be some useful information about the broader Wallachia and Moldavia as a whole. I can see it most relevant for balancing the power and traits of Wallachia and Moldavia. I'll AI translate some videos relevant to the game & make summaries of the wall of text at the end.
Who was more advanced, Wallachia or Moldavia?
The answer to the question of which region was more advanced in the Middle Ages, Wallachia or Moldova, is clear: Moldova. The chancery and administration were more advanced in Moldova. Stephen the Great and his successors had a large number of educated people capable of writing chronicles. The first Romanian chronicles from Wallachia are two centuries later. Moldovan diplomacy reached as far as Moscow and Italy, while the Wallachians barely reached Budapest. The Moldovan military organization survived numerous wars with the Hungarians, Ottomans, Poles, and Tatars. The Wallachians fought only two major battles with the Ottomans, whereas Moldova under Stephen had 10 impressive stone fortresses, while Vlad the Impaler only had one, and that one was not used for military purposes, as others had been taken by the Ottomans a generation earlier. It is no surprise that Stephen the Great built more churches and monasteries than all the Wallachian princes and boyars combined in the 15th century. Moldova paid the Ottomans half as much tribute as the Wallachians, and half a century later, that remained the case.
- Moldavia was clearly more advanced than Wallachia.
- The chancery, administration, education more advanced in Moldova.
- The Moldovan military organization was better.
- Moldavia had 10 stone fortresses, Wallachia had 1.
- Moldova paid the Ottomans half as much tribute as the Wallachians.
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My take: This was very interesting, I always assumed by default that Wallachia was always the most developed. And I still think that was the case in 1337, but it looks like by 1450s, Moldavia was a league above Wallachia)
Who was more respected by Europe, Wallachia or Moldavia?
Who were more respected in medieval Europe, the Wallachians or the Moldavians? The resistance of both Wallachians and Moldavians against the Ottomans sparked Europe's interest. Western chroniclers began to gather information about the Romanians, evaluating them culturally, politically, and militarily. So, who do you think were their favorites? The answer is quite clear—the Moldavians! The famous Cosmography of the German scholar Sebastian Münster, published in over 50 editions in multiple languages, highlights three highly appreciated aspects of the Moldavians: 1. Political stability, 2. Less violence, brutality, and tendency toward robbery, as well as fewer superstitions compared to Wallachia, and 3. The warrior spirit and ability to defend themselves. Münster claims that it was said the Moldavians were always ready for battle and that their country was even unconquerable. The one who shaped this image in Europe was, of course, Stephen the Great.
- The Moldavians were more respected than the Wallachians in medieval Europe.
- Moldavia had more political stability, less violence, brutality, less robbery, and fewer superstitions than Wallachia.
- Moldavia had better warrior spirit and ability to defend themselves.
- Münster claims that it was said the Moldavians were always ready for battle and that their country was even unconquerable.
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My take: not only more economically developed, but also more military powerful)
What did you have to do to become a Voievode, a leader of a Romanian state?
The term "voivode" derives from the Slavic words "voina" (meaning war) and "void" (meaning ruler or leader). Since the one who leads armies usually has the greatest influence in politics, this term came to denote leaders of lower rank than a king ("kral" in Serbian, "kiraly" in Hungarian, "crai" in Romanian). Originally used in the Serbian regions, the term spread to Macedonia, Bosnia, north of the Danube, and even to the Ottoman Empire, where it later came to designate the office of governor. In Wallachia and Moldova, there was no right of primogeniture, meaning any male offspring could claim the throne. The principle of legitimization was simple: the contender had to prove he had "reigning bone," meaning that his entire lineage had been rulers. Throne contenders could be both legitimate sons and bastards, the latter born of prominent mothers, common women, or those of dubious reputation. What truly mattered was the father's "bone." Another inherited condition from the Byzantines was that the contender had to be physically intact. This explains why, in the Slavic, Byzantine, and Romanian medieval worlds, competing relatives were often mutilated, usually by gouging out eyes or cutting off noses and/or ears. A ruler could reign from virtually any age, unless cut short by the ruthless intervention of death.
- In Wallachia and Moldova, there was no right of primogeniture, meaning any male offspring could claim the throne.
- The contender only had to prove he had "reigning bone," meaning that his entire lineage had been rulers.
- Throne contenders could be both legitimate sons and bastards. What truly mattered was the father's "bone."
- The contender had to be physically intact.
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My take: the interesting part about this one was the part where there was no primogeniture in Wallachia and Moldova)
Were Wallachia and Moldavia always allies?
Romanian history, much like the histories of neighboring nations, has been strongly ideologized and instrumentalized by different political regimes. One of the most frequent questions asked is whether Stephen the Great and Vlad the Impaler were friends and allies, thus forming a kind of Romanian alliance, or if this idea is merely a nationalist invention. Today, we reveal what the sources have to say, some of which have been previously ignored. It turns out that the two figures had, at one point, a significant political interest in convincing their contemporaries of the special nature of their relationship.
Greetings! My name is Adrian Gheorghe, a PhD in history, and together with Albert Weber, another PhD and author of this episode, I'm part of the international scientific team Corpus Draculianum, awarded by the Romanian Academy. What we present here is based on sources and our research, along with the work of other important historians. We also want to thank our sponsor, Andrei GPL, and all the other soldiers of His Majesty's army who made small contributions to keep the flag flying.
