Chapter CXXV: To Think and Act Imperially.
The start of 1936 had not found British commercial aviation at a crossroads, it had found it several miles past the crossroads but still bickering about the direction that had been chosen, with several participants vocally threatening to do a U-turn. The crossroads in question was the decision to use seaplanes for EAMS (the Empire Air Mail Scheme), a decision that had not been particularly controversial when it was made in 1934. The intervening years had not been kind, as is often the case the details of the decision had proved problematic and the consequences of the lax approach to consultation soon became apparent. The reasoning behind the decision had been somewhat involved but solid enough; Imperial Airlines believed larger aircraft would be more economical to run, as more passengers could be carried for the same number of ground and air crew. However, the existing generation of landplanes were about as large and heavy as could safely be operated off the dirt strips that made up much of the existing air routes, to say nothing of the operational problems caused by bad weather closing airports and washing away runways. The obvious solution, installing the deep foundations and tarmac toppings required for permanent runways to support heavier aircraft, was investigated but the cost was deemed 'excessive'. This line of reasoning led naturally to the flying boat, which required no expensive runways only a judicious choice of route so the craft could hop between harbours and lakes. Imperial also believed the flying boats would have another operational advantage, fuel at the coast, delivered straight off the tanker, tended to be far cheaper than the supplies available inland.
The first production Short S.8 'Calcutta' landed on the Thames in mid-1928. As the first flying boat procured by Imperial Airlines prior to entering commercial service it was shown off to the great and the good of the government and wider establishment. Publicity mission duly accomplished it departed for Southampton, there to begin service on the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern legs of the Imperial Airlines Indian Route. That the then brand new London to Delhi 'seaplane route' involved a train from London to Southampton Docks should have been a warning about the gap between the promise of the seaplane and the actual reality.
The key flaw in the thinking was, as is so often the case, a failure to consider logistics. Seaplanes did not need runways, but they still needed all the other facilities found at an airport, complicated by the need to move everything from the shore to a floating seaplane. It turned out that the launches, barges and various other craft required to get passengers, cargo and fuel from the seaplane to shore did not come cheap, neither did control rooms capable of both controlling the skies and serving as harbour master or the many other 'extra' costs associated with running an airport that was also a harbour. It is possible this came as a genuine surprise to the Air Ministry, but equally it may have been part of a somewhat Machiavellian scheme to get others (the Raj, the Dominions and anyone else who wasn't the British Treasury) to agree to 'fully fund' the new seaplanes bases without them properly understanding the costs. In any event, while there was a degree of grumbling in from the Dominion and Indian Offices about this, the main opposition came from Australia who, by January 1936, were threatening to quit EAMS entirely. There is a strong argument this was primarily just about the costs and a suitable renegotiation on the finances, perhaps along with QEA (Qantas Empire Airways, the Qantas/Imperial Airways joint venture) continuing to operate the seaplanes instead of it being an all Imperial Airways route, would have solved the matter. The exact Australian position is of only academic interest as the whole row was soon overtaken by wider events, when the Abyssinian War began all civil aviation discussions were paused, at least temporarily.
Taken purely from the perspective of EAMS and related matters, the outbreak of the Abyssinian War had left the British seaplane community feeling vindicated and ready to deploy that most satisfying of statements "I told you so, you fools." One of their main arguments in favour of the seaplane had been the vulnerability of the existing landplane routes to hostile action by a foreign power. Specifically all the African and Far Eastern Imperial Airline routes ran through France, Italy and Greece on their way to the main hub at Alexandria. This had not been take particularly seriously by anyone outside the Royal Air Force, and even then not by many on the Air Staff, so had not featured strongly in the debates around EAMS. This rapidly changed as the outbreak of war had seen those links severed as the Mediterranean became, at least initially, a no go area for commercial aircraft. Moreover it was apparent that there would be no quick return to the old routes post war; in blatant defiance of the Paris Convention on civil aviation the Italian government withdrew landing and over-flight rights for any and all British related airlines. While the Air Ministry and it's Imperial counterparts reciprocated and banned Italian airlines, this did have much of an impact; with it's overseas empire gone and the Rome's focus on Austria and Yugoslavia, her 'prestigious', and expensively subsidised, aviation efforts were much reduced. Ala Littoria (the Italian state airline) cut it's extensive African and Middle Eastern routes and was reduced to internal flights and a handful of international routes to various European capitals. In the short term Imperial cobbled together an alternative route via the Trans-African air, post-war the Libyan government was more than happy to make it's own airports available for a more permanent solution, but the point had been made. The existing air routes were vulnerable to foreign intervention and the flexibility of the seaplane offered a possible way to reduce that dependency.
It is unfortunate that such an incredible feat of navigation and logistics was burden with the name 'The U-Bend Route', but sadly the nickname stuck, despite the best efforts of Imperial to only refer to it as the 'Mediterranean By-Pass Route'. As the seaplane advocates were quick to point out, even this bypass route required stop-offs at Lisbon and crossing French Equatorial Africa, though as the Air Ministry observed, if international relations had reached the point where civilian aircraft were only allowed to fly in their own airspace, then the Empire probably had bigger problems. After peace was declared Imperial returned to the Med on a new Marseilles-Valletta-Alexandria route that bypassed Italy entirely. Interestingly they also used the existing Italian survey plans to add a new Valletta-Tripoli-Benghazi-Alexandria route to the network, integrating Libya into the wider Empire. Whether this was the airline living up to their unofficial motto 'To think and act Imperially in all things' or if it was pressure from the Foreign Office is less clear but perhaps irrelevant. Whatever the motivations it was clear that Imperial Airlines first duty, before any considerations of passengers, cargo or even profit, was to advance government policy.
