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In my evaluation, it honestly would not be possible for the French appanages to be tied more firmly into politics in Paris than they were in real life. They were major drivers of factional politics in Paris and there was even an entire civil war fought between them for control of the throne.

I also think it's important to not get too distracted with the "styling" of things. The appanages did work a bit differently from just really powerful magnates, but in my opinion they definitely should not be considered states.
I wonder if the best approach is a... rather convoluted thing involving creating a "cadet branch" building-based country ruled by the person with the nominal title, holding the actual land associated with that title under PU (where the land itself is, naturally, subject to the throne), and then a whole hell of a bunch of targeted actions and the like so that those families can properly interact with the throne.

But maybe I'm making things too complicated.
 
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I wonder if the best approach is a... rather convoluted thing involving creating a "cadet branch" building-based country ruled by the person with the nominal title, holding the actual land associated with that title under PU (where the land itself is, naturally, subject to the throne), and then a whole hell of a bunch of targeted actions and the like so that those families can properly interact with the throne.

But maybe I'm making things too complicated.
I remember someone (might even have been you) proposed that governors should be represented with buildings, the more I think about it, I think that approach might actually work well enough. So I do like the idea of using a similar solution here, since I feel like these two things are reasonably similar (in the way the game struggles to represent them, that is). And come to think of it, this might even work for powerful magnate families too. I'm not sure though, it might not really solve the problem since building-based tags are still their own tags.
 
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I remember someone (might even have been you) proposed that governors should be represented with buildings, the more I think about it, I think that approach might actually work well enough. So I do like the idea of using a similar solution here, since I feel like these two things are reasonably similar (in the way the game struggles to represent them, that is). And come to think of it, this might even work for powerful magnate families too. I'm not sure though, it might not really solve the problem since building-based tags are still their own tags.
Governors as countries seems like it'd be a problem since it breaks the one tenant that all countries (no matter the type) have in common: they're in charge of their own succession. You are right, though, that noble families as building-based countries still suffers from the fact that they're still separate countries. Then again, it's also rather evident that characters by themselves have no agency and exist entirely to be used in the base game. Like... you can assign them to things like general or cabinet member or marry them off and that's about it.

Maybe spinning out noble families into building-based countries is the way to give them agency?
 
Governors as countries seems like it'd be a problem since it breaks the one tenant that all countries (no matter the type) have in common: they're in charge of their own succession.
Is that really a thing? Did the devs say that somewhere?
 
Then again, it's also rather evident that characters by themselves have no agency and exist entirely to be used in the base game. Like... you can assign them to things like general or cabinet member or marry them off and that's about it.
Yeah, it's extremely disappointing to me that the game isn't really interested in simulating internal politics and the cabinet system pretty much exists for no other reason than to mechanically replace mana.
 
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No, but it seems apparent to me that it's the standard. It also makes the most sense to be the standard.
Doesn't really make much sense to me, this terribly limits how well the game can simulate sub-state political entities.
 
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Would it make sense for the Kurdish statelets, should the Khanate collapse, have an International Organization to simulate their tendency towards collective allegiance and resistance?

If not, what would better suit their situation?
 
Would it make sense for the Kurdish statelets, should the Khanate collapse, have an International Organization to simulate their tendency towards collective allegiance and resistance?

If not, what would better suit their situation?
Anything collective only happened much later. Back then, they very much would side with whatever state would put them in a position of power; why do you think they would switch sides between the Ottomans and Safavids depending on who gave them a leg up, or join up with the Aq Qoyunlu and Qara Qoyunlu, and so on?
 
