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So...social left is popular and can probably win the next election, which might be very soon depending on what the government does (the remaining colonial issues are going to be pretty disastrous, I'd wager).
This is quite possible. This assembly has basically been elected to decide the new constitution and electoral arrangements for the Fourth Republic, which is due to be completed in 1946, at which point new Presidential and Legislative elections are likely to be held. It is not a long-term legislative body, per se. Both the President and the PM are provisional positions for now, even with this recent election.
Indonesia going red or at least anti-west would be great for us, and they're also likely to be super anti-Japan, which gives us even more potential friends in the Pacific.
Under Sukarno, perhaps more pro-Communist and -West than anti-Japanese. In OTL, his independence movement did have communist support and Sukarno's sympathy, but the military and nationalists did not approve, which would lead to increasing tensions in coming years and eventually lead to Sukarno's overthrow in 1965. Per Wikipedia:
Sukarno and his fellow nationalists collaborated to garner support for the Japanese war effort from the population, in exchange for Japanese aid in spreading nationalist ideas. Upon Japanese surrender, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta declared Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945, and Sukarno was appointed president.
It's possible these far-right movements won't go quietly and Giraud might have to face down some degree of violent backlash at home. However, just about everybody should applaud his actions internationally.
It could be: he's trying to be rightist enough to keep them frozen out and minimised, while contrasting enough with the centre and left to provide a viable opposition to them.
This was Giraud's calculation, especially while France in general and his own power were trying to establish themselves again in the immediate post-war world.
Hard to call this one. I sense Giraud has a credible chance, but the odds are favouring the leftist bloc. As always, a finely crafted blend of OTL fact and TTL fiction.
As you say, it couldn't have been any closer. This result will certainly make it difficult for Giraud and d'Astier to govern, even if things turned out far better than they dared hope for. If the Radicals were to join forces with the Alliance that creates two blocs with almost equal numbers (and an alternative administration) but of course the more parties there are in a coalition, the harder it is to keep everyone on the same page. For that matter, will the Alliance itself hold together in the wake of this heavy electoral reverse?
It will be a tricky time for all concerned in the lead up to the full establishment of the Fourth Republic and the resulting elections - which really could go either way, given how close things are now.
Basically what this tells me is that the first sign of things going wrong will lead to panic and overreaction, followed by the collapse of the government.
Whether that's strikes/financial problems rebuilding the country itself (and there would be lots. France fought a year long war on its own soil in the east, again. We'd be looking at ww1 levels of destruction in at least some areas) or in the colonial empire (and that is going to happen pretty soon because absolutely no one believes, correctly, that France can do anything to stop indepednance movements, the cancellation of debts, etc etc).
Perhaps, but they just have to limp through to the establishment of the new Republic and see if they can improve their position after that. The trade off is that the longer war in 1940 is well balanced by virtually none in 1944-45, including all the infrastructure bombing conducted by the Allies during its lead-up and contact, not to mention those parts that were fought over again. Belgium and the Netherlands may be as badly off as OTL, however.
They hardly have any of the colonial empire left after losing most of it to Turkey and Japan in GW2. No Dien Bien Phu, no North African wars, etc. Maybe a bit of a mess in Africa, but hardly nation-shattering. And a possible focus of US rebuilding and post-war economic diplomacy? They may end up in a stronger position than one might suppose.
Turns out that when your country does not suffer a violent invasion from the north coast through to the German border, you have more surviving population to do things like voting. Who knew?
Sorry, I got that one wrong in the French update, as 25 July was when the delayed results were announced in OTL. Here, they were conducted and announced on 5 July, so I guess you could reverse the comment?
Japan welcomes this development as anything which contributes to the end of Western colonialism and the establishment of far-Eastern Asian identity (which Japan could exploit for commercial and diplomatic gain, of course) is a good thing.
Uhhhhh we just left them there by accident in the withdrawal, certainly we would never fund revolutionaries against a foreign government for our own ends, we are not Americans after all...
Per above, Sukarno could cut both ways: supported by Japan during GW2, but also with considerable Communist presence and influence in this revolutionary period. A complicated and nuanced situation, but certainly initially anti-colonial and anti-Western establishment, for sure. Maybe Japan might try to support them in TTL in the hopes of getting peaceful access to the oil resources they couldn't secure long term in the war. Or at least threaten it as a bargaining chip against the Dutch, anyway.
Highly unlikely. OTL, Japan supported Indonesian independence from the Dutch (actually making a promise to grant this in 1944, prior to the war's end) and a sizable number of Japanese soldiers contributed to the Indonesian ranks immediately after the war's conclusion. Given the recent occupation of parts of what will be Indonesia, relations may not be warm at first, but honestly the occupation was lesser in scope than in OTL so probably relations will warm up a good deal quicker.
That, plus the fact that Sukarno and the revolutionary leadership were not at all socialist let alone pro-Communist, and frankly it is too far from Russia proper for him to really care, given the much better opportunities he has on the East Asian mainland... I don't see it. Stalin does have an in with the Indonesian Communist Party but that's not likely to amount to much given OTL repression - which Japan is assuredly in favor of.
Yes, most of this. Though I think there was more Communist influence and/or tolerance under Sukarno, at least in the eyes of the military-nationalists and Soeharto twenty years later. What will happen in TTL may vary from all that.
Seems to be the story of the day in the West. One can imagine that the combination of the world's most powerful leftist (USSR), democratic (USA), and rightist (Turkey) nations making up the "Comintern" leads to significantly more political confusion compared to OTL, as here it is not so clear that Nazi ideology lost their war especially with basically fascist Japan making out like bandits compared to OTL. After all, Nazi ideology did hold popular appeal based on nationalism, a lot of false promises and bombastic speeches, and unfortunately a whole lot of racism - much as it sadly does even in the modern day for some people.
Fair comment. Though some moderation of HPOI3's, er, 'clunky' political system has been required to make things a little more plausible here. Then France tilted back to the right anyway!
Alternatively, if the rebuild is much easier compared to OTL it is not too unlikely that the conservative ruling coalition could solidify their positions with an effective rebuilding scheme. Granted, this requires a French government to be effective at something, so yes, I agree, we'll give them a year at best.
If the world’s topsy-turvy enough to give the UK an even bigger Labour landslide, I suppose there’s always room for the largest Stalinist party in the west to cock up an historic starting advantage. Hopefully the French will do what they do best and we’ll have picket-line barbecues and striking ballerinas outside the Opéra National before the year is out.
With more Soviet support, Japanese support, and even Turkish support for the Indonesians, I would wager this ATL war of independence will be much less in the Netherland's favour than the OTL one, and that's saying something.
As for France, it's an interesting swap to have Giraud front and centre. One might argue that the French have not yet forgotten Giraud's hopeful radio London broadcasts full of national pride and promises of a return to the strong, proud, and peaceful society that existed (in their minds) during the 'belle époque' (or even before 1870, but saying that would have gone against the majority republican public opinion...). After years of occupation, they want France to be a great nation again. Of course, they disagree on whether to go back to the old glory of the French Nation, or to start from scratch and build a new system that emulates the Soviet one, but with French characteristics. Giraud's victory is crucial here as it allows his coalition to build the structure of the post-war French state, thereby setting the framework within which all the next governments will operate. (until they manage to overturn it, of course).
I'm loving the twists and turns of these elections, and how they are shaping a complex post-war ecosystem. A leftist France would have been too easy, rallying towards the Comintern, making Europe into even more of a Socialist continent, and isolating the Benelux. With France still clearly on the side of the Allies, one could easily see a smaller, but significant third block develop on a continent partitioned between Turkey and the Soviets. France, the Benelux, with British support, and maybe Spain, could turn out really strong. Good relations with the Americans are a plus, and without a Western Germany to spend it on, American money is going to be pouring into France as THE European bastion against Communism. I see good times ahead for the French, unless their own politics destroy every advantage they currently possess, which is always very much possible with France.
