Chapter 175: Crash Through or Crash (16 to 20 August 1942)
Recap. By the end of 15 August, the ‘Bulge’ created by the Summer Offensive had cut deeply and widely into Axis positions in the west of the Patriotic Front. With corps boundaries redefined and HQs in movement, the troops on the ground still carried on the fight, irrespective of what the ‘brass hats’ may be doing in the exalted heights of the Turkish command structure. The re-named ‘Sava Sector’ embraced everything from
Beograd west along the Sava River to the fight for the
Gradiska bridgehead: mainly 2nd and 3rd Corps Areas of Responsibility (AOR). The main pocket of enemy formations being created around
Split remained fully in the ‘Adriatic Sector’, principally in the 1st Corps AOR, but with other troops assisting as assigned.
1. Sava Sector
16 Aug 42
At 1am, two battles continued from the last reporting period, in
Gradiska and
Doboj, while another started immediately afterwards in
Korcula (see Adriatic Sector report below). First, the enemy gave up their attempt to take
Doboj ...
... while the attack by 2 Mot Div on
Gradiska continued
[18% in favour of the Axis defenders].
And straight after this, a new and dangerous enemy attack began on
Sabac. 97 SD ‘Shar’ had been left there alone when 14 Inf Div had been diverted to retake
Zvornik a few days before. The newly formed HQ 6th Corps could add nothing to the defence and was immediately sent back to
Valjevo [don’t want to risk it being shattered]. 2 Inf Div had been heading to reinforce
Zvornik – it was quickly redirected to
Sabac, but would take just over two and a half days to get there. The fight would be a tough one, at least until 2 Inf Div could arrive and reinforce –
if it could.
17 Aug 42
Toüdemür’s attempt to blitz the hastily assembled defence of
Gradiska continued to run into trouble: even though the enemy divisions opposing them were weak, there were three of them and they used the river obstacle to their advantage. 2 Mot Div was steadily losing organisation and had proven ill-suited to river-crossing operations.
In
Sabac, the mix of German, Hungarian and Italian divisions, all under Italian command, had shocked the defending Soviet troops, who nonetheless bravely attempted to counter-attack. But the defenders’ morale was starting to erode as dawn broke.
By that evening, it was also clear the attack on
Gradiska was failing, with 2 Mot Div taking heavy casualties – their tank and TD brigades had suffered the most. LTGEN Artunkal (Comd 2nd Corps) called the attack off at 7pm.
But this did not mean the objective to seize a bridgehead over the Sava for possible later exploitation was done with. As 2 Mot Div began to recover in
Prnjavor, 15 Inf Div took up the task. They too were not ideally equipped for a river crossing, but their power and the weariness of the defenders was judged to warrant the attempt.
[The battle seemed to effectively continue from the old one despite the short break, as the tactics were the same and there was no new battle start screen.]
Gataly’s men – including the now grizzled veteran Sergeant Metin Sadik, as an acting platoon commander – closed with the enemy at 8pm. They got off to a reasonable start, but still remained at a tactical disadvantage to the defenders. It was also noted that to their south-east in
Banja Luca, 1 Inf Div had run out of fuel for their armoured vehicles.
At the same time, further east along the Sava, 2 Inf Div was making good time to
Sabac. This was important, as the enemy’s weight of numbers was telling on 97 SD ‘Shar’. HQ 6th Corps pulled safely into
Valjevo an hour later.
The supply problems identified earlier prompted a review of the logistical situation in the ‘Bulge’. The various corps commanders were uneasy. There were supply problems in
Nevesinje and potential issues in
Prozor in the Adriatic Sector, but those were not critical locations, as they were basically ‘picketing’ the surrounded Axis forces there. On the Sava,
Zvornik had run out of supplies, and the situation in
Tuzla was not good either. It had been shown before that the enemy was quick to pick up on these weaknesses and attack. Basic supply was fine in
Banja Luca: it was just the provision of fuel to the ‘gas-guzzling’ 1 Armd Div that was causing issues.
