We have updated our Community Code of Conduct. Please read through the new rules for the forum that are an integral part of Paradox Interactive’s User Agreement.
You are using an out of date browser. It may not display this or other websites correctly. You should upgrade or use an alternative browser.
Hah, that was off the phone - don’t know if it was the spell check failing to correct or turning it into something wrong! Whatever, it does sound amusing . I still can’t imagine who or what Sude might be or why it would be dark! But, like a dark alley (or ally) it sounds like it should be avoided.
I believe my role in this alternate timeline qualifies me to speak to the military situation with some expertise:
I believe that the Cabinet must view the situation along the Yeniceri and Debrecen lines in both near and long terms, with an eye towards fearing the worst in France. To this end, I would propose that a short-term strategy of reinforcement be pursued along the Yeniceri Line, with an eye towards the long-term goal of eliminating Hungary from the Axis roster.
The key to all of this will be the situation in France, where the German army faces two dangerous foes - Father Time and Mother Nature. The longer the war in France drags on, the more attrition will wear on the German forces, and the closer it gets to a cold and bitter winter which will slow their advance. If the French can hold Paris until the end of September, I believe that they will be able to mount an effective defense through the winter as the muck and mire slow the German Blitzkrieg to a crawl - which is already quite slow!
Thus, so long as France holds, the priority of the glorious Turkish Union should be the national defense. In this respect, I propose a military-industrial policy that will result in the raising and equipping of sufficient infantry divisions to hold the Yeniceri Line with two divisions apiece in each province along the line. Besides shoring up the defenses, this will also allow the corps commanders along the line to launch flanking attacks against enemy incursions to relieve pressure on whatever point the Axis may choose to attack, while retaining the second division in reserve to preserve the well-dug defensive posture should the Axis change their tactics. In addition, I would propose that a mobile corps be created from the 1st Cavalry and to-be-raised motorized divisions, to act as a mobile reserve until the line can be completely reinforced.
Through the winter, then, a corps or even an army can be formed and trained consisting of both mobile exploitation forces as well as additional line infantry, with the aim of launching an aggressive strike deep into Hungary in the early days of springtime, perhaps at the very end of March, 1941. It would be inadvisable to attack before this, I believe, due to the detrimental effects of the winter weather on a military offensive in the Hungarian terrain. By this time, attrition in France will have worn down the Axis forces, even if France has finally fallen, and the commission of a fresh corps to the front in Hungary will surely break the back of the Axis coalition!
I believe my role in this alternate timeline qualifies me to speak to the military situation with some expertise:
I believe that the Cabinet must view the situation along the Yeniceri and Debrecen lines in both near and long terms, with an eye towards fearing the worst in France. To this end, I would propose that a short-term strategy of reinforcement be pursued along the Yeniceri Line, with an eye towards the long-term goal of eliminating Hungary from the Axis roster.
The key to all of this will be the situation in France, where the German army faces two dangerous foes - Father Time and Mother Nature. The longer the war in France drags on, the more attrition will wear on the German forces, and the closer it gets to a cold and bitter winter which will slow their advance. If the French can hold Paris until the end of September, I believe that they will be able to mount an effective defense through the winter as the muck and mire slow the German Blitzkrieg to a crawl - which is already quite slow!
Thus, so long as France holds, the priority of the glorious Turkish Union should be the national defense. In this respect, I propose a military-industrial policy that will result in the raising and equipping of sufficient infantry divisions to hold the Yeniceri Line with two divisions apiece in each province along the line. Besides shoring up the defenses, this will also allow the corps commanders along the line to launch flanking attacks against enemy incursions to relieve pressure on whatever point the Axis may choose to attack, while retaining the second division in reserve to preserve the well-dug defensive posture should the Axis change their tactics. In addition, I would propose that a mobile corps be created from the 1st Cavalry and to-be-raised motorized divisions, to act as a mobile reserve until the line can be completely reinforced.
Through the winter, then, a corps or even an army can be formed and trained consisting of both mobile exploitation forces as well as additional line infantry, with the aim of launching an aggressive strike deep into Hungary in the early days of springtime, perhaps at the very end of March, 1941. It would be inadvisable to attack before this, I believe, due to the detrimental effects of the winter weather on a military offensive in the Hungarian terrain. By this time, attrition in France will have worn down the Axis forces, even if France has finally fallen, and the commission of a fresh corps to the front in Hungary will surely break the back of the Axis coalition!
Very cogent and well-argued advice from the well-known strategic commentator Nukeluru Slorepee! Despite his autocratic governing approach, the President does very much value diversity of opinion within the inner circle of Cabinet and key national advisers. This will help contribute to a lively debate.
—xxx—
To all commentatAARs: still a few days to voice views and provide advice: I have an entry of my other AAR to write up and am visiting family interstate over the coming weekend, so the Cabinet won’t finalise its considerations for a few days yet in OTL!
PS: the cash prize and autographed Ataturk picture are still up for grabs for the first reader to identify the specific dramatic inspiration for the historical recollections of the two Ankara diplomats.
PS: the cash prize and autographed Ataturk picture are still up for grabs for the first reader to identify the specific dramatic inspiration for the historical recollections of the two Ankara diplomats.
As I am unsure if I actually want an autographed Ataturk picture, or of the exact exchange value of a Turkish Lira, I'll continue to not ruin it for everyone else.
But I hope by now I've indicated through my response that the art and practic part of life must be my mistress.
As I am unsure if I actually want an autographed Ataturk picture, or of the exact exchange value of a Turkish Lira, I'll continue to not ruin it for everyone else.
But I hope by now I've indicated through my response that the art and practic part of life must be my mistress.
Yes, thought so, but I’ll now take that as an informal claim on the prize, which will be awarded formally the next time I have computer access. The (1940 vintage, of course) lira virtual prize is yours to do with what you will (in game, of course): a charity of your own invention, perhaps a political donation to the Turkish CHP , or something to console Lord El Pip back in London as he watches helplessly as the Chamberlain premiership drags on (and Churchill remains in the margins, hoping for his own Henry V moment), etc.
As for the Ataturk picture, well either for you to keep and treasure, framed and in a place or prominence (a mantelpiece or dartboard, whatever ) in Lord El Pip’s virtual London residence, or some other apposite fate.
1
Reactions:
Chapter 89: War Cabinet Meeting – ‘Contingency Plan Orange’ (16 August 1940)
Chapter 89: War Cabinet Meeting – ‘Contingency Plan Orange’ (16 August 1940)
[Editor's Note: this Cabinet Meeting is broken up into two parts, for ease of consumption and length considerations.]
The War Cabinet of the Great and Glorious Republic of Turkey gathered at 9am sharp on the morning of 16 August 1940. As mentioned previously, this meeting would be conducted in Istanbul, in the new Glorious Union Cabinet room, as a more central location for those Cabinet members, President Ismet Inönü first and foremost, who also performed in active duty roles in the Great Liberation War against Fascism.
The Istanbul Glorious Union Cabinet Room.
The Turkish War Cabinet as at 16 August 1940. [NB: Ignore the fact that Inönü has two different pictures and seems to be a member of two different political parties as President and Armament Minister. Except for El Pip, in which case: please discuss in no more than 500 words! ]
Prime Minister Mahmud Celal Bayar, acting as the Secretary of the Cabinet, brought the meeting to order: “Gentlemen, you know well the business for which we are summoned today,” Bayar started matter-of-factly. “You have all received your Cabinet pre-briefings and I know some of you have consulted various experts and advisers in preparation for this meeting. You have the agenda for today before you.”
Bayar paused to allow each member to scan the agenda. “If there are no other questions, we will proceed.” Looking around the table, none indicated a desire to speak at this stage. “There being none, Mr President, if it is your wish, would you make some introductory remarks to us?”
“I will, but briefly,” said Inönü. “Two and a half months of the Great Liberation War, in partnership with our Soviet and our other Comintern brethren, have now passed. While the strategic situation is not fully settled, we have had long enough now to make some initial judgements as to how we should proceed. In every major strategic decision we have made over the last four and a half years, there have been differing perspectives around our Cabinet table. The debate has been lively and contested. This is as it should be.”
