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Epilogue 1 - Confidential Country Briefings
Epilogue 1 - Confidential Country Briefings from the Geneva Peace Conference
What I thought I would start the Epilogue musings with is the briefing notes I provided to the powers at the start of the Peace Conference. Part out of interest, part to inform why the scores were broadly structured as they were (next Epilogue update will start to roll them out) and also to give you an idea where I was seeing the immediate post-war period heading before the Conference started. Of course, its outcomes will now help to further shape my hypothetical 'what happened next' scenarios.
As mentioned to each delegation in the notes, these were just thoughts and no-one was bound to follow the general guidance or the voting points.
Soviet Union – Classified Background Briefing
The USSR can be seen as perhaps the main overall ‘winner’ of the European phase of the Great Liberation War in terms of power and reach. But Turkey’s key role in joining the Comintern, bringing the USSR into the war when it did, then doing much to help the Comintern win has proved a double-edged sword. Turkey now has direct or political control over much of Central and Southern Europe, including in areas where the USSR would like to see itself as pre-eminent.
Poland has become and will be retained as a Soviet puppet, and that is not up for debate at this conference. Denmark is up for debate however and there may be more opposition to that continuing, especially from the Allies and perhaps the US.
But the great prize of Germany, against whom the USSR surely bore the brunt of the fighting, slipped from the Soviet grasp due to some shifty political shenanigans after their surrender. This is the sorest of points arising from the war, though it must be admitted Turkey has so far appeared genuinely understanding of the artificial position there and Soviet interests in the matter. Surely both sides will be willing to bargain over the fate of this key question? The same should apply in varying degrees to various other nations along the periphery between the two great powers of Europe and in Spain and Finland (another quirk of the war, becoming a Turkish puppet), where the USSR holds a special interest.
In general, in Central Europe the USSR will naturally prefer to see countries currently occupied or puppeted by Turkey to become independent Comintern countries, where both the USSR and Turkey might seek to influence them in the mid-long term post-war area. There is capacity to horse-trade in there with Turkey, agreeing to support them on some key votes while they voluntarily relinquish control in others. If they get recalcitrant and start vetoing freely, that may decrease their voting power over time … but would that be in the USSR’s best interests if a potential friendly vote in the latter stages of the Conference is diminished by forcing them into that position?
On Poland, the USSR clearly wants to see its most powerful current puppet state expand as far as possible, at the expense of Germany (primarily) and Turkey (with their Prussian enclave). Despite Turkey being its primary conqueror in the recent campaign, the USSR participated strongly with expeditionary forces on the ground and Spain properly belongs under direct Soviet influence, now with a sympathetic government and strong historical Popular Front ties.
But the first great issue to decide upon at this Conference is the continuing war with Japan. Despite recent slow gains, Japan still holds much Soviet territory and would likely take years to defeat, given the supine attitude the US has taken to the war in the Pacific. Also, there is a chance the UK and Allies may strike a separate peace with Japan, which would make the task that much harder for the USSR. And if we were to decide to veto a vote for a general treaty (whether on current lines – very unlikely anyone other than Japan will want that – or on pre-war Soviet-Japanese boundaries) and continue the war, any non-Soviet puppet Comintern partners (such as the US, Turkey and Romania, possibly Germany or parts of it) would be absolved from participating, and the UK and other Allies may also have signed a separate peace. Japan would be left within the Conference anyway and could well fill one of the five permanent League of Nations Security Council positions anyway, even while we remain at war with them!
Possible peace with Japan will require careful handling and negotiation. If we do not believe the war is worth continuing as is or in an even more isolated limited Soviet-Japanese conflict, clearly the best outcome would be peace on pre-war lines, including Mongolia being fully restored as a Soviet puppet state. Then let the Allies and Japanese bang their heads together over the rest of the contended territory – who cares?
In overall new alignments, we assess the US is likely to end its ‘marriage of convenience’ with the Comintern soon and rejoin – formally or informally – with the British-led Allies. They may try to persuade Turkey to come over with them, but we doubt they would be willing to embrace the necessary preconditions for truly joining them. We hope Turkey will remain in the Comintern or at least continue the brotherhood and friendly relations forged in the fires of the Great Liberation War. Especially given how much of the world’s oil reserves they control, though we too are major producers. There is a chance they may drift into or even try to create and lead a ‘Third Way’ faction based on their own hybrid governmental and philosophical world view, but we are very convinced they would never seek to join or revive the Axis.
United States – Classified Background Briefing
We find ourselves in a diplomatic ‘marriage of convenience’ we virtually stumbled into when the Axis attacked us in this war. While the scourge of Nazism and Fascism has been defeated in Europe, the US is hardly celebrating the aftermath there as it currently stands. Unfortunately, while we hold significant sway through our economic support during the war and our current industrial clout, the lack of much military participation in the fight means less clout at the post-war bargaining table. Other than some isolated and desultory fighting in the Pacific (where we mainly lost ground that has not yet been recovered) and the Marine detachment that fought with the Turks, the skin we put in the game was all economic through lend-lease. It saved a generation of our young men from the horrors of war but means less bargaining power for now.
At this conference, we need to tread a fine line to achieve a number of objectives:
So our negotiator in Geneva has the private guidance to stymie a peace with Japan if possible, even if at the expense of the UK/Allies. If there must be a peace, then much as we’d like to see the Soviets lose a chunk of their Far Eastern territory in a ‘peace in place’ (Proposition 1.1) that would be against our interests in the Pacific and would harm the UK/Allies. The Japanese are even worse than the Soviets, after all! So the next best option (after a continued war) would be Proposition 1.2, where we try our chances in the Round Two votes on Japan’s other conquered territory. We may have lost our hold over the Philippines for now, but we sure as heck don’t want to see the Japanese continue to control it. We don’t care quite so much about Burma or Indochina.
When it comes to Europe, we’d generally like to see as much independence for countries there as possible. Of all the Central European and Balkan countries, the US most believes Romania has earned the right to be an independent player from their role in the war, so that has become a cause celebre for FDR. We may be willing, for example, to trade support there with Turkey to ensure Romania’s freedom for some support in a few of the other decisions in the region.
Another somewhat special case is Arabia. While we don’t want it to remain as a constituent part of the UGNR on general principles, the US is also worried that, if Arabia becomes an independent country under the Comintern, it could eventually fall under Soviet hegemony, giving them way too much control over the world’s oil and energy reserves and undermining the viability of Turkey as a balancing power. So we’d prefer to see it remain under Turkish influence as a puppet state (Proposition 18.2). As with Romania, other countries may not suspect our motives here, so this is another outcome we may wish to trade for with other propositions that are less crucial to us.
India is another important issue we may clash over with the British. Churchill is likely to want to continue the Raj there, though if he goes against a majority decision to partition India and allow it to become non-aligned (which we would not welcome either) the consequences could be dire. We’d prefer to see India remain unified and become independent but under the Allied umbrella, which we intend to join as soon as soon it is strategically convenient. So, on principal and interest, we strongly support Proposition 21.2. A partitioned and non-aligned India would be the worst of the possible outcomes there from our point of view.
Naturally, we’d like to see the poor Poles get as much territory as possible, even if they will remain a Soviet puppet for the foreseeable future. They deserve it after all they’ve been through and it would ensure German power is moderated. And who knows, one day in the future the Poles may even be able to throw off their Soviet shackles and we would like to say we helped them do so.
On the big issue of Germany, we’d strongly prefer to see Germany remain unified and as independent as possible, because it may then be possible to foster Western democratic values there in the future and woo it away from the Comintern. Even one day into the Allies, as a democratic bulwark against authoritarianism. The worst case would see it remain unified as a puppet under the Soviets. A little less bad would be the same but under the Turks. In the absence of German independence from either or both, the least-worst option would be for a default to partition (Outcome 23.4). At least it would keep that power divided and provide a little more ballast against Soviet hegemony in Europe. And given the dynamics, it’s probably the most likely outcome of that tug-of-war.
With France, despite their current government, they remain a democracy and part of the Allies. The best thing there would be to see the country re-united. Having it even as an independent Comintern republic would be unjust. Leaving it under Turkish control for now would be marginally better, as it may be possible to persuade the Turks later to transfer it back to France for some post-war, post-conference bargain.
So: independence as a general principal; sometimes conditional but genuine support of the Western Democracies as we will soon wish to rejoin them; limited support for Turkey in selected areas to try to keep them on-side; reclaim lost Pacific territories (by treaty or war); and quiet but comprehensive action to limit Soviet influence wherever possible.
Poland – Classified Background Briefing
So far, despite being a Soviet puppet since our ‘liberation’, we have been permitted a surprisingly free rein by our Soviet overlords within the Comintern. Perhaps Stalin is not supremely confident of his position, given how they remain at war with the Japanese, with much territory still to regain in the Far East. While Turkey has managed – through a mixture or hard fighting and good luck – to secure much of southern and central Europe under their control, including a notional hold over Germany. Who, after all, remain the elemental enemy!
We may only have one vote in this forum, but we at least have a vote and without any Soviet compulsion to force us into a particular outcome. Then again, we do want them to support those cessions from Germany. In a potentially close vote, we may just be able to gain a bit of bargaining power for our big issues, especially the biggest of all: the cession of new territory to Poland, to not only reinstate what we lost to Germany but then compensate for what we have since lost to the Soviets. We are likely to have a good deal of international sympathy for our cause in that regard, though will no doubt find the Germans trying everything they can to prevent the loss of their eastern lands to us. Bring it on!
More generally, where we can do so without incurring too much Soviet wrath, our best interests would be served by seeing as many independent nations as possible emerge. We may be a Soviet ‘puppet’ government now, but we secretly strive for freedom from that yoke one day. And perhaps Turkey could be our best chance for balance in central Europe for the longer term. So there are a few instances where seeing them emerge stronger could be a good thing.
