Chapter 24: “Peace is Preparation for War by Other Means” (29 June – 6 July 1937)
29 June – 5 Jul 1937
Immediate post-war reorganisation continues. Some key points:
- Forces in Crete are ordered to concentrate in Irakleio for repatriation by sea.
- Troops in Greece are ordered to begin moving back to Thrace, to await further orders (which after a week are confirmed as summer training in Bulgaria).
1st and 2nd Corps are ordered to their summer quarters in the Bulgarian hills. All perfectly innocent,
just taking a rest cure after their exertions in Greece.
- Foundations are laid for the construction of the Calistar Line, with the first fort ordered for Istanbul.
- The INT and TAC wings are rebased to Varna (in Bulgaria).
- The General Staff contemplates the army’s organisation, having seen recent articles in various learned military journals concerning the benefits of embedding line units in Corps HQs as a remedy for small armies lacking in recognised leaders (Ed: thanks markkur).
- They have also decided to create an intermediate (Army Group) HQ, as had been contemplated but deferred during the reorganisation of 1936. General Arikan (skill level 2), Commander 9 Inf Div - our other logistics specialist is promoted to the titular rank of Field Marshal and put in charge of HQ 1st Army Group, with 1st and 2nd Corps reporting direct: an Army HQ level will have to wait for now. But Arikan knows where the real power lies in the field army – with Warrior-PM Inönü. Other reorganisations will be made once the troops reach their summer quarters.
In World News: 2 Jul 37. No matter how many times alternate history is revisited, sadly it never ends well for Amelia Earhart!
6 July 1937 - Special Cabinet Meeting on Future Strategic Options for the Greater Turkish Republic.
Item 1. Diplomatic and Intelligence Analysis
With the Cabinet members regathered in Ankara, the Cabinet Secretary distributed some initial diplomatic and intelligence analysis for another epic meeting to decide where the Path to Glory will lead next. A synopsis of the key points raised and discussed in Cabinet follows.
President Kemal Atatürk chairs the first Cabinet Meeting of
the new Greater Turkish Republic in Ankara, 6 July 1937.
1.1: General Points. Persia, Yugoslavia and Albania are all predominantly aligned towards the Axis, with Romania not far behind. This makes them all potential Enemies of the People! None of them are however yet formally aligned to any faction and no other country is currently guaranteeing the independence of any of them. Which also makes them reasonable targets.
1.2: Albania. NU 53.1%. The pathetic King Zog (yet another third-rate Balkan monarch) is merely a plaything of Benito Mussolini: there is danger Italy may use Albania as a base for spreading their filthy Fascist ideology and military influence further in the Balkans. Should King Zog manage to produce an heir, our Intelligence Service assesses this may trigger a full Italian takeover (invasion, annexation or puppeting) to stamp out any of the occasional limp attempts by Zog to demonstrate any form of independence.
[It was noted for the record that this possibility would of course be completely different to the recent just wars of liberation and emancipation launched by Turkey on Bulgaria and Greece.] The Albanian Army is full of Italian advisers and officers, so would almost certainly acquiesce to any demands the Italians might make. We wouldn't want that to happen.
A map of Albania showing its only Key City for VP purposes: Tirane.
King Zog of Albania. Not exactly a force to be reckoned with!
Invading Albania
could provoke Mussolini. But then, he is a puffed-up pompous ass, so this may not be a mortal danger, and it would remove one more potential Fascist puppet from their repertoire. The consensus is that it would be better to eliminate Albania as a potential dagger in the side of our new Greek Vilayet, sooner or later. This is not yet an urgent priority, though the General Staff have pointed out that, given the presence of our forces in Greece, "there may never be a better time to buy"! If we did conduct such an action, we would need to find some pretext or secure private guarantees from the Allies and the Soviets that they would not act to prevent it – even if not admitted publicly. It would certainly raise our threat level further in a region that already distrusts us.
1.3: Yugoslavia. NU 60.8%. Another potential Fascist recruit, run by another pantomime Balkan monarch. They seem to breed like cockroaches in this region! In this case, the 14-year-old King Peter II is not yet of age, so Prince Paul is Regent. Paul seems to swing between adherence to liberal western principles and craven fear of the growing Fascist powers on his doorstep. We believe he will try to keep Yugoslavia out of any general war or formal factional alignment, but would opt for survival within the Axis ahead of any personal preferences.