Same here, and I like the way I am myself surprised on occasion and can use those pivotal moments to open up more points of difference with OTL. France has the potential, at least, to do pretty well and be the focus of Western military and economic support in the post-war period. But nothing is guaranteed, of course.
that was a very bad result, but at least it's not a landslide. Internal divisions and tensions in an Allied nation is always good but as UGNR we've always seen France as more sympathetic and harmless. The real enemy is the UK.
Well, it was for the leftists, anyway. Though the Giraudist-conservative coalition government is not that politically different to the UGNR, really, who are by no means communists. And yes, for Turkey in this post-war world, the external flash points are all with the British. Though the internal ones all across Europe, the Middle East and North Africa may be far more troublesome and dangerous in the mid-term.
We shall see there. Interestingly, I had a lot to do with ASEAN security architecture in my previous role, so have some pretty in-depth perspectives on how it functions in the modern era, at least. I suspect we are a long way from that now, with most of SEA either under colonial or Japanese puppet control.
To All: the next chapter, on the US to the end of 1945, is pretty much ready to go and will be published shortly. I've used it as a bit of an overview of many (not all) of the recent major world events, too, as the US is either involved in or reacts to them. It will be the last of the detailed post-war epilogue updates that set the baseline for the rest of the epilogue, which I'm planning to be a briefer and more global sequence of events from here on.
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Chapter 250: United States – December 1944 to December 1945
Chapter 250: United States – December 1944 to December 1945
US Election Result 7 November 1944: Recap
Republican Thomas Dewey had won a very close election for President, taking a majority of the electoral college but not the popular vote. Dewey was no outright isolationist nor an arch-conservative – though his Vice President would be. His policies on post-war US strategy and defence spending, foreign relations and reconstruction aid to Europe and elsewhere was as yet unknown. He would of course not get to start implementing his policies until after his inauguration on 20 January 1945.
President-Elect Thomas Dewey.
Dewey’s party had narrowly failed to gain a majority in the Representatives and they had narrowed, but not overturned, the large Democratic Party majority in the Senate. This meant Dewey did not have a strong mandate and faced a hostile Congress. He would have to tread a careful path to achieve many of his policy objectives.
---xxx---
November 1944 to January 1945: Caretaking
The outgoing Roosevelt administration still held executive power for the two and a half months until 20 January 1945 but would of course refrain from making any major policy changes and consult on any major decisions that needed to be taken during the period.
One such came on 18 December 1944, when Douglas MacArthur was made a five-star general in the U.S. Army. Dewey was comfortable with the appointment as MacArthur was seen as sympathetic to the Republican Party. Indeed, he was suspected by some of wishing to one day be drafted by them as a presidential candidate. An opponent of anything that smacked of ‘appeasement in Asia’, especially to the Communists, he would prove a powerful influence on White House thinking in the coming years.
Douglas MacArthur (b. 26 January 1880), promoted to General of the Army (five-star general), December 1944.
Just four days later, a more secret matter was discussed and endorsed during a classified briefing between the outgoing and incoming administration teams: US OSS agents would continue to provide ammunition, logistic intelligence, equipment and training for the soldiers who would later become the backbone of the Vietnamese military which fought the Japanese occupiers.
On 6 January 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered his final State of the Union message. For the only time during his presidency, Roosevelt did not deliver the message as a speech before a joint session of Congress. Rather, he delivered it to Congress as a written message and recited a summary of the speech over the radio. The message concluded:
1945 can and must see the continued organisation of world peace. This organisation must be the fulfilment of the promise for which men have fought and died in this recent war. It must be the justification of all the sacrifices that have been made - of all the dreadful misery that this world has endured. We Americans of today, together with our Coalition partners, have made history - and I hope it will be a better history than ever has been made before. We pray that we may be worthy of the unlimited opportunities that God has given us.
---xxx---
Dewey’s New Broom
Thomas Dewey was inaugurated on 20 January 1945. In addition to his aspirations for economic and other domestic policies, his speech included a number of announcements regarding key world developments and US strategic objectives in the new post-war world. Its main theme was summarised in his call to embrace a new American destiny:
We need not be afraid of the future, for the future will be in our own hands.
Dewey confirmed he would be supporting the ratification of the new LN Charter by the US and its assumption of one of the P5 positions on the LNSC. Following on from a key plank of his election platform, he announced that the United States' ‘nominal’ membership of the Comintern had ‘served its purpose during the war but its time had now passed.’ The US would be withdrawing from that factional membership as a matter of priority, though he intended to ‘maintain productive and cordial relations with all our wartime partners’.
President Dewey delivers his ‘Future in Our Own Hands’ inaugural speech at the White House on 20 January 1945.
Dewey planned to ‘wash away the lacklustre approach of recent years’ and initiate ‘a great modernisation and expansion of US defence capabilities’, befitting a great power of the US’s status. There would also be an immediate review of the lend-lease program and consideration of priorities for both national development and the rebuilding of ‘friendly countries devastated by the recent conflict’. Other than discussion about ‘boosting international trade and the United States’ share of it’ and the ‘need to secure the natural resources we need for security and economic expansion’, there were no specifics provided in the speech on where those resources may come from.
In 1945 OTL the US remained a net exporter of oil. In 1938, Saudi Arabia was found to have vast quantities of oil. In 1943, with concerns growing about the diminishing US oil production capacity, President Roosevelt declared Saudi oil vital to US security and provides financial support. In February 1945, Roosevelt and Saudi King Abdul Aziz met aboard a U.S. ship on the Suez Canal to discuss closer ties. A few years later, the world’s biggest oil field was found in Saudi Arabia, and the country quickly became the world’s largest exporter of oil—though it did not become a significant US supplier for several decades. Of course, in TTL both the Saudi and Persian oilfields are controlled by Turkey, so any conversation will need to be with them.
---xxx---
The Dewey-Taft ‘Accommodation’
In a pick that surprised some, Dewey named fellow Republican scion and internal conservative sparring partner Robert A. Taft as Secretary of State.
Robert A. Taft Sr. (b. 8 September 1889), US Secretary of State in 1945.
Taft was the elder son of William Howard Taft, the 27th President of the United States. After winning election to the Senate from Ohio in 1938, Taft repeatedly sought the Republican presidential nomination, often battling for control of the party with the moderate faction of Republicans led by Dewey. He emerged as a prominent non-interventionist and opposed US involvement GW2 prior to the Japanese declaration of war. Dewey, for reasons of factional pressure and to maintain his shaky grip on power, had felt obliged to disarm Taft’s potential troublemaking in the Senate by drafting him into probably the most crucial cabinet position at that time.
Taft believed that America should avoid any involvement in European or Asian wars and concentrate instead on solving its domestic problems. Taft believed that a strong military, combined with the natural geographic protection of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, would be adequate to protect America. Although Taft fully supported the American war effort after they entered the war, he continued to harbour a deep suspicion of any American involvement in post-war military alliances. Dewey agreed with him about the need for a strong military but was more open to the need for strong international partnerships with ‘like-minded’ nations. He was also prepared to consider some international intervention in US strategic interests.
The uneasy working compromise they struck was to avoid formal factional or alliance entanglements. Thus confirming the early withdrawal from the wartime Comintern membership on both policy and political (anti-communist) grounds, without seeking to formally join the Allies in a new ‘Western Alliance’, as a number of Democratic pundits were advocating.