One of those is with the Czechs. The Turks have already stated they have no intention of retaining the Czech Republic as part of the UGNR. So, rather than seeing it independent within the Comintern and fall prey to Soviet domination, perhaps it would be better to see them become a Turkish puppet state, making our southern flank less of a threat. The same rationale applies to the Slovaks.
As to the rest of Europe, the more independent countries that border neither us nor the USSR, the better. That is where our future lies: at least (unlike us and Denmark) they did not all fall under the thrall of the Soviets, who would have been far less willing to surrender control than Turkey will likely be. Stalin will no doubt be far more willing and able to force himself on unwilling nations, as happened to us. Our 'liberation' by the Soviets, with Turkey’s assistance, from German tyranny was simply the lesser of two evils.
Of course, the greatest issue for us will be the enormously consequential Proposition 22, due to be voted on in Round Seven. It should be relatively easy to secure some sympathy there. And the Turks are unlikely to be thinking their Baltic enclave would be sustainable, so we might even be able to persuade them to support us in some pledges for trade-offs in earlier votes: they will surely be wanting all the support they can get, given how much they have at stake in the prior rounds. If we could lock in a number of pledges of support in one or more earlier votes to a single commitment to support us on the cessions, then the penalty of breaking them later could be prohibitive to Turkey.
On Germany, well – the more they are divided, the better as far as we’re concerned. Any retention of a unified Germany could only be a threat to us, whether it is relatively independent under the Comintern or under Soviet influence. Turkish control might be a little better, if it means in future years we could turn to them to help us extract ourselves from Soviet hegemony. So maybe we could welcome that as a compromise. But really, the best and most likely outcome – unless the Turks and Soviets come to some agreement not to use vetoes on each other – would be a partition, after gaining our cessions as well. That should reduce the German threat to us for a generation, at least.
Japan – Classified Background Briefing
Despite the failure of Germany and Italy in Europe, the might of Japanese arms has brought us to the bargaining table in Geneva in a strong position. Our expansion may currently be past its maximum point, but despite the Allies and Comintern making recent inroads, they must know that defeating us would be very costly and time consuming – and may not even be achievable. Banzai!
We may be able to secure many gains, if not all that we have made, plus a seat at the international table despite the overall failure of the German-led Axis push. The new world order can be made to include Japan, with a seat on the League of Nations Security Council almost a lock if even a limited peace is negotiated – so long as we don’t veto it.
Naturally, a settlement that permits us to retain all currently occupied territory (Proposition 1.1) would be the ideal result, but we must be realistic in thinking such a vote would be highly unlikely to succeed given the preponderance of Comintern and Allied powers voting in Geneva. Barring that miracle, our best bet would be for a treaty that sees the main pre-war borders in Asia with the Soviets and Allies resumed (Proposition 1.2), with our remaining holdings seized during the recent conflict negotiated one by one in Round Two of the Geneva voting process. We at least retain vetoes if we wish to deploy them for any or all adverse votes that may occur on those, allowing us to retain selected territory albeit at a diplomatic cost.
Of course, a majority of our adversaries may feel emboldened to continue their war against us, in which case they will find out the price of their folly. But if we can manage to forge a reasonable peace and judiciously use our veto on the occupied territories, we stand to gain much. And the loss of any oilfields in South East Asia should perhaps be offset by a policy of rapprochement with Turkey, despite the unpleasantness between us in the current war. That had been more on the diplomatic and espionage fronts – no actual fighting has taken place (other than by local Japanese-backed rebels in the Dodecanese) between us. We will need some strategic partners in this new Comintern-Allied dominated World Order, after all. The US is unlikely to have any sympathy for us, while the UK and USSR will also be staunchly opposed.
In terms of the Conference business, our greatest interests are of course in the first two rounds of voting (if we indeed make it to a second round). The Euro-centric outcomes are of more marginal interest to us, though in general the more smaller countries that can be relatively independent of the Comintern hegemony, the better. The main value for us in those rounds is the bargaining position our significant bloc of votes might command by any pledges we might make against support for our interests in the first two rounds. Gaining some substantive outcomes early for votes on issues we don’t care so much about later (and would be happy enough to fulfil) could be a good way to maximise our position and gain influence in the post-war world.
The big exception to the above is India, where its partition and prising from the grasp of UK and the Allies more widely would be a major strategic victory for Japan. And there may be a fair degree of support for such an outcome in the non-Allied powers: any mayhem we can cause the British would be welcome, and nothing less than they deserve.
To a lesser extent, the fate of our old ally Germany is of some interest. A unified Germany (partitioned or not) falling entirely under Soviet domination would be a bad outcome. Turkey – not so bad, but still a negative. As would be a partition between the two, though that would at least dilute the threat and possibly pit the two wartime allies against each other in the post-war world. Best would be a united and relatively independent Germany – which might one day be able to extricate itself from all Comintern control and once more pose a distraction to our main enemy – the Soviets. France and Poland? Don’t care too much, really. The French are a spent force.
Spain - Brief Notes (joined just after the Conference had begun)
Only Proposition 1 had been decided, as you'd have seen, and in Spain's case you didn't miss much - there would have been no difference for Spain whichever of the two most likely options got up. In essence, there are some questions for each country that they really don't care too much about. Spain is assessed as being only marginally more interested in Round Two, with the proposed fates of Burma and the Philippines assessed as equally bad/good from the Spanish perspective. But the others don't know that, so it means in such votes you might be able to offer votes for trade with no skin off your nose for things you may be keen to achieve later. In the main, in Europe the feeling for Spain is that as much independence as possible for other countries will set well with Spain and its own long-term interests. Romania is an outlier there - just a quirk, not a big difference, but I decided the in-game Romanian government did not seem truly in step with the Third Popular Front, they didn't want to see it possibly drift too much towards the Soviets later and so would be happy to see it stay under Turkish 'protection'. But it's only a five point score difference, so it's not a biggie really.
Naturally, the big one for Spain is Proposition 19, so good luck trying to maybe get some bound pledges to support you on that one: it's towards the end as one of the more important questions, naturally as much independence as possible is the desired outcome of your Government and people.
And while Spain is in the Comintern and under Turkish puppetry and Soviet moral suasion, as per the other countries at the Conference in a similar position (eg Germany, Poland, Romania) you have a completely free vote on all matters.
Germany – Classified Background Briefing
Of course, Germany finds itself in a fraught position and the object of probably the single biggest decision of the Conference, after the question of peace or war with Japan is decided. Our status as a nominal puppet state under Turkish control is very much a temporary and interim one. Under the terms of the Conference, Germany gets a free vote on all issues including upon its own fate – but, as a defeated power, it gets no veto.
In general terms, Germany wants to remain unified if possible and of course as an independent member of the Comintern as an ideal. Its future fate and long-term alignment would then be more in our own hands. If we must remain a puppet state to stay unified, it would far better to do so under Turkish than Soviet rule. The Turks are politically and ideologically closer to us and would likely be far less restrictive as overlords than would the Soviets. But even unification under Soviet control would be better than the worst possible outcome: partition! With territorial cessions to Poland very likely to be forced upon us, partition would see Sacred Germany divided into ever smaller pieces: it must be avoided if at all possible. This aim and deal-making with the other participants (including trying to persuade the USSR and Turkey not to veto a more favourable outcome, in ironclad pledges if at all possible) will be at the centre of everything we do in the lead-up to the vote on Proposition 23.
On Japan, Germany harbours a desire to see the war grind on if possible, to the detriment of all its worst old enemies. Failing that, a punitive peace that sees the Soviets and British worse off (or forced to commit vetoes) would be acceptable too. If there is a ‘status quo ante’ peace (Proposition 1.2) then so be it. Germany would have no particular interest in any Round Two outcome one war or another, so our vote could be ‘up for sale’ in a deal with interested parties, perhaps as either informal or bound pledges for future support in issues of more importance to Germany.
In Europe, Germany would prefer to see as much independence from Soviet control as possible, in Denmark in particular. German views on the fate of most other countries are a bit more idiosyncratic, especially where Turkey is concerned. Sometimes, more independence may be desired. In others, it may be better to have Turkey control a bordering state than have in ‘up for grabs’ and then possibly falling under subsequent Soviet control – such as in the Czech Republic, given Poland is already a Soviet puppet and is likely to gain more territory at German expense in the coming settlement.
Austria is another story: it is German in culture and should be as independent as possible. Hungary also fought strongly for Germany in the recent war: they too deserve as much independence as possible. Further away, in the Balkans and elsewhere, maximum independence from any other major power is preferable.
On France: we know Germany will not be permitted to retain its current technical occupation of the former Vichy territory of southern France. Which has British and Turkish enclaves within it anyway. So let’s try to keep France as weak and divided as possible. If we end up partitioned, there would be some schadenfreude in seeing the same happen to them!
UK & Allies – Classified Background Briefing
We directly represent all the current Allied faction, except for France, as a single voting bloc, giving us more power united than we would have fragmented. So our interests are influenced by the views of the Dominions (especially where Japan occupies territory in Australia and New Zealand) and other Allied combatants (for example, the Dutch in the their East Indies colony).
For the UK, peace with Japan is one of the more important issues of this conference. Frankly, we can’t afford for this war to continue, especially if presented with a ‘fair and reasonable’ option to end it. Some are arguing that even a peace in place on current lines would be better than continuing this war, for which domestic support may fail and the government fall if we are seen to have been too bloody-minded about it. The Royal Navy has been eviscerated, we’ve managed to hold onto Singapore and the south of Malaya and held the Japanese in eastern India.
Australia and New Zealand would be aghast if a ‘peace in place’ did occur, but that outcome is pretty unlikely: if it did happen, it would be a tricky call as to whether we exercised a veto there. We could find ourselves in a limited war if the Soviets acceded to it (though that too seems highly unlikely). And if we didn’t veto but the Soviets did, they are the ones who would be sapping themselves against the Japanese. But the Aussies, Kiwis and Dutch would howl and our credibility would be shredded, costing us influence at the Conference. A negotiated peace starting largely on pre-war Allied/Japanese boundaries and with the Round Two negotiations to follow would be by far the preferable outcome for us. Anything else would be a dreadful mess.