“And in each case, your President – whether that was our revered Mustapha Kemal Atatürk or me, in my current capacity as your very humble servant ..." (all present kept stoically straight faces at this little contrivance of Inönü’s, as they also wished to keep the heads to which their faces were attached) “… has made the final decision. Again, as it should be. And so it will be again today. Please, gentlemen, let us discuss frankly and I will decide where our glorious path next takes us.”
“Our thanks, Mr President,” says Bayar. He turns next to Chief of Staff Ali Örlungat. “That brings us to Item 1. The floor is yours.”
Item 1 – Offensive Operations on the Eastern Front
“You have all seen the briefing papers,” states Örlungat. “We entered this war to stop the Germans and their Fascist cohorts. And in doing so enlist the Soviets to our aid and the cause of our own Glorious Union and its place in the new order that will rise from this one. This was always going to happen at some point. But the specific timing of the Great Liberation War was determined by our assessment of the situation in France and its trajectory there. It was an opportunistic risk, albeit a calculated one.”
“Without doubt, the intervention has kept France in the war, which has in turn allowed us and our allies to hold our positions in the east and for Turkey to establish a strong forward defence, when we had contemplated having to surrender most of our Balkan holdings if we stood by and waited for the Germans to attack at a time of their own choosing.”
Örlungat pauses at this point, nodding to Bayar who takes up the discussion. “And as you all know, despite these efforts, France still seems to be gradually failing. We need to consider some strategic issues first. Will the French actually fail and, were they to, what are the consequences for us? Can we realistically do anything about that ourselves? What are your views?”
Ögel is the first to speak. “My Soviet counterparts have expressed some opinions on this matter,” says the Intelligence Chief, holding a folder with a report from GRU Agent SkitalecS3. “Naturally, they want to see us more actively engaged, given how the brunt of the fighting has fallen on them and the Romanians, with the Axis seemingly unwilling to attack our strong defences on the Yeniçeri Line, other than the probe on Ada last month. They believe we should be prepared to launch a limited offensive to see if Hungary can be taken out of the war. They also advocate doing this in December, assuming France can hold out that long. This would allow the units we require for the offensive to be fully raised and equipped and the German Wehrmacht’s temporary enthusiasm about its ‘Destiny’ has receded. However, if the fall of France appears imminent before then, they argue the Turkish Army should be ready to move earlier to have a realistic chance of knocking Hungary out of the war before German reinforcements arrive.”
“I see,” says Bayar. “Not unreasonable advice, but with consequences. Clearly, they view this as an opportunity to try to knock Hungary out of the war, using the distraction of France as a vehicle to do so. Not specifically to save the French, which such an offensive would be unlikely to do, even if successful. Very well, who else wishes to comment on this aspect?”
“Professor Markkur, the American strategic expert, has a similar view,” notes Foreign Minister Aras. “Yes, Americans agreeing with Soviets!” There are a few chuckles around the table. “He suggests though that we should – in the absence of intelligence of the Axis positions in depth – risk air reconnaissance to determine the true strength of the enemy’s defences, wherever we may intend to strike.”
Örlungat – who is also the Air Force Chief – looks a little worried about this, but can see the logic in the proposal. He gives a curt nod: "Though only at the point of possible commitment: I'm worried they may be shot out of the air in the attempt."
“Comrade Eurasia, our Soviet political liaison in Ankara, has also voiced some views,” continues Aras. “Stalin and the STAVKA also want us to attack in Hungary. Like the GRU, they have views on whether Rhodes should be attacked as well, but we will be discussing that later, I know. It is secondary and consequential to what we decide to do in the main theatre of operations, and when. Similarly, Lord El Pip, in a discussion with our Ambassador in London, also advocates an attack on Hungary. Arriving at a similar conclusion to SkitalecS3, he suggests preparing for an attack on or after December 6.”
Just when a consensus of advice seems to be forming, Kaya pipes up. “We have received a letter from a Romanian intelligence adviser known only by his codename of ‘Rasa Urs 75’.” Noting a few raised eyebrows at this, Kaya shrugs his shoulders and says: “It translates as racebear75 – just another undercover alias. Anyway, it seems our Romanian allies – not surprisingly – also agree an attack on their front with Hungary should be launched, but would prefer it happen earlier – in November and with a concentration of all available mobile units, presumably to exploit any gains made. They must believe the urgency outweighs us waiting until December and the end of the ‘Destiny Factor’.”
“We also have a submission from Darth Kelebek, the ‘Red Butterfly’”, says Ögel. There is an uncomfortable pause around the table. People look over their shoulders and into the corners of the room, though it is daylight and well lit. “He believes France is quite likely to fail and anything we do is unlikely to affect that substantively. He also argues that Britain may well end up benefiting from this the most if they are able to take advantage of France’s demise. On the other hand, if France sinks and in surrendering yields much to the Germans, then that could also be strategically dangerous for us in the long term.”
“My own conclusion from this is we would gain most advantage from France continuing to scrape through – but that it will not be decided by any actions we take. So any offensive we may make would want to be for our own reasons and advantage, rather than in a belief we can save France by doing so. Which takes us back to the original arguments advanced by the Soviets. But in this, Kelebek differs from others: he doesn’t seem to think an offensive would be justified – that (to quote him, re an offensive in the short term) ‘just because it's our only viable option doesn't mean we should do it’. I think there is some wisdom in these words.”
The mood around the table takes a more serious and uncertain turn at this point. The whole basis of advancing an offensive option has been challenged. Bayar takes the opportunity to talk next.
“Our old friend, the Turkish patriot and Istanbul Times defence correspondent Nukeluru Slorepee, has penned a private communication to me,” says Bayar. “I will summarise its contents to you on this aspect. He fears the worst in France – or at least that we should plan for such, whilst perhaps hoping for better. In essence, a flexible approach. If France can hold out until the winter and the German ‘Destiny Putsch’ survived, the attrition of a two-front war may start to tell on the Nazi foe. Their advance in the west is no blitzkrieg. While they hold, he advocates building sufficient defensive Turkish forces to be able to hold the Yeniçeri Line in strength.”
“In essence, using the time France buys us to make ourselves ready, rather than striking precipitately. This would also allow some local tactical flexibility, leaving one division dug in while the excess could mount local attacks, without risking the defensive integrity of the line. In the meantime, we would continue the current drive to create a more mobile strike force – as a reserve now, though it could come in handy later if exploitation becomes possible after some future breakthrough. Slorepee’s preference is to husband these various resources towards a major strike on Hungary in the early spring of next year – the winter weather being too harsh for such activity. In true patriotic fashion, he concludes with this observation, and I quote ‘By this time, attrition in France will have worn down the Axis forces, even if France has finally fallen, and the commission of a fresh corps to the front in Hungary will surely break the back of the Axis coalition!’. In this, I agree with him.”
After a short lull in the discussion, Örlungat resumes control of the item. “We have heard a range of opinions from those who sit outside the Cabinet but have credibility as advisers and commentators on this war. But what do we think? I turn first to you Yamut, who as Army Chief would carry a major burden. What do you say, Mehmet?”
“As we have maintained all along when contemplating this major war, we must balance between boldness of ambition and due recognition of our fundamental duty to protect the Glorious Union as a whole, but most importantly its beating heart – our Turkish Motherland." Yamut is well known as a strong advocate of static defence doctrine - he likes his defensive lines, perhaps shaped by his experiences in GW1.
"Our main insurance has been Soviet support, with all that means. We now have it. France was an opportunity to purchase that insurance early. It presents us with some strategic options, and has served a useful purpose in keeping German armour and half its Air Force away from us in the east. If we can knock Hungary out of the war with Soviet aid, that would be excellent. But hardly decisive for the greater struggle and not worth doing if it poses a serious – and in my book unnecessary – risk to our strong defensive position. I know we itch to go on the offensive, but why do so too early and risk all?”