The US would also consider deniable, proxy interventions (such as in Vietnam) but not direct US military involvement in such ‘non-core’ security challenges. Both were keen to boost the US military: Taft was keener on a naval build-up, Dewey wanted a credible ground force with some expeditionary capability, while both saw the need to build air power and examine the development of rocket and nuclear technology. So in the end, they would try to do it all.
---xxx---
Domestic and Multilateral Developments
MacArthur became commander in chief US Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC) in April 1945, a crucial and influential appointment for the coming years.
As we have seen in previous chapters, May saw the League of Nations agree on an eleven-member security council, with non-permanent members chosen by the General Assembly. The Conference approved veto rights for the Big Five powers (the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Turkey and Japan).
On 28 July, the United States Senate ratified the New Charter of the League of Nations, signed a month earlier. Taft, an opponent of full US membership, was in a battle he could not win within the Dewey administration: his grudging acquiescence on this matter was a price of his acceptance of his role as Secretary of State, and a significant reason Dewey had sought to bring him ‘into the tent’. The New League of Nations Charter was ratified by the United States Senate on 8 August.
Taft manages to force a smile when handing over a copy of the ratified League of Nations Charter he has just signed to President Dewey.
In 1945 OTL, Taft was among the seven senators who opposed full United States entry into the United Nations.
The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was disbanded and split up among several other agencies on 20 September. The most important of these would emerge as the Central Intelligence Agency.
The establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on 27 December 1945 set up another arena for ‘jousting’ between the US and the USSR, with the UK sitting to one side under Atlee’s new government. American delegate Harry Dexter White thought the IMF should function like a bank, making sure that borrowing states could repay their debts on time. The US would exert leverage over the UK, which was dependent on US financial support following on from the wartime lend-lease program, while the Soviets had a very different view of what the IMF should be supporting.
By 31 December the US had completed Level 2 and was actively researching Level 3 nuclear technology. This research would continue, but as yet there was no active weapons program being pursued, while rocket research remained in its infancy.
---xxx---
Relations with Western Europe
On 1 February, Dewey ordered that Lend-Lease aid be halted immediately, given it ‘was no longer needed and could best be spent at home’.
On 4 July, the day before the general election in the UK, the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity was recognised by Britain and the United States. Dewey was complicit in seeking an excuse to tacitly approve the fait accompli of Poland becoming part of the Soviet sphere of influence, and to legitimise the Warsaw government while withdrawing their recognition of the Polish government-in-exile. This rather craven approach had broad bipartisan support in Congress and powerful elements of the Dewey Administration, particularly Secretary of State Taft.
The election in the UK on 5 July, which brought Labour’s Clement Atlee to power, brought a government of very different political complexion to power there than now governed in the US. However, this did not significantly impair relations between the two most powerful Western democracies. Dewey’s main concern was about a possible weakening of British resolve as the leader of the Allies. Taft too was keen to encourage continued British leadership in that strategic area – largely so the US could continue to resist calls to do so itself.
The upset results of the French election on 21 July, confirming a narrow Giraudist-Conservative alliance in power, was more welcome in Washington. The veteran conservative Louis Marin, a leading member of the Republican Federation and new Deputy Prime Minister, maintained a strong and friendly relationship with the US in the post-war period.
Attlee’s broadcast on 19 September 1945 supporting the independence of India and stating that “never again would Britain make an imperial claim on that great nation” was met with approval in Washington. Neither the Democrats nor Republicans had approved of Churchill’s doomed attempt to maintain an Indian Raj subject to the Empire. The UK would not be pushed too hard to decolonise elsewhere until Soviet and Turkish intentions became more widely known, especially in Iraq and the oil-rich Gulf states.
Having discontinued lend lease early in 1945, on 9 December 1945 the Dewey administration granted Britain a reconstruction loan of about US$2.2 billion. Britain had more, but general US reticence and the watering down of the special personal bond that had existed between Roosevelt and Churchill limited American appetite to bankroll the Allied leaders. Taft pressed hard for the loan to go through despite his non-interventionist instincts [in OTL he actually argued it should have been made a gift].
The signing of the Anglo-American Financial Agreement, Washington DC, 8 December 1945.
This sum would go only part of the way to fulfilling Attlee’s needs and would lead to a period not of hostility so much as ‘a slight chill’ in the otherwise good relations between the two countries, which Taft would work hard to improve again. But all through 1945, Britain under both Churchill and then Attlee had begun to exert its ‘best efforts’ to bring the US more firmly into the developing Western group – at this stage, it was too early to call it a Western Alliance. In line with their accommodation on this policy, the US would provide encouragement and support to the Allies but Dewey and Taft were unwilling to join any formal alliance arrangement.
---xxx---
Japan and Asia
A potentially key development for the US in the Pacific occurred on 7 April 1945 Baron Kantarō Suzuki became Prime Minister. Among Suzuki’s subsequent announcements was a plan to reach out to both the US, the UK and other Allied powers to seek closer diplomatic and trade ties.
By the following month, the resumption of diplomatic relations between Japan and the US would be formalised by the exchange of ambassadors. They would, after all, soon need to work side-by-side in the LNSC as P5 colleagues. But though acting on the direction of Emperor Hirohito in this matter, Suzuki would have problems in seeing this approach through with his erstwhile Imperialist faction colleagues who desired to continue the confrontation with the US and the West, with assassination attempts occurring in the next few months. This made the US very wary of Japanese overtures; Dewey’s administration continued the clandestine US support of Vietnamese rebels.
The US Embassy in Tokyo, reopened in May 1945.
However, Dewey and Taft looked on with alarm when the Chinese Communists resumed their insurgency against the Japanese on 10 August 1945. MacArthur was briefing them that ‘a Communist takeover in China would be a disaster for the United States and the world.’ Plans were soon being drawn up to consider a diplomatic understanding with and aid for Nationalist China as a ‘bulwark against Communism.’ MacArthur was despatched on an official visit to Chiang later that month.
MacArthur meets Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese capital of Chengdu, 27 August 1945.
Taft also advocated a possible further reconsideration of the hitherto hostile relationship with Japan, arguing that ‘Hirohito may better the lesser of three evils’ when compared to Stalin and Mao. If pursued, this policy could call US support for the Vietnamese insurgency into question, but for now the key issue was trade and the possible easing of the embargo that still persisted following the end of GW2.
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed on 2 September 1945 by Ho Chi Minh, who still had covert (but separate) support from the Soviets, the US and France. As mentioned previously, the Western support was one of the reasons Japan was so keen to change the direction of those relations through diplomatic engagement.
Emperor Hirohito personally appealed to his people to "win the confidence of the world" and "establish firmly a peaceful state" when he opened a new session of the Japanese Diet on 4 September 1945. This would be followed by the appointment of Baron Kijūrō Shidehara me Prime Minister of Japan on 9 October 1945. Shidehara, a pre–GW2 Japanese diplomat and politician, was a leading proponent of the ‘peace lobby’. He was appointed to head up the diplomatic outreach to the US and the West, largely because of his pro-American reputation. This began a period of thaw in relations with the US: quiet negotiations soon began, the first item being a proposed relaxation and then removal of US-imposed trade restrictions on Japan.
The Soviet-backed referendum to officially assert Mongolian independence under Soviet domination on 20 October 1945 was regarded with scepticism and a degree of alarm by Washington. It was seen as more evidence of expanding Communist influence in Asia.
---xxx---
The Soviet Union and Turkey
After pulling out of the Comintern early in Dewey’s administration had cooled relations with the USSR somewhat, it was hardly a surprise for either side and relations remained business-like and even cordial.
While on 10 August the newly reappointed British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin condemned Soviet policy in Eastern Europe as "one kind of totalitarianism replaced by another," the US messaging through Taft was less strident, intimating the US may regret what had transpired there, but it was beyond his nation’s direct sphere of interest and a matter for the Soviets to answer to.