Naturally, on the Continent we generally wish to see Comintern (both Turkish but especially Soviet) influence diminished as much as possible, wherever possible. Of the decisions to be made, Denmark (Proposition 6) stands out, so too the fate of Yugoslavia, Romania and Greece. In North Africa, Arabia and Iran, we are particularly concerned about Turkish influence over both the oilfields and bordering our holdings in Egypt, Palestine, on the margins of the Arabian Peninsula and around out ‘friendly’ government in Iraq. These questions are all of significant interest to us.
We would rather see both Spain and Italy as independent as possible from either Turkish or (particularly) Soviet influence, but acknowledge there is little direct influence we can exert there. But on India, much as the common populace may be indifferent about its fate, Winston is adamant: this jewel in the Imperial crown should be retained under direct British control in this dangerous new world. If we can persuade enough of the other powers to support us on this matter, it would be the single most important outcome for us at this Conference. If we can’t achieve that, then at least we’d want to see an independent India stay unified and part of the Allied faction.
Should enough of the rest of the world combine against us to try to force partition and full independence, we should consider reserving the option of a veto as a last resort. Though our intelligence services report the results of such a repudiation of global opinion by us could be dangerous indeed and may see us lose India anyway as well as the political cachet sacrificed by exercising such a veto. Let’s hope it doesn’t come to that, Foreign Minister! It is your job to avoid it.
Of course, because we can’t release the poor Poles from their dominance by the Soviets in the short term, we should do the best we can for them in gaining cessions from Turkey and Germany, which has the advantage of weakening Germany in particular.
On Germany, it is a great pity we were not able in the end to carve a slice of occupied territory out of their hide to bargain with. But given the circumstances there, the worst outcome would be if they were to remain unified but as a Soviet puppet. That would be disastrous for the balance of power in Europe. Though it would have the benefit of splitting German power further, a partition of Germany would be bad as well, as the Soviets would gain the most significant slice of that cake, including Berlin, the major northern North and Baltic Sea ports and the industrial heartland of the Ruhr.
Having Germany remaining unified but as a Turkish puppet would be better, for both the balance of power and because they would be less likely to be able to fully control the Germans in the future: surely their dominance would begin to erode quite quickly in the post-settlement era. And it may also be possible to eventually split Turkey away from the Comintern. After all, they are very strange bedfellows philosophically and now have some geostrategic conflicts as well. Not least over Germany. For us, even though it leaves Germany unified, a more independent regime might eventually be persuaded to gravitate more to the West than either Soviet communism or Turkish Kemalism. And if the Soviets or Turks veto a plenary vote for German independence, we could live with a partition, even though it would be sub-optimal: far better than Soviet dominance.
France, of course, must be re-united. We would contribute those enclaves in the north and south we currently occupy, but France must be re-established as a genuine Allied power: we have so few of them left in the faction right now! The beastly Turks mustn’t be allowed to annex it – the French would surely veto that if they must – and we would look pretty shabby if we voted for such an outcome. If it did come to a partition, we may have to live with it and would of course agitate in the future to somehow help France re-unify at a future date.
Overall, we want to see the US rejoin its true spiritual home among the Western democracies as part of the Allies in the post-war aftermath. We are given to understand they are of a similar view and will tend to hope for the same general outcomes as we do, but their support may be conditional and cannot be taken for granted on some issues. Especially on India, where we fear they want to see more immediate de-colonisation than our own brief calls for.
France – Classified Background Briefing
We find ourselves in a very difficult position. The Republic has been re-established, but only just. Our power has been severely diminished and the country remains divided, with the hated Germans in technical possession of the former Vichy south, but effectively under Turkish control. Our empire has almost completely disappeared, much of it passing via Vichy into Turkish hands or in Asia falling under the heel of the Japanese. Communist and Kemalist influence runs rampant across Europe. We must do what we can to retrieve this dire situation, but it will not be easy.
We can probably rely on the British and the Allies they speak for on most issues, though support may be conditional on some. And despite their technical wartime membership of the Comintern, the US is also likely to be generally supportive, with many of our overall broad strategic objectives shared. But with only three votes to deploy in the Conference, it will have to be our powers of persuasion – and cultural superiority, or course – that we rely upon. At least we have been given a limited veto over the fate of southern France, which we hope we don’t have to deploy. While partition would be a disaster, annexation by Turkey would be a catastrophe. At least a so-called Peoples Republic of France in the south might eventually be persuaded or forced to reunify with us. Who knows what may happen if the Turks sink their fangs into it: they are likely to be far too powerful for us to confront any time soon in open conflict.
On Japan, continuing the war would be a hopeless pursuit from our perspective. We don’t even control all of Metropolitan France and don’t want the Allies focusing on Asia when we need their support here closer to home. Peace based largely on pre-war boundaries with some negotiations over the rest (Proposition 1.2) would be the best outcome. We know Indochina is lost to us forever. The least we can do is try to see it separated from Japan by negotiation, or to see their reputation trashed if they insist on vetoing a majority resolution against them. And after all, who other than Japan would vote in favour of them keeping some these ill-gotten gains? Unless of course it was in return for their powerful vote on other issues of more importance to us. Hmm, perhaps there is something we could explore there (other than Indochina) … an enemy of our enemies becoming a temporary friend?
In Europe and elsewhere, our interests like many others outside the Soviets and Turkey must be gaining as much independence for occupied and oppressed countries as possible. North Africa in particular, where the Turks have managed to hijack almost all our previous holdings. And we don’t want all that Arabian oil concentrated in Turkish hands either.
On India, we may be somewhat at odds with Churchill: better to see it unified and independent but safely within the Allied camp than as a non-aligned loose cannon or an antiquated colonial appendage of Britain. They are kidding themselves if they think they can hang onto India as a Raj for any appreciable time without it disintegrating into either a bloodbath or a debacle, either of which may end badly for the wider Allied cause. The British must be persuaded to see the error of their ways. Or forced to if it comes to that.
Germany? May they be cursed to hell forever! If we do have to try to court their vote where possible, so be it. But whether publicly or privately, we wish to see them as weak and divided as possible. Them remaining unified either as an independent Comintern country or under the Soviets would be equally bad. Remaining as a Turkish puppet wouldn’t be too bad, as at least their politics are closer to ours. And it might prove unstable and would also provide a buffer against Bolshevism. But probably the best outcome would be partition and dismemberment, even if it did leave the Communists on our doorstep. It would be a measure of revenge, anyway.
It goes without saying that for Poland, we want to see as much as possible hived off the Germans and throwing in that Turkish enclave in Prussia would be icing on the cake.
In the broad, we may not like the British that much, but they did help liberate northern France when it appeared the whole country would fall under the Comintern boot. They and the US returning formally to the Allied fold are our best prospect for longer term survival and trying to reunite the country. Without their support, the latter would be impossible. And of the other powers, we may be able to cut some deals with Turkey – perhaps even providing them some support in return for helping us reunify. They did try to help us in the recent war, even if it was too little, too late and for their own purposes. Japan? Well, we despise them of course, but if we can use them along the way, all the better.
Turkey – Classified Background Briefing
As the world situation now stands, Turkey has secured much territory and influence and potential ‘Big Five’ League of Nations Security Council status. But other countries – even recent Allies – may be torn between seeking your support and wanting to strip back some of the more excessive gains the UGNR has made.
The US remains a good economic partner and the participation of the US Marine detachment in the European War was most welcome. But they also retain strong ties with the UK and other Western Allies. Like Turkey, their membership of the Comintern faction was more out of opportunity and convenience than any political or philosophical attachment. But their tendencies are more likely to swing behind liberal democratic principles and outcomes in the post-war world.
The Soviet Union has been a close and faithful ally to Turkey as has Turkey to them. But with the war over, some practical issues may cause tension. The biggest of these is the question of the future of Germany. While technically Germany now functions as a satellite of Turkey, the Soviets are highly unlikely to be happy with this situation continuing unless some deal can be done. And Stalin will be aware of the political disparity between the two great multi-national unions now sharing Europe. And perhaps jealous of the wide gains that seem to have fallen into Turkey’s lap.
The UK will remain suspicious of Turkey, despite wanting to maintain a professional working relationship – especially given they will likely feel their holdings in Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt and Palestine may be surrounded and under a degree of threat from Turkey. They will want to hold their own interests dear – many of which are outside Turkey’s main area of interest and could be useful areas to bargain on.
Other than general antipathy, at present there is little direct interest for Turkey in Japan, its conquests, or East Asia and the Pacific generally. But Japan may well be keen to secure some of Turkeys enormous oil reserves in the future, while politically the two governments could have more in common than less, especially if Japan could be guided into a slightly more moderate path. Down the track, Japan could be a potential candidate to join forces in a new faction based on paternal autocracy, in which Japan and Turkey could be central players – along with as much of Germany and Italy that can be kept under Turkish control (in the UGNR or as puppets) as possible.
Apart from trying to steer a different course between the Western liberal democracies and the Communists and away from the old Fascist Axis construct, Turkey must decide how much political capital to trade away at the Conference by using vetoes to prevent unwanted outcomes if some ballots do not turn out favourably. Some of the newly conquered territory during the war is either somewhat peripheral to Turkey’s core interests or are not important enough to risk too much to hold onto. Others will be crucial, especially regarding some of the big questions for Turkey that will crop up towards the end (Germany, Italy, Poland, France, Spain).
The other danger as the smallest (in votes) at the start of the ‘Big Five’ powers (if Japan is included) is the risk of using so many vetoes that another country takes its place on the new League of Nations Security Council at the end of the Conference. This will be affected by how the votes go and whether Turkey will be satisfied to lose some puppets to become more independent players or currently occupied countries to become merely puppets. Note: in Round Four, it has been assessed that trying to hold onto Hungary as an occupied territory would be too hard to justify and control, so the Turkish preference is actually to have a puppet government installed, but other countries will not know that.