You may have already heard that Vlad and Stephen were cousins, and thus had an emotionally close relationship. However, there are two significant problems with this assumption. First, it's undocumented who Vlad's mother was, which raises many speculations. We don't even know if she was Romanian, Hungarian, or of another ethnicity, nor whether Vlad and his brothers had the same mother. It is not certain that Vlad Dracul had only one wife who gave birth to his sons. Historians have speculated about his mother's identity, with some suggesting she was Anastasia or Cniajna. What is known is that Vlad Dracul was once married to the daughter of Moldavian voivode Alexander the Good, making her Stephen the Great's aunt. However, this conflicts with the idea that she was the mother of all Vlad's children, as it would mean Stephen married his niece and that his third son, Bogdan, would have been the result of an incestuous relationship—something that would have likely attracted criticism in contemporary society.
The second problem arises when trying to establish Vlad's relationship with Stephen the Great, especially considering our modern perception of medieval kinship. Kinship in the Middle Ages did not exclude fierce competition for power, prestige, or the throne. In fact, it didn't guarantee amicable relations, even among close relatives. For example, Vlad and his brother Radu the Handsome fought against each other. This behavior was not exceptional in medieval Europe, where family cruelty was not uncommon. Assuming that Vlad and Stephen must have been friends just because they were cousins is naive and overlooks the brutal political culture of the time.
Vlad's biographers claim that after losing his first reign in 1448, he sought refuge in Moldova at the court of Bogdan II, Stephen's father. The image of two young voivodes becoming full-fledged men together in the beautiful medieval Moldova radiates a sentimental aura. But the reality was more complex. Bogdan II was allied with Vlad's enemies, including Vladislav II and Iancu of Hunedoara, who had killed Vlad Dracul and his older brother, Mircea. Vladislav likely helped Bogdan seize the throne of Moldavia, and the young Vlad, driven by survival instincts, did not feel safe staying close to Bogdan.
By 1451, after the murder of Bogdan II, both Stephen and Vlad sought refuge in Transylvania. Some historians believe the two may have fought together and sealed a pact: whoever reached the throne first would help the other. However, there is no written evidence to support this. The only clue is that Stephen took the throne from Petru Aron in 1457 with the help of Wallachian soldiers, likely sent by Vlad, as he had already taken the throne in 1456. This could suggest an alliance, but the details remain unclear.
In 1462, Stephen attacked the Chilia fortress while Vlad was facing the army of Sultan Mehmed II. Was this betrayal between two allies or evidence of a long-standing enmity? The conflict between Moldavians and Wallachians was not unprecedented; it followed the political logic of the time. Both Stephen and Vlad were vassals of different kings—Stephen of the King of Poland and Vlad of the King of Hungary. Their rivalry, therefore, was influenced by the interests of these larger powers. The conflict likely stemmed from Vlad's response to the looting of Szeklers by Stephen, which was revenge for their support of Petru Aron, the man who killed Bogdan II.
By 1475, just before Vlad's death, the two were united in a political alliance with Hungary against the Ottoman Empire. After the Battle of Vaslui, Stephen, facing the threat of Ottoman revenge, joined the Hungarians for military aid, which included the recently rehabilitated Vlad the Impaler. This alliance was more about military and political necessity than genuine friendship, with both rulers aiming to secure support against the Ottomans.
In conclusion, while Vlad the Impaler and Stephen the Great may have been politically aligned at certain points in history, there is little evidence to suggest a deep personal friendship or lasting alliance between them. They were neighbors, sometimes allies, sometimes competitors, who navigated the brutal political landscape of their time. As for their kinship, it remains uncertain, with no clear written proof to confirm their familial ties. What is clear, however, is that their relationship was shaped more by the strategic needs of the time than by emotional bonds.
- Vlad the Impaler & Stephen the Great may or may not have been cousins, but even if they were, this did not guarantee a deep relationship.
- For example, Vlad and his brother Radu the Handsome fought against each other.
- The conflict between Moldavians and Wallachians was not unprecedented; it followed the political logic of the time. Both Stephen and Vlad were vassals of different kings, Stephen of the King of Poland and Vlad of the King of Hungary. Their rivalry, therefore, was influenced by the interests of these larger powers.
- Just before Vlad's death, the two were united in a political alliance with Hungary against the Ottoman Empire.
- This alliance was more about military and political necessity than genuine friendship, with both rulers aiming to secure support against the Ottomans.
- In conclusion, while Vlad the Impaler and Stephen the Great may have been politically aligned at certain points in history, there is little evidence to suggest a deep personal friendship or lasting alliance between them. They were neighbors, sometimes allies, sometimes competitors, who navigated the brutal political landscape of their time.
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My take: As expected, they were both Romanian principalities, but this did not grant them a "special relationship", they fought themselves just as much as they fought others)
How long did the Middle Ages last in Wallachia and Moldavia? i.e. how underdeveloped where they?
We learned at school that the Middle Ages ended in the Romanian Principalities around Tudor Vladimirescu, in 1821. That would make us something very special, since nowhere else does the Middle Ages last that long. More recently, this idea has been used to feed the frustrations of some people who see in their own culture and history only signs of falling behind those they consider "civilized." But the matter is so simple in its complexity that this periodization offers no reason for either shame or pride. Moreover, we will see that we are not, in fact, very far from the Central and Western European Middle Ages, the one we get as the ultimate benchmark in movies and internet culture.