Anything collective only happened much later. Back then, they very much would side with whatever state would put them in a position of power; why do you think they would switch sides between the Ottomans and Safavids depending on who gave them a leg up, or join up with the Aq Qoyunlu and Qara Qoyunlu, and so on?
I feel like the reason these statelets were so persistent is found elsewhere. It seems to me that small principalities and communities like these that exist in the mountains tend to live for a long time even in the shadow of larger empires, with the Chinese Tusi being another good example of this, as well as various polities on the Indian side of the Himalayas, and various tribes in the vicinity of what would become Montengro. You could even argue it also applies to city-states. I'm not sure if it makes sense to say that they're just hard to conquer, since they often became vassals of larger states. Does it make sense to say that they're hard to bureaucratically incorporate even when you can achieve military superiority over them, because of their remote locations, different culture, deep connection to the land they rule, or long tradition of not being directly ruled by larger powers? Or do we just think that their remote locations enable them to engage in guerrilla warfare that makes it really difficult to make conquests "stick" even if you can march an army over there and defeat resistance, since your army have to leave again after that due to the poor local supply? I feel like it might be some combination of those. But whatever it is, I am certain that eu4 fails to represent it properly and I'm worried this game will have the same problem.
 
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I feel like the reason these statelets were so persistent is found elsewhere. It seems to me that small principalities and communities like these that exist in the mountains tend to live for a long time even in the shadow of larger empires, with the Chinese Tusi being another good example of this, as well as various polities on the Indian side of the Himalayas, and various tribes in the vicinity of what would become Montengro. You could even argue it also applies to city-states. I'm not sure if it makes sense to say that they're just hard to conquer, since they often became vassals of larger states. Does it make sense to say that they're hard to bureaucratically incorporate even when you can achieve military superiority over them, because of their remote locations, different culture, deep connection to the land they rule, or long tradition of not being directly ruled by larger powers? Or do we just think that their remote locations enable them to engage in guerrilla warfare that makes it really difficult to make conquests "stick" even if you can march an army over there and defeat resistance, since your army have to leave again after that due to the poor local supply? I feel like it might be some combination of those. But whatever it is, I am certain that eu4 fails to represent it properly and I'm worried this game will have the same problem.
My answer was more in reference to the idea of the Kurdish principalities acting collectively: they very much did not. Also keep in mind for Kurdistan in particular that, historically speaking, it oftentimes was ruled over by a singular polity without the emergence of individual tribes as any sort of significant force. There's something to be said that it's not so much that states couldn't rule these areas, but simply didn't care to. So long as they were surrounded by states in which direct ownership held no strategic or economic value, they were unlikely to be conquered. The reason why many were simply left with a lot of autonomy at the fringes of an empire were for exactly that: they were at the fringes, where preserving that autonomy worked well to the ends of the state as to create a buffer zone at the frontier. For Kurdistan again, note that the tribes were in many ways incorporated into the Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu which ruled on both sides of the Zagros as well as throughout the rest of Kurdistan.

After all, we're looking back at history with the perspective of survivorship bias.
 
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Anything collective only happened much later. Back then, they very much would side with whatever state would put them in a position of power; why do you think they would switch sides between the Ottomans and Safavids depending on who gave them a leg up, or join up with the Aq Qoyunlu and Qara Qoyunlu, and so on?

I don't understand the connection between the two sentences. Did the statelets frequently end up divided between the Ottomans and the Safavids? Because I didn't think that was the case.

My answer was more in reference to the idea of the Kurdish principalities acting collectively: they very much did not. Also keep in mind for Kurdistan in particular that, historically speaking, it oftentimes was ruled over by a singular polity without the emergence of individual tribes as any sort of significant force. There's something to be said that it's not so much that states couldn't rule these areas, but simply didn't care to. So long as they were surrounded by states in which direct ownership held no strategic or economic value, they were unlikely to be conquered. The reason why many were simply left with a lot of autonomy at the fringes of an empire were for exactly that: they were at the fringes, where preserving that autonomy worked well to the ends of the state as to create a buffer zone at the frontier. For Kurdistan again, note that the tribes were in many ways incorporated into the Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu which ruled on both sides of the Zagros as well as throughout the rest of Kurdistan.

