Talking Turkey: Alternate History from 1936

[Bullfilter]

What is the status of the Chinese communists? (Did Stalin back stab Mao like he did FDR?)

Quick answer: In this game, China remains neutral and independent, along with Nationalist China et al.

 

[Midnite Duke]

Quick answer: In this game, China remains neutral and independent, along with Nationalist China et al.

So we have Mao China, Chiang China and Hirohito China? If so, half the money in China will go to weapon purchases for the next quarter century.

 

[nuclearslurpee]

As you say, Japan is going to have some...issues...with rebels in various places but thankfully, they do not give a care for civilian casualties or international reputations, and so are fully free to do what they will.

We do care a little bit for our international reputation, albeit mainly insofar as people are disinclined to look too closely at us while continuing to give the Empire the respect she deserves on the world stage. Ostensibly.

 

[racebear75]

Look at the attachment

 

[Bullfilter]

Look at the attachment

Is this legit?

 

[Wraith11B]

I opened it--because I'm an idiot sometimes--and it was an explainer about his absence.

 

[racebear75]

It‘s just a pdf, so I hope so.

 

[TheButterflyComposer]

Boy is someone in for a nice surprise when they get back to Moscow...

 

[Bullfilter]

It‘s just a pdf, so I hope so.

No worries, just wanted to be careful! Welcome back - those adventures were in some very, ah, ‘topical’ places!

 

[Bullfilter]

So, on the comments re the First two rounds of voting (Epilogue 1A):

Not sure why Germany would gain so much if Japan continued the war, but I suppose that explains some of the round 1 foolishness that went on.

From the classified country briefings, this was the rationale behind Germany wanting the war to continue: just bloody-minded Realpolitik, really:

On Japan, Germany harbours a desire to see the war grind on if possible, to the detriment of all its worst old enemies. Failing that, a punitive peace that sees the Soviets and British worse off (or forced to commit vetoes) would be acceptable too. If there is a ‘status quo ante’ peace (Proposition 1.2) then so be it. Germany would have no particular interest in any Round Two outcome one way or another, so our vote could be ‘up for sale’ in a deal with interested parties, perhaps as either informal or bound pledges for future support in issues of more importance to Germany.​

Rather odd balance for the USA RE: Pacific vs Philippines. Not so much the relative weighting of the positive points but more the negatives, as losing the Philippines wiped out 3/4 of the American gains from recovering the Pacific islands.

On the US points: could be. I think at the time it was influenced by a feeling it was worse for the US for Japan to have the Philippines as a base than it was good for the US to hang onto it (which they wouldn't have for much longer anyway in a post-colonial arrangement). Whereas the Pacific bases include actual US possessions/bases that they'd really like to hang onto.

In terms of points and scoring for the 'competitive' bargaining process, its more the spread between min & max that matters than the absolute scores (because the handicapped scoring was more about where you ended up on the spectrum between min and max possible score, than the absolute). So in this case, its a 30 point spread for the Pacific conquests and only 25 for the Philippines, so its rating the Pacific issue a little more highly. That, and it was all a bit arbitrary and done in a degree of haste (though not recklessness and trying to think through), but not heavily worked or gamed beforehand, so there are likely to be a few inconsistencies, I'm sure.

In retrospect, the option to veto everything instead of cutting a deal was probably a viable option, although given how much work TBC was doing behind the scenes I suspect it would have ended with the Russo-Turkish bloc still getting what they wanted somehow. Even losing four votes would leave Japan with probably enough to retain the fifth U.N. seat.

This was where it was left to player preference, RP and negotiating dynamics, for which the points system was really just a guide and framework the players were free to extrapolate upon. Also to reflect the fact the attendees at the Conference are not the AI country leaders. So you're not playing Stalin, Churchill, Roosevelt etc with unlimited discretion or in Democracies the ability to ignore public opinion and legislative oversight completely. You were the Foreign Ministers working on instruction from 'central', so with some limits.

As mentioned, I really had thought Japan would be more isolated than it proved and would have had to use those vetoes. Whether the deals made were better for one side or another in either absolute game map or point scoring terms is an interesting one. I haven't sought (mainly because I'd probably be incapable of it ) to do a mathematical analysis of that kind of aspect and that wasn't really the point of it all: which was to have something like a game of Diplomacy for the players and allow you all to shape the post-war world a little, within the limits provided.

The way things worked out, it did make Japan more of a balance-deciding power than I thought it was going to be in a system where the USSR threw its superpower weight around rather expertly (and bearing in mind this game left it sitting in pole position) on the diplomatic front, putting in the legwork to get those deals done and thus making it harder for the West, which was collectively far weaker in this time line than in OTL.