Comd 3rd Corps (and Army Chief) GEN Yamut was particularly concerned:
“Things are hard enough on this part of the line as it is. If our front line troops run out of supplies, the enemy may pounce on us as they shift forces west along the line. Get this fixed. Now!”
“Yessir, we’ll do our best,” said his harried Chief Logistics Officer.
But really all he could do was fret – the system would suit itself as to who got what, when.
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18 Aug 42
Yamut’s fears were well-founded: supplies in
Tuzla ran out that night (even though they were restored in
Zvornik, at least), and by 1am the enemy had attacked with five well-rested divisions from three directions!
[I just knew this was going to happen. 
] The defence was otherwise well-set, but the lack of supplies almost negated the advantage they held by defending a river line. And, to add to the distraction already caused by the attack on
Sabac, the enemy launched a simultaneous assault on
Beograd as well. That looked far less likely to cause problems, but with the Axis mounting a ‘full court press’ from six provinces across the Sava and Danube Rivers between
Brko in the west and
Panavo to the east, it meant there were no spare units to shuffle on this more thinly held part of the line.
And to highlight the determination of the Axis to strike back on this sector of the line, at 2am two Hungarian bomber wings began a ground attack on 15 Inf Div in
Prnjavor, trying to disrupt their assault on
Gradiska. 1 AG (I-16s and LaGG-3s) was sent to intercept them. 3 AF was already carrying some damage into the aerial battle, which began at 3am. At 4am, things got more serious, when the Hungarians’ own interceptors engaged. In response, the Turks escalated by scrambling both 2 (Wildcat) and 4 (La-5) AGs, both of which also carried damage. 2 AG was the first to respond, joining their comrades in the dogfight at 5am.
By the end of it, both of the Hungarian bomber wings were damaged while 3 AF had sustained further damage. The Hungarian raid had struck home, but ground casualties were relatively light. 1 and 2 AGs returned to
Beograd at 7am for damage assessment, while the Hungarians returned to begin another ground attack on
Prnjavor. 1 AG was pulled out of the fight for repairs, with 2 and 4 AGs left to contest the second enemy raid.
A complicated running air battle developed. First, 4 AG engaged the five-wing Hungarian raiding group over
Prnjavor between 8 and 10 am. The enemy bombers were quite heavily damaged and had to abort their ground attack, but 5 AF in particular was badly mauled. Then at midday, the Wildcats of 2 AF were attacked by the Hungarian fighter group who were passing through nearby
Bosanski Brod. One of the enemy wings was heavily damaged, but 7 AF (already carrying damage into the fight) was rendered un-airworthy once the combat was done at 2pm.
As the aircraft returned to
Beograd, the heavy damage suffered by some of the fighter wings necessitated a temporary reorganisation of the Turkish Air Force groups. The more serviceable wings from the three fighter groups were grouped into a unified Combat Air Patrol in
Beograd (2, 4 and 6 AFs). 1 BG remained in reserve, as did 1 TAG based in
Cuprija. Three groups were currently unserviceable. 2 BG (in reality just 1 TAK) rested in
Kursumlija; 2 AG (3 & 5 AFs) and 7 AF were all being frantically repaired in
Beograd.
[Note: this was all done in a complicated shuffle that meant no wing suffered the command change organisation penalty and all groups retained a commander.] The pilots of the Beograd CAP waited tensely to see if the enemy would renew their air attacks on their land-borne colleagues seeking to defend the Sava River.
The battle for
Sabac seemed to take a turn for the better at 7pm, with the arrival of 2 Inf Div. By then, the Hungarian division attacking from
Ruma had pulled out. 97 SD ‘Shar’ was definitely fading, but the two remaining Axis attackers were also beginning to suffer somewhat as well. The issue was a familiar one: could 2 Inf Div reinforce in time? It would be a laborious process
[only 0.5% chance per turn]. Cleverly, the enemy (through Italian MAJGEN Reverberi) stepped up their attack, launching a reckless assault to try to win before 2 Inf Div could reinforce. This was going to be another of those nervous waits.
Air Report. The one Hungarian raid on
Prnjavor (15 Inf and 2 Mot Divs) killed 35 Turkish soldiers.