But on 5 September, the Russian code clerk Igor Gouzenko came forward to the FBI with many documents implicating the Soviet Union in numerous spy rings in North America: both in the United States and in Canada.
Soviet defector Igor Gouzenko.
This led to a significant cooling of US-Soviet relations and increased domestic counter-espionage efforts from the FBI.
See, hear and speak no treason! Among other things, the US feared the Soviets were actively seeking details of their nuclear research program. Fears that were entirely justified.
In response to the increasing coolness in US-USSR relations, in early in November 1945 former Foreign Minister Maksim Litvinov was sent as ambassador to the United States, where the appointment was met with enthusiasm. [Unlike OTL, at this stage there is no east-west Cold War on the horizon, though relations will become more complicated difficult, especially in Asia.]
On the other hand, early signs of the development of democratic institutions in Turkey in late 1945 were warmly welcomed by the US. The already good close – even fraternal – relationship that had persisted with Milli Şef Inönü after GW2 would only be strengthened if this trend could be continued.
In February, US officials began talks with Turkey on the possibility of US financing and co-development of at least some of the newly emerging Saudi oilfields. The Turks were receptive: the US anticipated growing domestic demand for petroleum products in the post-war period, while the Turks need both the funding and technical assistance to build their production capacity. By the end of 1945, the old Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) had been reactivated, notionally a joint venture between the US and the semi-autonomous Arabian GNR. Exploration and drilling teams were soon operating under the general auspices of the US-UGNR Joint Investment Agreement.
Joint oil exploration between the US and UGNR had resumed by the end of 1945, as new development projects were being considered by ARAMCO.
And the boost to US-Turkish relations would also be very welcome and (due to the somewhat ambivalent US position in the wider democratic camp) not a sticking point with either the Soviets or the British. It followed on from the close wartime relationship between the two and was one the Turks were keen to retain and expand upon. Joint military exercises and training, concentrating on amphibious operations and continued support for Turkish naval development, were continued before year’s end.
Turkish marines land during combined US-Turkish amphibious exercises, November 1945.
The outgoing Roosevelt administration still held executive power for the two and a half months until 20 January 1945 but would of course refrain from making any major policy changes and consult on any major decisions that needed to be taken during the period.
This sounds rather unlike FDR, clearly his health must not be the best as I would sooner expect him to do a number of terribly unconstitutional actions and then leave his successor with the mess of arguing with the Supreme Court about them.
An opponent of anything that smacked of ‘appeasement in Asia’, especially to the Communists, he would prove a powerful influence on White House thinking in the coming years.
US OSS agents would continue to provide ammunition, logistic intelligence, equipment and training for the soldiers who would later become the backbone of the Vietnamese military which fought the Japanese occupiers.
This is less desirable, but expected. And likely to backfire on the US as Ho Chi Minh and his followers will not appreciate the inevitable pressure to be a "Western" democracy which certainly will be attached to such assistance.
Taft also advocated a possible further reconsideration of the hitherto hostile relationship with Japan, arguing that ‘Hirohito may better the lesser of three evils’ when compared to Stalin and Mao.
While we of course would never call His Imperial Majesty "evil", we do agree that Japanese ascent is far preferable to that of the Communist dogs and look forward to warming of relations with this quite estimable Taft gentleman.
The Soviet-backed referendum to officially assert Mongolian independence under Soviet domination on 20 October 1945 was regarded with scepticism and a degree of alarm by Washington. It was seen as more evidence of expanding Communist influence in Asia.
Interesting. I didn't think trying to hold Mongolia was a good plan for Japan, but if it helps to galvanize positive relations with the USA and perhaps help some in their diplomatic establishment forget that they used to own the Philippines or about that slight scuffle with Japan way back when, it may be a net gain even if a withdrawal is eventually forced.
[Unlike OTL, at this stage there is no east-west Cold War on the horizon, though relations will become more complicated difficult, especially in Asia.]
This is less desirable, but expected. And likely to backfire on the US as Ho Chi Minh and his followers will not appreciate the inevitable pressure to be a "Western" democracy which certainly will be attached to such assistance.
Interesting. I didn't think trying to hold Mongolia was a good plan for Japan, but if it helps to galvanize positive relations with the USA and perhaps help some in their diplomatic establishment forget that they used to own the Philippines or about that slight scuffle with Japan way back when, it may be a net gain even if a withdrawal is eventually forced.
@nuclearslurpee: well, the US does have a long and infamous habit of supporting nationalist strong men and oh dear, that's exactly what Uncle Ho was until he came under the sway of the Soviets...
On one hand, American revulsion towards socialism and communism goes back way before the GW2, at least as far back as the late Gilded Age, the beginnings of U.S. organized labor, WIlliam Jennings Bryan, etc. On the other hand, the Comintern in TTL is not really a Communist alliance if it has Turkey in it, so the propaganda would be relatively muted. Even in OTL, Stalin shifted away from Communist themes and relied on nationalistic themes during the GPW.
All in all not really something that 3ish years of propaganda and public relations, largely aimed towards maintaining a military alliance more than promoting economic change, would do much to move the needle on.
Dewey’s party had narrowly failed to gain a majority in the Representatives and they had narrowed, but not overturned, the large Democratic Party majority in the Senate. This meant Dewey did not have a strong mandate and faced a hostile Congress. He would have to tread a careful path to achieve many of his policy objectives.
Aside from the awkward arithmetic, Dewey has the difficulty of reaching an accord with the isolationist wing of his own party. Not an enviable position, really.
Following on from a key plank of his election platform, he announced that the United States' ‘nominal’ membership of the Comintern had ‘served its purpose during the war but its time had now passed.’ The US would be withdrawing from that factional membership as a matter of priority, though he intended to ‘maintain productive and cordial relations with all our wartime partners’.
Dewey, for reasons of factional pressure and to maintain his shaky grip on power, had felt obliged to disarm Taft’s potential troublemaking in the Senate by drafting him into probably the most crucial cabinet position at that time.
Dewey’s main concern was about a possible weakening of British resolve as the leader of the Allies. Taft too was keen to encourage continued British leadership in that strategic area – largely so the US could continue to resist calls to do so itself.
Interesting. If the Americans are reluctant to assume leadership of the Allied powers, the logical consequence is that they should be actively supportive of the British so as to avoid the need to step up themselves.
Taft also advocated a possible further reconsideration of the hitherto hostile relationship with Japan, arguing that ‘Hirohito may better the lesser of three evils’ when compared to Stalin and Mao.
Shidehara, a pre–GW2 Japanese diplomat and politician, was a leading proponent of the ‘peace lobby’. He was appointed to head up the diplomatic outreach to the US and the West, largely because of his pro-American reputation.
@SSmith you'd think that the Americans would prop up their preferred leader of the Free World, but history (to date, TTL) has demonstrated otherwise...
Since France is now going another path, USA is the big power that Inonu feels the most connection with, and hopes to keep the relations as good as it can be.
Since France is now going another path, USA is the big power that Inonu feels the most connection with, and hopes to keep the relations as good as it can be.
It's looking like we might actually see a strange 50s and 60s where the US and SU have a post war consensus in most things and areas. If they're even co-operating on oil by joining the same international council alongside Turkey, that implies a lot of actually quite warm relations in Washington and Moscow.
The only place it might fall apart is in South East Asia (once Japan is booted out of it, as seems highly likely), and in regards to nukes...although no one reallyknows or is talking about them yet. The big blow there is going to be when the US realises how compromised their scientific and defence studies of The Bomb are.