After all, we're looking back at history with the perspective of survivorship bias.
I'm confused by the causal link between sentences here too. Is there a connection between "Kurdistan was often ruled by one polity" and "states didn't want to rule these areas"?
 
My answer was more in reference to the idea of the Kurdish principalities acting collectively: they very much did not. Also keep in mind for Kurdistan in particular that, historically speaking, it oftentimes was ruled over by a singular polity without the emergence of individual tribes as any sort of significant force. There's something to be said that it's not so much that states couldn't rule these areas, but simply didn't care to. So long as they were surrounded by states in which direct ownership held no strategic or economic value, they were unlikely to be conquered. The reason why many were simply left with a lot of autonomy at the fringes of an empire were for exactly that: they were at the fringes, where preserving that autonomy worked well to the ends of the state as to create a buffer zone at the frontier. For Kurdistan again, note that the tribes were in many ways incorporated into the Qara Qoyunlu and Aq Qoyunlu which ruled on both sides of the Zagros as well as throughout the rest of Kurdistan.

After all, we're looking back at history with the perspective of survivorship bias.
What does "buffer zone" mean exactly? Can EU5 actually represent that?
 
Population of Georgia


I didn't write about this in my main suggestion post on the first page or in the old thread, since it's such a contentious topic, but I can't keep ignoring the issue forever, so here goes:

The subject of Georgia's historical demography is widely debated, both in Georgian scholarly circles and by foreign historians. However, this is most often only in the context of ethnic-linguistic boundaries and religious divisions in parts of Georgia like Abkhazia, Tao-Klarjeti, Inner Kartli, and Hereti.

Unfortunately, not much thought is given to the population of Georgia as a whole. When searching for material about this matter, the only literature I could find were nearly 100-year-old observations by Ivane Javakhishvili and some works about regional censuses in the 18th century.

Regarding the time frame in question, the singular source we can use to determine the population of the kingdom is the widely cited, but barely understood, Mongol census of 1254. According to Roin Metreveli in "The Cambridge History of the Mongol Empire":

The Georgian source (Zamtaaghmtsereli) stresses that from the 1250s the Mongols began to introduce order into the taxation system. They attempted to determine the scale of income the subordinated countries could give and the number of troops they could supply. To this end the Mongols conducted a census in their dominions (evidence on this is also found in the Armenian historians Kirakos Ganjaketsi, Grigor Aknertsi, and Vardan Areweltsi). The census was conducted in 1254, under Möngke Qa’an (r. 1251–1259), and directed by his governor Argun Aqa: “the whole population of David’s kingdom was in great distress. And lists of everything were made, starting with people and ending with beasts, from fields to vineyards, and from orchards to vegetable gardens. And from every nine well-off peasants they took one for military service.” By this rule, the Gurjistan Vilayet had to supply 90,000 warriors.

This number of "90,000 men per every 9 families" has been interpreted differently by different authors, and depending on their background, have been transformed into population estimates of varying accuracy. The real issue lies in estimating family sizes in that time frame.

Donald Rayfield, one of the most renowned and respected Kartvelologists, in his "Edge of empires" suggests a number of 2,5 million inhabitants in Georgia, a rather conservative estimate:

"Worst of all was qalani, or conscription, which, after the 1254 census, was set at one soldier per nine registered male householders. (The Georgian army could field 90,000 men, which puts the population of Georgia and Christian Armenia then at around two and a half million.)"