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19 Aug 42
In the early hours of 19 August, GEN Yamut got some good news from his Logistics Chief: supply had been restored to
Tuzla! As soon as the truckloads of ammunition and other vital stores were distributed, the enemy attack suddenly evaporated as the odds swung heavily in the defenders’ favour. At that exact moment, an enemy air raid began on
Tuzla, but the issue had already been decided.
At
Gradiska, the battle was swinging in favour of 15 Inf Div – which had suffered no more air raids since the last one was seen off the day before. By 7am only the Hungarian 27th Division remained in the fight, the rest having fled during the night. Gataly could sense victory at last. Over in
Tuzla, another enemy probe came to nothing, lasting only a couple of hours and being easily repulsed.
Victory came in
Gradiska at 10am, but there was no detailed report this time of casualties. Despite the battle being won, it would still take some time for 15 Inf Div to secure the crossing: other Axis units were retreating towards
Gradiska, while some could be approaching from out of sight to its north. Supply and fuel for Gataly’s division was adequate, but not plentiful at this northern point of the ‘Bulge’ and they were not carrying full stocks as they pressed on.
At 11am, the Hungarians struck
Tuzla again from the air: this time the solitary Hungarian bomber wing seemed too good a target to pass up. The Beograd CAP was sent to intercept it. This time the engagement was so decisive that Air Force Chief (and Turkish Chief of Staff) Örlungat declared it a clear victory. The Hungarian bomber wing was savaged and was unable to conduct its ground attack mission.
Air Report. The earlier Hungarian air strike (finishing at 5am on
Tuzla) caused just 22 Comintern casualties. The second attack was beaten away.
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20 Aug 42
As 15 Inf Div advanced on
Gradiska in the early hours of 20 August, their lead elements encountered a German formation – indeed a type of unit – not seen before in the Turkish sector of the Balkans. At 3am, there was a brief skirmish with the 233rd Panzer Grenadier Division: a fully mechanised formation. The fight was over too quickly to be able to determine their orbat or strength (three Turks and four Germans were killed in the brief skirmish). They seemed to be passing through rather than attempting to hold the bridges over the Sava River: but
where were they heading?
At the same time, the raw victory odds in
Sabac were improving, but these were still predicated on 2 Inf Div reinforcing: which they had not yet done. And 97 SD ‘Shar’ was reaching the end of its tether. Meanwhile, a large group of Axis units had been spotted heading north-west along the north bank of the Sava River in
Brko. “Where are
they going?” worried LTGEN Artunkal out loud at HQ 2nd Corps. All he could guess was “his way”.
Given the situation in
Sabac, at 3am 1 BG was ordered to start launching round-the-clock ground attacks on the enemy units attacking from
Semska Mitrovica. The Beograd CAP would provide escort if required. They began at 4am, giving a clear look at the units the enemy had there and their state of repair.
At that point, the command net in all the corps HQs of 1st Army came to life.
“All Sunrays this in One, Acting Sunray Minor speaking. Durum Kırmızı. I say again, Durum Kırmızı! More information to follow shortly, out!”
All over the front, those Corps Commanders who were asleep were woken by duty officers and adjutants, all reacting with shock when the codeword was mentioned – General Yamut in particular. They knew what it meant, even if their subordinates did not.
Durum Kırmızı – ‘
Case Red’! What had happened to cause such an explosive codeword to be broadcast? The commanders of all the 1st Army corps went to their classified procedure books to make sure they enacted the required protocols correctly …
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2. Adriatic Sector
16 Aug 42
The very active German 88th Division seemed reluctant to be pent up in the developing pocket. Having been rebuffed from
Sinj earlier, they tried to surprise the defenders of
Korcula with an assault not long after midnight. The two Soviet divisions there were still quite battle-worn from recent combat, but they had been reinforced by 6 Inf Div. All three Comintern divisions had begun to dig in, but after between one and three days of digging each, they had only managed basic foxholes and a few fighting pits by the time the Germans attacked. But while determined, the Germans were badly outnumbered. Perhaps their action was to cover the retreat of other Axis units seen moving north-west to
Split, where the neck of the pocket was still open?