“We have already taken a risk in plunging forward, abandoning our carefully prepared fixed fortifications and air defences, to establish this new line. I was uneasy even with that much. My view is we do not currently have the additional strength to both guarantee we can hold the line while stripping defences to create an offensive force which could soon be blunted and swallowed in Hungary. All perhaps without tipping the balance there, when the Axis reacts. Perhaps in December, if France holds, the Soviets push hard, Germany runs out of Destiny-driven puff and we have greater forces to hand and a gap emerges. But that is a lot of 'ifs'. And Slorepee’s cautions about winter fighting in Hungary are valid. Furthermore, while manpower is currently strong, you all know our longer-term weakness in numbers, officer training and research capacity: we can expect no more influxes of men now – unless Istanbul falls and we conduct an emergency mobilisation. Which would of course be a disaster and could result from an incautious call now.” On that sombre note, Army Chief Yamut falls silent. The pause lengthens for a few seconds - though it seems far longer.
“Speaking in my role as both War [Armament] Minister and Commander of the 1st Army,” says Inönü, entering the actual debate for the first time, “I would endorse Yamut’s views on the potential fragility of our current line. Should we thin it significantly, it could be pierced by a concerted Axis drive, especially if they concentrate heavy air power at the key point and reinforce their attack properly, which they failed to do in Ada.”
Örlungat nods sadly at this: they are all aware after recent reporting that even the Hungarian Air Force outnumbers the Turkish decisively, let alone if reinforced by Italian or German air units. And the Soviets could not be relied upon to be able to provide either defensive or offensive air support.
"You have also seen the production reports furnished for this meeting,” Inönü continues. “We can generate – at some risk to both our front line in former Yugoslavia and in depth along our extended coastline – a small offensive force now, growing steadily during November and December. But the kind of forces envisaged by Slorepee will not be available for months yet. Perhaps not even by next year’s spring. Therefore, any offensive before then would entail risk. The degree of that risk is hard to determine now and will be affected by events as yet unknown in both France and with our allies on the Eastern Front.” He looks at Ögel, clearly seeking the views of the intelligence community.
Ögel replies, as the man responsible for providing analysis of foreign military capabilities and intentions. “Mr President, as you imply, I can offer no certainty on that score. The best I can do is offer a range of credible possibilities. In the West, in the worst case, France falls by or before the end of the year, either through a rapid collapse following a German armoured breakthrough culminating in the seizure of Paris; or by the continuation of the current death of a thousand cuts. This then allows the Germans to redeploy their mechanised units to the east in a few weeks and we find ourselves in the fight of our lives, perhaps with our own forces weakened by stalemated offensive operations and a thinned defensive line.”
“Best case, the French stabilise soon, the Germans run out of men and machines to sustain a significant advance, and their morale and resilience fall in early December as their Führer’s words of encouragement wear off. More Soviet forces are brought to bear in the east and Hungary becomes increasingly vulnerable, such that even a moderate intervention by our Army proves enough to tip Hungary over the edge. This would most likely happen from December onwards. If not poised to take advantage quickly, we risk missing out on the spoils on offer and a chance to hit the Hungarians when they are most vulnerable. The Soviets will then think us weak, indecisive and inconstant allies – especially as it was us who dragged them into this war in the first place - or so they would argue. And our claims of Glory are damned with faint praise around the world.”
“Of course, it could well be somewhere in between: a long slow French decline that is not fully halted and teeters on the seeming brink of collapse without doing so, at least before the end of the winter. The attrition continues in the east without major change." Ögel concludes: "There you have it. These are, in my view, the range of possibilities with which we must contend.”
Again, another pause ensues. Bayar glances towards Inönü, who nods almost imperceptibly. Bayar clears his throat: “My President, I believe we have discussed the main elements of the problem presented in Item 1 thoroughly. While the issue of what to do about the Italians in Rhodes has not yet been discussed, we are I think all agreed on the need to take the greater decision first, before we tackle the peripheral ones. I think we must now defer to your judgement in this.”
“I agree, Bayar.” Inönü rises to his feet – the rest of the Cabinet do likewise. “I will retire to my study to consider this matter. The rest of you may take your ease. We will reconvene in 30 minutes.” Inönü leaves the room. Unlike past practice, he retires alone – authority in the new Kemalist-Inönüist Turkey is now more centralised than ever.
---xxx---
At the appointed time, The Cabinet members finish their coffee and baklava and return to the Cabinet table, Bayar calling them to order. Inönü returns and takes his seat at the head of the table. He begins to speak.
President Ismet Inönü addresses the War Cabinet in Istanbul, 16 August 1940.
“Gentlemen, on my shoulders lies the responsibility for this decision, and with it the security of our great nation, our collective Comintern war effort and our continued progress along the Path to Glory. While possible, I think it unlikely circumstances will clearly favour an early offensive into Hungary at any time before December, for all the reasons we have discussed today. And I am loathe to risk the very survival of the Union and the Motherland when, by being patient, we can let the mathematics of this war grind out a victory for us through protracted attritional warfare.”
He looks, as if into the distance and glances towards the far end of the room, where a black-bordered portrait of Mustapha Kemal, the ‘Father Turk’, hangs. Focusing again on his Cabinet, he resumes. “Yet I am also the foremost proponent of offensive doctrine in the Turkish Army – our doctrine of Rapid Aggressive Warfare, which we put into glorious action before the Germans used their so-called blitzkrieg on the Poles last year. We may not have the armoured and air forces the Germans have, but we are well versed in using what we have decisively and against the enemy’s critical points, to secure victory. I chafe at the thought that we may, through an excess of timidity, miss out on some opportunity to deal our enemies a real blow and risk being perceived by Stalin as fair-weather friends and barkers, not biters. After all, I have promised those sauerkraut-eating Hanses we would feast on bratwurst in their beer-halls before this war is over!” This prompts some grim laughs around the table.
“My decision is therefore to maintain the defence while preparing for the offensive. We should be ready to strike in Hungary before the end of September in case the opportunity presents locally and the strategic situation justifies it. We can do that by some subtle shifts of forces, not weakening our defences obviously, but positioning ourselves so we can concentrate a corps-sized assault force relatively quickly, without the use of strategic movement (and the delays that entails). As new forces come on line, our defences can be reinforced and our offensive reserve strengthened.”
“Our planners will be directed to arrange this contingency offensive, aimed at Budapest as the primary objective. Assuming the Soviets continue to hold or can regain Debrecen and Kosice can also be taken – either by the Soviets or with our assistance once Budapest is secure – that should, with our estimate of Hungary’s national unity, be just enough to tip them over the edge into surrender. The terrain on the north-west approach to Budapest from Romania is open and conducive to the attack, other than the obstacle of the Tisza River which crosses the plain. It is close enough to the north of our line such that we can muster there quickly enough if necessary and still be available to redeploy in case of a major enemy offensive in former Yugoslavia. Mobile forces kept in reserve might be able to dash through this gap, if we can achieve the breakthrough, and seize Budapest before the Axis can react.”
The Hungarian contingency offensive is dubbed Plan Orange.
“So, we must be ready for an offensive any time from the end of September onwards, though probably not before early December and quite possibly not until the spring of 1941. We will monitor events and be prepared to pounce. We did not get where we are now by being rash and reckless, nor by being timid and unprepared to seize a chance. Calculated boldness will be our maxim here. We are a middle, not yet a major power, so must needs be opportunistic and take our chances where we can find them; but not delude ourselves into thinking that we alone can defeat the might of this German-led Axis. The Soviets will bake that cake: we shall ice it - either now, or later.”
At this point, Inönü called an adjournment to proceedings. The remaining strategic question – principally that of Rhodes – and the intelligence related items will be decided after a short lunch break. Food for thought, indeed!
A symbolically significant lunch is served: bratwurst, sauerkraut, potato and onion! A rehearsal for future culinary conquests in Germany.