Greetings! My name is Adrian Gheorghe. I'm a PhD in history and part of the international research team Corpus Draculianum. Before we get started, I want to make sure you've properly impaled the subscribe button and the notification bell. I have one more important request: We have just launched an English-only channel for international audiences. Help it grow fast to become visible in the YouTube algorithm! Please subscribe and like, at least pro forma, so we can get promoted. His Majesty Vlad will pass you in his register.
It must be said from the outset that periodization is only a construct, i.e., a kind of fabrication of historians, which, however, has no evil or occult purpose. Its purpose is as well-intentioned as possible, namely to make history more accessible to the public and young students, but also to help create specializations. Periodization has therefore a pedagogical purpose. It presupposes more or less an artificial segmentation of historical time, continuous in its own way, into small portions to which certain characteristics are assigned. This involves a certain amount of simplification and schematism.
The events in a certain historical segment are packaged with the help of certain principles that make complex things much easier to digest. That is, history acquires a kind of grammar if you divide it into pieces and according to a certain structure. Segmentation is operated where history notices a certain break in the historical content: a revolution (violent or just technological or economic), a cataclysm of any kind, something that makes reality look completely different from what it was before. A historical caesura, therefore, would cause society to change its thinking in order to face a new political, social, cultural, or economic reality.
And yet, don't imagine Uncle George, returned tired from the plough, going to bed one evening in the Middle Ages, and the next day, stretching like a cat, he leaves about 2-3 hours of relaxation in his bed, which overnight had become somewhat more comfortable due to historical progress. Looking at the new sun of the premodern age, he saw his future with much greater optimism, now that something told him that he was no longer living in that dark Middle Ages.
Although in universities and research institutes new ideas began to arise, Romanian historical culture continues to be dominated by an old (and perverse, I would say) attempt at periodization. According to it, the Middle Ages would end in Wallachia and Moldova with the Revolution of Tudor Vladimirescu in 1821, and in Transylvania a little earlier, with the uprising of Horea, Cloșca, and Crișan. Notice the revolutionary common ground. This is not accidental and has to do with Marxist-Communist ideology, which saw history as a continuous class struggle between the oppressors and the oppressed. Revolutions were seen as major leaps in history in that they would facilitate social progress. The old and rotten order is burned down, and a new chance is given to the progressive elements in the struggle against the oppressive ruling classes. Usually, ideologues like to think that revolutions only burn away the bad things and that the opportunity materializes in putting good things in place. This was also the reason why Marxist historians kept hunting revolutions in history, and when they couldn't find any, they twisted the pen to make it appear as they wanted it to appear.
There were also ruptures in history before and after Vladimirescu. I think we all agree that we can also look for them around the establishment of the Phanariot rulers. But hell no, the (Romanian) communists didn’t like that, because it didn’t fit the idea of progress. They saw the Phanariots as a regressive factor, as a tool of the Ottoman rulers to oppress and economically extort the natives. Anything to do with ruling elites and their increasing power was seen as regression. As I said, Marxists divide the world simply: the bearers of bad things (the reactionary elements, i.e.) were the "boyars, popes, and sultans," and the good ones (the progressives, i.e.) were the oppressed, real or imaginary, namely the peasants and the craftsmen. Marxist historians looked for an occasion to say, "Be careful! Here the oppressed have taken up the scythe and the ax and laid down the old system," that is what they said would have happened in Eastern Europe after 1945 with the help of the "liberating armies." You know what I mean. Was that progress too? Does history always go for the better? Share your opinions down below!
In short, according to Marxist-Communist historians, the Middle Ages could not end with the establishment of the Phanariots because they made everything worse. Not like in Romania after 1945! Tudor Vladimirescu was exactly the opposite. He put an end to the Phanariots. What do we do with Transylvania, where Vladimirescu didn’t really have any effect? They also looked for a similar event there, as close in time as possible to Vladimirescu, in order to create the feeling of simultaneity. In other words, the oppressors would have had their fill, and they took the club about the same time. If we go even further back in history, we can find even greater ruptures than the installation of the Phanariots. Although these would not have been a solution for those writing the history in the 50s, this offers more freedom and consistency to those who escaped from the slavery of ideology-driven science. To be consistent in our approach, we must analyze history at a macro level and not just consider some local events. I mean here the installation of direct, unchallenged, and irreversible Ottoman control over all three Carpatho-Danube lands.
This process took place synchronously and not too far from the end of the Central and Western European Middle Ages. European historians agree that the Middle Ages ended somewhere in the second part of the 15th century, no later than 1500. This is also the reason why the time of Vlad the Impaler and Stephen the Great is called the Late Middle Ages (Spätmittelalter in German). The historian Bogdan Murgescu proposed an alternative periodization. If we place the break in the case of the Romanians around 1550 (plus or minus a decade), it would remain more or less synchronous with European Middle Ages and the transformative macro processes in this cultural area. After all, no country was completely isolated in the woods. Romanians did not live in a bubble, in total isolation from their neighbors but coexisted intensively with them, making intense cultural and political-economic exchanges.
Let’s not forget that the Moldavian and Wallachian voivodes were vassals of the Hungarian and Polish kings for no less than two centuries. We learned in this episode that the fashion and weapons used came from or were heavily influenced by central Europe and the German space. In fact, the sword of Stephen the Great (very likely not only that) came from Italy, where his ambassador, Țamblac, gave speeches before the very Council of mighty Venice. Thus, we cannot separate the Romanian Principalities from the rest of the world. This separation was on the agenda of the national movement and later of Ceausescu’s nationalism, in order to achieve an identity policy, while depicting Romanians completely special and different... which they are, but for completely different reasons.