In terms of a hypothetical post-war break-up of the current Comintern faction, with Turkey forming a new right-wing/paternal autocrat/Kemalist but non-Fascist faction, a Turkish puppet would side with Turkey, while independent Comintern countries would face a choice (assume 50/50) in such a situation.
There you have the initial in-character briefing material provided to the main conference participants. In due course, I'll take screenshots of the master voting sheet that lists all the option and country points side by side for each proposition option, which I'll probably do in the same tranches as the voting was done.
What I thought I would start the Epilogue musings with is the briefing notes I provided to the powers at the start of the Peace Conference. Part out of interest, part to inform why the scores were broadly structured as they were (next Epilogue update will start to roll them out) and also to give you an idea where I was seeing the immediate post-war period heading before the Conference started. Of course, its outcomes will now help to further shape my hypothetical 'what happened next' scenarios.
As mentioned to each delegation in the notes, these were just thoughts and no-one was bound to follow the general guidance or the voting points.
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Soviet Union – Classified Background Briefing
The USSR can be seen as perhaps the main overall ‘winner’ of the European phase of the Great Liberation War in terms of power and reach. But Turkey’s key role in joining the Comintern, bringing the USSR into the war when it did, then doing much to help the Comintern win has proved a double-edged sword. Turkey now has direct or political control over much of Central and Southern Europe, including in areas where the USSR would like to see itself as pre-eminent.
Poland has become and will be retained as a Soviet puppet, and that is not up for debate at this conference. Denmark is up for debate however and there may be more opposition to that continuing, especially from the Allies and perhaps the US.
But the great prize of Germany, against whom the USSR surely bore the brunt of the fighting, slipped from the Soviet grasp due to some shifty political shenanigans after their surrender. This is the sorest of points arising from the war, though it must be admitted Turkey has so far appeared genuinely understanding of the artificial position there and Soviet interests in the matter. Surely both sides will be willing to bargain over the fate of this key question? The same should apply in varying degrees to various other nations along the periphery between the two great powers of Europe and in Spain and Finland (another quirk of the war, becoming a Turkish puppet), where the USSR holds a special interest.
In general, in Central Europe the USSR will naturally prefer to see countries currently occupied or puppeted by Turkey to become independent Comintern countries, where both the USSR and Turkey might seek to influence them in the mid-long term post-war area. There is capacity to horse-trade in there with Turkey, agreeing to support them on some key votes while they voluntarily relinquish control in others. If they get recalcitrant and start vetoing freely, that may decrease their voting power over time … but would that be in the USSR’s best interests if a potential friendly vote in the latter stages of the Conference is diminished by forcing them into that position?
On Poland, the USSR clearly wants to see its most powerful current puppet state expand as far as possible, at the expense of Germany (primarily) and Turkey (with their Prussian enclave). Despite Turkey being its primary conqueror in the recent campaign, the USSR participated strongly with expeditionary forces on the ground and Spain properly belongs under direct Soviet influence, now with a sympathetic government and strong historical Popular Front ties.
But the first great issue to decide upon at this Conference is the continuing war with Japan. Despite recent slow gains, Japan still holds much Soviet territory and would likely take years to defeat, given the supine attitude the US has taken to the war in the Pacific. Also, there is a chance the UK and Allies may strike a separate peace with Japan, which would make the task that much harder for the USSR. And if we were to decide to veto a vote for a general treaty (whether on current lines – very unlikely anyone other than Japan will want that – or on pre-war Soviet-Japanese boundaries) and continue the war, any non-Soviet puppet Comintern partners (such as the US, Turkey and Romania, possibly Germany or parts of it) would be absolved from participating, and the UK and other Allies may also have signed a separate peace. Japan would be left within the Conference anyway and could well fill one of the five permanent League of Nations Security Council positions anyway, even while we remain at war with them!
Possible peace with Japan will require careful handling and negotiation. If we do not believe the war is worth continuing as is or in an even more isolated limited Soviet-Japanese conflict, clearly the best outcome would be peace on pre-war lines, including Mongolia being fully restored as a Soviet puppet state. Then let the Allies and Japanese bang their heads together over the rest of the contended territory – who cares?
In overall new alignments, we assess the US is likely to end its ‘marriage of convenience’ with the Comintern soon and rejoin – formally or informally – with the British-led Allies. They may try to persuade Turkey to come over with them, but we doubt they would be willing to embrace the necessary preconditions for truly joining them. We hope Turkey will remain in the Comintern or at least continue the brotherhood and friendly relations forged in the fires of the Great Liberation War. Especially given how much of the world’s oil reserves they control, though we too are major producers. There is a chance they may drift into or even try to create and lead a ‘Third Way’ faction based on their own hybrid governmental and philosophical world view, but we are very convinced they would never seek to join or revive the Axis.
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United States – Classified Background Briefing
We find ourselves in a diplomatic ‘marriage of convenience’ we virtually stumbled into when the Axis attacked us in this war. While the scourge of Nazism and Fascism has been defeated in Europe, the US is hardly celebrating the aftermath there as it currently stands. Unfortunately, while we hold significant sway through our economic support during the war and our current industrial clout, the lack of much military participation in the fight means less clout at the post-war bargaining table. Other than some isolated and desultory fighting in the Pacific (where we mainly lost ground that has not yet been recovered) and the Marine detachment that fought with the Turks, the skin we put in the game was all economic through lend-lease. It saved a generation of our young men from the horrors of war but means less bargaining power for now.
At this conference, we need to tread a fine line to achieve a number of objectives:
- promoting as much national determination and freedom in Europe as possible, given the circumstances;
- supporting the UK/Allies in many but not all things;
- wishing to maintain friendly relations with Turkey – perhaps even wooing them away from Soviet influence; and
- peaceful, cordial relations with the Soviets.
So our negotiator in Geneva has the private guidance to stymie a peace with Japan if possible, even if at the expense of the UK/Allies. If there must be a peace, then much as we’d like to see the Soviets lose a chunk of their Far Eastern territory in a ‘peace in place’ (Proposition 1.1) that would be against our interests in the Pacific and would harm the UK/Allies. The Japanese are even worse than the Soviets, after all! So the next best option (after a continued war) would be Proposition 1.2, where we try our chances in the Round Two votes on Japan’s other conquered territory. We may have lost our hold over the Philippines for now, but we sure as heck don’t want to see the Japanese continue to control it. We don’t care quite so much about Burma or Indochina.
When it comes to Europe, we’d generally like to see as much independence for countries there as possible. Of all the Central European and Balkan countries, the US most believes Romania has earned the right to be an independent player from their role in the war, so that has become a cause celebre for FDR. We may be willing, for example, to trade support there with Turkey to ensure Romania’s freedom for some support in a few of the other decisions in the region.
Another somewhat special case is Arabia. While we don’t want it to remain as a constituent part of the UGNR on general principles, the US is also worried that, if Arabia becomes an independent country under the Comintern, it could eventually fall under Soviet hegemony, giving them way too much control over the world’s oil and energy reserves and undermining the viability of Turkey as a balancing power. So we’d prefer to see it remain under Turkish influence as a puppet state (Proposition 18.2). As with Romania, other countries may not suspect our motives here, so this is another outcome we may wish to trade for with other propositions that are less crucial to us.
India is another important issue we may clash over with the British. Churchill is likely to want to continue the Raj there, though if he goes against a majority decision to partition India and allow it to become non-aligned (which we would not welcome either) the consequences could be dire. We’d prefer to see India remain unified and become independent but under the Allied umbrella, which we intend to join as soon as soon it is strategically convenient. So, on principal and interest, we strongly support Proposition 21.2. A partitioned and non-aligned India would be the worst of the possible outcomes there from our point of view.
Naturally, we’d like to see the poor Poles get as much territory as possible, even if they will remain a Soviet puppet for the foreseeable future. They deserve it after all they’ve been through and it would ensure German power is moderated. And who knows, one day in the future the Poles may even be able to throw off their Soviet shackles and we would like to say we helped them do so.
On the big issue of Germany, we’d strongly prefer to see Germany remain unified and as independent as possible, because it may then be possible to foster Western democratic values there in the future and woo it away from the Comintern. Even one day into the Allies, as a democratic bulwark against authoritarianism. The worst case would see it remain unified as a puppet under the Soviets. A little less bad would be the same but under the Turks. In the absence of German independence from either or both, the least-worst option would be for a default to partition (Outcome 23.4). At least it would keep that power divided and provide a little more ballast against Soviet hegemony in Europe. And given the dynamics, it’s probably the most likely outcome of that tug-of-war.
With France, despite their current government, they remain a democracy and part of the Allies. The best thing there would be to see the country re-united. Having it even as an independent Comintern republic would be unjust. Leaving it under Turkish control for now would be marginally better, as it may be possible to persuade the Turks later to transfer it back to France for some post-war, post-conference bargain.
So: independence as a general principal; sometimes conditional but genuine support of the Western Democracies as we will soon wish to rejoin them; limited support for Turkey in selected areas to try to keep them on-side; reclaim lost Pacific territories (by treaty or war); and quiet but comprehensive action to limit Soviet influence wherever possible.
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Poland – Classified Background Briefing
So far, despite being a Soviet puppet since our ‘liberation’, we have been permitted a surprisingly free rein by our Soviet overlords within the Comintern. Perhaps Stalin is not supremely confident of his position, given how they remain at war with the Japanese, with much territory still to regain in the Far East. While Turkey has managed – through a mixture or hard fighting and good luck – to secure much of southern and central Europe under their control, including a notional hold over Germany. Who, after all, remain the elemental enemy!