Coming Up: The War Cabinet meeting considers Rhodes, intelligence operations and S.I.T.H. targeting.
Ögel is the first to speak. “My Soviet counterparts have expressed some opinions on this matter,” says the Intelligence Chief, holding a folder with a report from GRU Agent SkitalecS3. “Naturally, they want to see us more actively engaged, given how the brunt of the fighting has fallen on them and the Romanians, with the Axis seemingly unwilling to attack our strong defences on the Yeniçeri Line, other than the probe on Ada last month. They believe we should be prepared to launch a limited offensive to see if Hungary can be taken out of the war. They also advocate doing this in December, assuming France can hold out that long. This would allow the units we require for the offensive to be fully raised and equipped and the German Wehrmacht’s temporary enthusiasm about its ‘Destiny’ has receded. However, if the fall of France appears imminent before then, they argue the Turkish Army should be ready to move earlier to have a realistic chance of knocking Hungary out of the war before German reinforcements arrive.”
Because if France falls, the war in the east becomes bigger and badder for everyone. For that reason, it is to our benefit to shorten the front by as much as possible, dig in and deprive the Axis of local air power that Hungary would provide. Essentially, taking Hungary out now mitigates the fall of France in many aspects for the above reasons. However, only if we can keep a strong defensive line up the entire time and then move it to the new border quickly enough.
Turkey also needs more land and resources to fight the Axis or Romania and Russia are going to do everything (and get all the spoils). So I can see why we should push into Hungary.
Just when a consensus of advice seems to be forming, Kaya pipes up. “We have received a letter from a Romanian intelligence adviser known only by his codename of ‘Rasa Urs 75’.” Noting a few raised eyebrows at this, Kaya shrugs his shoulders and says: “It translates as racebear75 – just another undercover alias. Anyway, it seems our Romanian allies – not surprisingly – also agree an attack on their front with Hungary should be launched, but would prefer it happen earlier – in November and with a concentration of all available mobile units, presumably to exploit any gains made. They must believe the urgency outweighs us waiting until December and the end of the ‘Destiny Factor’.”
Which is far too early, since the Hungarians and Germans already have the advantage of home defence, air power and this destiny buff. Honestly, we need one of those to change or more before we attack.
“We also have a submission from Darth Kelebek, the ‘Red Butterfly’”, says Ögel. There is an uncomfortable pause around the table. People look over their shoulders and into the corners of the room, though it is daylight and well lit. “He believes France is quite likely to fail and anything we do is unlikely to affect that substantively. He also argues that Britain may well end up benefiting from this the most if they are able to take advantage of France’s demise. On the other hand, if France sinks and in surrendering yields much to the Germans, then that could also be strategically dangerous for us in the long term.”
“My own conclusion from this is we would gain most advantage from France continuing to scrape through – but that it will not be decided by any actions we take. So any offensive we may make would want to be for our own reasons and advantage, rather than in a belief we can save France by doing so. Which takes us back to the original arguments advanced by the Soviets. But in this, Kelebek differs from others: he doesn’t seem to think an offensive would be justified – that (to quote him, re an offensive in the short term) ‘just because it's our only viable option doesn't mean we should do it’. I think there is some wisdom in these words.”
Indeed. The absolute best possible outcome for Turkey and the Comintern is for France to just hold the line where it is, drained of resources and incapable of doing anything else. This pins German armies down in a horrible siege war they don't have the resources or manpower for. As they slowly whittle each other down (hopefully for another full year, best case scenario) we can make slow and steady gains in the East. Knock out Hungary. Crush Italy in Europe as Britain crushes her in Africa. And then, with the Allies exhausted (or in the case of Britain, discredited for doing nothing in European theatre), we can decide what happens to Germany, Italy and Hungary after the war. None of this splitting the continent in half nonsense.
"Our main insurance has been Soviet support, with all that means. We now have it. France was an opportunity to purchase that insurance early. It presents us with some strategic options, and has served a useful purpose in keeping German armour and half its Air Force away from us in the east. If we can knock Hungary out of the war with Soviet aid, that would be excellent. But hardly decisive for the greater struggle and not worth doing if it poses a serious – and in my book unnecessary – risk to our strong defensive position. I know we itch to go on the offensive, but why do so too early and risk all?”
That's the real kicker for Turkey. We have to stay in Stalin's good books or we won't get jack in Europe following the war (Africa and the Middle East yes but only because he'd give us those anyway. He doesn't care about them). And I want Italy and Hungary annexed or puppeted by us, not Russia, following the war. Since the campaign as it stands makes that seem likely if we actually do fight (Stalin goes high, into Germany and Finland if needed, we go low and take Hungary and Italy), I think this might actually be doable. But we have to keep the soviets happy. Otherwise they'll be on us after this war and try to get our republic absorbed into their own 'collection of allied free states'.
“Best case, the French stabilise soon, the Germans run out of men and machines to sustain a significant advance, and their morale and resilience fall in early December as their Führer’s words of encouragement wear off. More Soviet forces are brought to bear in the east and Hungary becomes increasingly vulnerable, such that even a moderate intervention by our Army proves enough to tip Hungary over the edge. This would most likely happen from December onwards. If not poised to take advantage quickly, we risk missing out on the spoils on offer and a chance to hit the Hungarians when they are most vulnerable. The Soviets will then think us weak, indecisive and inconstant allies – especially as it was us who dragged them into this war in the first place - or so they would argue. And our claims of Glory are damned with faint praise around the world.”
Yup. So that's our take on Hungary and the war ahead in Europe. France must stay alive till Hungary falls at the very least, we need to be seen to do something in the short term and take command of the southern campaign in the long term to safeguard Turkey's future, and despite all that we need to keep up a strong defence because we are still the weak point in the eastern front if the Germans go looking for one.
As for Rhodes...we've covered this before so lets see what happens.
As I am unsure if I actually want an autographed Ataturk picture, or of the exact exchange value of a Turkish Lira, I'll continue to not ruin it for everyone else.
But I hope by now I've indicated through my response that the art and practic part of life must be my mistress.
[So, due to my pic host suddenly deciding to not show any thumbnails, it took me a while to find the requisite photo and cash lira, but I hereby present the following significant award.]
The Great and Glorious Award for Play Spotting is awarded to Lord El Pip
President and Milli Sef Ismet Inonu proudly makes this award for his (subtly implied but nonetheless correct) spotting of the use of Shakespeare's Henry V as the dramatic basis for the recollections and reflections of the two anonymous Turkish Foreign Ministry officials who have recently joined us in this august chronicle of Turkey's Path to Glory. The President and People of a Great and Grateful Glorious National Republic salute you!
As stated previously, the 1,000 lira can be spent in-game in any way you like (by Lord El Pip) either in London or elsewhere, at his direction. Charity, personal use, bribe, whisky for Churchill, donation to Turkey's ruling (in 1940) CHP , etc!
The next episode will, as previously mentioned, cover the rest of the Cabinet agenda for 16 August 1940. Should be out reasonably soon.
Well, so I am Romanian and called Rasa Urs. Well, perhaps I had been born in 1875 and was an instructor at the army officer acadamy well known for rapid moving cavalry attacks and bear-like infantry-defence. After official retirement I stay close to my young friend Ion Antonescu as a silent adviser.
Well, so I am Romanian and called Rasa Urs. Well, perhaps I had been born in 1875 and was an instructor at the army officer acadamy well known for rapid moving cavalry attacks and bear-like infantry-defence. After official retirement I stay close to my young friend Ion Antonescu as a silent adviser.
And now the imminent threat of Honorary Captain Luca Brasi has been removed from the Romanian general staff, things should be slightly more relaxed, for Antonescu and his Rasa Urs (who is starting to sound a little Ras(a)putin-like!