Japan might be the most different AI (Turkey does not count) nation in this world. The Japanese military (primarily the navy) remains in power. Japan will have to deal with independence groups in Philippines, SE Asia, Burma and China. .... The Japanese economy will remain military focused. How soon before Japan is at war, either US, SU, Australia/New Zealand or independence movements?

So far as the Japanese and I could reckon, Mao was still alive and well in the mountains, but probably not going anywhere without a great deal of help.

As you say, Japan is going to have some...issues...with rebels in various places but thankfully, they do not give a care for civilian casualties or international reputations, and so are fully free to do what they will.

And what they will was not very nice.

So we have Mao China, Chiang China and Hirohito China? If so, half the money in China will go to weapon purchases for the next quarter century.

We do care a little bit for our international reputation, albeit mainly insofar as people are disinclined to look too closely at us while continuing to give the Empire the respect she deserves on the world stage. Ostensibly.

I will get around to 'mind-gaming' the post-war situation for Japan in due course, but yes there are plenty of challenges and 'unfinished business' left undone in Asia. I see Japan having a few broad paths, most or all of which have been hinted at by me in past comments and in the confidential guidelines for the Peace Conference:

1. Japan could remain a militant, militaristic and rather isolated imperial power nestled in that bottom right Axis corner of the diplomatic triangle. The US would be an implacable foe (if it doesn't lurch into isolationism), the UK and other Allies would likely remain ill-disposed and wary and the Soviets highly suspicious and probably ready to foment Communist insurgency proxy wars in China and south-east Asia. But Japanese conduct at the conference and membership of the LNSC probably mitigates against such a course being the most likely one.
2. Japan goes down the gradual path of careful, conservative/paternalistic (rather than fascist/imperialist) constitutional democracy and integration into the international community. This could lead it in a subsequent fork in the road depending on how other dynamics shape up (and all those potential colonial conflicts in Asia go, especially China, which never joined the main war but will now be a big factor in post-war Asia).
3. A more moderate course could see Japan try to accommodate the West more, make some practical concessions to 'de-conquer' but keep gains its remaining gains in Asia in a looser sphere of interest (co-prosperity style, much as modern China may be trying to do). Especially if the post-war world becomes more bi-polar (West v Comintern) than the previously prevailing tri-polar split of the HOI3 wartime factions.
4. But if (as has been mooted separately in Turkey's briefing and previous what-if discussions) Turkey was to decide to break away and strike a 'third way/non-aligned' direction as a paternalist/Kemalist faction leader then it may make sense for Japan to align to that instead, both for ideological and strategic reasons - including oil.

As for what happens in Asia, I'll probably stick to my old trick of imitating real life events (specific and broad sweep trends) but adapting them to the changed circumstances of this rather bleak new world. There could also be a few die rolls (Indian partition vote/veto style) used where a few plausible courses or outcomes are possible.

I will look soon to drawing up and publishing the next few rounds of the voting tables.

 

[Eurasia]

I will need a map of the Earth after this is all done to see the new borders and the Factions. Maps, maps, maps!

 

[nuclearslurpee]

1. Japan goes down the gradual path of careful, conservative/paternalistic (rather than fascist/imperialist) constitutional democracy and integration into the international community. This could lead it in a subsequent fork in the road depending on how other dynamics shape up (and all those potential colonial conflicts in Asia go, especially China, which never joined the main war but will now be a big factor in post-war Asia).
2. But if (as has been mooted separately in Turkey's briefing and previous what-if discussions) Turkey was to decide to break away and strike a 'third way/non-aligned' direction as a paternalist/Kemalist faction leader then it may make sense for Japan to align to that instead, both for ideological and strategic reasons - including oil.

Quote mangling of bullet numbers aside, this is what I see as most probable with the exception that I don't think a democratic path is remotely guaranteed as the "fascistic" military factions are clearly coming out ahead here. That said, the Army has plenty to do right now and the Navy has certainly been bloodied and will have to carefully thread a needle to keep parity with rival naval powers, so I don't see Japan agitating for another war against one of the big boys. Plus being on the LNSC and coming out of the conference with a positive world image should appeal to Japanese national ego, at least after this war no one is trying to tell us how many battleships we are allowed to build and why it should not be as much as the USA or Britain can build.

 

[Bullfilter]

Epilogue 1B - The Geneva Peace Conference
Voting Rounds 3-5​

This update covers the votes and country bargaining points for the main settlement of minor country outcomes in Europe, following the drama of the negotiations ending the war in Asia.

Note: for this segment, I've also highlighted in the tables (by using italics) where a country voted against its most advantageous course in terms of bargaining points scored. This basically highlights (as we all basically knew already) where the Comintern aligned powers and the deal with Japan caused compromise to occur, with both win and loss achieved proposition by proposition.

