Chapter XLIX: The Politics of Pragmatism.
The confusion and chaos that immediately followed the failed Monarchist coup could, and indeed has, filled several books. While the many groups that rose and fell need not detain us in detail, it is worth noting the shear variety of these groups, the range ran from factory staff forming anarcho-syndicalist communes to ambitious, if deluded, local councils declaring their rule over entire regions. The vast majority of these groups had faded within weeks of the coup with one significant exception; Bilbao and the Basque country. Separated from the new Republican government in Valencia a combination of separatists, anarchists and communists ruled the area for much of the war, the ever changing name of the notional government reflecting which faction or factions were in the ascendancy. This parallel government severely complicated the problems faced by the Republicans by making co-ordination between the 'Northern Pocket', as it came to be known, and the rest of the rump state far more difficult than it should have been, a fact that contributed to the failure of several link-up offensives.
The fraught relations with the 'Northern Pocket' was only one of the problems facing the Republican government; Much of the army had joined the Monarchists, any army would have to be based on the leftist political militias and the para-military Guardia de Asalto (Assault Guards, the Spanish urban police force mainly drawn from ex-army personnel), financially the flight from Madrid had cut the government off from the country's gold reserves and it's financial capital and on the broader economic front most of the modern heavy industry in the country was either in the 'Northern Pocket' or under monarchist control. Worse the Popular Front was experiencing a second, far more subtle, bureaucratic coup as communists and revolution socialists began taking over key functions in the new government, either by ministerial appointment or stuffing the ministry with loyalists. This expansion was at the expense of the Popular Front political moderates, lacking the bargaining chips of an armed militia or mass membership they were a far easier target than the anarchists and trade unionists that made up the rest of the front. Two main groups to benefit were Largo Caballero's revolutionary wing of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) and the Partido Comunista de España (PCE, Communist Party of Spain) under José Díaz. The success of the PSOE was down to their larger numbers, strong links with the trade unions and the not inconsiderable charm of Caballero in converting much of the party to revolution. The PCE's success in gaining such power and influence despite small numbers was far simpler and down to one simple fact; money, specifically floods of Soviet money routed from Moscow via the Comintern to the PCE. These funds paid for propaganda and campaigning costs during the 1936 election and later for the bribes to ensure the best jobs went to PCE members or sympathisers. The wisdom of helping a group theoretically dedicated to abolishing money gain power because of bribery by that group is, perhaps, questionable, although the irony of the situation is beyond doubt. The strength of the PCE's position would only grow over the following months as the Soviet's commitment to the Republicans increased.
This massive financial support was the first tangible proof of Stalin's change of foreign policy to the west, a change that began in the aftermath of the British General Election of 1935. The problem was not the poor showing of the hard left parties, little was expected of the small if committed Communist Party of Great Britain and little was duly delivered, nor was the failure of Labour to make gains a cause for alarm, the fate of the heirs of Lenin's 'Useful idiots' was not a matter that bothered Stalin. The problem was far simpler; the rise of Churchill to Prime Minister represented another Great Power with a vehemently anti-communist leader, a worrying trend for a leader already highly paranoid and with considerable fears of being surrounded and attacked. It was therefore declared that the absolute priority of Soviet foreign policy had to be stopping any other significant nation electing anti-communist leaders, a priority which would be backed by the entire weight of the state. Piecing together the narrative it appears France was considered, incorrectly as it happened, primed for a Popular Front victory and therefore 'safe' while Spain was correctly believed to be marginal. The flow of funding began at the start of 1936 and waxed and waned in accordance with the international situation, slowing as Britain and France became distracted by South Africa, Italy and the Rhineland and peaking as those troubles were overcome and Léon Blum's Popular Front lost in France. In the aftermath of the coup this behind the scenes support became far more extensive and, unavoidably, far more public despite the Soviet Union maintaining an official stance of non-intervention. Although not the most numerous in terms of feet on the ground there is little doubting the importance of the intervention, both in terms of supply of weapons and the opportunity for the hard left parties to leverage the Soviet presence into disproportionate influence on the always shaky Republican government.
Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Foreign Minister and one of the behind the scenes architects of the Popular Front policy. The failure in France had been more than balanced by the success in Spain, particularly after Sarraut had acted so decisively in the Rhineland, the aim of Popular Front had been as much anti-fascists as pro-communist after all. The Monarchist coup had badly spooked the Soviets, rumours of the links between the Spanish right and Italy had reached as far as Moscow. This reaction only grew stronger as the German involvement became apparent and was the spur behind the increase in Soviet intervention.
The Soviet Union was far from the only country to intervene in the war, as the dust settled and it became apparent that the matter would not be quickly overcome many of the nations of Europe began taking a serious interest in Iberia. For the most part the interest was entirely commercial, the prospect of significant arms sales at a time of depression was enough to motivate many otherwise disinterested countries into action. Government export officials and arms salesmen, often the same person for the state owned firms, flooded into the country to hawk their wares, Dutch Fokker representatives rubbed shoulders with Belgians from Fabrique Nationale, the Czechs machine gun makers of Zbrojovka Brno and a dozen other national arm makers all chasing the same two buyers. These efforts were, initially at least, to be a disappointment to the salesmen and their political and corporate masters, the two factions had already agreed their respective sources of arms, although for completely different reasons. The Monarchists choice had been made for them, in a rare burst of complete agreement the British and German 'advisers' had declared that the only firms based in their countries would be acceptable. While this strained relations between the two sides it was not too serious an issue, especially as both nations made sure no firm took excessive advantage of the situation and offered mostly fair deals without skimping on quality or specification. Critically however there was an early stand-off by both sides, neither willing to sell their latest models to Spain to avoid tipping of the other, while this would relax as the conflict grew more serious it was always a factor in the availability of Monarchist arms and equipment.