We may only have one vote in this forum, but we at least have a vote and without any Soviet compulsion to force us into a particular outcome. Then again, we do want them to support those cessions from Germany. In a potentially close vote, we may just be able to gain a bit of bargaining power for our big issues, especially the biggest of all: the cession of new territory to Poland, to not only reinstate what we lost to Germany but then compensate for what we have since lost to the Soviets. We are likely to have a good deal of international sympathy for our cause in that regard, though will no doubt find the Germans trying everything they can to prevent the loss of their eastern lands to us. Bring it on!
More generally, where we can do so without incurring too much Soviet wrath, our best interests would be served by seeing as many independent nations as possible emerge. We may be a Soviet ‘puppet’ government now, but we secretly strive for freedom from that yoke one day. And perhaps Turkey could be our best chance for balance in central Europe for the longer term. So there are a few instances where seeing them emerge stronger could be a good thing.
One of those is with the Czechs. The Turks have already stated they have no intention of retaining the Czech Republic as part of the UGNR. So, rather than seeing it independent within the Comintern and fall prey to Soviet domination, perhaps it would be better to see them become a Turkish puppet state, making our southern flank less of a threat. The same rationale applies to the Slovaks.
As to the rest of Europe, the more independent countries that border neither us nor the USSR, the better. That is where our future lies: at least (unlike us and Denmark) they did not all fall under the thrall of the Soviets, who would have been far less willing to surrender control than Turkey will likely be. Stalin will no doubt be far more willing and able to force himself on unwilling nations, as happened to us. Our 'liberation' by the Soviets, with Turkey’s assistance, from German tyranny was simply the lesser of two evils.
Of course, the greatest issue for us will be the enormously consequential Proposition 22, due to be voted on in Round Seven. It should be relatively easy to secure some sympathy there. And the Turks are unlikely to be thinking their Baltic enclave would be sustainable, so we might even be able to persuade them to support us in some pledges for trade-offs in earlier votes: they will surely be wanting all the support they can get, given how much they have at stake in the prior rounds. If we could lock in a number of pledges of support in one or more earlier votes to a single commitment to support us on the cessions, then the penalty of breaking them later could be prohibitive to Turkey.
On Germany, well – the more they are divided, the better as far as we’re concerned. Any retention of a unified Germany could only be a threat to us, whether it is relatively independent under the Comintern or under Soviet influence. Turkish control might be a little better, if it means in future years we could turn to them to help us extract ourselves from Soviet hegemony. So maybe we could welcome that as a compromise. But really, the best and most likely outcome – unless the Turks and Soviets come to some agreement not to use vetoes on each other – would be a partition, after gaining our cessions as well. That should reduce the German threat to us for a generation, at least.
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Japan – Classified Background Briefing
Despite the failure of Germany and Italy in Europe, the might of Japanese arms has brought us to the bargaining table in Geneva in a strong position. Our expansion may currently be past its maximum point, but despite the Allies and Comintern making recent inroads, they must know that defeating us would be very costly and time consuming – and may not even be achievable. Banzai!
We may be able to secure many gains, if not all that we have made, plus a seat at the international table despite the overall failure of the German-led Axis push. The new world order can be made to include Japan, with a seat on the League of Nations Security Council almost a lock if even a limited peace is negotiated – so long as we don’t veto it.
Naturally, a settlement that permits us to retain all currently occupied territory (Proposition 1.1) would be the ideal result, but we must be realistic in thinking such a vote would be highly unlikely to succeed given the preponderance of Comintern and Allied powers voting in Geneva. Barring that miracle, our best bet would be for a treaty that sees the main pre-war borders in Asia with the Soviets and Allies resumed (Proposition 1.2), with our remaining holdings seized during the recent conflict negotiated one by one in Round Two of the Geneva voting process. We at least retain vetoes if we wish to deploy them for any or all adverse votes that may occur on those, allowing us to retain selected territory albeit at a diplomatic cost.
Of course, a majority of our adversaries may feel emboldened to continue their war against us, in which case they will find out the price of their folly. But if we can manage to forge a reasonable peace and judiciously use our veto on the occupied territories, we stand to gain much. And the loss of any oilfields in South East Asia should perhaps be offset by a policy of rapprochement with Turkey, despite the unpleasantness between us in the current war. That had been more on the diplomatic and espionage fronts – no actual fighting has taken place (other than by local Japanese-backed rebels in the Dodecanese) between us. We will need some strategic partners in this new Comintern-Allied dominated World Order, after all. The US is unlikely to have any sympathy for us, while the UK and USSR will also be staunchly opposed.
In terms of the Conference business, our greatest interests are of course in the first two rounds of voting (if we indeed make it to a second round). The Euro-centric outcomes are of more marginal interest to us, though in general the more smaller countries that can be relatively independent of the Comintern hegemony, the better. The main value for us in those rounds is the bargaining position our significant bloc of votes might command by any pledges we might make against support for our interests in the first two rounds. Gaining some substantive outcomes early for votes on issues we don’t care so much about later (and would be happy enough to fulfil) could be a good way to maximise our position and gain influence in the post-war world.
The big exception to the above is India, where its partition and prising from the grasp of UK and the Allies more widely would be a major strategic victory for Japan. And there may be a fair degree of support for such an outcome in the non-Allied powers: any mayhem we can cause the British would be welcome, and nothing less than they deserve.
To a lesser extent, the fate of our old ally Germany is of some interest. A unified Germany (partitioned or not) falling entirely under Soviet domination would be a bad outcome. Turkey – not so bad, but still a negative. As would be a partition between the two, though that would at least dilute the threat and possibly pit the two wartime allies against each other in the post-war world. Best would be a united and relatively independent Germany – which might one day be able to extricate itself from all Comintern control and once more pose a distraction to our main enemy – the Soviets. France and Poland? Don’t care too much, really. The French are a spent force.
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Spain - Brief Notes (joined just after the Conference had begun)
Only Proposition 1 had been decided, as you'd have seen, and in Spain's case you didn't miss much - there would have been no difference for Spain whichever of the two most likely options got up. In essence, there are some questions for each country that they really don't care too much about. Spain is assessed as being only marginally more interested in Round Two, with the proposed fates of Burma and the Philippines assessed as equally bad/good from the Spanish perspective. But the others don't know that, so it means in such votes you might be able to offer votes for trade with no skin off your nose for things you may be keen to achieve later. In the main, in Europe the feeling for Spain is that as much independence as possible for other countries will set well with Spain and its own long-term interests. Romania is an outlier there - just a quirk, not a big difference, but I decided the in-game Romanian government did not seem truly in step with the Third Popular Front, they didn't want to see it possibly drift too much towards the Soviets later and so would be happy to see it stay under Turkish 'protection'. But it's only a five point score difference, so it's not a biggie really.
Naturally, the big one for Spain is Proposition 19, so good luck trying to maybe get some bound pledges to support you on that one: it's towards the end as one of the more important questions, naturally as much independence as possible is the desired outcome of your Government and people.
And while Spain is in the Comintern and under Turkish puppetry and Soviet moral suasion, as per the other countries at the Conference in a similar position (eg Germany, Poland, Romania) you have a completely free vote on all matters.
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Germany – Classified Background Briefing
Of course, Germany finds itself in a fraught position and the object of probably the single biggest decision of the Conference, after the question of peace or war with Japan is decided. Our status as a nominal puppet state under Turkish control is very much a temporary and interim one. Under the terms of the Conference, Germany gets a free vote on all issues including upon its own fate – but, as a defeated power, it gets no veto.
In general terms, Germany wants to remain unified if possible and of course as an independent member of the Comintern as an ideal. Its future fate and long-term alignment would then be more in our own hands. If we must remain a puppet state to stay unified, it would far better to do so under Turkish than Soviet rule. The Turks are politically and ideologically closer to us and would likely be far less restrictive as overlords than would the Soviets. But even unification under Soviet control would be better than the worst possible outcome: partition! With territorial cessions to Poland very likely to be forced upon us, partition would see Sacred Germany divided into ever smaller pieces: it must be avoided if at all possible. This aim and deal-making with the other participants (including trying to persuade the USSR and Turkey not to veto a more favourable outcome, in ironclad pledges if at all possible) will be at the centre of everything we do in the lead-up to the vote on Proposition 23.
On Japan, Germany harbours a desire to see the war grind on if possible, to the detriment of all its worst old enemies. Failing that, a punitive peace that sees the Soviets and British worse off (or forced to commit vetoes) would be acceptable too. If there is a ‘status quo ante’ peace (Proposition 1.2) then so be it. Germany would have no particular interest in any Round Two outcome one war or another, so our vote could be ‘up for sale’ in a deal with interested parties, perhaps as either informal or bound pledges for future support in issues of more importance to Germany.
In Europe, Germany would prefer to see as much independence from Soviet control as possible, in Denmark in particular. German views on the fate of most other countries are a bit more idiosyncratic, especially where Turkey is concerned. Sometimes, more independence may be desired. In others, it may be better to have Turkey control a bordering state than have in ‘up for grabs’ and then possibly falling under subsequent Soviet control – such as in the Czech Republic, given Poland is already a Soviet puppet and is likely to gain more territory at German expense in the coming settlement.
Austria is another story: it is German in culture and should be as independent as possible. Hungary also fought strongly for Germany in the recent war: they too deserve as much independence as possible. Further away, in the Balkans and elsewhere, maximum independence from any other major power is preferable.
On France: we know Germany will not be permitted to retain its current technical occupation of the former Vichy territory of southern France. Which has British and Turkish enclaves within it anyway. So let’s try to keep France as weak and divided as possible. If we end up partitioned, there would be some schadenfreude in seeing the same happen to them!
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UK & Allies – Classified Background Briefing
We directly represent all the current Allied faction, except for France, as a single voting bloc, giving us more power united than we would have fragmented. So our interests are influenced by the views of the Dominions (especially where Japan occupies territory in Australia and New Zealand) and other Allied combatants (for example, the Dutch in the their East Indies colony).