It is much more reasonable to periodize history in association with the events that marked the neighboring states. I am referring here to Hungarians, Poles, and, of course, Ottomans. You will probably be surprised, but the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of medieval Romanian history was the elimination of Hungary. The negative consequences for the Romanian Principalities were much deeper than even the fall of the Byzantine Empire, which in the last 100 years no longer played a political or military role anyway. Despite the confessional and political conflicts in the past, the Romanians were losing their most important ally. Remember that Poland had not been very involved in the region. Hungary remained the main European power fighting the Ottomans. It was therefore in its interest to support the Romanians against the Ottomans.
With the disappearance of Hungary, the Romanians were left without aces at the political poker table. While they could counterbalance the Hungarian excesses with the "Ottoman card" in the past, now they could no longer respond to the Ottoman excesses with the "Hungarian card." That this was the case, we see it in the last anti-Ottoman revolts that happened almost simultaneously: in the 1520s, in Wallachia, under Radu de la Afumați, who during his 5 short reigns fought no less than 30 battles with the akinci of the bey of Nicopolis and with the pretenders he supported, and in 1538 in Moldova under Petru Rareș. In Transylvania, in the 1520-30s, Ioan Zapolya fought without any scruples with Frederick of Habsburg for the throne of Hungary. Radu ended up assassinated, Rareș lost the throne after a fulminant campaign led by Sultan Süleyman the Lawgiver himself, and Zapolya had to kiss the sultan's hand in order to defeat his Habsburg opponent. The Poles, held in check by the Crimean Tartars, trusted vassals of the Ottomans, and the Habsburgs, oriented more to the west than to the east, had shown that they were not prepared to oppose the sultan decisively. So, as I said, the Romanians no longer had any ace, and the Ottomans could now do whatever they wanted.
Added to all this are other implicit factors. The printing press had reached the Romanians at the beginning of the century. The confessional reform in Western Europe had begun to radically change the political realities on the continent, with consequences in Transylvania and for the Romanians. The advance of military technology and the spread of firearms put an end to the culture of war until then. Around the middle of the century, together with Hugo Grotius, the idea of a border as a physical line appears in Europe. The (Romanian) idea of the "princely bone," i.e. the medieval order of blood relations, begins to essentially erode. In Moldova and Wallachia, still more many candidates for the throne came from outside the Musatin and Basarab dynasties. So does it seem doubtful to you that somewhere around the 1540s/50s a new era began for the Romanian population in the region? Many of you would think Michael the Brave and the union of the Romanian Principalities is a much more reasonable benchmark.
Two problems: 1) too far from European censorship. But let’s say that's not really important. The big problem is 2) that what we call today union was not long-lasting either. Basically, it only lasted a few months and didn't have that much of an effect powerful among contemporaries to determine its repetition. No one has ever tried to imitate Michael the Brave in the next 3 centuries, perhaps only with the exception of the Mavrocordat family and only in the case of Muntenia and Moldavia. They also introduced many Enlightenment ideas through their reforms. But here we enter dangerous ground, for these were... Phanariotes.
Or do we give the Phanariots some progressive credit and credit them with the end of the (Romanian) Middle Ages? What we've solved by getting far away from the European pattern and approaching the place where we left, i.e., Vladimirescu? We have to realize that we, the Romanians, argue loudly about what would actually have been "true history." In fact, we are still constructing narratives and establishing data, which we consider decisive to make sense of little things that we know about past centuries. On this channel, we try to make you aware of these issues and communicate methods to better orient yourself in history. In this episode, I explained how absurd it can be to try to periodize history when it becomes hostage to ideologies.
(Romanian) communists have disastrously influenced the perception of the end of the Romanian Middle Ages. Viewed with a mind free of ideological agendas, the Romanian Middle Ages ended most likely in the first half of the 16th century, not very far from the rest of Europe. Only if we force the situation, we could say that the Middle Ages ends, at the latest, a decade after Michael the Brave. Then modernity did not begin directly, but after a period of transition that we may call "pre-modernity," which would have lasted until the time of the Phanariote Mavrocordat family around the mid-18th century. Like that of the Ottoman Empire, the history of Eastern Europe must be periodized slightly differently than was done for Western Europe.
- Wallachia and Moldavia were in fact, not very far from the development of Central and Western Europe.
- The Middle Ages did not end in Wallachia and Moldova with the Revolution of Tudor Vladimirescu in 1821 or in Transylvania a little earlier with the uprising of Horea, Cloșca, and Crișan.
- Romanians did not live in a bubble, in total isolation from their neighbors but coexisted intensively with them, making intense cultural and political-economic exchanges.
- Moldavian and Wallachian voivodes were vassals of the Hungarian and Polish kings for no less than two centuries. The fashion and weapons used were heavily influenced by central Europe and the German space. In fact, the sword of Stephen the Great (very likely not only that) came from Italy, where his ambassador, Țamblac, gave speeches before the very Council of mighty Venice. Thus, we cannot separate the Romanian Principalities from the rest of the world.
- You will probably be surprised, but the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of medieval Romanian history was the elimination of Hungary, as they had no one to counter-balance the Ottomans.
- The Romanian principalities and Hungary were allies more often than not.
- The printing press had reached Wallachia and Moldavia at the beginning of 1500s.
- When the idea of a border as a physical line appears in Europe, the (Romanian) idea of the "princely bone," i.e. the medieval order of blood relations, begins to essentially erode.