Next chapter written, where we go into more global mode. The first six months of 1946 will be tackled in two parts: East Asia first (where much of the political and military excitement is in this post-war world), the second will cover the rest of the world (including India and Indonesia), LN and global events and the 'bonus' next six months of the continued AI GW2 to see what happens in Japan.
Also, as others have urged, if you haven't already please consider voting in the ACAs and YAYAs (see sticky posts on the genre AAR threads). Both those running them and all authors you may feel like voting for will really appreciate it.
This sounds rather unlike FDR, clearly his health must not be the best as I would sooner expect him to do a number of terribly unconstitutional actions and then leave his successor with the mess of arguing with the Supreme Court about them.
Not something he had to do in OTL: yes his more chastened aspect and failing health have him behaving graciously enough here. And given the narrow mandate, hostile Congress and international situation Dewey has been left with, he may have thought he didn't need to do anything more to make his successor miserable!
There will be conflicting forces at work here. To be isolationist-lite (but not outright appeasers), the US will still have to exert influence and try to shape their security situation and deterring (or suborning) potential foes and making and supporting friends while avoiding formal entanglements. There will be lots of tricky diplomacy and plausible deniability in the next few years.
This is less desirable, but expected. And likely to backfire on the US as Ho Chi Minh and his followers will not appreciate the inevitable pressure to be a "Western" democracy which certainly will be attached to such assistance.
Indeed. This will drag on for a while and will almost certainly prove untidy, one way or another. The next chapter will tell the first part of the next phase of that story.
While we of course would never call His Imperial Majesty "evil", we do agree that Japanese ascent is far preferable to that of the Communist dogs and look forward to warming of relations with this quite estimable Taft gentleman.
The Taft-Dewey dance and its implications for US engagement will be an at times convoluted one. Not to mention the influences of domestic opinion and Congressional hurdles.
Interesting. I didn't think trying to hold Mongolia was a good plan for Japan, but if it helps to galvanize positive relations with the USA and perhaps help some in their diplomatic establishment forget that they used to own the Philippines or about that slight scuffle with Japan way back when, it may be a net gain even if a withdrawal is eventually forced.
Mongolia has become a lightning rod for the Cool War between Japan and various Communist antagonists. Part symbolic, part not wanting to concede territory that ones enemies would only use to further undermine your position in China.
It's part of Japan's attempt to re-align given the new strategic environment and the entree their membership of the P5 provides. The US was never that keen on Communism even in TTL and the new Republican administration certainly isn't. The US probably feels both disappointed in their own participation in the war, that their massive LL program was taken for granted and provided them no great reward, other than the defeat of Germany and Italy, and dudded by the Soviets and the Comintern during the peace talks in Geneva. Why would they not be cautiosly exploring new avenues to get what they want (if they can fork out what that might be, which they haven't really yet)?
@nuclearslurpee: well, the US does have a long and infamous habit of supporting nationalist strong men and oh dear, that's exactly what Uncle Ho was until he came under the sway of the Soviets...
On one hand, American revulsion towards socialism and communism goes back way before the GW2, at least as far back as the late Gilded Age, the beginnings of U.S. organized labor, WIlliam Jennings Bryan, etc. On the other hand, the Comintern in TTL is not really a Communist alliance if it has Turkey in it, so the propaganda would be relatively muted. Even in OTL, Stalin shifted away from Communist themes and relied on nationalistic themes during the GPW.
All in all not really something that 3ish years of propaganda and public relations, largely aimed towards maintaining a military alliance more than promoting economic change, would do much to move the needle on.
Aside from the awkward arithmetic, Dewey has the difficulty of reaching an accord with the isolationist wing of his own party. Not an enviable position, really.
Interesting. If the Americans are reluctant to assume leadership of the Allied powers, the logical consequence is that they should be actively supportive of the British so as to avoid the need to step up themselves.
This is the current policy, even if the strategy behind it is perhaps rather unformed and/or confused. They need to sort that out in the next little while. At this point they're tending to be tactical and reactive, a product of the times and Dewey's badly compromised political situation.
@SSmith you'd think that the Americans would prop up their preferred leader of the Free World, but history (to date, TTL) has demonstrated otherwise...
Since France is now going another path, USA is the big power that Inonu feels the most connection with, and hopes to keep the relations as good as it can be.
Turkey is in one of those international situations that could see both threat and opportunity, depending on how good they are at maintaining the balance while keeping their own sphere (Italy, the European members of the Bucharest Pact, and North Africa-Middle East-Iran) in some kind of order.
I went with ARAMCO for historical reasons and because it presents a veneer of autonomy for the Arabian GNR. But the string are still firmly in the hands of the puppet-masters in Ankara!
It's looking like we might actually see a strange 50s and 60s where the US and SU have a post war consensus in most things and areas. If they're even co-operating on oil by joining the same international council alongside Turkey, that implies a lot of actually quite warm relations in Washington and Moscow.
The only place it might fall apart is in South East Asia (once Japan is booted out of it, as seems highly likely), and in regards to nukes...although no one reallyknows or is talking about them yet. The big blow there is going to be when the US realises how compromised their scientific and defence studies of The Bomb are.
Not sure it means great warmth, but it does at least sound far less confrontational and more businesslike that OTL, for sure. But it may also depend on what the Soviets get up to in Germany, Poland and Asia ...
,,, and SEA, yes. And wider developments on the atomic front (based on continued in-game research and the global developments of the narrative post-war security architecture).
This chapter covers developments across East Asia during the first half of 1946. First, a reminder of the Geneva Peace Treaty settlement as it applied to East Asia, as at November 1944. There will be a heavy focus on China (now slowly awakening from its long slumber during GW2) and Japan (domestic political developments and events within its Co-Prosperity Sphere)
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China
As the GW2 armistice was enacted in October 1944, Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT Government continued to rule the Republic of China with an iron grip, with the social conservatives of the Protect the Emperor Society their main opposition (though with no elections or legislature to be represented in). All the other parties had varying degrees of sympathy among the rest of the populace.
Having remained neutral throughout the war, China’s diplomatic relations were cordial to friendly with the key major powers they had most cause to engage with and the other Chinese states that existed at the time. They maintained warm relations with the Soviets (cemented in 1945 by their treaty with the USSR and ceding of any claims on Outer Mongolia) and the US in particular. Relations with the Allies (via the UK) were cordial and those with Japan somewhat cool but businesslike, having mellowed a little in the years since 1937. Though the continued occupation of eastern China and Manchuria provided an underlay of hostility and unrequited desires for full re-unification.
Of their Chinese neighbours, there was a very close relationship with the Ma Clique and good ties with the Yunnan (which granted the RoC military access) and Guangxi cliques, all of whom remained somewhat affiliated though autonomous from with the central KMT government. Peaceful working relations had been maintained with Mao’s Communist China, Soviet-supported Sinkiang and the independent and Allied-leaning Tibetans.
This state of affairs had largely remained at status quo through 1945, while Chiang calculated the new post-war balance of power and interests. As the Chinese Communists under Mao continued their guerrilla campaign against Japan in the provinces bordering the west of Shanxi and in Manchuria, on 14 April Chiang and Mao met to reaffirm their non-aggression pact.
Chiang and Mao meet to renew their non-aggression pact, 14 April 1946.
Chiang, bolstered by nine years of peace and reconstruction since 1937 and his recent treaty with the Soviets, then sought US backing to further modernise the economy and his military forces. Secretly, he also sought US political backing to begin a campaign to formally re-unify those parts of the old Republic of China that were not under Japanese jurisdiction. He received US backing for both these requests, while the US cultivated them as a useful proxy in the dynamic Asian theatre of luke-warm war.