Ivane Javakhishvili, "the father of Georgian historiography", places the number as high as 5 million, according to Mzia Shelia in "Ivane Javakhishvili’s Contribution to the Formation and Development of Demographic Science in Georgia":

"Despite this difficulty, Iv. Javakhishvili was the person who attempted, for the first time, to determine the number of the population of Georgia in the 13th century. According to his estimation based on the population census carried out by the Mongols in 1254, “there must have been at least 5
million inhabitants in the Kingdom of Georgia at that time. This number, of course, included not only Georgians, but also representatives of other nationalities who belonged to Georgia. It can be seen from these reports, how dense the population was in Georgia at that time, despite the fact that the country had already experienced the horrors of two invasions by Jalaleddin and Genghis Khan, which resulted in a quite large number of casualties”


Georgia Mongol division.png
Above: the Mongol division of Georgia into administrative units, between 1245-47


According to me, a literal who, I think the truth lies somewhere between those two estimates. Considering the fact that under Giorgi V the extortionate nature of Mongol taxation ceased, and taxation/tribute was no longer paid at all since 1330, we can say that population growth definitely began to recover in ~1320 at the latest. Hence, considering everything stated above, I think a population of 2,5-3 million pops in Georgia would be best.

Some other notes:

  • Primarily increase the number of rural settlements/pops: even at the height of Georgia's golden age, it's believed that 90% of the population was still rural. The sizes of cities as per the old thread are mostly fine (though Akhaltsikhe and "Sukhumi" are arguably too small).
  • Increase the population in Tao-Klarjeti (province of Meskheti): one of the key reasons as to why Samtskhe succeeded in establishing peace and prosperity within its borders was due to its geographic location, being far from the steppes of Azerbaijan or inner Anatolia (in many ways mirroring the success of the Kingdom of the Iberians). Hence, I think its population should be more numerous than it currently is.
  • Development: it's mostly fine, though I would, again, increase it slightly in the province of Meskheti, along with parts of coastal western Georgia, primarily in "Sukhumi" (which should be renamed to Tskhumi).

Population 2.pngPopulation.pngDevelopment.png
 
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According to me, a literal who, I think the truth lies somewhere between those two estimates. Considering the fact that under Giorgi V the extortionate nature of Mongol taxation ceased, and taxation/tribute was no longer paid at all since 1330, we can say that population growth definitely began to recover in ~1320 at the latest. Hence, considering everything stated above, I think a population of 2,5-3 million pops in Georgia would be best.



By this, is it 2.5-3 million pops in Georgia, or the Georgian kingdom as described in the accounts, IE, Georgia & Armenia? Those two could be easily mistaken.

Comparing those numbers to the current in-game map, it is far more than Transoxiana or Iraq, or almost as much as Iran.


 
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By this, is it 2.5-3 million pops in Georgia, or the Georgian kingdom as described in the accounts, IE, Georgia & Armenia? Those two could be easily mistaken.


The Georgian kingdom as a whole, of course. In other words, Georgia, which also includes parts of modern Armenia.

It would be ridiculous to argue about how many of these 2,5-3 million people were Georgian or Armenian, I feel. My post is 100% based on conjecture anyway.

Either way, nobles in Georgia couldn't care less whether their peasants spoke Georgian or Armenian. This is the 14th century we're talking about - far be it for me to impose a 19th century, revisionist, nationalist, view on that.
 
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Maybe this research by Alexander Akopyan will be more helpful.

ILKHANS and ISHKHANS.
coins of the Armenian principalities of the period of decline
of the Khulaguid State (737–759 AH / 1336–1358)
The text in the link below is in Russian
Zrzut ekranu 2025-04-17 172400.png

I. In the Ani Principality, gold, silver and copper coins were minted by Shahanshah III Zakaryan (740s-759/1340s-1358) in Ani (on coins أني Ani بأني "in Ani", or that is, crude آني Ani) on behalf of the Ilkhans and Jochid khans, as well as anonymous types of Ashraf Chobanid and Akhichuk. Also in the Ani Principality, coins were minted in Yerevan (on coins ایروان or ايريوان on behalf of Suleiman and Anushirvan of the Hulaguids.
It is significant that the second mint in the principality was Yerevan, considered a small settlement at that time, and not the second most important fortress of Bjni. Its choice was apparently due to its advantageous location at the intersection of trade routes from Ani through Nakhichevan to Adarbaijan and the road to the north to Kura and Tiflis73.