1
Reactions:
Chapter 90: War Cabinet Meeting – Rhodes (16 August 1940)
Chapter 90: War Cabinet Meeting – Rhodes (16 August 1940)
[Editor’s Note: In this second part of the War Cabinet meeting, the Ministers make a return to the table after lunch, while superfluous alliteration makes a comprehensive, concise, clear and congenial come-back to Cabinet considerations and the communication of crucial conclusions to the complete collection of commentators, the common crowd and Comintern commissars! In this introduction, at least. The debate is so intense on the remaining agenda items that their presentation will again be broken up, with the final espionage-related section coming last.]
One side of the Cabinet Room has a large political map of the world showing current borders after almost a year of the Second Great War, as at 16 August 1940.
Item 1 (continued) – Rhodes
The reason for the short delay in proceedings before the consideration of options regarding the key Italian-occupied island of Rhodes was soon made even clearer.
Prime Minister Celal Bayar begins: “Colleagues, we now continue, under our collective contemplation of combat considerations and courses …”
“Here now, Bayar, let’s not get carried away with nugatory displays of alliteration, shall we,” cautions President Inönü, in an effort to keep discussion both serious and on-topic.
“My apologies, Mr President – I spend so much time silently working away in the background to build our industrial might, I sometimes lapse into these circumlocutions to such an extent that I begin to pronounce these patently pompous, prolix and pretentious pleonasms and periphrasis …”
“Celal!” exclaims Inönü, with a mixture of indulgent humour and exasperation. “Now you are mixing excess alliteration with tautologies about tautology! It must stop – we have serious business at hand!”
“Ah, yes, quite so my Milli Şef,” a rather disconcerted Bayar responds, now unable to trust himself to speak in concise and non-alliterative terms. “Perhaps I should just refer members back to the Cabinet agenda paper and let Örlungat continue.” He pauses, as if to check the words he has just uttered for errant alliteration and tautology – indeed, he fears he may fall into a deep solipsistic trap, sprung (inevitably) in his own mind.
“Yes, good chap, I think that would definitely be for the best,” says the President. This exchange has at least brought a bit of levity to an otherwise very serious affair. But [alternate] reality cannot be kept at bay for long. Or ‘at bey’, thinks Inönü to himself, should we want to switch to vaudeville and puns. But that way lies madness. He wisely resists this strange Bayar-inspired compulsion and instead nods to Örlungat.
The Chief of Staff and of the Air Force has watched on with no little bemusement, but now continues with his next order of business. “Having decided on our broad approach for Contingency Plan Orange, we must now consider what we should do about the irritating Italian presence on Rhodes. I think we all agree it is not only an insult to the Glory and Pride of Turkey, but also a direct threat as an Axis air and naval base in our very backyard.”
Cries of ‘hear, hear’ and ‘remember the dastardly strike on the Council of Premiers’ echo around the table – the latter referring to the Axis-Mafia Foundation Day Plot of 28 January 1939. Readers may remember the later commission of inquiry had confirmed the Italian-facilitated armed float plane had used Rhodes as a staging base for the daring strike on Ankara that had, but for a jammed gun, almost wiped out the brand-new Union of Glorious National Republics’ Council of Premiers, on the very day of its proclamation. Though the embarrassing facts had been largely suppressed, it was a lasting stain on the pride and honour of the Glorious Union as a whole – and Inönü and his Ministers in particular.
Interior [Security] Minister Kaya and Intelligence Head Ögel for once find themselves agreeing with each other, without reservation: both still smarted at how that whole plot had played out without their foreknowledge. Their mutual anger, resentment and hot desire for cold revenge generates an almost Kelebek-like sense of menace in the room. A few of the others make another quick check of the room’s darker corners, while Navy Chief Üngen cannot not resist a quick and surreptitious peek under the Cabinet table.
“The other reason for waiting a little longer to consider what should be done about Rhodes is that early this morning, I commissioned a reconnaissance of the island by our fighter wing based in Crete. There was some potential danger, as we knew two Italian air wings are based there, but not the type of aircraft. Had they been modern fighters, our gallant pilots may not have returned.” He looks around the table here with one raised eyebrow, as he has always angled for more resources to be ploughed into Turkey’s woefully small and obsolete Air Force. While a wing of licensed Soviet I-16s is in production, he knows they need a lot more and better than that – his airpower-bias aside.
---xxx---
Recon Report – Rhodes 16 August 1940
“Fortunately, they met with success and came back unharmed. They have produced the following information.” An aid pins up some photos and an enlarged chart on the Cabinet Room’s briefing board.
“The recon report from 1 Avci Filo reveals the island to be garrisoned by a militia division of two brigades,” Örlungat advises his colleagues. “The Italian aircraft at the Rhodes airport have been identified as two wings of Italian naval bombers. We were very relieved when no fighters appeared. And the port has three submarine flotillas present – probably the same raiders that recently struck sunk one our convoys travelling on the Crete run. While these deployments could of course change, it is better than a fighter presence and a major surface ship fleet being in residence.”
The Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 Sparviero (Italian for sparrowhawk) is a three-engined Italian medium bomber with a wood-and-metal structure.
Originally designed as a fast passenger aircraft, between 1937 and 1939 this low-wing monoplane set 26 world records, qualifying it for some time as the fastest medium bomber in the world. It first saw action during the Spanish Civil War. It is easily recognisable due to its distinctive fuselage dorsal "hump", and is apparently well liked by its crews, who nickname it il gobbo maledetto ("damned hunchback").
“There are two wings of these naval bombers based on Rhodes. This picture has been shared (voluntarily this time) by French liaison officers at Supreme HQ in Ankara.”
Örlungat finishes his report and hands over to Navy Chief Admiral Üngen. The hero of the Battle of Cape Armeno now provides his findings, pointing to both a map and an enlarged photograph pinned to the wall. “This map of Rhodes indicates the main landing beach identified for a potential assault on the island – Tsampika Beach, just north of the town of Stegna on the east coast of Rhodes.”
Tsampika Beach, Rhodes, 16 August 1940.
“The recon flight was able to take some clear images of Tsampika Beach. There appear to be a series of obstacles on the shoreline and a set of seven pillboxes just back from the beach. These fortifications are common to the various other prime landing beaches on Rhodes. Given the Italian garrison will be thinly spread across all of these beaches, the assault should not be unduly hampered by such obstacles – despite our lack of combat engineers, purpose built landing craft, marines or amphibious doctrine. Any landing would have to be done the hard way – as on Stampalia in the northern Dodecanese in June.”
---xxx---
Strategic Discussion
Örlungat resumes the discussion lead. “There you have it gentlemen. At least we now know the situation on the island of Rhodes. The collective assessment of the Chiefs of Staff is that we have a good chance of establishing air superiority over Rhodes – unless the Italians fly in interceptors, in which case we could be in trouble. The submarines should not be an insurmountable threat to an invasion fleet, but could cause some damage if they attack it. And of course, as on Stampalia, the Reggio Marina may again try to intervene, though they have since suffered more casualties in the Mediterranean at the hands of the French and British fleets and would have a long way to come through hostile waters.”
“And General Yamut believes, again as on Stampalia, that with a good aerial preparation and naval gunfire support, a similar outcome could eventually be achieved. But it would probably take a couple of weeks – meaning the risk to our land, air and naval forces would extend for some time.”
Yamut nods in agreement at this assessment, adding: “I would use the Fighting Fifteenth again if required to conduct this operation. But that would mean its deployment to form part of any offensive force for use in Hungary would be delayed. Assuming we begin the preparations for the attack now, that it takes up to three weeks to complete and then figuring in recovery time and redeployment to the Eastern Front, it would be wise not to expect them to be in place and ready for operations there until the end of September at the earliest. They key, gentlemen, is not so much whether we can reasonably expect to attack and take Rhodes, but whether we should. Is it worth the risk?”
Bayar has regained his confidence by now and resumes his role as Cabinet Secretary. “Ögel, what is the view of our friends at the GRU?”