Interestingly, as far as I can see in all these votes (Propositions 6 to 15) - and noting that Romania here was voting 'by the book' with no human oversight - no Western power (ie USA, UK+Allies, France) once voted against their primary interest, whereas this was frequent for the USSR-led bargaining grouping.

---xxx---​

Round Three: Denmark and Finland

Here we saw the propositions to rubber-stamp Soviet control of Denmark won during the war. The vote was quite close, mainly because on this one Germany voted with the West according to its specific national interests. In this one, Turkey, Poland, Spain and Japan voted against their optimal outcomes, repaying agreements past or future.

Proposition 7 fixed up the game-caused anomaly of Finland having gone to Turkey rather than the Soviets after its capitulation. Clearly a big with for the Soviets, with Turkey, Poland, Spain and Japan again prevailed upon to vote against their narrow interests on this one.

---xxx---
​

Round Four: Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria and Hungary

Next it was central Europe that needed to be sorted out. These were of course all countries which Turkey had either conquered or puppeted during the war. To what extent would their control be continued? Here, the bargaining pact held sway, with Turkey the main beneficiary, with its bargaining partners the one to concede ground. This mainly means a potential Turkish-led third force (or Turkish bloc within a looser, more bi-polar Comintern) would be significantly strengthened. Naturally though, there would be costs for Turkey later, especially regarding Germany.

Slovakia ended up also being voted on 'agreement lines', with the Soviets, Germans and Japanese all going against their specific preferences.

In Austria, where three outcomes were possible, it was a matter of the middle course being followed by the bargaining pact., a fair outcome for all of them. Once more, the party line thwarted the West's preference for more freedom in Comintern-run central and eastern Europe.

Hungary was a good result for Turkey, where (known only to them) they actually preferred a puppet arrangement rather than continued occupation, mainly because it was considered untenable to expect that degree of control could be maintained and it established more of a buffer between the UGNR and USSR.

---xxx---
​

Round Five: Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece

​

And then it was the turn for the fate of the Balkans to be determined, areas more solidly within the sphere of Turkish regional hegemony. All these votes went strictly on 'party lines'.

Had Romania been run by a player to this point, there may have been a chance they might have negotiated some kind of deal to allow them to score 'the big one' for them of relative independence within the Comintern, as their war contribution might have warranted. The main sacrifice here was for the Soviets, in having to allow a reasonably powerful pro-Turkish buffer state to be maintained. It was also quite a sacrifice for Poland and Germany, less so for Japan - who were never going to be that interested in these minor European settlement issues.

Basically, Turkey got its best outcomes here across the board, surprising me that more of them weren't at least released as puppets. Still, they had fought hard for each of these and had achieved them before the main war started, so maybe the maintenance of that control was warranted anyway in a narrative sense. Of them, in historical-cultural terms, maintaining control over Greece was always going to be just that little bit more 'special', hence the extra points for that.

Of course, keeping a hold on these, especially the occupied territories, could be a difficult problem for Turkey in the coming years. How much will they need to concede some autonomy (eg puppet rather than occupied status) in order to maintain this grip? It may well come down to a similar process that the UK had with India: desire to maintain tighter control making a revolt more likely, while a concession could ensure they remain in the Turkish corner, but not as directly.

 

[Bullfilter]

I will need a map of the Earth after this is all done to see the new borders and the Factions. Maps, maps, maps!

Yes, that will definitely be coming up later, but will involve a bit of work to illustrate spheres of interest.

Quote mangling of bullet numbers aside, this is what I see as most probable with the exception that I don't think a democratic path is remotely guaranteed as the "fascistic" military factions are clearly coming out ahead here. That said, the Army has plenty to do right now and the Navy has certainly been bloodied and will have to carefully thread a needle to keep parity with rival naval powers, so I don't see Japan agitating for another war against one of the big boys. Plus being on the LNSC and coming out of the conference with a positive world image should appeal to Japanese national ego, at least after this war no one is trying to tell us how many battleships we are allowed to build and why it should not be as much as the USA or Britain can build.

I would not disagree with any of this, but there are a few variables and some event-forks that may push things one way or another, that aren't entirely under Japanese government control. Including hypothetical internal factors, world economic developments, etc.

 

[diskoerekto]

And then it was the turn for the fate of the Balkans to be determined, areas more solidly within the sphere of Turkish regional hegemony. All these votes went strictly on 'party lines'.

I would say that it's not only my bargaining but many years of readership that caused the players of the game to be more sympathetic to Turkey than their scorecards warranted. I'm very happy with how things went, with the exception of the wording of the tripartite agreement. I would've loved to create a South German Confederation, would have looked neat on the map

Of course, keeping a hold on these, especially the occupied territories, could be a difficult problem for Turkey in the coming years. How much will they need to concede some autonomy (eg puppet rather than occupied status) in order to maintain this grip? It may well come down to a similar process that the UK had with India: desire to maintain tighter control making a revolt more likely, while a concession could ensure they remain in the Turkish corner, but not as directly.