17 Aug 42
The fighting in
Korcula continued through into the next morning, by which time the difficulty of supplying the offensive was becoming obvious, as noted previously. 1 Inf Div had been making good time towards
Bosanski Petrovac, on the north of the ‘left hook’ to the Adriatic, when they ran out of fuel for their IS-1 tank brigade, slowing movement down to a crawl. Over in the Sava Sector, 14 Inf Div in
Zvornik had run out of supplies, as had 12 SD in
Nevesinje. Perhaps logistics would do what the Axis forces had found difficult: halt the momentum of the offensive.
At 6am, the report came from
Korcula: after just over a day of sharp fighting, the Germans had been thrown back with heavy losses.
18 Aug 42
On the evening of 18 August, the Turkish advance towards the coast hit two milestones. At 5pm, 2 Mtn Div under MAJGEN Türkes secured
Knin, due north of Split. If either
Zara or
Ubdina (to its north) could be secured, all Axis forces in the pocket to the south would be trapped. At 6pm, Türkes came under attack from the Italian 28th Division: it seemed they had been trying to escape north when 2 Mtn Div’s timely arrival sealed their route out. Their attempted escape became an assault, but the Italians were already worn down before the battle started. At the same time, 1 Armd Div was ordered to push forward to
Knin as well, to help seal the trap.
Then at 7pm, 1 Inf Div – fuel supplies replenished – completed their delayed advance to
Bosanski Petrovac and immediately advanced to attack
Ubdina. The Turks were determined to cut the neck of the salient, one way or another.
At 8pm, 1 Inf Div found only a very weak Hungarian division and an HQ in
Ubdina: they should be able to offer much resistance to the powerful heavy infantry division with its IS-1s. However, there seemed to be a newly arrived German infantry division also heading towards
Ubdina from the north. In
Knin, 222 SD joined 2 Mtn Div to make the enemy’s attack even more hopeless and to allow for a rapid exploitation towards
Zara: which scouts now reported was unoccupied, though a German division had been spotted heading to it from
Split.
19 Aug 42
The fighting in
Ubdina took a little longer than had been expected, but was over early on the morning of 19 August, bringing a Turkish victory with only a few casualties. The desperate Italian attack on
Knin continued. And that German division in
Split, now under Italian command, had reversed course and was now heading south-east from
Split to
Makarska instead. To their ultimate doom, it was hoped.
Victory came in
Knin at 5am, allowing 222 SD to proceed without hindrance to
Zara while 2 Mtn Div held the hills of Knin to keep the vice tight. To the north, the race for
Ubdina was on between the Germans moving south from
Perusic and 1 Inf Div from
Bosanski Petrovac.
The rest of the day passed relatively uneventfully, with Comintern units racing to the coast on a two-province front. Then, in the early hours of 20 August, came the fateful codeword on the command net:
Durum Kırmızı. What has happened, was the common thought of the concerned commanders of 1st, 2nd and 5th Corps as they were presented with the ‘Immediate-Flash’ message.
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3. Other Events
16 Aug 42
The day began early with an attempt to get 1 AG to perform a recon mission over
Novi Grad, to the north of the main line of advance, through an interdiction mission. But, for some reason, the mission never got off the ground.
[Perhaps I should have made it a ground attack instead, or air superiority, but I had just wanted to get them in and out quickly, as it could have been in range of a number of Axis air bases with large fighter concentrations. Things then got too hectic in the air to risk another attempt.]
At 11am, 1 TAK wing, recovering in
Kursumlija, received a new commander – MAJGEN Gökcen
[Sk 0, exp 61%] as the intention was for the obsolete old Blenheims to be used separately in secondary theatres.
The 1st Navy (ADM Üngen) arrived off
Tobruk at 3pm. They could tell the air and naval bases there were occupied, but not whether ground troops were present. They would loiter for a while to see what might happen – whether they would be attacked or sight any ground troop positions.
