Chapter XLVII: For King or Country - Part II.
The discovery of the Abwher agents in the Canary Islands had shaken British plans, no allowance had been made for foreign intervention before the coup. The news worsened as it became clear Franco intended to go alone, realising that sharing the effort would require sharing the prize, he believed the German assistance would be enough to get him into power. This caused considerable consternation in both Whitehall and the plotters unofficial HQ in Pamplona, if Franco succeeded he was clearly not going to share power while should he fail the government crack down would kill their plan before it had a chance to begin. The solution would come from a most unexpected source, the German contingent which insisted Franco co-operate as a condition of their support for him. While SIS put this surprising change down to the Abwher's realisation of the need for a united group, in fact it was due to orders from Berlin direct from the Fuhrer.
For Hitler the coup represented a dream opportunity; the chance for the Reich and the British Empire to work together in defeating Bolshevism. While such an alliance was never considered even a possibility by the British government, certainly not after the fall of Baldwin, it was an obsession of Hitler's and thus not limited by such inconvenient facts. Despite this there was solid logic behind the action, given the damage done to Hitler's reputation and relations with the armed forces by the Rhineland debacle it is unlikely any scheme would have got off the ground without reason beyond idealised obsession. The German economy depended very heavily on imports of certain raw materials, materials found in abundance in Spain, and domestic demand could only grow as the pace of the still secret re-armament accelerated. To have a friendly, indebted, government in power in Madrid could only be of benefit for Hjalmar Schacht and his negotiation team from the Reich Ministry of Economics. Yet that was not the main reason the sceptical War Ministry supported the man who had almost pushed Germany into a disastrous war weeks earlier, for them the decisive factor was the chance to fundamentally change Germany's unfavourable strategic situation.
Hjalmar Schacht, Reich Minister for Economics. Amongst his many responsibilities was ensuring the supply of raw materials to the industries of Germany. The fallout from the recent foreign policy disasters had only made that job harder with many countries reluctant to trade with an aggressive and opportunistic Germany, even though such moves had not been successful the intentions had been clear. For Schacht and his ministry a friendly Spain, sending its iron, mercury and other ores to Hamburg not Liverpool would solve many of their problems.
The Rhineland debacle had brutally reminded the German government of the advantages France still held over them, not that any reminder was needed, and had resulted in humiliation and French troops once more marching on German soil. It had also reinforced the strategic status quo, France would have to maintain the de-militarised Rhineland for the future or face a humiliating climb down of her own. For as long as that was the case France could advance, unopposed, into the Rhineland basin and occupy a fifth of Germany's heavy industry and almost a sixth of her population before any conflict even began. This situation was only made worse by the defeat of Italy and the Treaty of Valletta, as the Treaty came into effect France would be able to draw down her forces in North Africa, freeing up troops for the Maginot Line and the northern borders. Worse Italy would be in no fit state to provide even a notional threat across the Alps, allowing an even greater concentration of men and attention on the German border. Intervention in Spain offered the chance to open a new 'front', to force France to divert time and men to her southern border and distract her from the Rhineland, something that could only be of benefit to Germany. Some in the War Ministry even hoped for a big enough distraction to allow a more successful attempt at re-occupation after the French withdrew their troops, something that could never be possible if France only had one border to seriously watch. While far from wildly enthusiastic, certainly compared to their political masters, the War Ministry believed the potential rewards to be exceptionally valuable while the risks were tolerable, particularly given the presence of the British would help to temper any rash action from France, or any other power that felt compelled to react.
For the government in Westminster the news of co-operation was almost as unwelcome as that of Franco's independent stance, the discovery Britain would be working with the Germans caused many formerly enthusiastic supporters to pause. The German actions over the Rhineland, coming after the Italian declaration of war, had left many with the impression that fascist government were inherent warmongers, an accusation with more than a grain of truth about it. Moreover the arguments about carving up influence over the new Spanish government brought home the harsh reality of the plan to many, men who had only read sanitised and euphemism filled reports. Bluntly speaking Britain intended to overthrow a democratically elected government and install an at least partially military influenced government, something many in the Foreign Office felt to be distinctly un-British. These people were of course completely wrong, even the briefest look at the history of British India for instance will throw up similar examples, but it was still a source of discomfort to many, not only those based in King Charles Street.
Sir Eric Phipps, British Ambassador to Berlin during the Iberian Affair. As one of the few in the Foreign Office who had consistently warned of the threat posed by Hitler's expansionist plans his opinion was very much in demand at the start of the crisis. Phipps reported that, unpleasant as working with Hitler was to many, leaving the ambitious Germany to act alone was an even worse option.
A great deal of this anxiety dissipated, or at least was diverted, as Manuel Azaña formally assumed the Presidency and began a concerted and intolerant shift to the hard left, seemingly with little regard for the destabilising effects on both the Popular Front and the country. The new leadership rapidly abandoned the constitutional republicanism of it's moderate centre-left members in favour of a far more socialist direction, the Partido Comunista de España (PCE, Spanish Communist Party) very much to the fore, it's leaders following the Comintern's line with talk of revolution and a worker's state. While much of this talk was dismissed as little more than provocative rhetoric by the moderates it was clear men such as Largo Caballero, 'The Spanish Lenin' according to Pravda, were speaking with the tacit approval of at least part of the government when they declared revolution to be iminent. Faced with such a possibility the main centre right grouping, the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA, Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right), effectively gave up on las Cortes and parliamentary means of opposition, instead giving it's support to Mola and the British faction through the Carlist parties linking the two groups.
Aghast at the prospect of Soviet supported Spain, Azaña had unwittingly encouraged the wavering Cabinet members and stiffened their resolve. While still uncomfortable these men accepted that some sort of coup was now inevitable in Spain and that the Monarchists around Mola were the least bad option, certainly compared to the prospect of a Soviet controlled Spain or a Nazi supported dictatorship under Franco. That last point was, of course, a crucial sticking point in negotiations over the planned government of post-coup Spain with neither side even able to agree amongst themselves, let alone with each other, other even the basics. In the end, as Franco's inflexible deadline of early June approached, the issue was fudged; The Carlists and the British got agreement Spain would be a constitutional monarchy of some sort with Javier I as King, but his exact role and constitutional powers were left vague, as was the date for fresh elections. Franco and his German backers got chairmanship of the 'Military Council', a body that would 'advise' the King and the government, again with it left unclear how forceful this 'advice' would be and if the body was temporary or permanent. Although it was obvious at the time the compromise was only storing up problems for the future, some of which would come home to roost far earlier than anyway feared, both sides fully expected events in Spain to allow them alone to dictate the final nature of the government.
With the tentative agreement in place planning could finally proceed to the actual coup, although it would soon become obvious too much time had been wasted on the politics leaving too little left for the military, yet neither Franco nor his German backers would back down, the coup date was fixed for the 4th of June at the climax of the North African military exercises. The consequences of their self-serving obstinacy would be terrible, not just for them and their fellow plotters, but for the whole of Spain.
