Memo from the Desk of the Secretary General
First, some promised factual information on Lend Lease provision over the last few years. The yellow highlight is the provider, the countries to the right the recipeints, in daily IC transfers at sample times chosen from the last few years.
On Proposition 1: there will be no veto for the US on Proposition 1.1. Apart from it being a bit late in the process, the lack of a veto was deliberate. The consensus of world leaders (ie me 
) agreed that the US had really not done enough against Japan or had that much skin/occupied territory in the game (their former puppet the Philippines having been written off) to warrant a separate veto. They will have to try to exert their interests via the votes. The only veto for 1.2 is deliberately given to Japan, as it would force them to concede ground, just in case they wanted to opt for death or glory instead, despite the risks and costs.
On Proposition 22: As raised by Germany.
After long deliberation we have come to the conclusion that proposition 22 seems unfairly biased in favour of Turkey and against Germany. There is no scenario where Germany retains most of it's eastern territories while the Turkish enclave in Eastern Prussia is ceded to Poland, but there is a scenario where Turkey retains it's Baltic enclave while Germany cedes all of it's Eastern territory to Poland.
Any 'bias' against Germany is deliberate in this case, as mentioned before, as a losing power. They do at least have an opportunity to avoid the cessions, though it will no doubt be a difficult achievement.
As to the Turkish enclave issue, as mentioned before, I do agree this part is clunky. At the risk of perhaps affecting initial negotiations pertaining to this Proposition and trying to keep things as simple as possible,
option 22.2 is eliminated (simply mentally delete it from your individual score sheets). The scores for 22.1 and 22.3 remain the same. The cession for Poland is now treated as a job lot,
but Turkey can exercise a veto over its cession if it really wishes to, but at an increased penalty (and no change to the scores of other countries if 22.1 gets up). Still no veto to Germany.
**Edit: My bad, I mistakenly had Poland as the veto instead of Turkey.
On Proposition 23: In reviewing this, it became apparent that an omission was made in case the German cession is not made under Proposition 22. And it has a direct bearing on viewpoints and votes.
The question if the cession is
not made but Germany
is eventually partitioned (ie 23.4 enforced due to a veto being applied under 23.1-3), what happens to the part of eastern Germany/Prussia that was not ceded? This has the potential to complicate things, but something has to be done about it.
The proposal is that eastern Germany would therefore be included in the partition of Germany, so it remains as part of Northern (Soviet puppeted) or Southern (Turkish puppeted) Germany and is divided between them on partition per the attached map. The Secretariat is willing to hear arguments on this proposed solution, in public session.
[OOC: if anyone can think of a better way of handling it without completely changing the proposal structure, I'm all ears].
Map to be used for the partition of Germany under Outcome 23.4 if the cession of territory is not made to Poland in Proposition 22.
The original (the Polish cession included) German partition map is included below, for comparison.