Cantons of Switzerland or States of USA aren't puppets but integral parts of their countries, so that's what I'm aiming here for the hypothetical future Turkey. A democratic confederation in which states don't have to love each other in order to cooperate and trade.

 

[nuclearslurpee]

Round Five: Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece

This was the round I never really understood why we had it. Maybe Romania's status was worth an evaluation, but the rest of these territories I think Turkey had taken before joining the GW2 so I did not understand why they were treated in the peace treaty. After all we did not vote on whether Japan could keep Chinese states or Italy could keep Ethiopia (albeit in their now rather less powerful and independent form of polity).

Cantons of Switzerland or States of USA aren't puppets but integral parts of their countries, so that's what I'm aiming here for the hypothetical future Turkey. A democratic confederation in which states don't have to love each other in order to cooperate and trade.

I think the difference between the UGNR and the United States, at least, is that most of the US states were colonized rather than conquered and annexed. Not to put too fine a point on it, but it is somewhat easier to forge a unitary superstate when all of the member states have WASPy sorts in charge politically. The UGNR has member states basically divided along (very rough) ethnic lines, and ethnic minorities historically have objections to being ruled over by a different ethnic ruling class. Not to say it cannot be done, there are plenty of examples of this to varying degrees of success, but it is a tricky balance, and a loose democratic confederation sounds nice but the questions of centralization inevitably raise their ugly heads.

 

[Wraith11B]

@nuclearslurpee, not to mention that they have a significant history of being controlled by Turkey/Ottomans and are vehemently against that vassalage.

 

[diskoerekto]

it'll be quite decentralized in my headcanon. There'll be 3 Balkan, 3 Anatolian, 3 Iranian/Azeri, 1 Arab/Bedouin, 3 African/Caribbean/Oceanic, 3 North Italian and 3 South Italian cantons which are all comprised of 7 districts each. Everytime there's a federal or local election, any town/village/neighborhood closer than 100km to an internal border will have the right to join to the other side. Each of the 133 districts will be free to do as they please internally. Every district will select 51 representatives to the canton parliament (357 seats) and likewise every canton will select 51 representatives to the federal parliament. Federation will handle finance, standardization, inspection, high judiciary, military. critical infrastructure and foreign relations, cantons will handle economics and districts will handle everything else including policing, education, judiciary, health, infrastructure etc.

 

[TheButterflyComposer]

I would say that it's not only my bargaining but many years of readership that caused the players of the game to be more sympathetic to Turkey than their scorecards warranted. I'm very happy with how things went, with the exception of the wording of the tripartite agreement. I would've loved to create a South German Confederation, would have looked neat on the map


Cantons of Switzerland or States of USA aren't puppets but integral parts of their countries, so that's what I'm aiming here for the hypothetical future Turkey. A democratic confederation in which states don't have to love each other in order to cooperate and trade.

That and I just didn't believe the UGNR could hold sway over the border buffer states AND keep the balakns integrated under TURKISH and ITALIAN dominance.

It will be incredibly decentralised at best, and that plays into my head canon's internationalist Comintern quite well.

Mind you, I also wanted someone to try and keep order in the balkans, so Turkey actually succeeding would have been a win for the world and the Soviets anyway.

 

[SSmith]

Interestingly, as far as I can see in all these votes (Propositions 6 to 15) - and noting that Romania here was voting 'by the book' with no human oversight - no Western power (ie USA, UK+Allies, France) once voted against their primary interest, whereas this was frequent for the USSR-led bargaining grouping.

From my perspective, with no deals in place there was nothing to be gained in voting against the UK's most favourable outcomes, but these were just the kind of peripheral rounds where I could readily have made compromises if the Soviets/Turkey hadn't managed to get everything settled so neatly.

Had Romania been run by a player to this point, there may have been a chance they might have negotiated some kind of deal to allow them to score 'the big one' for them of relative independence within the Comintern, as their war contribution might have warranted.

This was the one where I was hoping there might some sympathy for Romania. Sadly that wasn't to be.

Basically, Turkey got its best outcomes here across the board, surprising me that more of them weren't at least released as puppets. Still, they had fought hard for each of these and had achieved them before the main war started, so maybe the maintenance of that control was warranted anyway in a narrative sense.

Given how well the war went for Turkey, I find this a very reasonable outcome. The question is how the Balkans will look in say ten or twenty years' time, because this part of the world certainly has the potential to become very difficult for Turkey to handle.