For the UK, peace with Japan is one of the more important issues of this conference. Frankly, we can’t afford for this war to continue, especially if presented with a ‘fair and reasonable’ option to end it. Some are arguing that even a peace in place on current lines would be better than continuing this war, for which domestic support may fail and the government fall if we are seen to have been too bloody-minded about it. The Royal Navy has been eviscerated, we’ve managed to hold onto Singapore and the south of Malaya and held the Japanese in eastern India.
Australia and New Zealand would be aghast if a ‘peace in place’ did occur, but that outcome is pretty unlikely: if it did happen, it would be a tricky call as to whether we exercised a veto there. We could find ourselves in a limited war if the Soviets acceded to it (though that too seems highly unlikely). And if we didn’t veto but the Soviets did, they are the ones who would be sapping themselves against the Japanese. But the Aussies, Kiwis and Dutch would howl and our credibility would be shredded, costing us influence at the Conference. A negotiated peace starting largely on pre-war Allied/Japanese boundaries and with the Round Two negotiations to follow would be by far the preferable outcome for us. Anything else would be a dreadful mess.
Naturally, on the Continent we generally wish to see Comintern (both Turkish but especially Soviet) influence diminished as much as possible, wherever possible. Of the decisions to be made, Denmark (Proposition 6) stands out, so too the fate of Yugoslavia, Romania and Greece. In North Africa, Arabia and Iran, we are particularly concerned about Turkish influence over both the oilfields and bordering our holdings in Egypt, Palestine, on the margins of the Arabian Peninsula and around out ‘friendly’ government in Iraq. These questions are all of significant interest to us.
We would rather see both Spain and Italy as independent as possible from either Turkish or (particularly) Soviet influence, but acknowledge there is little direct influence we can exert there. But on India, much as the common populace may be indifferent about its fate, Winston is adamant: this jewel in the Imperial crown should be retained under direct British control in this dangerous new world. If we can persuade enough of the other powers to support us on this matter, it would be the single most important outcome for us at this Conference. If we can’t achieve that, then at least we’d want to see an independent India stay unified and part of the Allied faction.
Should enough of the rest of the world combine against us to try to force partition and full independence, we should consider reserving the option of a veto as a last resort. Though our intelligence services report the results of such a repudiation of global opinion by us could be dangerous indeed and may see us lose India anyway as well as the political cachet sacrificed by exercising such a veto. Let’s hope it doesn’t come to that, Foreign Minister! It is your job to avoid it.
Of course, because we can’t release the poor Poles from their dominance by the Soviets in the short term, we should do the best we can for them in gaining cessions from Turkey and Germany, which has the advantage of weakening Germany in particular.
On Germany, it is a great pity we were not able in the end to carve a slice of occupied territory out of their hide to bargain with. But given the circumstances there, the worst outcome would be if they were to remain unified but as a Soviet puppet. That would be disastrous for the balance of power in Europe. Though it would have the benefit of splitting German power further, a partition of Germany would be bad as well, as the Soviets would gain the most significant slice of that cake, including Berlin, the major northern North and Baltic Sea ports and the industrial heartland of the Ruhr.
Having Germany remaining unified but as a Turkish puppet would be better, for both the balance of power and because they would be less likely to be able to fully control the Germans in the future: surely their dominance would begin to erode quite quickly in the post-settlement era. And it may also be possible to eventually split Turkey away from the Comintern. After all, they are very strange bedfellows philosophically and now have some geostrategic conflicts as well. Not least over Germany. For us, even though it leaves Germany unified, a more independent regime might eventually be persuaded to gravitate more to the West than either Soviet communism or Turkish Kemalism. And if the Soviets or Turks veto a plenary vote for German independence, we could live with a partition, even though it would be sub-optimal: far better than Soviet dominance.
France, of course, must be re-united. We would contribute those enclaves in the north and south we currently occupy, but France must be re-established as a genuine Allied power: we have so few of them left in the faction right now! The beastly Turks mustn’t be allowed to annex it – the French would surely veto that if they must – and we would look pretty shabby if we voted for such an outcome. If it did come to a partition, we may have to live with it and would of course agitate in the future to somehow help France re-unify at a future date.
Overall, we want to see the US rejoin its true spiritual home among the Western democracies as part of the Allies in the post-war aftermath. We are given to understand they are of a similar view and will tend to hope for the same general outcomes as we do, but their support may be conditional and cannot be taken for granted on some issues. Especially on India, where we fear they want to see more immediate de-colonisation than our own brief calls for.
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France – Classified Background Briefing
We find ourselves in a very difficult position. The Republic has been re-established, but only just. Our power has been severely diminished and the country remains divided, with the hated Germans in technical possession of the former Vichy south, but effectively under Turkish control. Our empire has almost completely disappeared, much of it passing via Vichy into Turkish hands or in Asia falling under the heel of the Japanese. Communist and Kemalist influence runs rampant across Europe. We must do what we can to retrieve this dire situation, but it will not be easy.
We can probably rely on the British and the Allies they speak for on most issues, though support may be conditional on some. And despite their technical wartime membership of the Comintern, the US is also likely to be generally supportive, with many of our overall broad strategic objectives shared. But with only three votes to deploy in the Conference, it will have to be our powers of persuasion – and cultural superiority, or course – that we rely upon. At least we have been given a limited veto over the fate of southern France, which we hope we don’t have to deploy. While partition would be a disaster, annexation by Turkey would be a catastrophe. At least a so-called Peoples Republic of France in the south might eventually be persuaded or forced to reunify with us. Who knows what may happen if the Turks sink their fangs into it: they are likely to be far too powerful for us to confront any time soon in open conflict.
On Japan, continuing the war would be a hopeless pursuit from our perspective. We don’t even control all of Metropolitan France and don’t want the Allies focusing on Asia when we need their support here closer to home. Peace based largely on pre-war boundaries with some negotiations over the rest (Proposition 1.2) would be the best outcome. We know Indochina is lost to us forever. The least we can do is try to see it separated from Japan by negotiation, or to see their reputation trashed if they insist on vetoing a majority resolution against them. And after all, who other than Japan would vote in favour of them keeping some these ill-gotten gains? Unless of course it was in return for their powerful vote on other issues of more importance to us. Hmm, perhaps there is something we could explore there (other than Indochina) … an enemy of our enemies becoming a temporary friend?
In Europe and elsewhere, our interests like many others outside the Soviets and Turkey must be gaining as much independence for occupied and oppressed countries as possible. North Africa in particular, where the Turks have managed to hijack almost all our previous holdings. And we don’t want all that Arabian oil concentrated in Turkish hands either.
On India, we may be somewhat at odds with Churchill: better to see it unified and independent but safely within the Allied camp than as a non-aligned loose cannon or an antiquated colonial appendage of Britain. They are kidding themselves if they think they can hang onto India as a Raj for any appreciable time without it disintegrating into either a bloodbath or a debacle, either of which may end badly for the wider Allied cause. The British must be persuaded to see the error of their ways. Or forced to if it comes to that.
Germany? May they be cursed to hell forever! If we do have to try to court their vote where possible, so be it. But whether publicly or privately, we wish to see them as weak and divided as possible. Them remaining unified either as an independent Comintern country or under the Soviets would be equally bad. Remaining as a Turkish puppet wouldn’t be too bad, as at least their politics are closer to ours. And it might prove unstable and would also provide a buffer against Bolshevism. But probably the best outcome would be partition and dismemberment, even if it did leave the Communists on our doorstep. It would be a measure of revenge, anyway.
It goes without saying that for Poland, we want to see as much as possible hived off the Germans and throwing in that Turkish enclave in Prussia would be icing on the cake.
In the broad, we may not like the British that much, but they did help liberate northern France when it appeared the whole country would fall under the Comintern boot. They and the US returning formally to the Allied fold are our best prospect for longer term survival and trying to reunite the country. Without their support, the latter would be impossible. And of the other powers, we may be able to cut some deals with Turkey – perhaps even providing them some support in return for helping us reunify. They did try to help us in the recent war, even if it was too little, too late and for their own purposes. Japan? Well, we despise them of course, but if we can use them along the way, all the better.
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Turkey – Classified Background Briefing
As the world situation now stands, Turkey has secured much territory and influence and potential ‘Big Five’ League of Nations Security Council status. But other countries – even recent Allies – may be torn between seeking your support and wanting to strip back some of the more excessive gains the UGNR has made.
The US remains a good economic partner and the participation of the US Marine detachment in the European War was most welcome. But they also retain strong ties with the UK and other Western Allies. Like Turkey, their membership of the Comintern faction was more out of opportunity and convenience than any political or philosophical attachment. But their tendencies are more likely to swing behind liberal democratic principles and outcomes in the post-war world.
The Soviet Union has been a close and faithful ally to Turkey as has Turkey to them. But with the war over, some practical issues may cause tension. The biggest of these is the question of the future of Germany. While technically Germany now functions as a satellite of Turkey, the Soviets are highly unlikely to be happy with this situation continuing unless some deal can be done. And Stalin will be aware of the political disparity between the two great multi-national unions now sharing Europe. And perhaps jealous of the wide gains that seem to have fallen into Turkey’s lap.
The UK will remain suspicious of Turkey, despite wanting to maintain a professional working relationship – especially given they will likely feel their holdings in Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt and Palestine may be surrounded and under a degree of threat from Turkey. They will want to hold their own interests dear – many of which are outside Turkey’s main area of interest and could be useful areas to bargain on.
Other than general antipathy, at present there is little direct interest for Turkey in Japan, its conquests, or East Asia and the Pacific generally. But Japan may well be keen to secure some of Turkeys enormous oil reserves in the future, while politically the two governments could have more in common than less, especially if Japan could be guided into a slightly more moderate path. Down the track, Japan could be a potential candidate to join forces in a new faction based on paternal autocracy, in which Japan and Turkey could be central players – along with as much of Germany and Italy that can be kept under Turkish control (in the UGNR or as puppets) as possible.