- The Phanariots rulers era (17th-19th centuries) was not a dark age for Wallachia & Moldavia. It was just a propaganda tool of Ceausescu's regime because they were bourgeoisie that ended via revolutions, thus, drawing a strong parallel with the communist struggle.
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My take: I mean fair point, Wallachia and Moldova were behind central and western Europe, but they were not very far behind)
Romanians or Dacians? or Danes?!
Those who are not well-versed in medieval chronicles quickly fall into a trap. In some chronicles, the term "Dacians" is used when describing events contemporary to the authors. What does this mean? Is it a reference to the Dacians, as we know them, or to the Romanians? Medieval chroniclers greatly enjoyed using antiquated ethnonyms, that is, names borrowed from ancient authors to describe contemporary populations. This showed that they had a refined taste, like seasoned intellectuals. Thus, the inhabitants of Wallachia (or even Transylvania) would become Dacians, the Hungarians, Huns or Peonians, the Serbs, Tribals, the Bulgarians, Moesians, and the Ottomans, Teucrians. The problem is that the ethnonym "Dacians" was used for two peoples: for the Romanians (as in the post-Byzantine Chalkokondyles, who calls Vlad the Impaler the ruler of the Dacians), but, strangely, also for the Danes. Therefore, one must look very carefully at the context, whether the chronicler is writing about the Romanian Principalities or about Denmark, which, for propagandistic reasons, associated its name with the ancient Dacians, despite having no actual connection to them.
- To sound more intellectual, medieval chroniclers used to call people by their ancient names: Romanians = Dacians, Hungarians = Huns, Serbs = Tribals, Bulgarians = Moesians, Ottomans = Teucrians.
- But Dacians was also used for Danes, which, for propagandistic reasons, associated its name with the ancient Dacians, despite having no actual connection to them.
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My take: lmafo, I'll have to check out later why the Danes wanted to be associated with the Dacians)
Dracula on Netflix in the Ottoman series - fact or fiction?
Often, the historical past is ugly, full of immoral deeds, chaotic, and very difficult to understand. This makes it not very motivating for 21st-century people. Would you prefer a fictionalized version of history that touches your heart, delights your eyes, and caresses your ears? Or do you want a shock dose of historical information, delivered straight to the point but dry, like a doctor examining you in the hospital? Would you like to hear that in the Romanian countries, as well as in the other neighboring countries, a kind of mafia ruled, practicing an elitist and brutal political culture, contrary to the majority humanist values preached today? Or would you prefer to simply have your own beliefs confirmed, without even reading an actual historical source?
The American company Netflix chose the first path. It shares a new series, mostly in Turkish but in English, about the alleged relationship between Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror and Vlad the Impaler. This series tells the history of the Wallachian voivode from a modern perspective, according to today’s aesthetic taste, and based on certain political and ideological narratives. How thoroughly it reconstructs the past is something you will find out in this review, made from the perspective of a professional historian. We hope this review helps you navigate the minefield and pitfalls of the narrative constructed by the creators of the Netflix production.
Greetings! My name is Adrian Gheorghe, and I am a professional historian, part of the international team of Corpus Draculianum, which deals with editing all sources of any genre, origin, and language on Vlad Țepeș Drăculea. Recently, this project was awarded by the Romanian Academy. It is time to put things in order and systematically analyze what the series tells us versus what historical scholarship reveals. We will only touch on aspects related to our competence as historians and are not discussing the dramatic, aesthetic, or cinematic aspects. This video is a review and does not pursue any hidden controversy with anyone, and certainly not with those who contributed to making this series. But beware—spoilers ahead!
Let’s start with the two manipulations that influence the viewer’s perception the most: narrative manipulation and ideological manipulation. Explaining the narrative manipulation, we can recognize that, most likely, we are all fans of Vlad the Impaler’s history. There is one truth we must admit: Vlad was not a ruler of great European importance. His country was too small and did not have enough resources to become a powerful and prominent political actor. The Ottomans crushed Bulgaria, Serbia, and Byzantium, and were about to defeat the Venetians. In this historical context, the Romanian Principalities received some attention for several decades because the other Orthodox powers in Southeast Europe had already been liquidated. The Romanians were the last ones left.
Vlad the Impaler and Stephen the Great earned some attention through their victories, but after them, their countries quickly fell into vassalage to the Ottomans, losing even this episodic and limited European attention. The series presents Vlad as a famous ruler in the Catholic world, but this is false. Behind this portrayal lies a creative decision by the screenwriters. A story about a conflict doesn’t work if it doesn’t have two opponents of roughly equal power. The plot of this series wouldn't have worked if it showed Vlad as a marginal actor with small military power, largely unknown to the enemies of the Ottomans.
The series even goes further by presenting Vlad as a defender of Europe, who could have mobilized and led a crusade against the Ottomans. This is absolutely ridiculous. The Catholic powers and the Catholic Church would never have supported a crusade led by an Orthodox Christian. Never! Some crusades had even been directed, at least partially, against the Orthodox, such as the Fourth Crusade in 1204, which ended with the conquest of Byzantium and the imposition of a Catholic emperor in Constantinople. Or the Catholic Church’s plans in 1443 to impose Catholic kings over the Orthodox in the Balkans after their liberation from Ottoman rule. These examples give you an idea of the interfaith relations at the time.