The first phase of Chiang Kai-shek’s political campaign to begin consolidating the Republic of China saw the ‘New’ Guangxi Clique and its army formally merged back into the Republic of China on 26 April. Li Zongren was a prominent KMT general and led the Guangxi Clique but had a fractious relationship with Chiang. He now accepted the post of Deputy President of the Republic of China as his price for the reintegration of the semi-autonomous province.
Li Zongren (b. 13 August 1890), estranged KMT general, and leader of the Guangxi Clique and now Vice President of the RoC.
Next to be reincorporated fully into the RoC was Yunnan. Its governor and warlord Long Yun (b. 27 November 1884) was overthrown in a coup in June [October 1945 in OTL], known as "The Kunming Incident", under the orders of Chiang Kai-shek, taking cynical and ruthless advantage of Nationalist’s military access.
The Ma Clique, or Xibei San Ma, had remained an autonomous pro-KMT regime throughout the ‘long peace’ following the 1937 armistice with Japan. Chiang now had momentum and resources; the Ma were induced to re-join the increasingly powerful RoC in late June. They did not wish to suffer the same fate as Long Yun or to face the increasingly powerful Chiang in any internal conflict. All the Ma leaders were confirmed in official posts within the expanding RoC.
Outside Mao’s independent Communist state, Japanese occupied China this left just Sinkiang (Xinjiang) with its Soviet-supported but anti-Mao government and the fiercely independent Tibet out side the RoC The activities of Mao and the guerrilla war against Japan will be dealt with under the Japan section.
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Japan
On 24 January, Baron Kijūrō Shidehara, the Prime Minister of Japan, held a secret meeting in Manila with US Pacific Army Commander General Douglas MacArthur. He suggested that the Emperor was willing to introduce a new constitution for Japan that would include democratic elections as part of the Japanese outreach to the West. Hirohito would remain Head of State though with reduced executive powers and the military command would retain significant power and autonomy in return for acquiescing to this plan. Japan also wanted the US to cease their clandestine support for the Viet Minh and suggested an anti-communist coalition could be formed to counteract Communist expansion in Asia.
In return, MacArthur passed on US conditions that included a plan for eventual self-determination in the Philippines and restriction on Japan’s Imperial Navy expansion in return for a long-term non-aggression pact between the two principal Pacific powers. This was accompanied by a further suggestion that Japan should first negotiate a working agreement of non-aggression with the Republic of China and the consideration of talks with Chiang to return those parts of China occupied in 1937. Manchukuo and Mengkukuo were not included in that ambit.
The next day, MacArthur recommended in a telegram, to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, that Japan's offer should be seriously considered. Depending on the level of further concessions Japan was willing to make, progressive easing of economic sanctions against Japan might be productive, while US support for the Vietnamese rebels could be offered up as an early ‘confidence building measure’.
These recommendations were passed on to the Dewey administration for further consideration. Dewey and his Secretary of State Taft were inclined to first see what came of the proposed political reforms in Japan before proceeding more substantively with further bilateral negotiations. The economic embargoes and modest clandestine support for the Viet Minh would continue in the interim.
Good to their word, the new Japanese constitution was approved by the Emperor and implemented by Shidehara in late February. In Japan's first multi-party election since 1932, on 10 April 1946 women were allowed to vote for the first time as 2,770 candidates vied for 468 seats in the House of Representatives (Diet) of Japan.
In the months following the war, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association caucus broke up and three major political parties emerged in the Diet, loosely based around the major parties that stood in the 1937 election prior to the war. The Liberal Party was mainly composed of former Rikken Seiyūkai members, while the Progressive Party was mainly composed of former Rikken Minseitō members and the Socialist Party was mainly composed of former Shakai Taishūtō members.
Japan’s major political parties and their outcomes in the April 1946 general election.
Detailed election results.
Following the election, there was a brief attempt to keep the Shidehara cabinet alive by having Shidehara join the Progressive Party, which the other major parties opposed. The Liberals and Progressives agreed to form a government under Liberal leader Ichiro Hatoyama on 2 May, but Hatoyama was promptly purged on 4 May and a new government formed under Foreign Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who officially became Prime Minister on 22 May.
Hatoyama was not allowed by the Allied occupation authorities to serve, as Prime Minister, because of prior service in the enemy government. [That would be no impediment if he wins in the ATL election!]
Shidehara was a political independent, Prime Minister purely by appointment from the Emperor. At the election, the still-dominant ‘Control Clique’ (Tōseiha or Control Faction) would rename itself as the Conservative Party and be led by the former war time [in-game he was also the Control Clique PM as GW2 ended] prime minister Okada Keisuke. The original Tōseiha was based around a grouping of moderate officers united primarily by their opposition to the radical Kōdōha (Imperial Way) faction and its aggressive imperialist and anti-modernisation ideals.
Admiral Okada Keisuke (b. 20 January 1868), former Prime Minister of Japan in 1934-36 and again during GW2 and now leader of the newly remodelled Conservative Party.
In the mid-30s, Okada was considered one of the more democratic and moderate voices against the increasing strength of the militarists. He was therefore a major target for extremist forces pushing for a more totalitarian Japan. He narrowly escaped assassination in the February 26 Incident of 1936, largely by the rebels misidentifying his personal secretary as him. Okada emerged from hiding on 29 February 1936 but left office a few days later.
Okada had been adamant in his opposition to the war with the United States and during Great War II, formed a group of like-minded politicians and military officers seeking an early end to the hostilities after returning to the Prime Ministership. For this reason, he was an excellent candidate to lead a process of rapprochement with the West in general and the US in particular. [In OTL, after the defeat of Japanese forces at the Battle of Midway and Battle of Guadalcanal, Okada pushed for negotiations with the Allies, and played a leading role in the overthrow of the Hideki Tōjō cabinet in 1944.]
The [HOI3] Seiyuki and Rikken Seiyukai would merge to form the centre-right Liberal Party, led by Ichirō Hatoyama. Hatoyama was a former member of the conservative Seiyūkai and many of his new Liberal members came from that party. Hatoyama was a Master Mason and a Protestant Christian (Baptist). While anti-militarist and labelled "liberal" by its own members, the post-war Liberal Party it was generally conservative by modern definitions. It often opposed social reforms and it supported bureaucratic control and militarism for the purpose of winning votes.
Ichirō Hatoyama (b. 1 January 1883), leader of the new Liberal Party.
The former Minsei Party now styled itself the socially and economically liberal Progressive Party, led by the venerable Machida Chūji, an entrepreneur, politician, and pre-war cabinet minister.
Machida Chūji (b. 17 May 1863) would lead the Progressives to the 1946 election at the age of almost 83.
Tetsu Katayama was a Christian pacifist and socialist who became secretary-general of the Social Democratic Party when it was established in 1926. After Great War II, Katayama served as secretary-general of the Japan Socialist Party when it was established in November 1945. Then in March 1946 he became the chairman of the party's executive committee and led them to the 1946 election.
Tetsu Katayama (b. 28 July 1887), leader of the Japan Socialist Party at the 1946 election.
One of the two smaller parties on the far left was the Radical Party [invented for TTL and taking the not-really-analogous Cooperative Party’s votes from OTL].
Inejiro Asanuma (b. 27 December 1898), the firebrand leader of the newly formed Radical Party at the 1946 election.
After being elected to the Diet in 1936, Asanuma had pivoted from earlier anti-imperialist views to become a vocal supporter of Japan's "holy war" in East Asia as part of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, claiming that it was necessary to "liberate" Asia from the forces of western imperialism. But he fell out with the IRAA during GW2, only to re-emerge afterwards as a forceful advocate of socialism in post-war Japan. He was noted for his support of Mao’s communists and advocated negotiations with them to end the insurgency, making him a very polarising figure and hated by the far-right.