Apart from trying to steer a different course between the Western liberal democracies and the Communists and away from the old Fascist Axis construct, Turkey must decide how much political capital to trade away at the Conference by using vetoes to prevent unwanted outcomes if some ballots do not turn out favourably. Some of the newly conquered territory during the war is either somewhat peripheral to Turkey’s core interests or are not important enough to risk too much to hold onto. Others will be crucial, especially regarding some of the big questions for Turkey that will crop up towards the end (Germany, Italy, Poland, France, Spain).
The other danger as the smallest (in votes) at the start of the ‘Big Five’ powers (if Japan is included) is the risk of using so many vetoes that another country takes its place on the new League of Nations Security Council at the end of the Conference. This will be affected by how the votes go and whether Turkey will be satisfied to lose some puppets to become more independent players or currently occupied countries to become merely puppets. Note: in Round Four, it has been assessed that trying to hold onto Hungary as an occupied territory would be too hard to justify and control, so the Turkish preference is actually to have a puppet government installed, but other countries will not know that.
In terms of a hypothetical post-war break-up of the current Comintern faction, with Turkey forming a new right-wing/paternal autocrat/Kemalist but non-Fascist faction, a Turkish puppet would side with Turkey, while independent Comintern countries would face a choice (assume 50/50) in such a situation.
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There you have the initial in-character briefing material provided to the main conference participants. In due course, I'll take screenshots of the master voting sheet that lists all the option and country points side by side for each proposition option, which I'll probably do in the same tranches as the voting was done.
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Fascinating to read...though in many cases, pragmatism seems to have been overlooked for ideaolpgy. Not wrong, considering OTL, but also considering OTL, I suspect the wheeler dealing of the conference would certainly have happened. Especially with the Soviets already canonical pragmatists in allying with Turkey (an expansionist imperial power) in the first place...
I do see them as such, but also they occupy the position the New Roman empire would have been in: hilariously overextended, in charge of every historical trouble spot in the old world, desperate for money and resources, and reliant on their major ally to support all of the above.
They are in a better place than Italy would be in, but having to control Italy, the balkans and Arabia is going to be very difficult. Such that I judged any puppet of theirs is more likely to be a free agent than the name would suggest, esepcially in Central europe, who are much more like buffer stares than vassals of either side.
That being said, the same pragmatic thought that brought us this far also carried through the conference, and I think, provided the Comintern alliance holds, Turkey has a good chance of holding it all together for at least a few decades.
To my recollection, only Turkey briefly objected to Russian Denmark. The allies in general were reasonable enough to see it was lost.
Didn't really have a problem with Finland once I laid out how many puppets Turkey was going to get. Likewise with Germany, I was determined to at least try to get it whole on my side, before just taking the north.
Considering the history between the regions and Russia, I felt that supporting their buffer statehood would come across better than trying to take them over, and considering how many communists were in each region beforehand, am confident at least a few may well turn into free comintern societ republics without any direct action from us.
It did. Fortunately, Japan had no friends more likely to be long term partners than us.
This happened, though much slower than anticipated.
...yes, well...oh dear.
...not really?
Got those two down. Probably will continue to for the next decade at least.
Romania is probably ironically going to be the one Turkish puppet who actually will be controlled more carefully by Turkey, because of how powerful and ideally positioned it is.
Hehehehehehe
Little did they know their best friend would be comrade uncle k for the entire conference...
In the very begining yes, but the agreed upon borders and sphere of influence, as well as Turkey's many distractions and no such distractions for us...we're in a very good place. As are they, but less so.
I do see them as such, but also they occupy the position the New Roman empire would have been in: hilariously overextended, in charge of every historical trouble spot in the old world, desperate for money and resources, and reliant on their major ally to support all of the above.
They are in a better place than Italy would be in, but having to control Italy, the balkans and Arabia is going to be very difficult. Such that I judged any puppet of theirs is more likely to be a free agent than the name would suggest, esepcially in Central europe, who are much more like buffer stares than vassals of either side.
That being said, the same pragmatic thought that brought us this far also carried through the conference, and I think, provided the Comintern alliance holds, Turkey has a good chance of holding it all together for at least a few decades.
To my recollection, only Turkey briefly objected to Russian Denmark. The allies in general were reasonable enough to see it was lost.
Didn't really have a problem with Finland once I laid out how many puppets Turkey was going to get. Likewise with Germany, I was determined to at least try to get it whole on my side, before just taking the north.
Considering the history between the regions and Russia, I felt that supporting their buffer statehood would come across better than trying to take them over, and considering how many communists were in each region beforehand, am confident at least a few may well turn into free comintern societ republics without any direct action from us.
It did. Fortunately, Japan had no friends more likely to be long term partners than us.
This happened, though much slower than anticipated.
...yes, well...oh dear.
...not really?
Got those two down. Probably will continue to for the next decade at least.
Romania is probably ironically going to be the one Turkish puppet who actually will be controlled more carefully by Turkey, because of how powerful and ideally positioned it is.
Hehehehehehe
Little did they know their best friend would be comrade uncle k for the entire conference...
In the very begining yes, but the agreed upon borders and sphere of influence, as well as Turkey's many distractions and no such distractions for us...we're in a very good place. As are they, but less so.
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get rekt franklin
well i never
Who, indeed?
Indeed. I was actually pleasantly surprised in reading these that there was a good mix of where the player actions aligned well with the national goals in the briefs and where players took some leeway. Well played by all involved I think.
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Thank you. That was a fascinating read! All things considered, I would say the Japanese mindset was the one I serioulsy miscalculated.
Japan was clearly a lot more confident militarily than I judged, but fortunately (or perhaps unfortunately as things turned out) did still favour a negotiated peace.
Here, I didn't appreciate just how strongly Japan was motivated to undermine British interests... and I probably should have, because it makes a lot of sense.
Japan was clearly a lot more confident militarily than I judged, but fortunately (or perhaps unfortunately as things turned out) did still favour a negotiated peace.
Here, I didn't appreciate just how strongly Japan was motivated to undermine British interests... and I probably should have, because it makes a lot of sense.
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The biggest leeway I took was deciding whether or not the russians would think Turkey would last as a power.
As most other powers would, I think, I came to the conclusion that they would not, at least not to the extent that I was worried about them.
To theorise for a moment, I suspect Africa as a whole, and probably the UGNR bits too, get decolonisation rapidly in this timeline. Then it becomes a race to see who bags the most out of the Soviets or the allies. Given how isolationist the US is and how distracted and vulnerable the British are, I suspect we would do well here.
The middle east is going to be trouble for everyone but esepcially Turkey. If they can figure out a way to secularise it or divide it up properly, they should be alright for a while but it's going to be an expensive and complicated process even with the oil coming out of it. And complicated and valuable enough that a lot of attention and military is stationed there.
The balkans are going to be trouble, of course, because they will. Properly divided up, the tension may stick to tension, rather than full out wars, but I suspect a similar OTL amount of chaos will ensue at least at some point every decade.
Italy is going to be trouble because half, the northern rich half, is very socialist and would want to be with the Comintern rather than the UGNR, and the southern half is profoundly Conservative and Catholic...which may or may not mix well with Turkey. If the UGNR keeps the pope onside, and appeased the south, they might be alright there. The north however...I suspect will be tempted various ways, especially with France and Germany right there over the alps getting close with the Soviets whilst Italy has to help douse fires in the balkans and Arabia again and again.
Which brings us to central europe and my guiding theory throughout that, because of the above, they will be very loosely coordinated by Turkey, with the exception of Romania who is already embedded in the Turkish system. The Soviets and comintern will have ample oppuritnry to play nice and build bridges with the socialists in each country (of which there are many), tempt them all with full independance, Soviet support, etc etc.
I think Turkey might be alright, but the empire is shakey and I suspect they can't actually push their power out beyond their borders effectively, making them something of a paper tiger, despite their ostensible wealth.
Russia on the other hand should be alright everywhere. Finland can be pacified as per OTL, Germany being unified is a boon to them, and them being a puppet is a boon to us. Lots of socialists and explicit anti fascists there that can be used as per otl to denazify and create true beleivers.
Denmark...May be a problem, depending on show the war went for them. They have a healthy socialist base too but also a monarchy that may or may not be experiencing war time support. Might have to tred carefully and perhaps even keep them around for a while.
Poland, despite their attempted betrayel, benefitted tons from the conference and all we really have to do to get their support is reveal what the nazis did there and how the previous regime helped them do it. Proclaim ourselves restorers of Poland, play nice with their socialists and even their moderates, and also purge the radicals and conservatives as part of a denazification (helpfully, this time its true!).
Our only other spot of bother is China, and me and Japan have had a lot of talks and theorising about what will happen there. Probably some renegotiated borders and attempts (at least for now) to be cordial and respect each others spheres. Japan has a gigantic mess to clean up, and we have Mao in the mountains to dangle over them.
I suspect we may end up being the Empire's fuel depo and banker for the next decade whilst rhe US smarts and sulks, before deciding what to do about Japan.
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The US is fairly easy. Isolated, not particularly involved in world affairs, lingering favouritism of comintern and socialism over the allies (who aside from France, were all shit or murderous apathetic to their own side, and are all also former colonial powers now).
I suspect the next decade will have a time of good feeling with the Turks and Soviets provided nothing big happens (nukes being developed, maybe). The British on the other hand are going to get slapped. Maybe in India but much more likely at suez.
Aside from that and lingering issues from Japan, fhe US is going to be withdrawn, prosperous and generally good natured for the next few years.
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France has some choices to make and it has to make them fairly quickly. After an election, which will probably decide which way they go. If they go Conservative, they'll plump for britian, which is a brave choice. If socialist, then closer ties and friendly relations with Soviets.