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17 Aug 42
A close eye remained on supply production. A surplus
[+114, stockpile 29, 292] had been produced the day before, so supply effort was reduced somewhat
[from 60 IC down to 50, 488 supply produced per day down to 402] in the hope of getting some of those delayed projects moving again.
The Mk1 Eyeball sub flotilla arrived off
Bengasi at 11am. As yet, they could see nothing in
Bengasi itself. They too would wait for a while.
After a query from the Turkish Supreme HQ, at 5pm the US Defence Attaché provided an update on US Navy moves in the Pacific. A succession of naval groups was moving up past Central America and Mexico towards the US Pacific North-west: they were all re-basing in
Seattle. There continued to be no major US naval forces either in
Hawaii or around the rest of the Pacific. Including near
Midway, where the Japanese invasion fleet continued to have free rein.
Then at 7pm, 4 Cav Div radioed in – via relay through
Kabul – that they had finally arrived at
Gora Manas and would hold there, having linked up with the Soviets (though only a HQ at that point) to their north. The Soviets seemed to be mounting a modest advance against Manchukuo-controlled Axis forces in Central Asia.
18 Aug 42
A routine message came in from the commander of the
Dodecanese garrison at midnight: the local rebels had risen once again. No-one really worried much about such reports any more: “I will report again when they have been suppressed,” was the simple ending to his short bulletin.
Back in
Ankara, FM Calistar’s logistics chief at Supreme HQ advised recent activities had increased supply consumption again, with a deficit of 214 units again the previous day. Supply production was put back up to 60 IC again. This meant a shortfall of almost 50 IC in projects
[100/149.5], with both of the new Mustang wings on hold and only a 61% rate of effort (ROE) possible on the 4th TD Brigade.
HQ 5th Corps arrived in its new location of
Zenica at 9pm – and was out of range of GEN Arikan’s HQ 1st Army Group back in
Istanbul, which needed to get within range of HQ 1st Army and its two direct-command Corps HQs (5th and 6th),
That night, Arikan’s HQ began its back to the old location in
Sofiyah: it would be seen if that would be close enough.
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19 Aug 42
By 4am neither of the naval recon forces had been able to spot anything worth reporting on over in Libya. Aware of supply demands and the fuel consumption involved in keeping the navy at sea, they were recalled to their home bases. Instead, 1 TAK began to base-hop
[via the reserve mission to preserve organisation] from
Kursumlija, from where they set off for
Tirana (due to range limitations); from there at 6am to
Athens; then at 8am heading to
Chania in western Crete, arriving at 9am. By then they were at 92% strength but still barely had any organisation. It would be a while yet before they would be ready for any sustained operations. And they had no dedicated fighter escort.
From
Chania 1 TAK was in range of
Tobruk, but not
Bengasi. British air liaison reporting indicated that
Tobruk had four Axis air units present (of unknown composition) and the British had five based in
Alexandria. But
Tobruk could only effectively support two air units, so (even if it was in supply and not blockaded) the units there were likely to be suffering increased attrition.
Inönü’s midnight report, read at a stop on the road between
Sofiyah and
Užice, included something from the US on
Midway. The defenders were fighting hard, but the situationlooked grim. The US 3rd Mar Div was nearly spent and 82nd Abn Div had started to sustain more serious damage. One of the attacking Japanese marine divisions (the 2nd) was also badly worn, but the other (the 4th) was relatively fresh. Still there was no US air support to protect the troops or naval intervention to disrupt the invasion fleet.
[Again, I blame you, @Eurasia ].
OTL Event: Dieppe. The Dieppe Raid took place on the northern coast of France. The operation was virtually a complete failure and almost 60% of the 6,086 men who made it ashore were killed, wounded or captured. The British destroyer Berkeley was crippled by Focke-Wulf Fw 190s and scuttled.
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20 Aug 42
There was good news in the midnight War Ministry report: new light artillery was available for all infantry formations and would begin to be rolled out (and given top production priority) straight away. Only upgraded infantry AT weapons (research due for completion on 27 August) was need to bring Turkish infantry divisions up to contemporary (1942) standard. Given how supply production had rapidly come the the fore with the unprecedented demands of the Summer Offensive, technical heft was given over to looking at ways to improve it, as Turkish processes were a decade behind the times.