The Republicans faced a more fundamental problem before deciding on supplier; how to pay for the arms in the first place. Separated from both the gold reserves and the hard currency holdings in the treasury their options were decidedly limited, payment in exported goods or credit purchases appeared to be the only short term possibilities. The need for these unconventional deals was a boon for the moderates, the requirement for presenting an 'acceptable face' (ie non-Communist) to the many suppliers and their governments kept President Azaña in office and the Foreign Ministry full of moderates, even as they were squeezed from the rest of government. Unsurprisingly the push for credit sales was mostly unsuccessful, the vast majority of arms firms were, and still are, unwilling to extend substantial credit to anyone, let alone a government in a civil war. The idea of credit sales was also far from popular with the Soviet Union's representatives, the communist state could always find uses for foreign hard currency whatever official ideology said about the evils of capitalism. However the idea was grudgingly accepted and arrangements were made for significant shipments, deposits paid for in exports and the balance on credit to be paid when Madrid was re-captured, something the Soviets were assured was top priority. Theses relatively generous terms did not make the deals particularly good however, far from it in fact, the shipments regularly arrived late, even allowing for the convoluted supply routes, and with far less ammunition than any European supplier would dream of providing. For all that though there were positive to the Soviet deals beyond the price; the communists militias received free equipment and training, 'observers' were sent who rapidly did far more than just watch and the 'volunteer' units who flocked to Spain were little more than cover for crews and training staff for the new tanks and aircraft.
The other significant supplier was somewhat surprising, and certainly due to the policy of maintaining the façade that the Popular Front was still in power; France. The news of the coup had come as a total shock to Sarraut and his government, while it was known in general terms the government was unpopular no-one in the Quai d'Orsay had predicted a coup and was consequently left somewhat flat footed. Initially the coup managed the previously unthinkable and united left and right, with both Léon Blum's Popular Front and Pierre-Étienne Flandin's Democratic Republican Alliance calling for immediate and active intervention in the war, sadly however they were calling for intervention on different sides; Blum naturally cleaving to the Spanish Popular Front while Flandin equally naturally favoured intervention on the Monarchist side. For Sarraut the choice was less obvious, following his parliamentary ally Flandin's lead would upset much of the Radicalist left and possibly lead to the fall of the government, while backing the Republicans would mean building a new coalition with Blum's Popular Front and hoping he didn't lose too many from the right of his party. This did of course presume intervention was the correct course of action, with French troops still occupying the Rhineland General Gamelin and the General Staff urged caution, if France became too heavily embroiled in Spain there was a great risk the Germans may take advantage of the overstretch, forcing the country into a two front war. With such considerations weighing heavily on Sarraut's mind there can be little doubt the revelation of German involvement in the coup came as something of a relief, transforming a complex strategic and political decision into a far simpler one. As news spread through the government Flandin rapidly changed sides, recoiling from the prospect of supporting the Germans and hurriedly converting to the Republican cause.
The revelation was also welcomed by General Gamelin who played it up for all it was worth, revelling in the proof that his staff's warnings had been correct, while neatly sidestepping the fact that his staff had also never suspected foreign involvement in Spain. Despite this the General Staff's stock was once again high, their opposition to the Rhineland operation was increasingly seen as foresighted not over-cautious, this recovery of reputation allowed them to effectively veto direct military intervention, not that this was entirely unpopular with the politicians. For all the bluster by politicians of both sides the words had been carefully chosen to never specify what sort of 'intervention' France should make, reflecting the continuing doubts over whether the electorate's rediscovered desire for 'Honour and Glory' would survive an actual battle, let alone suffering casualties. The shaky consensus also ruled out significant economic aid, with the depression still gripping France tightly none but the most committed could justify the vast cost of meaningful financial aid, a decision that extended to supply of free equipment. With options limited the government, supported in the main by the Popular Front, decided to exert pressure on arms firms to sell their wares at reduced rates, with the incentives of tax breaks and Popular Front pressure on the relevant unions not to strike for firms who agreed. As the deals were negotiated and it became clear the Republicans would try and pay with goods and raw materials, this assistance rapidly snowballed into government agents agreeing to assist with the assessment of the exports, providing an honest value for the cargoes guaranteed by the French government, at the cost of any over payment going straight to the treasury not the arms firm.
With the bulk of the French border in Monarchist hands, bar the area around the Northern Pocket, the Republican were forced to export by sea. As the railways had previously dominated the result was an explosion of activity in the ports along France's Mediterranean coast. This was just one of the many benefits to the French economy of intervention, although it would not be long before the downsides became all too apparent.
That the Deuxième Bureau (the Second Bureau of the General Staff, France's external military intelligence agency) also reported the British presence and suspected involvement was not acted upon at the time, frankly there were enough problems for France to deal with without a major row with a formerly close ally. However it would not be forgotten, especially by the Anglophobic 'Contintentalists' in the government, and would later become the catalyst for a major change in French foreign policy.