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The UK...is a bit of a mess. The country itself hasn't been impacted by the war. No bombing, no economic damage, no huge loss of men or equipment. However, the international prestige and imperial stuff is GONE. They abandoned Europe and their own empire for years to nazi invasions, Japan actually invaded white dominions with no British response, and overall, with a failed intervention in India, the empire is dying and the UK is in dire straits. No real friends to speak of, and enemies at every corner, I'm not entirely sure what the british response will be.
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Japan has got some things to sort too. The war wasn't so bad for them, indeed they did very well on their own account, and so the government should be quite popular. They for the moment also are the only ones in South East Asia and are going to reap the rewards of China...if they can handle it.
Their main tasks for the next three decades is avoiding passing off the US in a way that could lead to war or economic reprisal, and trying to dominate China as much as possible. I have no idea how well they will succeed at either, but at least they (probably) don't have to worry about the british, India or Russia.
I suspect the next decade will have a time of good feeling with the Turks and Soviets provided nothing big happens (nukes being developed, maybe). The British on the other hand are going to get slapped. Maybe in India but much more likely at suez.
Aside from that and lingering issues from Japan, fhe US is going to be withdrawn, prosperous and generally good natured for the next few years.
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France has some choices to make and it has to make them fairly quickly. After an election, which will probably decide which way they go. If they go Conservative, they'll plump for britian, which is a brave choice. If socialist, then closer ties and friendly relations with Soviets.
...
The UK...is a bit of a mess. The country itself hasn't been impacted by the war. No bombing, no economic damage, no huge loss of men or equipment. However, the international prestige and imperial stuff is GONE. They abandoned Europe and their own empire for years to nazi invasions, Japan actually invaded white dominions with no British response, and overall, with a failed intervention in India, the empire is dying and the UK is in dire straits. No real friends to speak of, and enemies at every corner, I'm not entirely sure what the british response will be.
...
Japan has got some things to sort too. The war wasn't so bad for them, indeed they did very well on their own account, and so the government should be quite popular. They for the moment also are the only ones in South East Asia and are going to reap the rewards of China...if they can handle it.
Their main tasks for the next three decades is avoiding passing off the US in a way that could lead to war or economic reprisal, and trying to dominate China as much as possible. I have no idea how well they will succeed at either, but at least they (probably) don't have to worry about the british, India or Russia.
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One should always judge Imperial Japan to be far more militarily confident than they have any right to be.
Even then, if the US had been willing to play ball Britain would probably have come off okay, i.e., kept control in India. For all TBC's waxing loquacious ("poetic" is a stretch of course) about masterminding the game, I really think 90% of it came down to the USA being stubbornly roleplayed as...well, the USA.Here, I didn't appreciate just how strongly Japan was motivated to undermine British interests... and I probably should have, because it makes a lot of sense.
I think the big thing with China is that it will remain challenging, as long as Chiang is alive there will be conflict, but with the USA pushed very far away there will not be the same desperation that led to things like Ichi-Go, meanwhile Japan will have somewhere to stick all of their gung-ho army leaders so they can feel like they matter.
Without the Philippines it would be much harder for the USA to even covertly try to base bombers in China, setting aside that this would of course be a blatant act of war.
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The main thing that we learned is that a very good human player can take a minor power and carry a second rate power (Soviets) to victory over the AI. TBC can talk smack until the cows come home, but the SU is in a worse place in TTL vs OTL because there is more of Europe that needs his rebuilding and Uncle Sam will not spare a dime for anyone but France unless Turkey repudiates his Uncle Joe and joins Uncle Sam.
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Counterargument: the USSR does not have to fight a Cold War against a superpower USA+NATO in TTL, as there is no Soviet vs NATO conflict in Korea and Indochina (both under Japanese control) or the Middle East (Turkey mostly). No need for the Iron Curtain with its massive permanent deployments draining the economy. Long-term the USSR may be more stable although without better leadership than OTL they will likely still collapse from internal pressures.
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Do you think still strong Japan could slowly influence Soviet Union?
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I suspect there will be divergence after stalin dies as to how the USSR is run and relates to the wider comintern. No cold war or iron curtain is a huge boost to international and national communism and socialists generally. Socialists parties will still be a thing, and post stalin Russian leaders will be looking to find favour and boost their appeal as much ad possible
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Now that I’ve finished my diss and have free time again (that specific, existential-horror-inducing form of free time known as “unemployment”) I can give this a go. Will write something up tomorrow. But I agree with the general thrust of the conversation so far that the USSR will be different, probably for the better, though maybe not enough to totally save it (unreformed) in the long run.
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The general gist is that if it goes full internationalist rather than a 'red' Russian empire, it should alright. If it sticks to socialism in one country, its not going to have the flexibility and favour elsewhere to stick together.
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"Could"? Maybe. "Would"? Probably not, frankly the Japanese have other things to do and are happy to just keep the Soviets vaguely on their side as a counterweight to the USA for the next couple of decades. While of course undermining their efforts in India.
Ah, the memories...I mean: AGH!! THE MEMORIES!!!
I think the key trick is how the post-Stalin era goes. Stalin is gonna Stalin, no doubt about that, so assuming OTL death date we're looking at 8-9 more years of socialism in one country plus a plethora of buffer states, philosophically. After that, maybe there is some change from the different international situation but internally de-Stalinization is still the likely follow-on, especially if not much changes and Khrushchev succeeds Stalin, and the pressure to be the Anti-Stalin in most ways will limit what Khrushchev or anyone else can do. However, without the pressures of the Cold War and with a generally less rabidly anti-Socialist international climate (i.e., isolationist or Japan-focused USA) Khrushchev or someone of similar mind could liberalize and open up Soviet society a good bit more than in OTL. On the other hand, given the reaction of Poland, Hungary, et al in OTL how much more pressing will it be when Germany reacts in the same manner?
Ultimately, I think regardless of one's feelings on the economic systems involved, if one looks at the people involved both OTL and likely in TTL, I don't know that optimism is necessarily the correct assessment. Frankly, it could go either way, but given the general quality of Soviet leadership in the Cold War era (and, for that matter, of Russian leadership after that... Slava Ukrayini!) I would tend toward the pessimistic side - and I do not readily see the historical impetus to produce a world leader of high quality from the Soviet system in this era, TTL changes notwithstanding.
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As a fun aside because I seem to keep having time slip away from me:
The Turkish navy is undergoing sea trials of it's future LHD/light carrier!
The Turkish navy is undergoing sea trials of it's future LHD/light carrier!
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Epilogue 1A - The Geneva Peace Conference
Epilogue 1A - The Geneva Peace Conference
Japan Vote Scores (Rounds 1 and 2)
Japan Vote Scores (Rounds 1 and 2)
My apologies on the delay in continuing the Epilogue. Working on the new HOI3 mod is a colossal 'time sink'. Once you're into the intricacies of events, game balancing and looking at LUAs, it not only takes time but I have to learn/relearn how to do the basics. Also, I've been following the discussions and wanted to give everyone an ample opportunity to make comments after the release of the confidential briefing papers.
Here is the first instalment, which is the crucial first two rounds of voting. First on peace with Japan (which of course you know I heavily weighted towards a peace agreement, but there was no guarantee). Then, with the peace agreement in place, there was the voting on how to dispose of the lands occupied by Japan that were up for negotiation at the Conference. Including the additional detail that was included for the return of US territories.
This was the first indication I got (in combination with the formalised deal-making that surrounded this process) that things would not be turning out quite as I might have expected them to. Basically, I'd thought (before the start of the conference and all the politicking that followed) that Japan would lose most if not all of the Round 2 votes and would have been motivated to exercise vetoes, thus decreasing the power of their voting bloc for the rest of the Conference. But of course, it didn't work out that way.
As to the raw scores for Round Two, the outcomes on Burma and the Philippines didn't matter at all to the smaller European powers (Romania, Poland, Germany and Spain). Due to the deals made, USSR and Turkey voted against their (small) interests in seeing Burma, the Philippines and sundry South East Asian territory released. While on the Pacific conquests, Japan wanted to avoid providing the US a casus belli given the vote for peace in Round 1 and it was one of the big point scorers for the US and in the end it got up by a landslide. The rest of the votes went in Japan's favour 'by the agreements', thus preserving a larger than expected (by me) Japanese voting bloc for the rest of the conference, with no vetoes needed.
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Not sure why Germany would gain so much if Japan continued the war, but I suppose that explains some of the round 1 foolishness that went on.
Rather odd balance for the USA RE: Pacific vs Philippines. Not so much the relative weighting of the positive points but more the negatives, as losing the Philippines wiped out 3/4 of the American gains from recovering the Pacific islands.
In retrospect, the option to veto everything instead of cutting a deal was probably a viable option, although given how much work TBC was doing behind the scenes I suspect it would have ended with the Russo-Turkish bloc still getting what they wanted somehow. Even losing four votes would leave Japan with probably enough to retain the fifth U.N. seat.
Rather odd balance for the USA RE: Pacific vs Philippines. Not so much the relative weighting of the positive points but more the negatives, as losing the Philippines wiped out 3/4 of the American gains from recovering the Pacific islands.
In retrospect, the option to veto everything instead of cutting a deal was probably a viable option, although given how much work TBC was doing behind the scenes I suspect it would have ended with the Russo-Turkish bloc still getting what they wanted somehow. Even losing four votes would leave Japan with probably enough to retain the fifth U.N. seat.
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Japan might be the most different AI (Turkey does not count) nation in this world. The Japanese military (primarily the navy) remains in power. Japan will have to deal with independence groups in Philippines, SE Asia, Burma and China. What is the status of the Chinese communists? (Did Stalin back stab Mao like he did FDR?) The Japanese economy will remain military focused. How soon before Japan is at war, either US, SU, Australia/New Zealand or independence movements?
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So far as the Japanese and I could reckon, Mao was still alive and well in the mountains, but probably not going anywhere without a great deal of help.
As you say, Japan is going to have some...issues...with rebels in various places but thankfully, they do not give a care for civilian casualties or international reputations, and so are fully free to do what they will.
And what they will was not very nice.
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