Fictionalizing Vlad as a powerful ruler, well-known and therefore dangerous to the Ottomans, Mehmed's victory would supposedly have the potential to change the course of history. This is a cliché we find in all bombastic documentaries. The truth is that Vlad's war with the Ottomans, although spectacular, did not bring anything significant. Wallachia did not escape vassalage, but it was not conquered either. The anti-Ottoman policy of the voivodes of Wallachia had already failed in 1444 with the failure of the Varna Crusade. The Catholic world was too politically fragmented to form a strong movement against the Ottomans or to support the Romanian Principalities.
I expected many neo-Ottoman influences, as suggested by the trailer of this series. However, I will nuance my position. The series is narrated exclusively from the perspective of Ottoman court chronicles, focusing on the Sultan. This makes it difficult to discern when we are hearing their voice and when neo-Ottoman discourse, camouflaged by pragmatic economic interests from the American side, is being introduced. Most elements of neo-Ottoman ideology are formed by blindly following these Ottoman chronicles. Two details sound the alarm: first, the idealization of the past and the nostalgic tone regarding the golden age of the Sultans; and second, revisionism. These cannot be confused with the ideology of the Ottoman chronicles. Neo-Ottomanism asserts that the Ottoman Empire was a paradise of tolerance, a time when Christian Europe was persecuting Jews and burning witches at the stake. In the series, Vlad not only enjoys this supposed tolerance, but is also personally integrated into the Sultan’s family. This suggests there could be no talk of an Ottoman yoke, as long as one could always make fair deals with the Turks, as the ideologues claim.
The revisionism in the series becomes evident when the Ottomans accuse Vlad of failing to remember history correctly. This is a message aimed at 20th- and 21st-century Balkan people who might talk about Ottoman brutalities, as if they don't know the “correct history.” Other qualities of the sultans come directly from the Ottoman chronicles. Murat and Mehmed, for example, are idealized as dispensers of justice, generosity, and charity, with their harsh policies framed only as reactions to the iniquities of ungrateful rebels like Vlad.
For those who want to understand these subtleties, I recommend reading the chronicle of Tursun Beg, the great vizier Mahmud Pasha's right-hand man and participant in the 1462 campaign against Vlad. Tursun was probably also the author of the letter of conquest of Wallachia sent by Mehmed to his Anatolian opponent, the ruler of Karaman, Ibrahim Beg, discovered by our team and published in volume II of Corpus Draculianum. If you can’t access the chronicle, this letter might open your eyes.
To gauge the quality of information delivered by the series, let’s examine some key scenes and statements. We primarily rely on letters, charters, and other official documents, which offer more reliable information than narrative sources such as chronicles. These chronicles often intentionally manipulate information, whereas administrative documents were created to regulate urgent matters, not to form public opinions. For example, the German tales about Dracula, which emerged from the propaganda of Vlad’s enemies, raise the most doubts. Much of the information in these tales is fictional, and they deserve no more trust than a Russian portal's propaganda about the great Russian military victories in Ukraine.
There is no mention in any sources—any sources!—that Mehmed and Vlad had any personal relationship. They might have met in Adrianople, when Vlad and Radu were held hostage, but even this is not confirmed in any documents. It is outright ridiculous to claim that Mehmed could have considered Vlad a brother or part of his family, where even the highest-ranking Ottoman dignitaries didn’t have entry. In medieval political parlance, the term “brother” indicated a relationship of equal alliance between two political actors with comparable power and status. Since Mehmed was a Sultan, Vlad would have had to be at least a high-ranking king, if not an emperor. The use of the term "brother" in this film is pure fiction, meant to present a positive view of the Sultan and a particularly negative one of Vlad.
The dragon symbol, often associated with Dracula, is misused in the series. There is no clear evidence that Vlad Dracul, Mircea, Vlad the Impaler, Radu the Handsome, Vlad the Monk, Mihnea the Evil, or any other member of the Drăculești family ever used the dragon as a symbol on their coats of arms, coins, or seals. All we know is that Emperor Sigismund of Luxembourg gave a banner bearing the symbol of the Order of the Dragon to a throne candidate for Wallachia, some historians identifying this candidate as Vlad Dracul. This is the only connection between the Drăculești family and the symbol.
The story presented in the series mixes two separate events: the impalement of the townspeople of Târgoviște on Easter Day in 1447 (NOT boyars, as the series suggests) and the alleged impaling of boyars, which is reported only by German propaganda chronicles. These stories were designed to promote the narrative that the boyars, being against Vlad Țepeș, deprived him of legitimacy. However, this is an invention. No contemporary sources confirm this. The first mention of this event appears in German stories, but these sources often have Italian messengers. In Bonfini's chronicle—who was pro-Vlad—the victims are even transformed into Ottomans. Vlad did not have a wife or concubine named Anastasia. Both of his legitimate wives were from the Hungarian royal family and were close relatives of King Matthias Corvinus. His first wife, whom he probably married around 1462, remains unidentified. The second, Iustina Szilágyi, whom he married after 1474, was part of the political rehabilitation process following his release and conversion to Catholicism. This review has touched on some of the most egregious inaccuracies and fictionalizations in the series. Hopefully, it helps clarify the actual historical context of Vlad the Impaler's life and rule, and the real historical dynamics that surrounded him.
- There is one truth we must admit: Vlad was not a ruler of great European importance. His country was too small and did not have enough resources to become a powerful and prominent political actor.
- The series presents Vlad as a famous ruler in the Catholic world, but this is false. But the plot of this series wouldn't have worked if it showed Vlad as a marginal actor with small military power, largely unknown to the enemies of the Ottomans.