A map of Yugoslavia showing its Key Cities for VP purposes.
The 14 year old King Peter II of Yugoslavia and the Regent, Prince Paul.
While a strong dose of
People’s Republicanism - Turkish style - would be good for them, Yugoslavia is a large country and may be hard to take and hold. It would give us a direct land border with Italy and put us close to Austria, which is now almost
completely aligned with the Axis. The key cities we would need to seize to force Yugoslavia’s surrender are well spread out, with many of them being in the north of the country. Though Prof Markkur, publishing recently in the Swedish
Paradox Strategic Forum Quarterly, has pointed out that taking Yugoslavia out of the potential Axis column (as either a collaborator or a conquest) could be of benefit.
1.4: Romania. NU 69.9%. Yes,
another monarch – this time Carol II. They have oil and a refinery (
Ploesti). Six of their eight VPs (
Bucharest 4,
Ploesti 2) are located very close to our border (the Bulgarian Vilayet). The other,
Cluj (2 VP), is in the north. Our Intelligence Bureau thinks gaining
Bucharest and
Ploesti may be enough to force a surrender
without having to take
Cluj. This sounds good in theory, but the Cabinet was not well versed enough in the arcane mysteries of national will-power to know if this is an ironclad fact. Romania has a large army and the aforementioned resources: the army would be a problem if both mobilised and arrayed along our border. But
if we could force a surrender before it could be brought to bear, and we
don’t have to capture
Cluj, this would mean a potential Fascist puppet removed from both our borders and the Soviets'.
A map of Romania showing its Key Cities for VP purposes.
Carol II, King of Romania.
If that large army could be brought to our cause under a puppet regime, we could use it to help put up a screening defence of our Balkan possessions without having to risk substantial Turkish forces. We could instead concentrate on easily defensible lines in depth, such as the proposed
Calistar Line along the
Bosporus/Dardanelles, and perhaps even something similar on an
Athina/Peloponnese line. Again, we remain concerned that the Romanians would be even more susceptible to German pressure as time wears on.
This recent photograph of King Carol meeting Hitler at the Berchtesgaden is not reassuring! And that moustache seems a bit - derivative!
The West would no doubt characterise a takeover by us as another aggressive act, but perhaps we could see if the Soviets may acquiesce in return for a cession of territory current held by Romania but long claimed by Russia (ie Bessarabia)? One of our field agents – known only by the codename “BBBD316” – did make a good argument that, as a source of oil, Romania was the better choice over Persia as the former would be far easier to defend compared to the latter.
1.5: Persia. NU 74.9%. Another Fascist-leaning regime with a monarch on our doorstep. Is there a pattern beginning to emerge here? Apart from
Tabriz, the rest of Persia’s key VP cities lie far further south and east of our common border: although we assess they have a weak army, the distances are long and the terrain difficult. The main attraction is the oil resources they control would be significant. A long border with the SU actually counts in our favour if our wider plans come to fruition. If it were ever to come to a war of revolutionary liberation with the Allies the long, shared border with British-controlled Iraq and India would be both a potential opportunity and threat. But if Soviet support were available, then ground strength at least would also be in our favour. A conquest of Persia could be feasible and of benefit and would at least not breach our recent undertaking of ‘no more new territorial demands in Europe’.
A map of Persia showing its Key Cities for VP purposes.
Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Persia.
One of our agents has photographed this piece
of incriminating evidence in the Shah’s Palace.
In this signed photograph of Adolf Hitler for Reza Shah Pahlavi, the text below the photograph reads:
“His Imperial Majesty – Reza Shah Pahlavi – Shahanshah of Iran – With Best Wishes – Berlin, 12 March 1936 – (signed) Adolf Hitler”. This worrying social climbing by the Persians with the Nazis must be dealt with at some point; whether sooner or later remains to be decided.