“SkitalecS3 thinks an attempt may be made on Rhodes with a single Infantry Division, while we prepare for our potential attack on Hungary. He believes the key advantage to taking it is depriving Italy of a base (both Air and Naval) in the eastern Mediterranean. I think the recon report now bears out his view: those submarines and naval bombers are a genuine nuisance to commerce. And, as Kaya has discussed with me before this meeting, the recent sinking of that convoy put a bit of a dent in our national morale. We don’t want that happening. The GRU is also concerned about Italy reaching the Suez Canal, supposing they could easily send some divisions up to Rhodes, to use it as a staging ground for a surprise invasion of the Turkish mainland. He encouraged scouting of the island (which we have done) to see what was possible to capture the place.”
Bayar gives a non-committal nod at this. “Aras, how about the Soviets’ political-diplomatic perspective?”
“Comrade Eurasia takes a less military and more political view,” observes Aras. “He sees Rhodes as something to pick up after Italy starts to crumble. Lord El Pip takes a similar view. He reckons taking it now will not help the war effort. The Royal Navy is strong enough in the Med and the British are finally making efforts in North Africa so the area should stay secure enough for the foreseeable future. For him, it's something that can easily be picked up later or just left until the peace treaty after our victory. A very British view perhaps, where one small island matters little in their wider world view, but a valid perspective.”
Kaya chimes in again. He is in two minds. “My heart says let’s grab Rhodes now and poke another burnt stick into Mussolini’s piggy little eye. Darth Kelebek was also leaning that way, but when he saw the reports from Comrade Eurasia and Lord El Pip, he came to the opinion that there was no real point in attacking Rhodes, unless the Italians are preparing to do something with it themselves. In that case, he thinks we should take it soonest. Otherwise, 'let them rot'. The forces would be best used elsewhere. So, he’s sitting on the fence with this one: but I go for the heart over the head. Let’s take it out to silence those naval bombers and subs, and before the Italians do something more with it and it is beyond our ability to handle. Remember Foundation Day!”
---xxx---
Having heard from those external advisers with a firm opinion on Rhodes, other views are sought from around the table.
Admiral Üngen is the first to speak up: “I have as much at stake as anyone here. I would be on the Yavuz again if we attack, standing off shore the whole time, prey to any Italian fleet that may come to disrupt the landings and subject to attacks from the naval bombers and subs already based there. But Rhodes is a thorn in our side already and something it would be excellent to remove – while we still can. If they reinforce, with our limited resources we probably could not take it. I say we should take the risk, remove this wasp’s nest from our backyard now, before more of them arrive. I will take my chance with Örlungat’s gallant flyers to try to keep the enemy bombers out of the sky. And we can hope the Italian Navy won’t risk trying to interdict the fleet so far away, running the gauntlet of the British and French all the way across to Rhodes. If worse comes to worst, then we will just have to try to escape – it isn’t far to our home ports.”
“We will soon find out whether we can dominate the air situation,” offers Örlungat. “It will be known before we have to send a fleet to find out. I’m willing to risk it: we’d fly air superiority over Rhodes to see what the Italian’s have to offer. I’d like to see how we’d go against those SM.79 ‘Hunchbacks’. Not taking anything for granted, and if fighters appear we’re in trouble, but I’d be willing to try. And I will personally lead the Blenheims again on another air campaign.”
Army Chief Yamut also rises to the occasion: “If the Navy and Air Force are up for it, so too would the Army be ready to try. 15 Inf Div will become specialists at this if necessary. If we could do it on Stampalia, we can do it on Rhodes.”
“There you have it, gentlemen,” summarises Örlungat, now as the Chief of Staff. “If you want us to, we think we can give it a ‘red’ hot go!” Kaya is also keen, but Aras not so, nor Ögel. They still have misgivings. All eyes now turn to Bayar and Inönü. It is time for a decision.
“Very well, I will think on this,” Inönü says, then turns to Bayar. “Prime Minister, I would appreciate your views on this matter. Let us briefly retire to the private study.”
---xxx---
“Frankly Bayar, until I saw that recon report this morning and we discovered the naval bomber and submarine bases the Italians have established there, I was of a mind to ignore Rhodes and not take the risk,” starts Inönü as they sit in a couple of comfortable leather armchairs. “They are a genuine inconvenience, apart from being an insult to our honour. You can almost swim there from the Motherland!”
“I know, My President, but we must be dispassionate here. Is the risk acceptable? And, given you are the Army Commander in the field on the Eastern Front, are you willing to see 15 Inf Div off line for up to a month and a half before it can reinforce our Plan Orange force?”
“The risk to the participating forces could, I think, be born, Bayar. We should be able to flee if seriously struck there, and the military Chiefs seem willing enough to try it. The delay in 15 Inf Div redeploying is a consideration, and we could come to rue it if we end up wanting to attack Hungary sooner rather than later. But on balance, I doubt whether we’re likely to attack in Hungary before December. And if an irresistible opportunity does arise before the end of September, the absence of 15 Inf Div wouldn’t be decisive: if it’s that good a chance, then we shouldn’t need it and can compensate from elsewhere in the line.”
“If that is your inclination, My President, then politically it could be useful to point to another example of us taking action in Rhodes even while we build up our position on the main front. If the Soviets see that, plus our plans to be ready to exploit any chance in Hungary in a few months (or earlier if a golden opportunity arises), then that should be enough to satisfy them.”
“I am so inclined Bayar. Let us inform the Cabinet accordingly.”
They return, authorising plans for a joint assault on Rhodes. The air phase will be used to gauge the situation, with the amphibious landing ready to move once the word is given. This attack will go by the name of Operation Rodos Devi (Colossus of Rhodes).
Another piece from Persephonee’s easel: it will be issued once the naval landings commence and will no doubt immeasurably boost the morale of the populace.
---xxx---
Coming Up Soon: the final part of the Cabinet Meeting of 16 August 1940 [written, just needs post-production, up tomorrow night (my time)].
And now the imminent threat of Honorary Captain Luca Brasi has been removed from the Romanian general staff, things should be slightly more relaxed, for Antonescu and his Rasa Urs (who is starting to sound a little Ras(a)putin-like!
Curiously enough I read this as Rhodesia, probably because of the world map. I got all excited then I saw that it was Rhodes instead...which I think is a pretty nasty situation because we really can't just leave it as it is but there's no way to do anything about it without taking intense risks compared to what we'd gain.
"...of the callous, coarse and crude capitalistic crusteaceons that co-erse, creep and crush across continents. Can we the committee challenge, charge and change these chomping chumps with our collective communist covenant of cheery countries? I say, certainly."
“Celal!” exclaims Inönü, with a mixture of indulgent humour and exasperation. “Now you are mixing excess alliteration with tautologies about tautology! It must stop – we have serious business at hand!”
Interior [Security] Minister Kaya and Intelligence Head Ögel for once find themselves agreeing with each other, without reservation: both still smarted at how that whole plot had played out without their foreknowledge. Their mutual anger, resentment and hot desire for cold revenge generates an almost Kelebek-like sense of menace in the room. A few of the others make another quick check of the room’s darker corners, while Navy Chief Üngen cannot not resist a quick and surreptitious peek under the Cabinet table.
Kelebek itself couldn't see why people kept checking to see whether it wasn't there. It was always there. On the inside.
And oftentimes on the ceiling.
And the port has three submarine flotillas present – probably the same raiders that recently struck sunk one our convoys travelling on the Crete run. While these deployments could of course change, it is better than a fighter presence and a major surface ship fleet being in residence.”
“This map of Rhodes indicates the main landing beach identified for a potential assault on the island – Tsampika Beach, just north of the town of Stegna on the east coast of Rhodes.”
“The recon flight was able to take some clear images of Tsampika Beach. There appear to be a series of obstacles on the shoreline and a set of seven pillboxes just back from the beach. These fortifications are common to the various other prime landing beaches on Rhodes. Given the Italian garrison will be thinly spread across all of these beaches, the assault should not be unduly hampered by such obstacles – despite our lack of combat engineers, purpose built landing craft, marines or amphibious doctrine. Any landing would have to be done the hard way – as on Stampalia in the northern Dodecanese in June.”