- The series even goes further by presenting Vlad as a defender of Europe, who could have mobilized and led a crusade against the Ottomans. This is absolutely ridiculous. The Catholic powers and the Catholic Church would never have supported a crusade led by an Orthodox Christian. Never!
- The truth is that Vlad's war with the Ottomans, although spectacular, did not bring anything significant. Wallachia did not escape vassalage, but it was not conquered either. The anti-Ottoman policy of the voivodes of Wallachia had already failed in 1444 with the failure of the Varna Crusade.
- Neo-Ottomanism, which a wrong historical revisionism, asserts that the Ottoman Empire was a paradise of tolerance, a time when Christian Europe was persecuting Jews and burning witches at the stake. In the series, Vlad not only enjoys this supposed tolerance, but is also personally integrated into the Sultan’s family.
- The revisionism in the series becomes evident when the Ottomans accuse Vlad of failing to remember history correctly. This is a message aimed at 20th- and 21st-century Balkan people who might talk about Ottoman brutalities, as if they don't know the “correct history.”
- Other qualities of the sultans come directly from the Ottoman chronicles. Murat and Mehmed, for example, are idealized as dispensers of justice, generosity, and charity, with their harsh policies framed only as reactions to the iniquities of ungrateful rebels like Vlad.
(
My take: yes, I expected that the series was propaganda, too "good and evil" which is rarely the case in history)
How good was the Wallachian army?
Many myths and misconceptions still persist around this poorly documented topic. While some view Wallachians as primitive warriors, poorly equipped despite possessing some notable individual qualities, others see them as Sergiu Nicolaescu, one of Romania’s greatest filmmakers, depicted them in his late blockbuster Mircea (1989), about Vlad the Impaler’s grandfather. Nicolaescu placed all his Wallachian soldiers in shiny, heavy plate armor, allowing them to fight epic battles. The following description is not a general one, but rather one that focuses on the military operations of Vlad the Impaler between 1448 and 1476.
Greetings! My name is Adrian Gheorghe, I am a professional historian and part of the international and interdisciplinary research team CORPUS DRACULIANUM, which aims to collect and publish all historical sources of any kind and origin from and about the famous Wallachian voivode Vlad the Impaler Dracula. Before we begin, please consider supporting this scientific project and channel as much as you can, either by subscribing or, if your finances allow, donating via PayPal to the following address. As usual, what we present here is the result of research carried out by our team of professional historians using original historical sources from countless archives, libraries, and museums around the world.
To start, we must keep in mind that Wallachia and Moldavia were hybrid cultures of contact between the Catholic (Central and Western Europe), Byzantine (Southeastern Europe and Western Anatolia), and Mongol worlds, which dominated the vast steppes between today’s Ukraine and China. One should therefore expect influences from all these horizons. Such peripheral cultures had no problem acting asymmetrically in all aspects of daily life or during wars.
A second point is the shortage of resources. Regions between empires often served as war theaters and buffer zones where these powerful actors regulated their disputes. While swinging between sides and seeking external support, the local ruling elites eventually became proxies for these powers. As Wallachian (or Moldavian) elites clashed for power and resources, their more powerful neighbors actively or passively fought for dominance in the region. Since alliances were fluid and conflicts frequent, the political situation was highly unstable, resulting in rapid changes of rulers (Rom. voivodes) with devastating consequences for the local economy. The traditional military system in Wallachia is of Byzantine origin with some Central European influences.
As was typical in Western Europe and Byzantium, noblemen (Rom. boyars) had the duty to provide military support with their banners (steaguri) for the voivode, who in return promised, confirmed, or expanded their estates or gave them functions (dregătorii) in his administration. The second most important military source were smallholding soldiers (cneji) and the small nobility (slugi domnești), who served either alone or with a few assistants, depending on the income from their estates (baștină). Their organization resembled that of the Ottoman sipāhi and voynūḫ, with whom they shared common origins.
The final category of soldiers were mercenaries, especially bodyguards, crossbowmen, and gunners. Mercenaries came from Wallachia, Moldavia, Transylvania, other Central European regions, or even Turks and Italians. A regular horseman’s monthly salary was around 3-4 ducats (about 10-14 grams of gold), or more depending on rank, equipment, tasks, and skills. All these soldiers had to come to battle with their own equipment, horses, and food.
The mass mobilization of peasants, although it may have occurred in exceptional cases, is one of the greatest myths in Romanian historiography, popularized during the communist period. Neither their limited skills nor their lack of war experience nor the interests of the boyars they worked for support this myth. 15th-century Wallachia could have mustered no more than 7,000 to 8,000 men (including mercenaries). More on this in a separate video.
Wallachian and Moldavian warfare had its roots in Deșt-i Kıpcak, the steppes north of the Black Sea. This highly mobile art of war, practiced by light mounted soldiers, entered both the Byzantine Empire and the Hungarian Kingdom with 11th-century Turkic nomads (especially Pechenegs and Cumans) and solidified during the 13th-century Mongol (Tatar) domination. The arrival of the Ottomans, with their similar military patterns, posed no threat to these traditions and ultimately diminished Western European influences. Dracula’s era was a transitional period, in which the Ottomans did not sever Wallachia’s ties to the West, despite gaining the upper hand in their competition with the Hungarians during the second half of the 15th century. In conclusion, the large space between the Volga and the Bosporus (including the area between the Carpathians and the Danube) represented a continuum in which certain military patterns dominated the overall military thinking.