1.6: Diplomatic Strategy for War. Diplomatic advice is that any new campaign in the Balkans would need to be carefully managed. We could risk provoking a response from the Germans or Italians and providing them with later avenues through which to attack us. Though they could do that anyway. The Allies would be unimpressed but probably unlikely to interfere – especially with PM Chamberlain in charge of the UK! And we would rightfully claim in private that this is all part of creating an anti-Fascist Bulwark in the Balkans (Ed: a
Balwark?). Care would need to be taken that the Soviets did not misperceive this fraternal assistance on our part as a threat to them, which they may do while we remain outside the Comintern.
Item 2. Military Analysis
A reminder of the four major strategic options earlier put under consideration by Cabinet.
Case Red – Albania. Our military staff believe Albania would be a walkover and an invasion could be executed very quickly, with readily available forces merely needing to refit and relocate.
Case Yellow – Romania. Preparing for an attack on Romania would take longer, as we need to strike quickly and decisively to prevent an extended war, similar to our Bulgarian campaign. Our best hope of success is complete strategic surprise, catching them un-mobilised and defeating them before they can bring their whole army to bear.
Case Blue – Yugoslavia. This may end up being more like the Greek campaign. Like that one, it would benefit from having a wider front along which to initially attack (for example Albania and/or Romania) than we currently have. But it could be a drawn out campaign and the Staff would like more of our new forces to be available before we commenced an attack. Tactical surprise would be difficult to achieve beyond the first few days or weeks.
Case Green – Persia. This would be an attack on a narrow front and would require most of the army to relocate a long way, exposing us to risk in our Balkan holdings during that time. A lot of difficult territory with poor infrastructure (both within Persia and in our supply lines to the border), though counter-balanced by the Persians appearing to have a weak army.
As always, the final decision will be down to the vision of President Atatürk and the wise counsel of Warrior-Prime Minister Inönü. Voting, even of the non-binding variety in Cabinet, is becoming a rarer form of decision-making in the increasingly Messianic and autocratic leadership theories of 1937. Turkey included.
Item 3. Decision
“Very well gentleman”, Atatürk announced, “the Prime Minister and I will now retire to consider this difficult problem in private. We will seek any advice if we need it and will inform you of our decisions shortly.” They retired to the President’s private chambers to discuss regional conquest over coffee and
baklava.
“So Ismet”, Atatürk began, “we could conduct
all of these operations if it came to that. But which are the most urgent and would carry the most benefits? Which are promising but could wait? Should we launch soon or wait for our recent conquests to settle, our alignment to the Soviets to progress further and our armed forces to build? I have my own views, but would like to hear yours first.”
Inönü briefly considered the questions and options, but he already had firm views and proceeded to spell them out: “Persia should either be done straight away, to get it done and the oil benefits secured; or last, when we already have Soviet backing, as an afterthought. I think we should leave it for now, so long as we can secure our resources from elsewhere. If we need to do anything about Persia – for instance if it were to formally join the Fascists – we can worry about it at that point. If there was a general war at the time, we could swamp them between ourselves, the Soviets and the West.”
Atatürk nodded at this, but allowed Inönü to continue uninterrupted.
“Albania,” Inönü went on, “is only of consequence for two things: first, to keep any Italian dagger from our side and purge the place of Italian Fascist parasites. And second, as a potential place from which to outflank Yugoslavia, should we choose to do that. So if we choose to attack Yugoslavia, we should at least take Albania first, to put us closer to Beograd, Sarajevo and Split.”
Atatürk remained impassive, letting Inönü continue with his train of thought.
“Next comes the crucial decision: do we think we can take down Romania quickly, forcing them to surrender by just taking Bucharest and Ploesti in a "Rapid Action Warfare" campaign? Or would it be a longer affair, in which case having Yugoslavia either as a new Vilayet or a puppet government would open a new flank on Romania, putting Cluj within easier striking distance.”
Inönü pauses for a moment, then continues: “My main concern is that our Army, while battle tested and with better generals than a few months ago, remains comparatively small and with too few generals. If we did defeat Yugoslavia in order to open up a flank on Romania, I don’t think we would have sufficient forces to properly man the extended border unless we made a puppet of Yugoslavia and forced them to join the campaign. And we would by then have probably lost the surprise factor we
may be able to achieve if we strike Romania soon and with stealth. I think the tactical choice hinges on whether we think we can surprise them, as we did Bulgaria, before they mobilise and garrison our border.”