Unfortunately for the seaplane advocates this was their highpoint, post-Abyssinia, and specifically post-Imperial Defence Conference, things once again turned against them. The Australian government had found new reasons to oppose the plan, firmly on a path to a domestic land based aircraft industry seaplanes were even less attractive. Instead the aviation strategists in Canberra sketched out a vision of QEA using a civilian version of the Vickers Wellington for 'their' leg of the route, the aircraft naturally being built in Australia by the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation factory. It should be noted that at this point the basic Wellington was still barely a prototype, no-one at Vickers had even looked at an Merlin engined model let alone an airliner version and the CAC factory and engine works were just some foundations, however no-one has ever accused the Australian aviation lobby of lacking ambition. In any event Canberra felt the time and effort of building up bases and operational experience in seaplane would be a waste, and so pushed for the Singapore-Australia leg of EAMS to remain land plane operated.
The opposition of one Dominion alone might have been manageable, particularly if the others stayed on side, however the RAF Air Staff shifting their support was another matter entirely. The Air Staff has been cautiously supportive of the scheme on essentially financial grounds, seaplanes were seen as a cheap way of meeting Imperial defence commitments and EAMS appeared to offer a way to get others to pay for further seaplane development and an expanded range of possible bases. Post Abyssinia the RAF was required to maintain a large standing force in Singapore and prepare plans for rapid deployment of an even larger force at short notice. Naturally the RAF wanted to do all this by air and not rely on aircrew and 'boxed' aircraft being shipped out by the Navy, which brought the runway issue into sharp focus. It was believed the current generation of medium bombers were fine on grass/dirt air strips (vulnerability to bad weather aside), but the upcoming Vickers Wellington would be marginal in all but perfect conditions. Far more seriously for the Air Staff the current heavy bomber, the Whitley would struggle on most of the strips between Singapore and Alexandria. The politicians faith may have wavered but the bomber boys remained convinced the heavy bomber could, and would, win any future war, therefore not being able to deploy their heavies to the Far East was unacceptable and a round of runway upgrade would be required, if EAMS could get others to help pay for it, all the better.
This change in direction would go on to change how EAMS, and indeed Imperial Airlines, developed it's future aircraft. Just as the Air Ministry had guided commercial seaplanes development to help develop Coastal Command on the cheap (the Short Calcutta above was just part of a line of alternating commercial/military variants that Short developed), the need of the Air Staff to shift a great deal of men and equipment between the UK and the Far East would drive their priorities in aircraft development. Such changes were too late for the aircraft already ordered and in production, so logically our next step is to look at the aircraft EAMS was going to get, even if by that point they were perhaps no longer what the participants all wanted.
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It's Back! With many words on Imperial Civil Aviation policy in the 1930s. I was going to skim it, then I realised that quite a lot had changed so I thought I'd explore those changes. The British establishment having to take the Far East relatively seriously, certainly much more than in OTL, does have some interesting changes.
Game Note:
There is now a lev 4 airfield in Gibraltar and a few Lev 1s being scattered across the Empire. Yes, there is a genuine game hidden under all this, though I confess I'm tempted to move it across to HOI3. Having a more fine grained map, and being able to use the battle plan bit for the pictures, would make Spanish Civil War updates a bit easier.
Notes:
Australia did 'quit' EAMS in early 1936 but then rejoined in 1937. In practice this made sod all difference as she carried on building seaplane bases and the bulk of the new aircraft didn't enter service till that time anyway. As hinted at this was a negotiating tactic to get a better financial deal and to make sure Qantas remained involved in Singapore-Australia legs. There was also some local politics about mail planes in Australia being stopped short so mail trains would retain their monopoly but, while I know there are those who would find that diversion from a diversion from a diversion entertaining, I have to draw a line somewhere or I'll never get anywhere. I hope I haven't made the Australian's too madly ambitious about their aircraft, but it did seem to fit, the world of Butterfly Effect may well be blessed with an early Vickers Viking or similar approved.
There genuinely were people warning about the dangers of relying on landplane routes that had to cross foreign powers territory, along with a bit of standard-issue tub thumping about how as a 'maritime nation' should rely on the sea and so use seaplanes. These people were mainly found in RAF Coastal Area/Command being ignored. Mussolini temporarily made them seem wise fortune tellers. The "U-Bend" air route is genuine, as used in 1941 when Imperial was flying planes out to the Middle and Far East but had to avoid the Med. It was done in Short Empires, so entirely feasible for 1930s.
The RAF really did not take the Far East that seriously and so was relaxed about the difficulties of sending heavy bombers out to Singapore. This is no longer an option, well not if they want to keep their budget, so they have changed their views on the scheme. They may have been forced to form Strike Command but they are convinced Britain will need heavy bombers, maybe with air-to-air refuelling, to have any chance of victory. Also, as they are now taking it seriously and have a large force to support, the air route for crew and spares needs to be upgraded, it's that or facing the horror of having to rely on the Royal Navy. This is clearly unthinkable, that sort of slippery slope would lead to co-operation, co-ordination and the RAF being disbanded and split between the Army and RN.