The island is also covered by various walls, built from the Middle Ages up to now, some of which could probably stand up to bombardment for a while, especially against our guns. Plus the capital itself is protected by a fort at the port and a huge castle (that you will NOT blow up, it's too pretty), that can hold out for months without air bombardment or heavy artillery shelling. So...in summary, Rhodes is even more of a nightmare and risk than I thought when I commented on it last time. I understand why no one bothered to attack it the entire war (The Germans took it from the Italians only after the latter surrendered and the former was already there in force).
Kaya chimes in again. He is in two minds. “My heart says let’s grab Rhodes now and poke another burnt stick into Mussolini’s piggy little eye. Darth Kelebek was also leaning that way, but when he saw the reports from Comrade Eurasia and Lord El Pip, he came to the opinion that there was no real point in attacking Rhodes, unless the Italians are preparing to do something with it themselves. In that case, he thinks we should take it soonest. Otherwise, 'let them rot'. The forces would be best used elsewhere. So, he’s sitting on the fence with this one: but I go for the heart over the head. Let’s take it out to silence those naval bombers and subs, and before the Italians do something more with it and it is beyond our ability to handle. Remember Foundation Day!”
“If that is your inclination, My President, then politically it could be useful to point to another example of us taking action in Rhodes even while we build up our position on the main front. If the Soviets see that, plus our plans to be ready to exploit any chance in Hungary in a few months (or earlier if a golden opportunity arises), then that should be enough to satisfy them.”
Again, this might work. However, the point about taking over the Southern European campaign stands and for that, you have to be active in taking Hungary. It's also debatable about which would be more risky. At least you'd have backup in Europe. But we'll see what happens. Could be wrong.
“My apologies, Mr President – I spend so much time silently working away in the background to build our industrial might, I sometimes lapse into these circumlocutions to such an extent that I begin to pronounce these patently pompous, prolix and pretentious pleonasms and periphrasis …”
“Celal!” exclaims Inönü, with a mixture of indulgent humour and exasperation. “Now you are mixing excess alliteration with tautologies about tautology! It must stop – we have serious business at hand!”
“Ah, yes, quite so my Milli Şef,” a rather disconcerted Bayar responds, now unable to trust himself to speak in concise and non-alliterative terms.
My Apology; It seems this retired professor is a little too retired. I was waiting for the second half before commenting. My earlier praise of the agenda was directed towards that great graphic you made.
On to business. I like the idea of getting Italy off Rhodes first before moving forward. Btw, my Russian friends agree with me.
Rasa Urs will only appear from time to time because he is Romanian and will therefor not appear at any Turkish meeting. There will be only comments if Antonescus staff could be involved in plannings. Of course there will be no comment about any plans involving Rhodes!
Rasa Urs will only appear from time to time because he is Romanian and will therefor not appear at any Turkish meeting. There will be only comments if Antonescus staff could be involved in plannings. Of course there will be no comment about any plans involving Rhodes!
Under normal circumstances Op Rodos Devi would seem beyond Romania’s immediate interests, but remember they themselves have stationed their wing of naval bombers in Crete and have been demonstrating quite a strong naval presence in the Eastern Med, so Rasa Urs should still feel free to comment if he wishes
Naval Bombers and Submarines can be a problem and thorn in the side. They could also be dangerous to an invasion if there isn't enough escorts to protect the transports and/or landing craft. 6 of one and half a dozen of the other. I still think Rhodes is pretty worthless and will become harmless one Italy started to crumble but it depends on what damage it is doing to Turkey now and how cheap it would be to take.
1
Reactions:
Chapter 91: War Cabinet Meeting – Revenge (16 August 1940)
Chapter 91: War Cabinet Meeting – Revenge (16 August 1940)
Previously, on Talking Turkey:Contingency Plan Orange (preparations for an offensive in Hungary) and Operation Rodos Devi (plans for an attack on and seizure of Rhodes) have been dealt with under Item 1 of the agenda for the major War Cabinet meeting of 16 August 1940. This third episode in the ‘War Cabinet Meeting Trilogy’ will deal with the two intelligence-related topics on the agenda. Revenge is the recurrent theme of this story – something which manifests itself on many levels. All without further excessive alliteration or deliberate tautology! Feedback to any comments on both the previous (Rhodes) and this latest episode will be consolidated and presented subsequently, after a few days of letting it all sink in.
---xxx---
Again, a reminder of the agenda for this meeting.
Item 2 – Espionage Training and Targeting
This item is Intelligence Chief Ögel’s to argue. The facts are simple. With the French operation wound up and domestic counter-espionage already at 10, the current rate of spy training is such that it will take a good deal of time for it to arrive at the point where a strong new network, with reserve agents ready to replace any casualties, can be deployed. The current training rate would need to be increased significantly to make this happen in anything other than very slow time.
“My dear colleagues,” Ögel begins – he knows he has a tough job here, but is hopeful. “You are well aware of the requests I have made in the Cabinet papers. Our current espionage allocation is only about 3% of our national leadership capacity [ie 0.27 out of just under 8.81 LS]. This is a very small amount. With just 5 or 6% of the total, for a few months, we could generate sufficient spy capacity to put a full new network in a country of our choice, with the aim of infiltrating their technical archives, as we did in France, before it became overrun by Commonwealth counter-espionage agents.”
Current diplomat, spy and officer levels and leadership allocations as at 16 August 1940.
“This small investment would be well spent in my view. We have four spies trained now; another eight would be enough to establish such a network with a few reserves. We could then revert to the current rate or even a little lower to keep things topped up. The issue of training numbers aside, I also seek approval to authorise our next espionage deployment against Italy. They shouldn’t be as tough a nut to crack as Germany, but they still have technology we would be interested in acquiring. We have had success in the past and can again.”
“Thank you Ögel,” responds Bayar. “As the President is also the War [Armament] Minister and is thus responsible for officer training and research, he has asked me to respond with a few points from that perspective, to allow him to maintain an impartial approach to this debate today.”
“A relatively uneducated population is, as we all know, one of our great difficulties. We need more officers now, let alone for the new units that will shortly come on line and are planned for the coming year. We are currently at 113% on officer numbers – I’d like to see that higher, ideally at 140% if we could ever achieve it. And our research needs all the leadership it can get. I think I would rather invest the effort in known research and training than in the lottery of an espionage attempt, where we don’t know when or if we’ll get something, and can’t choose what we will get if we do.”
“And we saw what happened in Japan – it was a disaster,” says Ögel’s long-time rival, Kaya. “France ended up that way too. Now I admit there was some success along the way ... though the cruiser technology wasn’t exactly useful.”
“And we need to keep a few diplomatic resources up our sleeves – especially for buying licenses or making trade deals,” chimes in Aras.
The increasingly besieged Ögel looks around the table, hoping for some support. “Are there any other views – perhaps from some of our learned consultants?”
“Perhaps I can help,” says Kaya, with a nasty look in his eye. “I’m sure your good friend in the GRU, Agent SkitalecS3, would support you Ögel, given his perspective – though I notice you didn’t cite any of his comments this time round. But it’s all right, I have a copy of his submission here.”
Kaya distributes a sheet to the Cabinet members on GRU letterhead, containing the GRU liaison’s advice.
Ögel glares at Kaya. I thought I’d buried that report! And so much for any solidarity we may have generated together, he thinks. It’s straight back to the bad old days.
Aras is next: “I too can help. Lord El Pip has some advice for us from the British perspective. Let me quote him:
As I may have intimated previously, Turkish intelligence is probably just about up to taking on the Mafia (though not without cost as Luca Brasi found out) but against a proper intelligence agency it is badly out of its league. To be brutal any investment of leadership is a waste, get 10 spies at home plus a couple of reserves and then zero funding. The Italian OVRA are a very competent outfit, and I cannot see this ending well for Turkish Intelligence if they try to operate on their turf.
“Oh dear, that doesn’t sound too promising, does it?” Aras is a picture of false surprise and sympathy.