“The next piece of the puzzle is whether our intelligence assessments can be relied upon that taking Bucharest and Ploesti would be enough to force King Carol to surrender quickly, to spare his people further harm. In which case Romania’s large army would be very useful to have on our side and out of potential Axis hands. We could in turn see if we could use it to help take down Yugoslavia if that option is still be available.”
“Of course,” said Inönü, smiling, “Foreign Minister Aras would have to deploy all the 'biased intellectualism' at his disposal to explain how all this fitted into our pledge for no more expansion on the European continent and was a good thing for Democracy (to appease the Allies) and anti-Fascism (to placate the Soviets). While at the same time preventing our anti-democratic Fascist opponents from intervening to crush our ambitions before we can realise them or obtain the protection of an alliance with the Soviets. Child’s play!”
Atatürk finally spoke, weighing his words carefully, “We have come this far by combining a lack of emotion and mercy for our neighbours with a relentlessly offensive military spirit. It is purely business. I think we should stay true to our strengths. But first, I want to be convinced about whether the Romanians can be quickly brought to the surrender table. On this question hinges whether we strike them or Yugoslavia first.”
Head of Intelligence Ogel is summoned and is questioned about this topic. He produces an assessment that has been made on the current situation in Republican Spain. It used the same model his operatives have used to assess the likely reaction of the Romanians to a decisive defeat in the south that resulted in the loss of both their capital and their key resource centre of Ploesti in quick succession.
The Intelligence Bureau’s calculations regarding the likelihood of Republican Spain to surrender.
Ogel insists these ‘iron laws’ of international relations will also apply to Romania and that all such questions can be reduced to mathematical formulae. The Cabinet had no idea to that point they lived in such a mathematically deterministic world! Of course if this turns out to be wrong, the only mathematical application to Ogel will be quartering, after drawing!
Ogel’s bureau calculates that the loss of Bucharest and Ploesti would put 75% of Romania's “important cities” under occupation. Given we currently assess Romanian NU at around 70%, this should be sufficient. Such a decisive strike should knock them out of the war, but there can be no certainty. He also advised that there have been no reports yet of Romania mobilising, while they only have a light garrison of a couple of divisions on our mutual border. The rest of Romania's large army must be deployed along their Yugoslavian, Hungarian and Soviet borders, though a garrison would be expected in Bucharest, on which we have no current information.
As Ogel turned to leave the study, he is enjoined by Atatürk to say
nothing of this discussion to the other Cabinet members yet: “Or the Intelligence Bureau
and its Head will both need new heads!” There was no hint of humour in his statement. Ogel left – quietly.
“I have decided then,” said Atatürk, squaring his shoulders. “We prepare to strike Romania as soon as the preparations can be made. The intent is for a quick, focused war to secure their surrender with a minimum of fighting. We wish to preserve our own precious manpower and to leave the Romanian’s army as undamaged as possible. Tell Aras we must portray this as a war of liberation, not of conquest. We will not attempt to bring Romania into the Greater Republic directly: we shall just control their Government. After we have dealt with Romania, I foresee a quick campaign to remove the Albanian irritant, then we can reconsider a pre-emptive war against Yugoslavia with Romanian backing – if it looks worthwhile and depending upon how the wider situation has developed by then.”
Inönü rises with a satisfied look on his face: “You are indeed the Father of the Nation, My President. After we announce our decision to the Cabinet, I will direct the General Staff to commence planning immediately. We will quickly reorganise the Army from the Greek campaign and position them as we did before the attack on Bulgaria – hopefully out of sight of prying Romanian eyes. They will encamp a province away from the border, pacifying the Bulgarian Vilayet and preparing for some ‘summer manouevres’. Aras will formulate a diplomatic strategy and we will start convening some key meetings soon with major powers.”
The two men strode out of the door and once again along the Path of Turkish Glory …
Atatürk after the Cabinet meeting of 6 July 1937. As always, the burden of leadership
weighs heavily on his broad shoulders. The Path to Glory is only for the strong!
Coming Up: The Army repositions; detailed plans for
“Case Yellow” are prepared; Aras gets busy seeking to position Turkey to justify the unjustifiable to our other neighbours and the Great Powers. It’s a good thing no-one takes any notice of the League of Nations, or we might actually be held to account!
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