And a report came to the Milli Şef that a spy had just been caught nearby, not far ahead of the relocating HQ 1st Army in
Novi Pazar.
“A spy, you say? Any further information?” asked the President absently.
“Another one of those Slovakian devils, sir,” said his security chief. “We arrested him earlier in the day. It is a bit concerning he was between us and
Užice, but the speed of the advance has created enough chaos for a few of these operatives to slip through. I recommend an increase in security patrols and for the Headquarters convoy, General.”
“Whatever you say, but we must keep up the pace of the move to ensure proper command lines are maintained with the front.”
“Of course, General. But I suggest you travel the rest of the way in your armoured command car rather than your staff car. I’m uneasy.”
“I’m sure its quite unnecessary, but I will take your advice.”
“Thank you, General.”
They would be moving again that morning, early, in their haste to make it to
Užice. Inönü was soon reading his reports under ‘red light’ in his command car, a Zis BA-10M (an improved version with a new radio setup) provided as a personal gift from Comrade Stalin the year before.
Inönü’s personalised BA-10 armoured car, seen here the day before (19 August), with his Adjutant clearing the road as the crew commander consults a map during a break in the relocation of HQ 1st Army from Sofiyah to Užice.
As they rattled along the road in the dead of night, Inönü read through the latest operational reports.
I must get that ‘left hook’ to the coast quickly, he thought to himself.
The sooner we have that pocket squeezed to death, the sooner we’ll have the forces to hold what we’ve got so far and decide where we go next. Keep going north, Libya, Syria, Hungary, Sicily, … In Moscow, I must get Bayar to …
His thought was interrupted by a loud clang and a screeching sound of tortured metal, then … the armoured car swung violently to one side and crashed. The President’s head struck the steel of the armoured car’s side … and then blackness.
A desperate group of spies, partisans or saboteurs (this was yet to be determined) had ambushed the command convoy with light weapons, grenades and a Panzerbüchse 39 (PzB 39) 7.92mm anti-tank rifle. It had been the latter that had struck the front of the armoured car, killing the driver and causing it to crash. But the main target had been Inönü’s staff car, which had been riddled with bullets and bombed, killing his driver and unlucky HQ chief-of-staff, who had been travelling in it.
The initial conclusion was that this had been an assassination attempt – but who was behind it? And had it worked? All this was unknown as the President’s security detail and medical team ran to the crashed BA-10 under fire, as the assaulting group was dealt with.
Inönü’s crashed BA-10 on the side of the road in Novi Pazar, a photo of the scene taken later in the morning following the 4am ambush on 20 August 1942.
The 1st Army’s deputy chief of staff – now acting chief of staff - was simply told the President was unconscious and could not be woken. He was alive, but the prognosis was uncertain. He had no alternative but to have the codeword transmitted that would alert the Corps Commanders that the Commander was either dead or incapacitated. General Yamut, as Army Chief and the senior Corps Commander, would take temporary command of the 1st Army. He also sent the same codeword to
Ankara, where Prime Minister Celal Bayar would also act as President for as long as the Milli Şef was unable to exercise his responsibilities.
“Signaller – transmit the Codeword Durum Kırmızı on the 1st Army command net and to Supreme HQ in Ankara. We must just hope that our next signal is not ‘Case Black’!”
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Coming Up: Will Inönü survive? What effect, if any, will this have on operations in the Summer Offensive and the ability of Celal Bayar to travel to
Moscow in a few days’ time for the Coalition Meeting? Can the Adriatic Pocket be closed off and eliminated without too much delay or heavy Comintern casualties? And if it can, what would the troops released from that do next?
More widely, is
Midway - and with it the 82nd Airborne - doomed? Have the Soviets turned the corner on the Patriotic and Eastern Fronts, or will the success of the Summer Offensive be subsumed by disaster elsewhere? And what of the British fights in North Africa, Burma and Malaya? Will there be plenty of vodka and caviar served at the forthcoming Moscow Coalition Meeting? And who will attend from Turkey?