As a politician, Asanuma cultivated an "everyman" image. He lived modestly in public housing his entire life, and was particularly popular among ordinary laborers, small shopkeepers, and other members of the working class. He proved a very effective advocate during the 1946 election campaign, drawing support especially from the increasingly isolated Communists. Though a political chameleon, Asanuma was consistent in his antipathy to Western imperialism and a desire for Asia to chart its own course in world affairs. [In OTL Asanuma was one of the founders of the Japan Socialist Party, and would eventually rise to become its secretary-general, but here I’ve hived him off to take over the more strident Radicals, given his views on China and populist approach].
Furthest to the left was the recently legalised Japanese Communist Party [Leninist rather than Stalinist in-game]. Their leader Kyuichi Tokuda had a suitably persecuted past but he would have trouble connecting effectively with the limited hard-left base present in the post-war Japan of 1946.
Kyuichi Tokuda (b. 12 September 1894) released from twelve years in prison during the post-war political thaw of 1945. Chairman of the Japanese Communist Party and their leader at the 1946 election.
There was also a significant number of independent candidates who were polling quite well (around 10%) by the time the election campaign began in earnest in March 1946.
As the campaign began in March 1946, the standings of the parties had evened up considerably, with the governing Conservative (formerly Control) Party still the largest grouping, well short of a majority of votes with around 37.4% [here they were allocated the 11.7% 'other party' votes from the OTL election result].
Next came the Liberals, then well back the Progressives and Socialists, followed by the smaller left-wing Radicals and Communists and Independents holding at around 10% of the vote. If as appeared likely a coalition would be needed to form government, it was likely the Progressives and Socialist and those to their left would form a loose confederation (currently polling at a combined 31.3%). In the middle would be the Liberals (20.7%) as potential king-makers and the Independents, who could go in any direction as individuals.
The 1946 Japanese election campaign: for the first time in 14 years, the Japanese electorate was ‘spoiled for choice’, but in the end a number of the contenders would be devastated at the polls.
The new Japanese Diet [unlike in OTL, for simplicity’s sake] would be elected by proportional representation. Swings [by trusty % dice] would be applied in total to the notional starting percentages of each party [as with the French election], so national results could vary wildly.
Polling day in Japan, 10 April 1946. A turnout of around 70% was a little lower than expected.
In the event, both the Progressives and the Communists were almost completely wiped out at the polls, with neither winning any seats [both got 00 rolls – extraordinary]. The tiny fascistic Imperial Rule party was also reduced to complete irrelevancy. The Conservatives did well, the Liberals even better, while the Radicals seemed to absorb most of the Communist vote. The Socialist and Independent support was steady in a decreased overall total vote where the turnout was well below that expected.
The Conservatives held the largest single bloc of 198 seats, but this was still 37 short of an absolute majority. The Liberals had the choice of joining a ‘unity’ coalition with the Conservatives (probably a more natural political fit) as the junior partner which would garner a very comfortable parliamentary majority. Or they could attempt to negotiate a fractious minority government as senior partner with the remaining leftists (Socialists and Radicals), which could garner a total of 220 votes between them. This coaltion would then have to rely on getting enough independents (15 out of the 51) to regularly support them in the Diet for the nomination of a Prime Minister and other key votes.
Under discreet pressure from outgoing Prime Minister Shidehara, acting under advice from the Emperor himself, Hatoyama was persuaded that old Okada and the Conservatives would be able to bring the military along with him, with Hatoyama becoming Deputy Prime Minister and the Liberals given the Foreign and Finance ministries. The Conservatives would take the Defence and Security portfolios, the rest split proportionally between the two parties. Hirohito and Okada hoped this would be enough to allow continued rapprochement with the US and the Allies and careful political and economic reform in Japan, while maintaining military support and required support for the counter-insurgency wars in China and Vietnam.
Meanwhile, even as arrangements were being put in place for Japan to develop a share of the emerging exploration and exploitation opportunities in the UGNR’s Arabian oil fields they began imports from ample Turkish stockpiles in the first half of 1946.
By mid-1946 Japanese oil tankers were plying a steady trade via the Persian Gulf with the UGNR, which was not a party to the Western economic and trade sanctions on Japan.
The new (slightly) more moderate Japanese Government commenced more serious negotiations with the US on the range of issues broached informally through MacArthur earlier in the year in May. This culminated in outgoing Prime Minister Shidehara being sent as a special envoy to begin negotiations with senior US State and Presidential advisers in early June 1946 in Hawaii. The hope was that cabinet-level official talks may come about later in the year – if and when it became clear there was something more substantial to announce jointly.
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Mongolia
The Line of Demarcation in Mongolia continued to harden, with neither side willing to give up ground that may have to be fought over later. Japan began arrangements to formally integrate southern Mongolia into its existing inner Mongolian puppet state of Mengkukuo.
The division of Mongolia as at 30 June 1946.
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Communist Insurgency in Occupied China
In early 1946, Mao’s independent Communist state remained formally neutral, though they were heavily supporting a supposedly 'home grown' communist insurgency in occupied China and eastern Manchuria. Mao was also relying on words of support from the Soviets to deter a direct Japanese invasion of his state. And Japan, trying to court the West and live up to its place as a P5 LNSC member, was under pressure to tread carefully.
Communist insurgents ambush Japanese troops in Hebei province, May 1946.
Up to the end of June 1946, some at times heavy engagements were being fought in the occupied areas of Hebei and Henan provinces nearest to Shanxi and also across Manchuria, in its south-west but also at places near the Soviet border, raising (justified) suspicions of informal clandestine Soviet support of insurgent groups with small arms, ammunition and basic supplies.
Map showing major insurgency engagements in occupied China and Manchuria, January-June 1946.
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Korea
Korea's Communist Party leader Kim Il Sung was saved from a Kempeitai assassination on 1 March by an alert Soviet officer during a rally. As yet, the Soviet-backed infiltration of northern Korea through Kim had yet to develop to the level of a full armed insurgency, but tension was building. Most Japanese attention remained focused on the anti-Communist campaign in occupied China and eastern Manchuria.
Kim and Soviet ‘Advisor’ General Profoky Romanenko in Pyongyang, in April 1946. Possibly giving thanks for his Soviet protection and support in recent months.
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Vietnam
In an attempt to demonstrate its legitimacy and under pressure from Japan, their puppet government in Vietnam conducted the first democratic elections there on 6 January. This backfired, with the Viet Minh Party, led by Ho Chi Minh, winning 230 of the 300 seats in the National Assembly. The current government refused to allow the assembly to sit, making (partly accurate) accusations of intimidation by Viet Minh cadres at many provincial polling sites.
Members of Hanoi’s Thanh Tri agricultural cooperative cast their votes to elect deputies to the 3rd National Assembly, 6 January 1946.
On 26 January, Japanese troops clashed with Vietnamese rebels at Phong Thổ District in the first pitched battle between the two sides. The Viet Quoc Armed Force unit under Deo Van Bao surrendered after a two-day battle.
The military forces of Japan made a large-scale assault to recapture the Bến Tre Province on 7 February, which had been under control of the Viet Minh since August 1945. The province was quickly brought back under Japanese-backed Vietnamese rule, but guerrilla activity continued.
An Imperial Japanese Army troop column advances in Bến Tre Province, 7 February 1946.
During early 1946, clandestine US support under the OSS (soon to be transitioned into the CIA) continued to be provided to the Viet Minh.
OSS team members train Viet Minh soldiers on the M1 carbine, February 1946. The small-scale support would continue in the lead-up to proposed US-Japan talks later in 1946.
Then on 28 February Ho Chi Minh, now the de facto but in hiding elected President of Vietnam, sent a telegram to US President Thomas Dewey. He asked the United States to use its influence to persuade Japan not to withdraw its forces from Vietnam and to "interfere urgently in support of our independence".