Mobile warfare, hit-and-run tactics, and stealth incursions did not require heavy protective gear, especially if this gear limited maneuverability, visibility, and speed. Outnumbered or outmatched at the best of times, the Wallachians had to avoid close engagements with enemy lines. However, skirmishing scattered enemy detachments may have involved direct charges and close combat. Thus, the equipment used in battle reflected tactics and immediate needs, all contributing to the optimal achievement of goals. The level of equipment reflected not only the art of warfare but also the three main social and status stratifications in the Wallachian army. At the bottom were the light-armored cneji and their men, who wore gambesons or other padded textile pieces. The double protection of adding a chain, possibly reinforced with smaller iron plates or a shield, was considered only if they expected close combat. The 7 to 10 kg heavy chainmail offered good protection against thrusts and slashes, but not as much against arrows. Celatas or more simply cervellieres (German Hirnhaube) and scale helmets protected their heads.
The soldiers were explicitly required, sometimes under severe punishment, to come to battle with certain equipment according to their estate’s resources. However, this didn’t mean they always fought with their full kit. This explains why all 16th-century representations of Wallachian horsemen did not show significant protective gear, except for large Hungarian shields, which were likely used for cavalry charges with lances. Their captains (căpetenii) and heavier cavalry from the boyars’ banners or the voivode’s guardsmen wore gambesons doubled with chainmail and brigandines. Mostly overlooked by historians, this torso protection consisted of many smaller iron and low-carbon steel plates riveted beneath thick textile cloth, a common feature on Western and Central European battlefields.
Brigandines were significantly cheaper than plate armor, offered more flexibility, and had lower maintenance costs, though with less protection against lances, halberds, and war hammers. This wasn't much of a concern, as the Wallachians avoided enemy heavy cavalry charges. More concerned with defense were the elites and their closest guards, men displaying wealth and status and those protecting them at any cost. Bright shiny armor and colorful gear were part of the spectacle. Thus, it might be expected that the voivode and his powerful boyars wore the most expensive full plate armor available in Wallachia.
Their guards wore either full plate armor of lower quality, chainmail reinforced with armor plates in various combinations, or brigandines reinforced with larger steel plates for arm and head protection. We must distance ourselves from the image of heavy, full plate armor increasingly seen on 16th-century Western European battlefields.
Most military gear, especially sophisticated protective equipment and even horseshoes, were imported from the local Saxon towns of Brașov (Kronstadt), Sibiu (Hermannstadt), and Sighișoara (Schässburg). Some items were produced locally, while good-quality plate armor came from South German or possibly northern Italian cities. The weapon of choice was the composite bow shot from horseback with the thumb, protected by leather or, more rarely, a metal thumb ring (zingir). In emergencies, a small axe (topor or baltag), or a bronze or iron mace (topuz or buzdugan) were available. These served as ideal substitutes for costly swords and sabers, which were primarily of Central and Western European origin.
Most swords were straight, with one notable exception: the slightly curved one-and-a-half-handed Hungarian cavalry saber, likely from the same category and origin as the German Kriegsmesser (war knife). This saber may have been the weapon of choice for any heavier (or elite) Wallachian soldier or mercenary. The voivode and his boyars would have preferred, of course, German or Italian-made straight swords of higher quality and prestige. Oriental swords with blades made of high-quality wootz Damascus steel were less likely, although still a possible alternative, as evidenced by a 1495 register from Caffa. Oriental blades became more common in Central Europe by the mid-16th century.
Since Western European-style cavalry charges, though occurring occasionally, were not suited to Wallachian warfare, lances—mostly light ones—had secondary importance. This warfare did not entirely exclude heavy soldiers, both on foot and horseback. This applied to the voivode’s guards, who served at his court, rapid-intervention troops, and men from the most powerful boyars who competed directly with the ruler to display fashion and wealth.
- First thing we must consider about Wallachia and Moldavia's army, was that they were hybrid cultures between the Catholic world, Byzantine world and Mongol worlds. Therefore, one should therefore expect influences from all these horizons.
(YAY, WALLACHIAN & MOLDAVIAN HORSE ARCHERS!)
- The second thing we must consider is their shortage of resources, they had no peasants but a profressional army, but 15th-century Wallachia could have mustered no more than 7,000 to 8,000 men.
(he doesn't ouright say it, but based on his previous videos, Moldova could have mustered slightly more? edit: found out from WIkipedia, Moldova had 10.000 - 12.000 men)
- Wallachian and Moldavian warfare had its roots in
Deșt-i Kıpcak, the steppes north of the Black Sea. This highly mobile art of war, practiced by light mounted soldiers.
- Mobile warfare, hit-and-run tactics, and stealth incursions did not require heavy protective gear, especially if this gear limited maneuverability, visibility, and speed.
- Outnumbered or outmatched at the best of times, the Wallachians had to avoid close engagements with enemy lines. However, skirmishing scattered enemy detachments may have involved direct charges and close combat. Thus, the equipment used in battle reflected tactics and immediate needs, all contributing to the optimal achievement of goals.
- We must distance ourselves from the image of heavy, full plate armor increasingly seen on 16th-century Western European battlefields. Which was only reserved for the Voievode, his bodyguards and his most powerful noblemen.
(
My take: I knew that the Vlachs used mostly hit and run then ambush on a drained enemy tactics, this only seems to confirm it, a professional and fast army. I think fighting Wallachia and Moldavia must have been like fighting an army of flies, they are not more powerful than you, but are annoying to deal with)
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