Chapter LI: Fallout and Aftershocks Part II - Central Europe.
When considering the Rhineland Crisis it is important to bear in mind that neither side had actually expected events to unfold as they did. This was especially true on the French side, no plans had been prepared for what to do next, save those by the General Staff which had assumed the outbreak of war between the two nations. There was, in modern jargon, no exit strategy, no idea of when, or even how, to pull the troops out of the Rhineland without losing face or encouraging the Germans to march in the moment they left. More worryingly was the question of time, while the initial response had gained France a measure of respect and was broadly supported, most Germany's neighbours had an interest in seeing the country restrained from such aggression, that support would not last long if France was perceived as the aggressor. The longer France stayed the more questions were asked about what exactly her motives were and if she would in fact leave at all.
Sarraut's government was not unaware of these concerns but was seriously distracted by the emergence of another serious problem in French foreign policy; the obvious collapse of the Entente Cordiale. The failure had been progressive and relatively good natured, relations with Britain had not seriously deteriorated, the two nations had too many common interests for that, but there was no doubt the never-formal alliance had taken a mortal blow. The root cause was the failure of France to support Britain during the Abyssinian War, that France was under no obligation to join the war and that Britain had succeeded without French help were beside the point to Chamberlain and the rest of the government. The blunt truth was that France had not been there when Britain had needed an ally, so why should Britain commit herself to do what France had so conspicuously not done? The British Ambassador to Paris summed up the problem, having been bombarded with excellent reasons why France had not intervened this time but would certainly do so in the future he commented "The purpose of an alliance is not to have a friend help when it is convenient for them, but to have them come to your aid when it is convenient for you."
The Franco-Czech-Polish Alliance sent shock waves throughout the continent. The balance of power was shifting as France re-asserted herself in Central and Eastern Europe
The solution to these two problem was as elegant as it was audacious, providing France with both a tangible result from the Rhineland intervention and allies to replace the defunct Entente. Quite simply France entered into a full, formal defensive alliance with both Poland and Czechoslovakia. The existing web of limited pacts, qualified agreements and contradictory secret clauses were swept away and the three nations agreed to come to the defence of the other parties in the event they were attacked. The benefits to France were obvious; two new allies, one with a large army, the other with a strong industrial base, both of whom had considerable interest in constraining Germany. For the the Czechs and the Poles the advantages were less clear cut, the advantage of a French guarantee of independence had to be weighed against gaining a new commitment to the third nation, not just against German aggression but any attack. In Poland the centrist 'Castle faction' around President Ignacy Moscicki presented the treaty as a triumph, a treaty that offered guaranteed support in the ongoing territorial disputes with Germany, an argument sufficient to win around General Rydz-Smigly's right wing military faction and ensure the treaty was accepted. The Czech's, who had been unwilling to formalise the alliances in earlier years, were a considerably harder sell for the French diplomats. The essential problem had been that the Czechs had no wish to get involved in the ongoing territorial disputes between Poland and Germany. However Germany's actions in attempting to seize the Rhineland, when seen through the prism of well known German designs on the Sudetenland, had served to focus minds on the immediate threat from that nation. In the end the advantage of two allies with far larger armies outweighed concerns over the extra commitments and the country agreed to join. The solid electoral triumph of President Edvard Beneš, the former foreign minister, gave the government a respected leader and a strong mandate to push the alliance through and ensure full Czech involvement.
The New Entente, as the Franco-Czech-Polish alliance became known, was not the only diplomatic offensive undertaken by the Quai d'Orsay, there was also the matter of the Little Entente, the French sponsored three way alliance between Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. With the Czechs and the French now formally allied the weight of French diplomatic pressure, and the skill and determination of the alliances founding father, the recently elected President Beneš, was applied to influencing Romania and Yugoslavia into joining the New Entente. In Romania these efforts met with failure, while the country was involved in many territorial disputes King Carol II and his Prime Minister Gheorghe Tatarescu believed they were in hand; a "Protocol of Mutual Assistance" had been signed with the Soviet Union securing the northern border while the existing Little Entente arrangement was aimed at Hungarian irredentism, providing protection on that front. The only outstanding issue, Bulgarian demands for Romania to return of territory gained after the Second Balkan War, was not considered likely to be anything more than an irritant for the foreseeable future given the relative strengths of the two nations. The judgement was that joining the New Entente would gain little but potentially embroil the country in a general war, not to mention enrage the fascist Iron Guard movement, who were already angry at the non-aggression pact with Soviets. For all that there were some positive outcomes, the Romanian government agreed to an exceptionally large arms deal with the New Entente, using French loans to buy Czechoslovakian armaments and Polish aircraft. This deal, aside from improving Romanian-New Entente relations also bolstered the internal relations of the Entente, by indirectly fixing one of the long standing economics complaints; the lack of French investment in Czech and Polish domestic industry. Yugoslavia however was distracted by events elsewhere although, as we will see later, this did not prevent them from lending a sympathetic ear to the French delegation.
To round out central Europe we finish with Germany herself. On the surface the summer months weren't too bad for Germany, the Olympic Games were a popular success, the economy continued to grow and though the French still occupied the Rhineland the French ambassador had proposed talks to set a new permanent solution for the region. Behind the scenes however the government was in considerable trouble, the victories of Jessie Owens had enraged Hitler, the finance ministry was growing increasingly alarmed at the sums of MEFO bills issued to fund the rearmament and economic growth and the French offer of talks was seen as depressing proof that Paris held the advantage over them, particularly as the talks would be with the entire New Entente not just France. Despite this Hitler remained popular with the public, while the foreign failures had taken some of the lustre of his image there was still food in the shops and jobs to go to, important considerations for a population that had experienced so long when both had been scarce. It is also worth noting the efforts of Goebbels at the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda which, rather than attempt to hide the truth of the Rhineland, presented the entire event as an evil French plot to crush innocent Germany and prevent her regaining her rightful place in the world. While successful in preventing a popular backlash at the failure it would create a rod for the German government's back, stirring up anti-French feeling and making re-occupying the Rhineland even more important. In contrast to the public the non-Nazi elements of the government were increasingly alarmed, believing Hitler was out of his depth on the world stage, the string of foreign failures the damning evidence. In such an environment success in Spain became even more important as did the need for a solid diplomatic success, a public demonstration of Germany regaining her standing on the continent. These two imperatives would shape the Reich's foreign policy, over-ruling almost all other concerns as her neighbours would soon discover.