“To be fair,” says Bayar, “we did receive this from our Romanian contact, Rasa Urs 75: ‘Keep the spy-training at its current level until more leadership is available and the officer ratio reaches at least 120%. Italy as a target sounds well. They have plenty of navy and air force techs for us to steal.’ There Ögel, not all doom and gloom – some think the current espionage expenditure at least is justified.”
Ögel’s hopes lie in ruins. He looks to the President to see whether he will have any spy program left at all.
“I am persuaded that, for now, research and officer training must be our key focus,” says Inönü. “A spy force on the scale you seek is beyond our resources and of questionable value, Ögel. I will not axe the program completely, but for now will cut our investment in spy training by over half [ie to 0.10 LS]. We need the effort elsewhere. By all means, consider Italy as a future target, but such a decision won’t be required for some time.” Kaya and Aras both look quite pleased at this.
“And Aras, we can’t afford too much on diplomats for now, either,” continues the President. Aras’ face falls immediately, the smirk disappearing. “You have ten of them in reserve now, that is plenty for the time being. Your allocation will be cut to the same level as for Ögel’s spies[also 0.10, down from 0.16]. The savings from both of these reductions will go to fully funding seven research projects again, with the balance going to officer training. We can review all this in the future, if either diplomacy or espionage become a priority again.”
Well, thinks Ögel to himself, now my misery has some company – that smug bastard Aras copped one behind the ear that he wasn’t expecting. If only I can find some way of putting a dent in that snake Kaya’s self-satisfied hypocrisy.
Leadership allocations as ordered at the Cabinet meeting.
---xxx---
Item 3 – S.I.T.H. Objectives
“With that settled, we now move on to our final agenda item,” says Bayar. “Kaya, over to you.”
“We have a comparatively simple choice before us,” begins Kaya confidently. “The main effort for our ‘black ops’ agents is Italy, as we have all previously agreed. You have seen the choice we have been offered following the disappearance and presumed death of our valued operative, Luca Brasi. He was last seen entering a meeting with Bruno Tattaglia in Cagliari, Sardinia. Which is now under French occupation, of course. Ambassador (and Western Europe S.I.T.H. 'Station Chief') ‘Vito’ Ceylan advocates a slow and deliberate revenge. His son wants to ‘go to the mattresses’, as our Italian Mafia enemies would put it. Are there any views as to which approach we should take?”
A tee-shirt, produced by the Italian OVRA and distributed widely in Sicily and surreptitiously around the Balkan republics of the Glorious Union, is pinned to the wall - a reminder of the hubris of the Fascist-Mafia enemy and a clarion call for Turkish revenge.
“Our GRU friends are with Vito Ceylan on this,” says Ögel. “Long term revenge – served cold. Though I must say, Kaya, your reckless gamble with Brasi – an asset we shared and who was dearly valued by all here, especially our President and his ward Cennet – was careless in the extreme. We have lost one of our chief shared agents and for what? A little bit of information we didn’t really need. I think it was profligate. But, whatever your inept conduct here, I think revenge is justified, but not by hasty or wasteful means.” Ögel already feels a little better, as Kaya’s cocksure attitude is taken down a level. If he wants to throw crap at the fan, he should expect some to come flying back his way.
“Lord El Pip also argues for caution – the Italian OVRA needs to be respected, let alone the Mafia, who we now try to fight on their own turf,” offers Aras. “Our recent good work in Rome and the Vatican was one thing – Sicily itself is quite another. We have already seen what happens when trying to do that too hastily – and that was in supposedly neutral ground in Sardinia.” Ögel nods happily at this – Aras now sets his sights on bringing Kaya back to earth, as well.
“Are there any more comments on this matter?” asks Bayar, looking to wrap up the meeting, given no-one seems keen on doing anything rash so soon after the traumatic loss of the great Luca Brasi.
The Propaganda Department have come up with a counter to crass Italian taunts. The poster will be used in Foreign Intelligence and S.I.T.H. outposts overseas as a reminder that patience is a virtue.
“Just one more thing, Prime Minister. Perhaps we owe Kaya an apology,” says Ögel. Kaya looks calmed, though nonplussed for a moment. It doesn't last. “You know, reflecting on this recent episode, I can’t help but think the pressure of events and keeping track of all his domestic responsibilities as well as the international activities of S.I.T.H. is perhaps a little too unfair on our hard-working Interior Minister. It is our fault he has failed so abjectly in this way.” He looks over at Kaya with theatrically faux sympathy and concern. Kaya’s face begins to burn a bright red as his anger rises. “Indeed, it can’t be good for his apoplexy.” Kaya’s face proves the point more as every second passes; even more so when he starts to make alarming choking sounds.
“Yes,” continues Ögel, now enjoying himself. “I think this must have been what led to Kaya’s misjudgement in this matter and his inability to properly control his overseas agents. While I think of it, that is my primary area of expertise, after all. And I have today been left with far less to do than before, and many months before we are likely to have any conventional foreign intelligence action for me to supervise. I feel I could be contributing more.”
Ögel turns once more to Kaya, with a stagily solicitous look on his face. “I think the least I can do, Sükrü Kaya, in return for all the support you have given me, is to lighten your heavy load a little. Let me ease your burden. International espionage is my field, after all.” He turns back to face the head of the Cabinet table. “My President, Prime Minister; don’t you think it may be wisest to move S.I.T.H. to the full control of the Intelligence Bureau and make it a purely overseas body, now that we are at war? It doesn’t seem to make much sense having them serve two masters. Very inefficient. Rest assured, I will indeed take a slow, deliberate and well-planned approach to our justified revenge on the Italian Fascist-Mafia Complex.”
Kaya would reply, but is so apoplectic with rage that he is unable to muster any coherent words. Bayar looks to Inönü. Like Atatürk before him, the President knows well the value of keeping his subordinates in balance, angrier at each other than at him. Let them plot and manoeuvre against each other, he thinks sagely to himself. They can all both win and lose today – and Ögel’s points are actually logical, which is a happy coincidence.
“Yes, Sükrü Ali, I believe you are right. From today, you will take sole managing control over S.I.T.H. operations, which will be devoted entirely to aiding our foreign war effort. We will keep our focus on Italy and revenge: first on the Tattaglias, then on the Fascist Government itself. In time, you may be able to build the conventional spy network to the point we can use it in Italy – perhaps more for future subversion and sabotage than for industrial espionage, which isn’t so important now we have access to Soviet military technology. Make it careful and slow – they must really suffer when the blow finally falls. I would have them receive my earnest regards, with interest paid on what they have done to us.”
Bayar looks across to Kaya, who by now appears to be in need of medical attention.
---xxx---
“That ends a long and momentous meeting, gentlemen,” concludes the President. “Thank you for your frank and – ah – robust contributions today. Please also make our thanks known to all the advisers who have contributed their wisdom to our considerations. Now, our planners must turn our decisions into action on the ground. I will fly straight back to the front. Bayar, I again leave the day-to-day running of the Government in your capable hands. Please provide a redacted account of our deliberations today to the Council of Premiers of the Glorious Union. We will require their continued unqualified support for our mighty war effort. Good day to you all.”
With that, the meeting ends and each goes off to his assigned tasks. Or in Kaya’s case, for an aspirin and a lie-down.
---xxx---
Coming Up: The air phase of the Operation Rodos Devi will commence straight away: will it be as successful as that on Stampalia? Will the Italians send in fighters this time to contest the air battle? Will a land assault on the mountainous Rhodes even be feasible? Meanwhile, how quickly can a credible force be generated for Contingency Plan Orange? Will they be called in early to take advantage of any lapse in the defence of Hungary, especially if the Soviets deploy strong forces there? Can France last through the winter, or will all the opportunistic plans of the High Command be turned on their heads, with a hailstorm of German armour and air power hitting the Eastern Front while Hitler’s ‘Destiny Factor’ is still in force? Turkey will once again be subject to the delicate and uncertain balances around them and must be prepared to cope with both threat and opportunity at short notice, with more difficult decisions to be made in the near future.