II, III. In the Proshyan (Khalbakyan) principality, coins were minted by Amir-Hasan II (717-752/1317-1351) in the central fortress of the principality of Garni (on coins كرني on behalf of Suleiman (2) and Anushirvan. In the Vachutyan principality, coins were minted in the main fortress of Karbi (on coins كاربي or قاربي - first by the Kurdish prince the Great Amberdtsi
729 c. 740 / 1329 - c. 1340) on behalf of Muhammad and Satibek, and then by his son Theodoros-Cherkin (c. 740 – 751 / c. 1340 - 1350) in 741 AH (on behalf of Suleiman (including the gold dinar) and Anushirvan (?)).
 
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I don't understand the connection between the two sentences. Did the statelets frequently end up divided between the Ottomans and the Safavids? Because I didn't think that was the case.
What, the various Kurdish tribes? They absolutely did pick sides between the Ottomans and Safavids and depending on how things went would switch sides to the other.
I'm confused by the causal link between sentences here too. Is there a connection between "Kurdistan was often ruled by one polity" and "states didn't want to rule these areas"?
My point is that it depends on the broader geopolitical context. These places weren't inherently unrulable; rather, it depends on whether any particular state at any particular time happens to actually want to rule there. The fact that there were plenty of states that did rule over Kurdistan directly indicates that it wasn't some magical property of the land or its people that led to its decentralized/local rule nature in the era of this game's timeframe, but rather a consequence of its geopolitical circumstances sandwiched between the Ottomans and Safavids.
What does "buffer zone" mean exactly? Can EU5 actually represent that?
Basically... when you have a land border between you and a significant hostile power, you generally want to have some number of subject or independent states between you and that significant hostile power. If the game uses the raiding model I described, it makes this sort of thing much more natural because said raids would be against those subjects of yours rather than you directly and that those states can self-mobilize to defend against those raids rather than you needing to send an army yourself. Additionally, since those territories directly between you and a significant hostile power are the most likely to bear the brunt of the conflict between you and them (after all, wars between you and them will mostly be fought on that frontier), they'll be the ones bearing the brunt of those conflicts. This makes them, generally speaking, economically undesirable. Hence, there's not really much to be gained by investing into those locations for anything other than defense; better to leave their administration to the locals.

If you throw in my proposed split of control and authority, these locations by sheer virtue of being on "the frontier" (that is, adjacent to locations owned by a hostile foreign power) will naturally have lower control. Coupled with the low authority by virtue of distance to the capital, means that they have both low authority and low control and consequently make an easy case for "locations best ruled through vassals".
 
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One small note I would add, is that the lowlands of Shaki likely held a minggan or less worth of Oirats/Mongols, as Shaki was ruled by the Arlat clan under the Georgians at this time.

This is likely as the great fortification against the Golden Horde was situated there and had an Oirat/Mongol officer corps. Only way I could explain why Sidi Ahmed, an Oirat of the Arlat tribe would rule there.
Ah yes, absolutely right — I had completely forgotten about that. I’d also like to suggest a few revisions to the Aramenian's map: in the regions north of the Kura River, particularly in Shaki and Baku, the Azeri culture was not very prominent during this period, unlike the Mongols who settled in the lowlands. In the Arran region as well, Mongols were far more numerous than Turks, mostly residing in large cities such as Ganja and Barda. However, the Udi people still made up the majority of the population in those areas.
As mentioned in previous comments, Turkic tribes only began settling these regions in large numbers during the Safavid period—under Shah Ismail I "Khatai" (as I mentioned earlier, the source on this is highly unreliable, since he directly controlled Shirvan only from 1501 to 1502; for the rest of the time Shirvan paid tribute to the Safavids but remained under the Derbendi dynasty and conducted its own policies with little interference) and later under Shah Abbas I, during whose reign large-scale resettlements of Turkic tribes deeper into Shirvan truly began.
 
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