Members of the OSS team and Viet Minh at a training camp, early 1946. Allison Thomas stands in the centre and is flanked on the right as viewed by Vo Nguyen Giap and on the left by Ho Chi Minh.
Dewey's reply was that the U.S. would not support Japan and would leave the OSS trainers in place. But (given the Administration's quasi-isolationist leanings and knowing that talks with Japan were in prospect) nor would he promise to intercede strongly on Ho’s behalf in public. Ho then sought assistance from both France and the Soviet Union as well, seeking to hedge his bets in case the US abandoned him.
On 6 March Viet Minh forces in northern Vietnam agreed to allow troops from the Vietnamese puppet government to return to its cities in return for recognition of North Vietnam as "a free country within the framework of the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere". General Võ Nguyên Giáp later wrote that the intent was for the peaceful withdrawal of Japanese military occupation, but that a new war began when Japanese forces continued their occupation.
As the Chinese Communists under Mao continued their guerrilla campaign against Japan in the provinces bordering the west of Shanxi and in Manchuria, on 14 April Chiang and Mao met to reaffirm their non-aggression pact.
This does make a lot of sense given substantial parts of China are controlled by the Japanese in TTL. Another alliance of convenience. The enemy of my enemy is my friend... for now.
Chiang, bolstered by nine years of peace and reconstruction since 1937 and his recent treaty with the Soviets, then sought US backing to further modernise the economy and his military forces. Secretly, he also sought US political backing to begin a campaign to formally re-unify those parts of the old Republic of China that were not under Japanese jurisdiction. He received US backing for both these requests, while the US cultivated them as a useful proxy in the dynamic Asian theatre of luke-warm war.
Yes, that does change things, doesn't it? Chiang and China have enjoyed many years of peace while the world was on fire all around them. The annexation of the Guangxi, Yunnan and Ma cliques is a job well done.
It's good to see this fascinating multi-polar world continue to evolve. Hopefully we end up with some form of post-war settlement that is reasonably stable and we don't end up on a trajectory towards a new world war!
Good to their word, the new Japanese constitution was approved by the Emperor and implemented by Shidehara in late February. In Japan's first multi-party election since 1932, on 10 April 1946 women were allowed to vote for the first time as 2,770 candidates vied for 464 seats in the House of Representatives (Diet) of Japan.
Under discreet pressure from outgoing Prime Minister Shidehara, acting under advice from the Emperor himself, Hatoyama was persuaded that old Okada and the Conservatives would be able to bring the military along with him, with Hatoyama becoming Deputy Prime Minister and the Liberals given the Foreign and Finance ministries. The Conservatives would take the Defence and Security portfolios, the rest split proportionally between the two parties. Hirohito and Okada hoped this would be enough to allow continued rapprochement with the US and the Allies and careful political and economic reform in Japan, while maintaining military support and required support for the counter-insurgency wars in China and Vietnam.
This seems to achieve three important objectives. It creates a solid, well-founded government with a clear majority, it keeps the powerful military on-side, and it provides for the on-going realignment towards the West.
In an attempt to demonstrate its legitimacy and under pressure from Japan, their puppet government in Vietnam conducted the first democratic elections there on 6 January. This backfired, with the Viet Minh Party, led by Ho Chi Minh, winning 230 of the 300 seats in the National Assembly. The current government refused to allow the assembly to sit, making (partly accurate) accusations of intimidation by Viet Minh cadres at many provincial polling sites.
That was unfortunate! Ho Chi Minh's new democratic legitimacy might make it a little more awkward for Dewey to throw him under the bus. However, from a pragmatic point of view, relations with Japan are more important.
The military forces of Japan made a large-scale assault to recapture the Bến Tre Province on 7 February, which had been under control of the Viet Minh since August 1945. The province was quickly brought back under Japanese-backed Vietnamese rule, but guerrilla activity continued.
The US isolationist government are playing a dangerous game by appeasing Japan just so they cab ignore Asia and the Pacific.
South Vietnam is now definitely going to fall under the Comintern influence, and since Japan is not going to be able to hold the north, that's the whole country gone eventually.
And China being sold under for Japan (don't care what the game says, relationship between the various Chinese governments and Japan are never, ever going to be 'warming' with Hirohito and Co still in China) is really dumb, and quite nasty to boot. Japan can't long term win that one either, and in the meanwhile the Soviets can work on turning as many of the opposition communist and socialist.
From the looks of things, unless Japan has nukes or something, we're looking at them losing the entire continental empire and system they have within two decades, and now the only people supporting the fight against them are Russian and French.
The US made an okay ish short term decision but have compeltly effed up their long term hopes and projections into Asia.
Relations with the Allies (via the UK) were cordial and those with Japan somewhat cool but businesslike, having mellowed a little in the years since 1937.
This will come as a surprise to many who don't know what they're talking about are unfamiliar with the surprisingly complex Japan-China relations prior to the Second Sino-Japanese War (OTL) and subsequent Communist takeover, but "businesslike" is an apt description for the normal state of affairs. Prior to 1937, Japan was occupying Manchuria and aggressing into Inner Mongolia while simultaneously designing and building cruisers for the ROC Navy.
It's not too different a story from the Centry of Humiliation and European colonial era, really. China is just too big, fractured, and heterogeneous to maintain a united stand against outsiders (prior to 1949, OTL), there will always be many willing to collaborate for business purposes or worse if they stand to gain from it.
Outside Mao’s independent Communist state, Japanese occupied China this left just Sinkiang (Xinjiang) with its Soviet-supported but anti-Mao government and the fiercely independent Tibet out side the RoC The activities of Mao and the guerrilla war against Japan will be dealt with under the Japan section.
The Conservatives held the largest single bloc of 198 seats, but this was still 37 short of an absolute majority. The Liberals had the choice of joining a ‘unity’ coalition with the Conservatives (probably a more natural political fit) as the junior partner which would garner a very comfortable parliamentary majority. Or they could attempt to negotiate a fractious minority government as senior partner with the remaining leftists (Socialists and Radicals), which could garner a total of 220 votes between them. This coaltion would then have to rely on getting enough independents (15 out of the 51) to regularly support them in the Diet for the nomination of a Prime Minister and other key votes.
Nothing too dramatic here, I'd say. With a parliamentary system you'll usually always have these coalition governments but it looks like there is not going to be a sharp cultural shift anytime soon in Japan. Domestic stability, contrary to Soviet opinion, remains excellent.
The new (slightly) more moderate Japanese Government commenced more serious negotiations with the US on the range of issues broached informally through MacArthur earlier in the year in May. This culminated in outgoing Prime Minister Shidehara being sent as a special envoy to begin negotiations with senior US State and Presidential advisers in early June 1946 in Hawaii. The hope was that cabinet-level official talks may come about later in the year – if and when it became clear there was something more substantial to announce jointly.
I suspect the actual hardest sticking point will be the proposed naval restrictions, even if in practice Japan cannot hope to match the USN they will not want to be told again that they are not allowed to try. The lesson which should be learned from the Washington/London treaties is to just leave well enough alone and aim for cooperation rather than repression.
It would be funny to see the CIA support the communists and then immediately turn around and depose them for some right-wing authoritarian if it wasn't so depressingly true in OTL.
A very quick message of sympathy, friendship and best wishes to any of my dear readAARs directly or indirectly affected by today’s earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria. I sincerely hope you, your families and friends are safe and well.
A very quick message of sympathy, friendship and best wishes to any of my dear readAARs directly or indirectly affected by today’s earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria. I sincerely hope you, your families and friends are safe and well.
